On the eve of the 2500th Anniversary of Lord Mahāvīra:

JAINISM
IN
BUDDHIST LITERATURE

By

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
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JAINISM in Buddhist Litera

To
My uncle, a great social worker,
Who Made me What I am.



LATE SHRI SHAH DEEPCHAND
JAIN NAHAR
Katara, Sagar. M. P.

FOREWORD

[By Dr. H. L. Jain, Formerly, Director, Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Prākrit, Jainology and Ahiṁsā Vaishali, Bihar, and Professor and Head of Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākrit Department, University of Jabalpur, India.]

Jainism and Buddhism alike held Non-violence as a supreme virtue and laid emphasis on celibacy and renunciation. They likewise condemned animal sacrifices, preached kindness to all creatures, big or small, and strove, not for worldly prosperity and happiness, but for absolute release from the cycle of birth and death through the goal of Salvation, Mokṣa or Nirvāṇa. Both the Prophets, Mahāvīra and Buddha, were Kṣatriya princes of Eastern India, and both renounced their kingdom for a life of asceticism, attained perfect knowledge through meditation and preached to the people the way to peace. Their career was spent for the most part in the province of Bihar where they were both born and died. Jina, Buddha and Śramaṇa were their interchangeable titles, and many proper names such as Siddhārtha, Gautama and Kāśyapa were common in their hierarchies.

These and many other common features misled the earlier Western historians, such as Elphinston to propound the view that Jainism was no more than an offshoot or school of Buddhism which had very wide ramifications in Asia and a much greater circle of followers in ancient India itself. This opinion, however, underwent a radical change, when scholars like Jacobi and Hoernle studied the Jaina and Buddhist systems more closely and analysed dispassionately the facts revealed by the ancient texts of the two systems

of thought. It was then established beyond dispute that Jainism was not only independent of Buddhism, but it was older of the two in its origin and development, and it was preached more than two centuries earlier than Mahāvīra by Pārśva whose followers had continued to maintain their identity and religious propaganda all through the period, so that the parents of Mahāvīra, and probably of Buddha also, belonged to that faith. The name of Buddha's father Śuddhodana is in itself a testimony that he was a pure vegetarian, a rice consumer, implying there by that *Ahiṁsā* was his creed.

Opinion is also unanimous that the two Prophets were contemporary. But, for how long, who was senior of the two and who attained *Nirvāṇa* earlier, are disputed questions. Among various calculations and theories about Buddha's Nirvāṇa, the two deserve particular attention. One is the reference in Ceylonese Chronicles, according to which Buddha achieved salvation in 544 B. C. The second evidence is provided by the Chinese dotted Records which go to prove that the event took place in 487 B. C. This evidence is also in accord with an earlier Simhalese tradition. As against this, there is only one stable tradition about Mahāvīra's *Nirvāṇa* that it took place 470 years before Vikrama and 605 years before Śaka i. e. 527 B. C. There is plenty of literary and epigraphic evidence to support this, and what is claimed to militate against this has been again and again proved to be based on an error or preconceived notions. There are frequent references in the Pāli literature of the Buddhists themselves that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta i. e. Mahāvīra was one of those six *Tīrthaṅkaras* or teachers who were senior to Buddha and were sufficiently famous and popular to be consulted by the contemporary monarch Ajātaśatru on matters of religion and philosophy, before Buddha could be thought of for the purpose. Not only this, but it has also been clearly stated that when the news of Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa reached the ears of Buddha, the latter thought it fit to

summon all his followers together and warned them against any schismatic tendencies after his death, as was allegedly happening in the case of Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa. To ignore these facts as erroneous, because they run counter to one's own fanciful theories and calculations, is not rational and logical.

Doubts and debates apart, there is no denying the fact that Mahāvīra and Buddha had a contemporaneity of more than two decades, preaching in the same localitis and finding some of their followers changing allegiance from one to the other teacher even more than once. This, taken into account with the fact that they both belonged to an earlier phase of the Śramaṇa ideology, would naturally lead us to expect a large amount of similarity in the teachings of the two systems and numerous references to one another in their literature. This is more so in the Buddhist works than in the Jaina, presumably because the younger were more envious of their seniors than vice versa. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the known Jaina canonical works assumed their present shape much later than their Buddhist counter-parts. Hence, whatever historical, philosophical or religious references to Jainism are found therein, they are of great importance, not only for both the systems of thought but for the cultural history of India as a whole.

This is what has been thoroughly studied by the author of the present book, Dr. Bhagchandra Jain. He is by birth and faith a Jaina and a Buddhist scholar by choice. He has not only dived deep into Buddhist literature, but also stayed long and travelled widely in Ceylon, collecting sifting, selecting and classifying his data. The book "Jainism in Buddhist Literature" was originally submitted as a thesis for a Doctor Degree, and its acceptance for the same in a Ceylon University was a strong evidence of the fact that it withstood well the scrutiny of a team of specialists. Still Dr. Bhagchandra did not think it fit to project his thesis into publicity imme-

diately after receiving his Doctorate. He allowed it, as well as himself, to ripen with age and experience, while he engaged himself in teaching Pāli and Prākrit at the University of Nagpur. He has put his finger, not only on all the direct references to Mahāvīra and his teachings, but also on all those ideas and practices which appeared to have a common basis. The wealth of information stored in this book, the scholarly marshalling of well authenticated facts, penetrating judgement, systematic exposition and balanced conclusions make the book indispensable for all lovers of Indian culture as well as for those who wish to undertake any kind of study or research work in the field.

I congratulate the author and bestow my best blessings on the young scholar from whom I have reason to expect further contributions to our knowledge on a subject which, in its own way, is of deep interest and supreme importance in the domain of Oriental Classical Studies.

Balaghat, M. P. **Hira Lal Jain**
1-3-1972.

PREFACE

Nearely a hundred years ago, Weber, on the basis of some superficial similarities, came to the conclusion that Jainism was an off-shoot of Buddhism. In 1884 Jacobi corrected this view and with a thorough investigation into the historical and traditional records of the two religions, established the fact that Jainism was an earlier and independent religion of India. Although over eighty years have passed since Jacobi's researches, the much-needed comparative study of Jainism and Buddhism has not been undertaken seriously. There have been passing references to their contemporaniety and doctrinal dissimilarities as well as the role they played together as a revolutionary opposition to Vedic Brāhmaṇa. The reason for the long delay in attempting a deeper study can easily be understood. The Buddhist literary and Philosophical works are in Pāli and Sanskrit while the Jaina records are in Prākrit and Sanskrit. Neither in India nor in Ceylon do we find many scholars who had the opportunity of acquiring competence in all the three languages, Apart from the linguistic equipment, there is the more difficult problem of understanding fully the religious, philosophical, ethical, and epistemological naunces of both religions. An adherent of Jainism or Buddhism knows his religion only; but for comparative studies, a thorough grasp of botha is *sine qua non.*

My early studies gave me an opportunity to acquire an adequate knowledge of Sanskrit, Pāli, Prākrit, Philosophy and Ancient Indian History and culture and Archaeology. While studying for my M. A. in Pāli I went through many Buddhistic texts. But these, in themselves, could not have given me the requisite qualification to handle a subject like Jainism in Buddhist literature.

When I was awarded the Commonwealth Scholarship for study in Ceylon and admitted to Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, I felt that I could undertake a comparative study between Jainism and Buddhism more successfully. I was provided with the most suitable environment and facilities for

this work. As a Jain I was conversant with my own religion and Vidyodaya, being a revered seat of Buddhist learning, the venerable scholar-monks who guided me in my researches knew all about Buddhism. This, indeed, is a very rare opportunity for one who wants to study Buddhism. That is why I did not mind giving up half-way the work, I was doing at Benares Hindu University as a University Grant Commission Scholar, on the Saddhamapuṇḍarīka.

This thesis represents only the beginning of a series of comparative studies which should be undertaken in the field of Buddhism and Jainism. My attempt is to trace the references to Jainism in Buddhist literature and to evaluate the information contained therein. It has been my intention to find out the degree of accuracy and completeness with which the Buddhist literature has recorded various dogmas and teachings of Jainism.

The method addopted by me has been to examine the data in the Tipiṭaka, the Pāli Non-Canonical literature and Sanskril philosophical works in that order. I have utlized the original texts in Pāli and Sanskrit as far as possible. Where similarities or original Jaina versions of any doctrinal point were observed, the Jaina works in Ardhamāgadhi and Śauraseni Prākrits and Sanskrit were used.

One observation has to be made at this stage on the scope of the research I had undertaken. Contrary to the general belief, the data on Jainism available in Buddhist Literature are very meagre. Though contemporaneous, the Buddhist records have only made scanty references to both Jainism and its Tirthaṅkara or Tirthaṅkaras. These references are distributed all ever the voluminous literature and the search for them has been a very arduous task whose magnitude and difficulty may not be very clear to an ordinary reader of these chapters.

My indebtedness to previous authors and translations of the Pāli, Prākrit, and Sanskrit literature has been duly acknowledged in the references and the bibliography.

Acknowledgements

At the end it is my pleasant duty to acknowledge the help that I have received from various quarters. It is with gratitude that I record my sincere appreciation of all the assistance I received from the Government of India which selected me for this scholarship, and the Government of Ceylon and the authorities of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon who very kindly awarded the scholarship to me and made all arrangements for not only studies but also a very happy sojourn in this beautiful Island.

I am very grateful to my teacher and guide Ven. Balangoda Ananda Maitreya, D. Litt., Professor of Theravāda Buddhism and Dean of the Faculty of Buddhism, Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, who supervised my studies and ven. late Dr. Palannoruwe Wimaladhamma Nayaka Thero, D. Litt., then Vice Chancellor, the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon who too, gave me much encouragement and very valuable suggestions.

I am highly grateful to Dr. Hira Lal Jain, Formerly Director, Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Prākrit, Jainology and Ahiṁsā, Vaishali, Bihar, and Professor and Head of Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākrit Department, University of Jabalpur, India who encouraged me from time to time and blessed this work with his valuable *Foreword*.

I am gratefully recollect the valuable help received from Dr. Ananda W. P. Guruge, formerly Professor of Sanskrit, Vīdyodaya University of Ceylon and the Senior Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Education, Government of Ceylon and at present UNESCO Expert and Professor of Educational Planning, who inspite of his busy official schedule extended all the possible help in completing my work. He went critically through the thesis before it was submitted to the University. In fact, it was to a great extent due to him that my stay in Ceylon became comfortable and purposeful.

I am also indebted to Dr. A. N. Upadhye, Professor and Head of the Department of Jainology and Prakrit, Mysore University, who helped me in every possible way in the completion of the work. He responded to my letters and queries without delay from Kolhapur while I was in Ceylon.

I am also grateful to my brother Dr. Ajaya Mitra Shastri, Reader in Ancient Indian History, culture and Archaeology, Nagpur University, who willingly went through the entire manuscript critically and made a number of valuable suggestions for better presentation. He has always been a sourcc of encouragement to my studies.

I shall fail in my duty if I do not express my gratitude to my teacher Dr. N. H. Samtani Department of Sanskrit and Pāli, Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi who suggested me to apply for the Commonwealth Scholarship for which I was fortunately selected. I am further indebted to him for the willing help he extended to me in various ways.

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Mr. H. Gunasekera, then Registrar of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, Mr. E. H. Disanayake, then Deputy Registrar (Administration) and Mr. P. Abeseker, then Assistant Registrar (Administration) who helped me in many ways.

I will be failing in my duty if I fail to express my gratitude to the, Librarians of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, Vidyalankara University of Ceylon, Archaeological Department and the Public Library, Colombo, Ganesha jain Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Library, Sagar, Pārśvanātha Vidyāshrama Library, Varanasi, Syādvāda Mahāvidyālaya Library Varanasi, and Librarians of Benares Hindu University and Nagpur University who went out of their way to assist me in getting the books and journals I needed for my work.

Last but not the least, my grateful thanks go to my uncle, Shah Deep Chandra Jain Nahar and my brother, Duli Chandra Jain Nahar, Katara, Sagar, M. P. for the encouragement they gave me in my studies and the security they provided for my mother and wife during my sojourn in Ceylon. Without their kindness and generosity I could never have had the education which enabled me to undertake this work. To my mother Smt. Tulsadevi Jain and my wife, Smt. Pushpa lata Jain M. A. I am extremely grateful for the many sacrifices they have made to help me achieve my ambition of bringing about a better understanding of the mutual dependence of Jainism and Buddhism and of the timely role these two great religions of India can play in bringing about peace and well-being to humanity.

I am also grateful to Shri Prof. Sudhakar Pandeya, M. P. and the authorities of the Nāgarī Prachāriṇī Sabhā, Varanasi and Shri Sharad Kumar Sadhak for the help in the printing of the book. I am also thankful to my friend Shri Prof. B. V. Mohril who prepared the index of the work.

ABREVIATIONS

A	Anguttara Nikāya.
AA.	Anguttara Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā, i. e. Manorathapūraṇī.
AP.	Apadāna.
APT.	Anekānta Praveśa Ṭikā.
AS.	Amitagati Śrāvakācāra.
ASI.	Archaeological Survey of India.
BU.	Buddhavaṃsa.
ChāUP.	Chāndogyopaniṣada.
D.	Dīgha Nikāya.
DA.	Dīgha Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā, i. e. Sumangala Vilāsinī.
DHA.	Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā.
DHP.	*Dhammapada.*
DPPN.	Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names.
DS.	Dravya Saṅgraha.
DSV.	Dravya Saṅgraha Vṛtti.
EC.	Epigraphia Carnatika.
EI.	Epigraphia Indica.
ERE.	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
HBT.	Hetu Bindu Ṭikā.
HBTA.	Hetu Bindu Ṭikāloka.
IA.	Indian Antiquary.
IHQ.	Indian Historical Quarterly.
J.	Jātaka.
JA.	Jaina Antiquary.
JBORS.	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.
JPTS.	Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JRAS.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
LT.	Laghīyastraya.
M.	Majjhima Nikāya.
MA.	Majjhima Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā, i. e. Papañcasūdanī.

MHV.	Mahāvaṃsa.
MK.	Mādhyamika Kārikā.
NKC.	Nyāya Kumuda Candra.
NM.	Nyāya Mañjarī.
NS.	Niyamasāra.
NV.	Nyāya Viniścaya.
NVV.	Nyāya Viniścaya Vivaraṇa.
PK.	Pañcāstikāyasāra.
PKM.	Prameya Kamala Mārtaṇḍa.
PM.	Pramāṇa Mīmāṁsā.
PMU.	Parīkṣāmukha.
PSU.	Puruṣārtha Siddhyupāya
PTS.	Pāli Text Society.
PV.	Pramāṇa Vārtika.
PVA.	Pramāṇa Vārtikālaṅkāra.
PVST.	Pramāṇa Vārtika Svavṛtti Ṭīkā.
S.	Saṃyutta Nikāya.
SA.	Saṃyutta Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā, i. e. Sāratthappakāsinī.
SBE.	Sacred Books of the East.
SBJ.	Sacred Books of the Jainas.
SN.	Sutta Nipāta.
SNA.	Sutta Nipāta Atthakathā, i. e. Paramattha Jotikā.
SS.	Sarvārtha Siddhi.
STP.	Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa.
Sūkṛ.	Sūtrakṛtāṅga.
TS.	Tattva Saṅgraha.
TSP.	Tattva Sangraha Pañjikā.
TSū.	Tattvārtha Sūtra.
TSūBh.	Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāṣya.
TV.	Tattvārtha Vārtika.
V.	Vinaya Piṭaka.
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CONTENTS

Antiquity of Śramaṇ System

Sixth Century B.C.

The Brāhmaṇas were dominant in society during the period of the Nigaṇtha Nātaputta and the Buddha. Their ritualism was represented by the priest who "vigorously claimed that the welfare and, indeed, the very existence of the world, including even the gods, depended upon the maintenance of their systems of sacrifice, which grew to immense size and complexity."[1] Their "rites and ceremonies multiplied and absorbed man's mind to a degree unparalleled in the history of the world and literature occupied itself with the description or discussion of the dreary ceremonial."[2]

Vedic System

The Brāhmaṇical religious system had its beginning in early Vedic literature. The term Brāhmaṇa is derived from the root *bṛh* to grow, expand, evolve, develop, swell the spirit or soul.[3] The priests, who were the custodians of such prayers, assumed a very high degree of spiritual supremacy in Vedic society and were considered to be the very progeny of Prajāpati, the creator - God (*Brāhmaṇo viprasya Prajāpatervā apatymiti Brāhmaṇo*). For the sole purpose of preserving spiritual leadership the Brāhmaṇas evolved a system of very elaborate sacrifices. These sacrifices were considered to be eternal and even the creation of the world was believed to be the result of a sacrifice. The rites were performed both to gain worldly enjoyment and to injure one's enemies.

Later Vedic literature

In later Vedic literature the value of the actual sacrifices was transferred to their symbolic representation and to meditation on them.[4] Later on, Upaniṣadic thinkers observed that the nature of soul could be described only in negative terms; the *ātman* was said to be neither this nor that (*neti neti*), and was regarded as free from sin, old age, death, grief, hunger, and thirst. Its desires were true. Its cognitions were true. A man who knows such ātman gets all his desires and all worlds.[5]

The soul or Brahman pervaded all objects of the universe. The universe has come out of Brahman.

Thus "we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic hymns, on the one hand, being supplanted by the growth of a complex system of sacrificial rites, and on the other, bending their course towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate reality of the universe."[6]

The social outlook and the goal of life of the Vedic system were based on the caste system. The so-called Śūdras, the lower community, were considered ineligible to perform spiritual rites.[7]

Śramaṇa System

There prevailed, at that time, another stream of cultural current which was quite independent of the Brāhmaṇical or Vedic current and, probably older than it.

The word *Śramaṇa* is derived from "Śram" to exert effort, labour, or to perform austerity, but is mixed in meaning with *Śam* a wanderer, recluse[8]. One who performs acts of mortification or austerity is called Śramaṇa (*Śramayati tapasyatīti Śramaṇaḥ*[9]).

The Śramaṇa cultural system was based on equality. According to it, a being is himself responsible for his own deeds. Salvation, therefore, can be obtained by anybody. The cycle of rebirth to which every individual was subjected was viewed as the cause and substratum of misery. The goal of every person was to evolve a way to escape from the cycle of rebirth. Each school of Śramaṇas preached its own way of salvation. But they all agreed in one respect, namely, in discounting ritual as a means of emancipation and establishing a path of moral, mental and spiritual development as the only means of escaping from the misery of *saṃsāra*.

Thus the Vedic cultural system differs from Śramaṇa cultural system in three respects; viz. (a) attitude to society, (b) goal of life, and (c) outlook towards living creatures. Consequently, both these cults were so opposed to each other that Pāṇini and Patañjali referred to them as having *Śāśvat-virodha and Govyāghravat-virodha*.

Independent origin of the Śramaṇa cultural system

There are two principal theories in regard to the origin of the Śramaṇa cult : according to one (i) it is more or less a protest against the orthodox Vedic cult, and, according to the other (ii) it is of an independent origion. The first theory, though supported by Winternitz, Rhys David, E. Leumman etc., is no longer accepted by the majority of Jain scholars.[12]

From the survey of various theories about the origin of the Śramaṇa cultural system Deo came to the conclusion that each of them stresses a particular aspect, such as, (i) Kṣatriya protest, (ii) Organised sophistic wanderers, (iii) The qualities of the Brahmacārin, (iv) Copy of the Brāhmaṇical rules for sanyāsa, and (v) The existence of Māgadhan religion in the eastern part of India. All these factors, he says, "helped the formation of the great wandering community of the *Śramaṇas*. But Deo places greater emphasis on the Kṣatriya protest against the Brāhmaṇical sacrifices. He says "The Śramaṇas did reveal anti-Brāhmaṇical feelings as they were dissatisfied with the degenerated Brāhmin priesthood[13]."

But this conclusion is not altogether correct, since we find very strong evidence, both literary and archeological, which proves, beyond doubt, that the Śramaṇa cultural system as practised by the Jainas or the so-called *Vrātyas*[14] of Vedic literature, existed prior to Brāhmaṇism. The great antiquity of the Śramaṇa religious system has received less attention from scholars due to the fact that in historical times the Brāhmaṇa cult appeared to be more influential and widespread. The emergence of the Śramaṇa cultural system at this time was only a revival of an ancient religious system. This gaining of influence had been made possible through protests against the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇas. That is why some scholars assumed the origin of Śramaṇa cultural system to be a result of the protest against the Brāhmaṇical sacrifices.

Classification of Śramaṇas

The Śramaṇas (Samaṇa in Pāli) are classified in various ways. The *Sutta Nipāta* refers to four kinds, viz. the *Maggajinas*,

Maggadesakas or *Maggadesins*, *Maggajivinas*, and the *Maggadusins*[15]. Disputes arose among them[16] and a number of philosophical schools had already arisen by the time of the Buddha. These schools are generally designated as *Ditthi*[17]. The sixty-two wrong views (Micchādiṭṭhi) referred to by the Buddha in the *Brahmajālasutta* represent the teachings of such schools.

In the same work, Śramaṇas are called disputatious (vādasīla[18]), and are classified under three headings, viz. *Titthiyas*, *Ājivikas*, and the *Niganthas*. These were recognised as rivals of Buddhism. The Tamil tradition also observed the same classification, viz. *Aṇuvādins* (Pakudha Keccāyana's sect), *Ājivikas*, and the *Jainas*[19].

The *Ṭhāṇāṅga*[20], a Śvetāmbara Jain canonical work, gives as many as five divisions of the Samaṇa class, viz. *Niganṭha*, *Sakka*, *Tāvasa*, *Geruya*, and *Ājiva*. Here Sakka means the Buddhist, and Ājīva means the Ājīvika, the followers of Makkhali Gosālaka. No accounts are found regarding the Geruya who wore red clothes and Tāvasa who were Jaṭādhārī and lived in forest[21]. The Ājīvakas are no more. Only the Niganṭhas and the Buddhists have survived the vicissitudes of history.

Common features of the Śramaṇas

The Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms defines Śramaṇa as follows : "Ascetics of all kinds: the Samanai or Samanaoi or Germanai of the Greeks, perhaps identical also with the Tungusian Samaṇa or Śramaṇa." Further it presents the common features of Śramaṇa : "He must keep well the truth, guard well every uprising (of desires), be uncontaminated by outward attractions, be merciful to all and impure to none, be not allotted to joy nor harrowed by distress, and able to bear whatever may come."

The Buddha also says that to be Acelaka (naked) is not the only characteristic of a real Samaṇa. According to him the real Śramaṇa is he who has got rid of covetousness, ignorance, and mastered the four Bhāvanās, viz. Friendliness, Compassion, Sympathetic joy and equanimity[22]. At another place he says : "The real Samaṇa is he who has acquired a

perfectly purified conduct in speech, thought and mode of living, by controlling the sense organs, moderation in eating, being intent on vigilence, being possessed of mindfulness, and clear consciousness, remote lodging in forests to get rid of doubt, getting rid of the five hindrances and being aloof from pleasures of the senses he enters on the four meditations one by one[23]."

All these references indicate clearly that the Śramaṇa is characterised in Buddhist literature, as an ordinary monk belonging to any sect except perhaps the Brāhmaṇas. Aiyaswami Shastri[24] collected some common features of such religious communities from Tamil literature which are as follows:—

(i) They challenged the authority of the Vedas.

(ii) They admitted into their church all members of the community irrespective of their social rank and religious career (Varṇa and Āśrama).

(iii) They observed a set of ethical principles.

(iv) They practised a detatched life with a view to liberating themselves from worldly life etc.

(v) They could take to a life of renunciation (pravrajyā) on reaching majority.

Likewise Deo[25] refers to some of the features of monastic conduct which were common to all these communities. They are as follows :—

(i) The members of such groups gave up worldly life, and severing all contact with the society, they wandered as homeless persons.

(ii) Being least dependent on society, they maintained themselves by begging food.

(iii) Having no home, they led a wandering life, staying, however, at one place in the rainy season in order to avoid injury to living beings.

(iv) Lastly, they seemed to acknowledge no cast barriers, and hence consisted of various elements of the society.

The *Samavāyāṅga* refers to the ten types of conduct which should be followed by the Samaṇas. They are as follows : *kṣānti*, *mukti*, *ārjava*, *mārdava*, *lāghava*, *satya*, *saṁyama*, *tapa*, *tyāga* and

brahmacariyavāsa. At another place, some other types of conduct has been mentioned, viz. *Upadhi*, *śruta*, *bhaktipāna*, *añjalipragraha*, *dāna*, *nimantrana*, *abhyutthāna*, *kṛtikarma*, *vaiyāvṛtya*, *samavaśaraṇa-sammilaṇa*, *saṁnisadyā*, *and kathāprabandha*.

In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[28] the Buddha mentions three pursuits for a Bhikku : (i) training in the higher morality, (ii) higher thought, and (iii) higher insight. He then says that a monk must follow these pursuits with keenness ; otherwise his presence in the order will be like that of an ass in a herd of cattle.

Ascetics in Buddhist literature

In Buddhist literature all ascetics or wandering sects are referred to by the name Samaṇa. Sometimes they are also designaed Titthiya, Paribbājaka, Acelaka, Muṇḍasāvaka, Tedaṇḍika, Māgaṇḍika, Aviruddhaka, Jaṭilaka, Gotamaka, Maggadesin, Maggadūsin. The sixty-two wrong views (Micchādiṭṭhi) of the *Brahmajāla Sutta*[29] and three hundred and sixty-three views of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* refer to a great number of such sects. Some of these may be vedic, while others were teachings of moral sects of the Samaṇas.

The *Lalitavistara*[31] mentions a list of ascetics which includes the Carakas, Paribrājakas, Vṛddha-śrāvakas, Gautamas, and Nirgranthas. A similar list is given in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*[32] where it is stated that Bodhisattva does not associate himself with them.

Importance of the Samanas

Of all these numerous communities of ascetics the Śramaṇas always figure prominently in Jaina and Buddhist literatures. Upadhye says : "All intellectual activities in ancient India were not confined only to Brāhmaṇas : there was not only Brāhmaṇical literature, but there was also the Paribbājaka, Śramaṇa, or ascetic literature. These two representatives of intellectual and spiritual life in ancient India are well recognised by the phrase Śamaṇa–*Brāhmaṇī* in Buddhist sacred texts, by reference to *Śramana Brāhmaṇā* in Buddhist inscriptions, and further by Megasthenes' distinction between Brahmanai and Samanai[33]".

Samaṇas in Jaina and Buddhist literature

The Samaṇas in Jaina and Buddhist literature are represented as "worker" (from *Śram*, to strive) in spiritual life who attain salvation through their own efforts. They are accorded high honour both within their circles and without. The *Mahāvagga* refers to *Samaṇa* who is honoured by the bhikkhus. Pāli literature mentions usually, besides the Buddha, the well-known six Samaṇas, the so-called heretical teachers of outstanding position in the community.

Sometimes the term *Samaṇa* is used in Pāli literature, as an adjective showing respect towards the designated teacher. The Buddha himself is called *Mahāsamaṇa*, and his followers *Sākyaputtiya Samaṇas*[34]. So the followers of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta are designated the *Samaṇa Nigaṇṭha* or, to be exact, the *Nigaṇṭhanāmā Samaṇajātikā*[35].

Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa in Jaina and Buddhist literature

Buddhist literature, specially the Pāli Canon, uses a compound designation "*Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa*" to denote a religious sect that is opposed to the caste superiority of the Brāhmaṇa community and its ritualism. Likewise, the Jaina literature also mentions *Śamaṇa-Māhaṇāḥ*[36] and *Māhaṇā-Samaṇā*.[37]

T. W. Rhys Davids rightly says that Samaṇa connotes both asceticism and inward peace, He is of the view that "Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa should therefore mean, a man of anv birth who by his saintliness, by his renunciation of the world, and by his reputation as a religious thinker, had acquired a position of a quasi-Brāhmaṇa and was looked up to by the people with as much respect as they looked up to a Brāhmaṇa by birth[38]. Jaina literature also gives the same connotation to this term[39]."

Sometimes the term *Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa* is also used in Pāli literature for the followers of the Brāhmaṇa community. The Brahmajālasutta and some other suttas refer to them as *kecit Samaṇa Brāhmaṇā*. And in some places it is used for any follower of any sect as mentioned in the course of the sixty-two wrong views (*micchādiṭṭhi*). Thus the term *Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa* is

used, in Buddhist literature, in a very loose sense[40]. I, therefore, examined the views attributed to Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa and found that the teachings of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta are also represented among them.

The origin of *Samaṇa-Brahmaṇa* is unknown, but we can trace it from the works of Pāṇini (prior to Buddha[41]) and Patañjali (second century B. C.) which mention a perpetual enmity (śāśvata-virodha) between a snake and mongoose (*ahinakulavat*) to illustrate the compound formation of Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa.[42] The edicts of Aśoka also mention them; but the term is *Brāhmaṇa-Samaṇa*, and not *Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa*[43].

The reason of this variation in Aśokan edicts, according to Sukumara Dutta, is that "The legends were composed by those who themeselves belonged to the Samaṇa class and wished to give it precedence, while the Brāhmaṇa is put first in the edict because the Brāhmaṇical society was perhaps demographically more extensive in Aśoka's empire. The accomplishments of this ëlite, the Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa, are described from the Buddhist point of view in the scripture"[44].

Another reason for the relative positions of the two component parts of the compounds *Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa* and *Brāhmaṇa*-Samaṇa may be adduced by reference to the antiquity of the Samaṇa cultural system and the subsequent growth in importance of the Brāhmaṇa cultural system. The earlier appellation *Samaṇa Brāhmaṇa* gives precedence to Samaṇas most probably because Samaṇa cultural system was the more ancient system. The change in precedence in the term *Brāhmaṇa-Samaṇa* might have been due to the waxing influence of the Brāhmaṇa religious system which resulted in relegating the Samaṇas to a less important position in the religious life of India.

The Heretical Teachers

The leaders of Śramaṇism were referred to in Buddhist literature as "Heretical Teachers". These contemporary teachers "were doubtless, like the Buddha himself, inspired by the wave of dissatisfaction with the system of orthodox Brāhmaṇism." Six such teachers are mentioned in the Pāli Canon:—

(i) Pūraṇa Kassapa. (ii) Makkhali Gosāla.
(iii) Ajita Kesakambali. (iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana.
(v) Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, and (vi) Nigaṇṭha Nātputta.

In the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* each of these teachers is highly commended as a leader of an order (*gaṇino gaṇācariyo*). Each has been described as being well-known (*ñātā*), famous (*yasassino*), the founder of a sect (*titthakarā*), respected as a saint by many people (*sādhusammatā bahu-janassa*), a homeless wanderer of long standing (*cirapabbajitā*), and advanced in years (*vayonupattā*[46]). Barua[47] thinks of them as philosophers or theologians in the modern sense. But in the sixth century B. C. there were controversial theories which are said to have been propagated in various ways by the Ācaryas who belonged to the Brāhmaṇa as well as the Śramaṇa religious system.

The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* deals with the doctrines of these heretical teachers in detail. It may be noted here that these doctrines are "to be treated very cautiously; for it is evident that the authors had but a limited knowledge of the teachings of the heretics, and what knowledge they had warped by "odium theologicum.[48]"

As king Ajātasattu expressed his desires to know something about spiritual matters, his six ministers, the followers of the six heretical teachers one, after another, suggested that the king should meet their Ācaryas and clear his doubts. Ajātasattu then paid a visit to them and questioned them thus : "The fruits of various worldly trades and professions are obvious. But is it possible to show that any appreciable benefit can be derived from asceticism (*Sandiṭṭhikaṃ Sāmaññaphalṃ*) in this very life ?" The answers given by them could not satisfy Ajātāsattu. It was then suggested to him that he should ask the Buddha to answer the question. Hence, the Buddha is said to have solved his problem in a authoritative way.

Pāli Canon refers to the teachings of Pūraṇa Kassapa and others in several Suttas. Although all such passages are stereotyped, they seem to give a fairly comprehensive summary of atleast the impressions which their teachings had made on the Buddhists. While we have no sufficient sources from which

their accuracy can be verified, except, of course, in the case of Nigantha Nātaputta, we are fortunate that the meagre references in the Pāli Canon are the only means by which we know about the existence of two of the six teachers[49].

(i) Pūraṇa Kassapa

This teacher upheld the view that there is neither merit nor demerit in any sort of action. He says, "He who performs an act or caused an act to be performed.. (karato kho kārayato pana atimāpayato), he who destroys life, the thief, the housebreaker, the plunderer..the highway robber, the adulterer and the liar, commits no sin. Even if with a razor-sharp discus a man reduces all life on earth to a single heap of flesh, he commits no sin. If he comes down to the south bank of the Ganges, slaying, maiming, torturing, and causing others to be slain, maimed, or tortured, he commits no sin, neither does sin approach him. Likewise if a man goes down the north bank of the Ganges, giving alms, and sacrificing and causing alms to be given and sacrifices to be performed, he acquires no merit, neither does merit approach him. From liberality, self-control, abstinence, and honesty is derived neither merit nor the approach of merit[50]."

This doctime is based on Akiriyāvāda, the theory of non-action, according to which the soul does not act and the body alone acts. According to Barua it is *Adhiccasamuppannikavāda* (i. e things happen fortuitiously without any cause or condition[51]). Jain Commentator Śīlāṅka considers the doctrine of Pūraṇa Kassapa as similar to the one which obtained in the *Sāṅkhya* system[52]. But Nalinaksa Dutt observes that "it would be wide of the mark if we say Kassapa's teaching is the same as that of Sāṅkhya, though it holds that Puruṣa is only an onlooker, an inactive agent, the functioning factor being the Prakṛti[53]". As a matter of fact, Kassapa's teaching is so peculiar that we cannot find any similarity to the six Indian philosphies

In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*[54] and *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[55] he is mentioned as an *Ahetuvādin*, which appellation is applied to

Makkhali Gosāla in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*. He is also reported to have claimed omniscience[56].

Buddhaghosa gives some biographical data on Pūraṇa Kassapa. He says that Kassapa came to be known by his name from the fact that is birth completed (*Pūrṇa*) one hundred slaves in a certain household. Owing to this fact he was never found fault with, even when he failed to do his work satisfactorily. In spite of this, he was dissatisfied and fled from his master's house. He then had his clothes stolen and went about naked[57].

The *Dhammapada Commentatory* gives another account. It says that when the heretical teachers were unable to prevent the Buddha's miraculous power, they ran away. While fleeing Pūraṇa Kassapa came across one of his followers carrying a vessel and a rope. Pūraṇa took them and on the of river near Sāvatthi he tied the vessel round his neck. He threw himself into the river and committed suicide[58].

(ii) Makkhali Gosāla

Originally Makkhali Gosāla was a follower of Jainism of the Pārsvanātha tradition. As he was not appointed a Gaṇadhara in Nigaṇṭha Nataputta's order, he left the Jain Saṅgha and founded another sect called Ājīvikas[59]. He too was a naked ascetic.

He was prophet of *Niyativāda* (fatalism), according to which "There is neither cause nor basis for the sins of living beings ; they become sinful without cause or basis Neither is their cause or basis for the purity of living beings ; they become pure without cause or basis. There is no deed performed either by oneself or by others which can affect one's future births, no human action, no strength, no courage, no human endurance or human prowess can affect one's destiny in this life. All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all that have li'e, are without power, strength, or virtue, but are developed by destiny, chance and nature, and experience joy and sorrow in the six levels for existence. Salvation, in his opinion, can be attained only by death and existence which

are unalterably fixed (*niyata*). Suffering and happiness, therefore, do not depend on any cause or effect."

The *Majjhima Nikāya*[61] calls this ahetukadiṭṭhi or akiriyādiṭṭhi, while the Sūtrakṛtānga (1.127) *Darśanasāra*[62] and *Gomaṭṭasāra Jīvakāṇḍa*[63] of Jainas designate it as *ajñānavāda*.

The Buddha considered Makkhali as the most dangerous of the heretical teachers. He says : "I know not of any other single person fraught with such loss of many folk, such discomfort, such sorrow to devas and men, as Makkhali, the infatuate"[64]. "Buddha also considered his view as the meanest one as would appear from the following comment:

"Just as the hair blanket is reckoned the meanest of all woven garments even so, of all the teachings of recluses, that of Makkhali is the meanest[65]".

In the *Dīgha Nikāya Commentary*[66], Buddhaghosa shows how he was called Makkhāli Gosala. He says that he was once employed as a servant. One day while carrying an oil pot along a muddy road, he slipped and fell through carelessness, although warned thus by his master : *Mākhali* (stumble not). Hence he is named *Makkhali*. He was called Gosāla because he was born in a cow-shed. Pāṇini[67] describes him as *Maskarin* (one who carries a bamboo staff). *Uvāsaga Dasāo* calls him *Makkhaliputta*[68].

(iii) Ajita Kesakambali

Ajitakesa Kambali was a meterialist who denied the existence of good or bad deeds. According to him, "There is no merit in almsgiving, sacrifice or offering ; no result or ripening of good or evil deeds. There is no passing from this world[69] to the next. No benefit accrues from the service of mother or father. There is no afterlife, and there are no ascetics or Brāhmaṇas who have reached perfection on the right path, and who, having known and experienced this world and the world beyond, publish (their knowledge). Man is formed of the four elements ; when he dies earth returns to the aggregate of earth, water to water, fire to fire, and air to air, while the senses vanish into space. Four men with the bier take up the corpse; they gossip (about the dead man) as far as the burning gro-

und[70] (where) his bones turn the colour of a dove's wing, and his sacrifices end in ashes. They are fools who preach alms-giving, and those who maintain the existence (of immaterial categories) speak vain and nonsense. When the body dies both the fool and the sage alike are cut off from life and perish. They do not survive after death[71].

Ajita's philosophy can be compared with the philosophy of *Cārvāka*. In the *Brahmajāla Sutta* it is classified as *Ucchedavāda* (the doctrine of anihilation after death) or *Tam Jīvam tam sariram* (the doctrine of identity of the soul and body). In the *Mahābodhi Jātaka,* it is said, that Ajita was born, in a previous birth, as one of the five heretical councillors to the king of Vārānasī. Then, too, he preached the doctrine of *Ucchedavāda*. He was called Kesakambali because he wore a blanket of human hair, which is described as being the most miserable garment. It was cold in cold weather, and hot in the hot, foul smelling and uncouth[72].

(iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana

According to Pakudha Kaccāyana, the seven elementary categories are neither made nor ordered, neither caused nor constructed; they are barren, as firm as mountains, as stable as pillars. They neither move nor develop ; they do not injure one another, and one has no effect on the joy and sorrow of another. What are the seven ? Earth, Water, Fire, Air, joy and Sorrow, with life as the seventh...No man slays or causes to slay, hears or causes to hear, knows or causes to know. Even if a man cleaves another's head with a sharp sword, he does not take life, for the sword-cut merely passes through the seven elements[73].

In the *Brahmjāla Sutta* this theory is classified as both *Akiriyāvāda* and *Sassatavāda*. According to Pakudha, good or bad deeds do not affect the elements which are eternal. Like *Ucchedavāda*, this teaching is also criticised in Buddhist literature.

Buddhaghosa says that Pakudha Kaccāyana avoided the use of cold water, using always hot water. When hot water was not available, he did not wash. If he crossed a stream he

would consider it as a sin, and would make expiation by constructing a mound of earth[74].

(v) Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta

Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta was the preacher of *Ajñavāda* or Agnosticism. He says that if "you asked me, "Is there another world ?" and if I believed that there was, I should tell you so. But that is not what I say. I do not say that is so ; nor do I say that it is not so[75].'

It is said that the Elders Sāriputta and Moggalāna were disciples of Sañjaya before they were converted to Buddhism[76]. Moggalāna and Sañjaya are mentioned as Jaina Munis in Jaina literature[77].

The Jaina doctrine of *Syādvāda* is said to have been influenced by the teachings of Sañjaya. According to Malalaseker, "It is probable that Sañjaya suspended his judgements only with regard to those questions, the answers to which must always remain a matter of speculation. It my be that he wished to impress on his followers the fact that the final answer to these questions lay beyond the domain of speculation, and that he wished to divert their attention from fruitless inquiry and direct it towards the preservation of mental equanimity[78]". But as a matter of fact Sañjaya's teachings are based on indeterminable characters, while the Syādvāda has a definite answer. That is why the Jaina philosophers criticised Sañjaya's theory[79]. We can, however, say that whether Sañjaya was a Jaina muni or not, his teachings seem to be influenced to some extent by the Jaina doctrines. The sūtrakṛtāṅga does not mention his name in this context. Sañjaya's view is criticised in Pāli literature as an *Amaravikkhepavāda* (a theory of eel-wrigglers[80]).

(vi) *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta :*

In the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta,* Nigaṇṭha Nāta-Putta is introduced as the teacher of *Cātuyamasaṁvara.* "A Nigaṇṭha is surrounded by the barrier of four-fold restraint. How is he surrounded ?...He practises restraint with regard to water, he avoids all sin, by avoiding sin his sins are washed away, and he is filled with the sense of all sins avoided[81]...So surrounded

by the barrier of fourfold restraint his mind is perfected, controlled, and firm[82].

As pointed out by Jacobi this reference to the teaching of Nātaputta is very obscure[83]. *Cātuyāmasaṁvara* as mentioned in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*[84] consists of the four characteristics of the Jainas. The real *Cātuyāmasaṁvara* belonging to the Pārśvanātha tradition, is found else-where in the Pāli Canon itself.

In response to the Buddha's question Asibandhakaputta Gāmaṇi said that the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta preached thus to his followers or Sāvakas : a slayer of living creature (*pāṇaṃ atipāteti*), a stealer of a thing (not given to him) (*adinnaṃ ādiyati*), a subject of sensual passion wrongly (*kāmesu micchā carati*), and one who tells a lie (*musā bhaṇati*) are all condemned.[85]

Here are mentioned the four causes of sin. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* the five ways of falling into sin, according to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, are outlined. They are : destruction of animates (*pāṇātipāti hoti*) taking what is not given (*adinnādāyī hoti*), passionate enjoyment of evil (*abrahmacārī hoti*), speaking a lie (*musāvādī hoti*), and living on liquor and drink (*surāmerayamajjappamādaṭṭhāyī hoti*).[86]

Both these references are neither correctly recorded nor in order. The *Nikāyas* appear to have confused between the Vratas of Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra. The *Parigraha* (attachment to the mundane affairs), a fourth cause of sins according to the Pārśvanātha tradition, included the passionate enjoyment, was not mentioned in the *Nikāyas*, while the *Abrahmacarya*, separated from *Parigraha* by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, is mentioned there.

Non-violence is the fundamental principle of the Jainas which is recorded in the Pāli Canon. The Nigaṇṭhas do not use cold water as living being exist therein.[87] They take a vow not to go beyond a limited area, so that the possibility of destroying life while moving about is reduced to a minimum.[88]

The *Kāyadaṇḍa* (Physical deeds) is more blamable than *Manodaṇḍa* (mental deeds) in their oppinion.[89] Intention (*bhāva or manodaṇḍa*) is the main source of violence, and if the injury is caused by the body intentionally (*bhāvena*), it will be considered more blamble. Meat-eating is completely prohibited in Jainism. It is said that while *Sīha Senāpati* served meat to Buddha and his followers, the Nīganthas had protested and criticised such activities.[90]

Nakedness or nudity (*acelakatva* or *Digambaratva*) with a mind controlled and restrained from all sorts of attachment and the practice of severe austerities with right knowledge are the main sources of omniscience and salvation[91] Pāli literature too records the Jaina claim to the omniscience of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.[92] The Pāli Canon is also familiar with the rudiments of *Syādvāda* and *Navatattvas*. Buddhist philosophical literature which developed later establishes and refutes the more advanced Jaina doctrines about epistemology and logic.

The foregoing is a brief description of the leaders of Śramaṇism as recorded in Pāli literature. From this somewhat scanty data it is clear that their teachings can be grouped under two main headings :—

(i) *Ājīvikism* as taught by Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, and Pakudha Kaccāyana and

(ii) *Jainism* as taught by Pārśvanātha and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.

The doctrine of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta does not fall into either of the above categories. But as Nalinaksa Dutt has shown, Sañjaya's teachings are "only a stepping stone to that of Buddha.[93]" We shall now take into consideration the interrelationship among the three prominent religious systems : Jainism, Ājivikism, and Buddhism.

Jainism and Ājīvikism :

Makkhali Gosāla, the founder of the Ājīvika sect, was a follower of Jainism, before he founded his separate school.[94] It is, therefore, not unnatural for his teachings to be influenced

by Jainism. Ājīvikas and Jainas share a set of common monastic rules. Both were normally naked and both followed the same method of eating.[95] That is the reason why the Pāli literature could not make a clear distinction between the *Niganthas* and the *Ājīvikas*. The *Sutta Nipāta*[96] distinguishes the Ājīvikas from other sects, whereas the *Majjhima Nikāya*[97] includes all the heretical teachers in the general category of *Ājīvikas*.

Buddhaghoṣa in his *Dhammapada Commentary*[98] describes an ascetic who knocks at the doors of all the sects including the *Ājīvikas* and the *Niganṭhas*. But the same work refers indiscriminately to *Nagga-samaṇa*, *Ājīvika* and *Acelaka*[99]. Similarly the *Divyāvadāna*[100], in the story of *Aśoka*, seems to use the term *Ājīvika* and *Nigantha* (Nirgrantha) synonymously.

Chinese and Japanese Buddhist literature classes the Ashibikas, (i. e, *Ājīvikas*) with the Nikendabaras or *Nirgranthas* as practising severe penance. "They both hold that the penalty for a sinful life must sooner or later be paid so that the life to come may be free for enjoyment. Thus their practices were ascetic. Fasting, silence, immovability and burning themselves upto the neck were their expressions of penance.[101]

Hoernle identifies the *Ashibikas* with the *Digambara* Jainas. In support of his theory, he refers to *Halāyudha*[102] which "enumerates a large number of names of the two divisions, the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras...The latter are also known as the *Ājīva*, which is only a shorter form of *Ājīvika*...It is evident now, from what has been said, that the terms *Nigantha* and *Ājīvika* denote the two jaina orders which are known to us as *Svetāmbars* and *Digambaras*."[103]

Hoernle's further suggestion is that the term *Nirgrantha* implied only a *Śvetāmbara* Jaina. This conclusion is not supported by any evidence. The verse quoted by Hoernle does not contain exactly synonymous words. It mentions the names of various schools. Basham remarks in this connection that the evidence of both Halāyudha and Yādava, including the *Nirgrantha* in the same category as the *Nagnāṭa*,

should be adequate to disprove the theory. The term was obviously used for a Jaina of any type[104].

"Nigaṇṭha" or *"Nirgrantha"* was always used with reference to Digambaras in the earlier works. Its application to *Śvetāmbaras* was a later development subsequent to their breaking away from the original school of Jainism in the early centuries B. C.

Śīlāṇka, the commentator of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, says : "They are the *Ājīvikas* who follow the doctrine of Gosāla, or Boṭikas (i. e, Digambaras.[105]"). On the basis of this reference Hoernle righty concluded that the later *Ājīvikas* merged with the Digambara Jainas. He says "Śīlāṅka states that the reference is to the Ājīvikas or Digambars. Seeing that, in his comment on another passage of the same work, he identifies the *Ājīvikas* with the *Terāsiyas* (Sanskrit-*Trairāśikas*). It follows that in Śīlāṅka's view the followers of Gosāla, the Ājīvikas, the *Terāsikas*, and the Digambars were the same class of religious mendicants. "[106]

Basham, too, appears to support this view when he says that the *Ājīvika* survived in Madras, Mysore and Andhra until the 14th century A. D., and that the original atheism of Makkhali Gosāla merged with that of the Digambara Jainas.[107]

But, as a matter of fact, Śilāṅka could not make a clear statement that the Ājīvikas and Digambaras were the same. It seems that on the basis of nakedness, Halāyudha, Śilāṅka etc. referred to the words which have the same meaning.[108]

Jainism and Buddhism

As both Jainism and Buddhism were taught within the same geographical area during the same historical period, a high degree of mutual ideological influence was inevitable. The wandering of the Buddha for six years in search of enlightenment also would have brought him into contact with Jainistic degmas.

Some ideas are found to be common to both Jainism and Buddhism. Buddhism is based on the Four Noble Truths

(*Cattāri ariyasaccāni*), viz. the Truth of suffering (*Dukkhasacca*), the Truth of the Arising of suffering (*Dukkha-samudayasacca*), the Truth of the Annihilation of Suffering (*Dukkhanirodha-sacca*) and the Truth of the Path leading to the Annihilation of Suffering (*Dukkha-nirodhagāmanī-paṭipadā-ariyasacca*). Jainism, too, teaches substantially the same doctrines. During the twelve meditations (*Dvādaśānuprekṣā*) a Nigaṇṭha thinks of the nature of the world and soul. In this way he tries to abstain from attachment to anything so that he could attain the state of *Vītarāgatva* (freedom from all desires). *Avidyā* (ignorance), as in Buddhism, is the root cause of Karmic bondage, and release is possible through Right Vision (*Samyagdarśana*), Right Knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*), and Right Conduct (*Samyagcāritra*[109]).

Buddhism extols the four meditations (*Bhāvanā*), viz. *Mettā* (Frindship) *Karuṇā* (Compassion), *Muditā* (delight), and *Upekkhā* (indifference[110]). The Jain Scripture declares that these should be meditated upon by everybody (*Maitrī-pramodakāruṇyamādhyasthāni ca satvaguṇādhikakliśyamānavinayeṣu*). They are realizable through concentration (*yogakkhamaṁ nibbāṇaṁ ajjhagamaṁ*), and are free from ageing (*ajaraṁ*). Salvation can be attained with the cessation of the chain of causation. Nibbāṇa, in Jainism, is a condition of the pure soul, free from all bondage of karmas, peaceful, enlightened and eternal[111]. Both religions believe that every being experiences fruits of his good and bad deeds in the present or future life and rebirth continues till the attainment of salvation.

Non-violence (*Ahiṁsā*) is also a common feature of both Jainism and Buddhism. Buddhism, like Jainism, stipulates that its adherents should abstain from all forms of violence (Hiṁsā). But Jainism appears more strict in this respect. The eating of flesh, which is not altogether forbidden in Buddhism, is completely forbidden in Jainism. In other words, Non-violence is the foundation of Jaina religion and philosophy. *Syādvāda* and *Nayavāda*, the spirit of reconciliation, is an integral part of its theme.

Both Jainism and Buddhism hold that the Universe came into being without the intervention of the creator-God. Worshiping of the images of their sages is a common feature in both religions.

As regards the dissimalirities between them, they are so fundamental that any positive influence of Jainism on Buddhism or vice-versa is difficult to establish. Buddhism does not believe in soul, whereas Jainism regards it as an essential part of human personality and its purity is essential for the attainment of salvation. According to Buddhism, a thing which comes into being perishes in the next moment. All the psychical factors like feeling, cognition, names and concepts are discrete and momentary. The first moment is regarded as the material cause (*upādāna*) and the second the effect (*upādeya*). The combined stream of *Upādāna* and *Upādeya* give rise to the false notion of a permanent self.

On the other hand, Jainism, in spite of admitting the obvious psycho-physical changes, adheres to the belief that both *jīva* (soul) and *ajīvā* (matter) are eternal. It maintains that only the modes (*Paryāyas*) of a substance are subject to change while the substance with its essential qnality (*guṇa*) is unchanging and abiding. The Buddhist theory of flux has been, therefore, criticised bitterly by the Jaina philosophers.

These two religions resort to a common terminology. For instance, the word *nigaṇṭha* is used for Jainism in both scriptures. Buddhism also regard "*sabbaganthappahīna*"[112] as the nature of *Nibbāna*. *Pudgala* is used only in these two religions but with different meanings. In Jainism it means as inanimate thing, while Buddhism gives it the sense of *Ātmā* or *Jīva*. Likewise, *Arhat*, *Buddha*, *Āsava*, *saṁvara*, *Sammādiṭṭhi* (*samyagdṛṣṭi* or *Samyagjñāna*) *Micchādiṭṭhi*, *Tisaraṇa*, *Noraka*. etc. are common to both the religious systems.

According to the Pāli Canon, the Buddha himself had a more favourable impression of *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* and Jainism than of any other contemporary teacher or teaching.[113] though he condemned the Nigaṇṭhas at a number of places. Apart from

the fact that they arose from the same social milieu, the emphasis they both laid on ethical principles and on the empirical testing of truth seems to have made them mutually respectful to each other.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has brought us to the conclusion that the Śramaṇa cultural system led by the Jainas existed perhaps prior to Brāhmaṇa cult and that most of the leaders of diffierent sects of that time were influenced by the Jaina dogmas. Jacobi came to the following ooncluslon on the inter-relationship of these religious teachers :

"The preceding four *Tīrthaṅkaras* (Makkhali Gosāla, Pūraṇa Kassapa and others) appear to have adopted some or other doctrines or practices of the Jaina system, probably from the Jainas themselves... Here it appears that Jaina ideas and practices must have been current at the time of Mahāvīra and independently of him. This combined with other arguments, leads us to the opinion that the Nirgranthas (Jainas) were really in existence long before Mahāvīra, who was the reformer of the already existing sect."[115]

2. JAINISM AND ITS LITERATURE

Jainism is a religion based on sound scientific reasoning. It stresses the perfection of knowledge, and teaches as its fundamental doctrine, the ethical evolution of man. It illuminates the path of liberation and persuades its adherents to seek real happiness in the immortal soul. Mental purity, not the external appearance, is the source of constant tranquillity and emancipation in Jaina opinion. Non-violence is primary principle of the Jaina religion and philosophy.

Origin of Jainism

According to Jaina belief, Jainism is both eternal and universal. It is open not only to human beings of all castes and classes, but even to animals, devas, and souls in hells. According to the Jaina tradition, twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras appear in every kalpa.[1] *Ṛṣabhadeva* is said to be the first

Antiquity of Jainism

Jainism is believed to be a pre-Vedic religion. Jainas are referred to in early Vedic literature by the name of *Vrātyas*[3] They are identified as the members of Śramaṇa cultural system which is led by Jainas. The *Ṛgveda*[4], the oldest scripture of the Hindus refers to Ṛṣabha, perhaps Ṛṣabhadeva, frequently. Besides, the Hindu Purāṇas[5] contain accounts of his life and these tally with Jaina accounts. As regards archaeological and epigraphical evidence, the *Kāyotsarga* (dedication of body) Yoga pose of sitting and standing images engraved on the seals of Mohanjodro, Harappa and Lothal are identified by some scholars as *Ṛṣabha* images[6]. The *Hāthīgumphā* inscription of king Khāravela refers to an image of Jaina which was taken away to Magadha by king Nanda.[7] Similar evidence is found with regard to other Tīrthaṅkaras who, too, had been historical personages of immense reputation in philosophical and religious circles[7].

The modern scholars appear to agree with the view that Jainism is the oldest of Non-Aryan group. For instance, Dr. Zimmer says : "There is truth in the Jaina idea, their religion goes back to remote antiquity, the antiquity in question being that of the Pre-Āryan, so-called Dravidian period, which has recently been dramatically disillusioned by the discovery of a series of great Late Stone Age cities in the Indus valley dating from the third and even perhaps fourth millennium B. C."[8]

Antiquity of Jainism and Buddhist literature

But he also remarked : ' 'But there is nothing to prove that Pārśva was the founder of Jainism. Jaina tradition is unanimous in making Ṛṣabha, the first Tīrthaṅkara (its founder)...... They may be something historical in the tradition which makes him the first Tīrthaṅkara[10]''

The Pāli Canon refers to *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* as an elder heretical teacher and is also familiar with some characteristics of Pārśvanātha tradition. Besides, Buddhist literature mentions Ṛṣabhadeva, Padma, Canda, Puśpadanta, Vimala, Dharma and Ariṣṭanemi, the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras.

Ṛṣabhadeva is called one of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras in Chinese Buddhist literature[11] The *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*[12] refers to him as *Ṛṣabha-nirgrantharūpin.* and the *Dharmottarapradīpa*[13] mentions him along with the name of *Vardhamāna* or *Mahāvīra.*, It may be noted here that the names and numbers of Buddhas Paccekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas in Buddhism appear to have been influenced by those of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras. For instance, *Ajita*, the name of the second Tīrthaṅkara, has been given to the Paccekabuddha who lived ninety-one *kappas*[14] ago. The *Vepulla-pavvata* in the time of Kassapa Buddha appears to have been named after *Supassa* (Pāli) or *Supārśva*, the seventh Tīrthaṅkara of Jainas. The people of Rājagaha were called Suppiya or the follower of Supassa at that time[15]. *Padma* or *Paduma*, the sixth Tīrthaṅkara, is the name of the eighth of the twenty-four Buddhas[16]. It is also the name of a Pacceka-Buddha to whom Anupama Thera offered some akuli flowers[17]. Paduma is also referred to by the name of Cakkavattī of eight kappas ago[18]. Canda, the eight Tīrthaṅkara, is the name of a chief lay supporter of Sikhi Buddha.[19] *Pupphavatī* is the name of Benaras in the *Jātaka.*[20] It would have been named after Puṣpadanta, the ninth Tīrthaṅkara of Jainas. Vimala, a Paccekabuddha, has been named after the thirteenth Tīrthaṅkara[21]. A king who lived sixty-one kappas ago, has also been called Vimala[22]. Likewise, Dhamma is the name of the fifteenth Tīrthaṅkara of Jainas. A Bodhisatva who, was born as Devaputta in a Kāmāvacara Deva-world has also been

referred to by this name[23]. In the *Milinda Pañha*,[24] he is called a Yakkha[25] *Ariṭṭanemi* or *Nemi* the twenty-second Tīrthaṅ kara of Jainas, is also referred to in Pāli literature. The *Dhammikasutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[26] speaks of Aranemi as one of the six Tīrthaṅkaras (Sathāre tithaṅkare). *The Majjhima Nikāya*[27] refers to *Ariṭṭha* as one of the twenty-four Pratyekabuddhas who inhabited the Sigiri mountain. The *Dīgha Nikāya*[28] draws our attention to the name of" *Dṛḍhanemi* as a Cakkavatti. In the same work there is a reference to king *Ariṭṭhanemi* who is called a Yakkha[29]. All these past references probably are to the Ariṭṭhanemi of Jaina Tīrthaṅkara. As we shall see later, Jainism had been a prominent religion In Ceylon before Buddhism was brought there. It is therefore not unnatural if we find some places named after the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras. For instance, *Ariṭṭhapavvata* is a mountain which is identified with modern *Riṭigala* near Habarane in the North Central Province[30]. *Pāṇḍuābhaya* lived there for seven years, awaiting an opportunity to make war on his uncles and it was near this place that ultimately defeated them.[31].

Pārśvanātha, the twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara of the Jainas, who flourished 250 years earlier than Mahāvīra or Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta at Benaras, was born to King Aśvasena and queen Vāmā. He is said to have attained Nirvāṇa (Salvation) on the Sammeda Śikhara which is called today the Pārśvanātha Hill.[31] Tha *Jātakas* mention the names of Kings of Vārāṇasī-Brahmadatta, Uggasena, Dhanañjaya, Mahāsīlava, Saṁyama, Vissasena, and Udayabhadda.[32] Pārśvanātha belongs to the *Ugravaṁsa* which may have been named after Uggasena and Vissasena may be recognised as his father.[33] *Brahmadatta* is also said to have been a Jaina king who devoted his whole life for Jainism. *Vappa* (*Manorathapūraṇī*), the Buddha's uncle, was a follower of Pārśvanātha tradition.

In pāli literature various doctrines of Jainas have been acknowledged. They belong to Pārśvanātha or Ariṣṭanemi, if not to earlier Tīrthaṅkaras. *Pārśvanātha* was known as *Purisājānīya* or the distinguished man according to the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*(P. 290)

The *Dharmottarapradīpa* (P.286) also refers to both Pārśvanātha and Ariṣṭanemi. The *Cātuyāmasaṃvara*, which is attributed to the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, is in reality a teaching of Pārśvanātha. Some Nigaṇṭhas mentioned in Pāli literature are apparently followers of Pārśvanātha. For instance, Vappa[34], Upāli[35], Abhaya[36], Aggivessāyana saccaka[37], Dīgha Tapassī[38], Asibandhakaputta Gāminī[39], Deva Ninka[40], Upatikkha[41], Sīha[42], are lay followers while Saccā, Lolā, Avavādikā, Paṭacārā[43] etc. are lay women followers of the *Pārśvanātha* tradition. They had later on become the followers of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta[44]. Jacobi, therefore, says that 'Pārśva was a historical person is now admitted by all as very probable.

Mahāvīra or the *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* of Pāli literature was born in Kuṇḍagrāma[45] (Koṭiggāma) of the *Mahāvagga*, a suburb of Vaiśālī[46], and an important seat of the Jñātṛi Kṣatriyas. He was the son of Siddhārtha and Triśalā, who belonged to the clan of Jñātris or *Nāha*[47]. He renounced worldly enjoyment at the age of thirty without getting married[48] and became a Nigaṇṭha ascetic. He then underwent a course of severe bodily mortification for the next twelve years and attained omniscience.

The Pāli Canon does not mention anything of the early life of Mahāvīra, but refers to the period of his mission as a religious teacher. He was called *Nigaṇṭha* in the sense that he is free from all bonds, and was called *Nātaputta* because Nāta or Nāya was the name of his clan.[49] As Gotama is generally referred to as the *Buddha*, *Jina* came to be used as the popular name of Ṛṣabha and other Tīrthaṅkaras, and their adherents began to be called 'Jainas'. The Pāli Nikāyas mention *Nigaṇṭhā* in place of Jinas (*Amhākaṃ ganthānakileso paḷibujjhānakileso natthi, kilesaganthirahitā mayaṃ ti evaṃ vāditāya Laddhanāmavasena Nigaṇṭho*[50]). The term 'Nigaṇṭha' for a Jaina came to be used perhaps along with the origin of Jainism itself.

Teachings of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta have been already mentioned in the course of our discussion on the six heretical teachers. It is remarkable here that both Jainism and Buddh-

ism arose and grew up in the same province of India. The leaders of both sects were sometimes living in the same city, but they never met perhaps personally[51]. Their followers, however, used to indulge in discussions, conversations and debates.

The date of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta

The date of *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta,* like the date of the Buddha has been a subject of much controversy among the scholars[52]. The Pāli Canon has two main references which give an idea of the age and death of Nātaputta. Ajātasattu is reported to have spoken of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta to the Buddha in *Sāmañña-phala Sutta* as "One who has long been recluse, old and well-stricken in years (*cirapabbjjito, addhagato, vayonupatto*[53]). Another reference recorded is that when the Buddha was at the Ambavana of the Sākyas, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had just died at pāvā (*ekaṁ samayaṁ bhagavā sakkesu viharati vedhañña nāma sākyā tesaṁ āmbavane pāsāde tena kho pana samayena Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto Pāvāyaṁ ādhunā Kālaṅkāto hoti.*[54] Ānanda is supposed to have conveyed this news to the Buddha in a very pleasant mood.

The Chief landmark in Jaina chronology is the year of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death, which is generally placed somewhere between 468 and 482 or 527 and 546 B. C. Jacobi is perhaps the first savant who tried to determine the date of Mahāvīra. In the introduction to the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, showing the differences between the Buddha and Mahāvīra, he says : Mahāvīra died in Pāvā, avowedly before the former (Buddha[55]). Hence, in the introduction to the *Kalpasūtra*[56] he Suggests that his death might have taken place round about 468–467 B. C. This opinion was based on Hemachandra's *Pariśiṣṭaparvan*[57] which tells us that Chandragupta, the Sandrokottos of the Greeks, ascended throne 155 years after the death of Mahāvīra. The Chandragupta's ascension, according to Jacobi, took place in 313 B. C. Therefore the death of Mahāvīra must have occured in 468 B. C. (313 + 155 = 468 B. C.) Charpentier[58] also supported his view. If Hemachandra's chronology is accepted,

the tradition of the Pāli Canon has to be rejected. Both, Jacobi and Charpentier were of the view that the statement in the Pāli Canon to the effect that Mahāvīra died when the Buddha was at Pāvā was spurious. But this gives rise to a further problem in view of the fact that the death of the Buddha is now widely accepted as having occured in 543 B. C. Therefore this quistion needs further investigation as the interval between the death of Buddha and Mahāvīra could not have been as long as 75 years. Basham, too, is inclined to accept Jacobi's view. But he based his arguments on the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* and a less favoured theory about the date of the Buddh's Parinirvāṇa in 483 B. C. He says ; "If we accept 483 B. C. as the date of the Buddha's nirvāṇa, on the basis of Mahāvaṁsa synchronism, the accession of Ajātasattu must have occured in the year 481-480 B. C. The first campaign, soon after which the death of Gosāla occurred, must have taken place at some time between the date of Ajātasattu's accession and the year preceding the Buddha's death." He then suggests that' "the first campaign occured in 484B. C., and the death of Gosāla in that year, or in 484 B. C. On the strength of the *Bhagvatī* statement that Mahāvīra survived Gosāla for sixteen and a half years, this date would place Mahāvīra's death in 468-467 B. C[59]."

As regards the reference to the Nigaṇtha Nātaputta in Pāli scripture he suggests that "the Pāli record may not in fact refer to the death of Mahāvīra at Pāvā, but to that of Gosāla at Sāvatthi, which *Bhagvatī* Sūtra also mentions as having been accompained by quarrelling and confusion. At a later date, when the chief rival of Buddhism was no longer Ajīvikism but Jainism, the name may have been altered to add to the significance of the account[60]. The explanation of Basham that the Pāli Canon recorded the death of Gosāla and not that of Māhāvīra appears to be farfetched.

Majumdar and Raychaudhuri are of the view that Mahāvīra's death should have taken place in 478 B. C. In support of this theory they suggest that Mahāvīra died about sixteen

years after the accession of Ajātaśatru, and the commencement of his war with his hostile neighbours. This would place the Nirvāṇa of the Jain teacher after the Buddha's death, as according to the Ceylonese chronicles, the Buddha's died eight years after the enthronement of Ajātaśatru. This is supported by the Hemachandra's account that places the Chandragupta's accession a hundred and fifteen years after the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra. We know that Chandragupta's enthronement took place in 323. B. C. (323+155=478[61] B. C.).

Another attempt to date the death of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta has been made by Hoernle. According to him, 483 B. C. is "practically certain" date of Buddha's parinirvāṇa. Bimbisāra was murdered by his son Ajātaśatru eight years before the nirvāṇa, or in 490 B. C. Hoernle believes that for some years before this Ajātaśatru was *de facto* ruler, and the war took place not in the year of his legal, but of his *de facto* accession, which could not have been long before the murder of Bimbisāra. He accepts the *Bhagvatī* tradition of the sixteen years interval between the death of Mahāvīra and Gosāla. He therefore suggests 484 B. C, for the death of Māhāvira and 500 B. C. for that of Gosāla, and for the war and *de facto* accession of Ajātaśatru[62]. The theory of Hoernle is more comprehensive, as he tries to establish the chronology of all events connected with the issue. In the aforesaid Pāli record, Chunda expressed the hope that on the death of the Buddha a similar question would not arise in his order. This fact indicates that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death was thought of as having taken place at a time when the Buddha himself was very old, when the Buddist monks were concerned about the future of the order after the death of its leader. Hoernle's theory which places Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death two years prior to that of the Buddha tallies with the statement of Chunda in the Pāli Canon.

The orthodox Jaina tradition which dates the death of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta in 527B. C. is not unanimously accepted by the scholars. The main problem with regard to this traditional date is that its accuracy depends on the correct calculation of

the commencement of the Vikrama Era. According to one-view, Vikrama was born 470 years after the death of Mahāvīra while his accession and death took place 483 and 568 years respectively after Mahāvīra's death[63]. Another view holds that the Vikrama Era began 410 years after Mahāvīra's death.[64] According to these data, the date of Mahāvīra's death mainly depends on the event in Vikrama's life which marked the commencement of the Vikrama Era. If the Vikrama Era commenced with Vikrama's birth, the date of Mahāvīra's death is 527 B. C. (i.e 57+470=527 B. C.[65]). If it began with Vikrama's accession, the date has to be 545 B. C. (57+488=545 B. C.)[66] If the Vikrama Era began with Vikrama's death, Mahāvīra's death has to be dated as 622 B. C. (470+80+72=622 B. C.[67]). If we accept the tradition, which gives the interval as 60 years, the date of Mahāvīra's death will be 467 B. C. (527−60=467 B. C.)[68]. Thus the dates of Mahāvıra's death will be 527 B. C., 545 B. C., 622 B. C. or 467 B. C. This makes the entire problem rather confusing and intricate.

Jacobi refers to the traditional date of the death of Niganṭha Nātaputta as follows. "The reduction of the Jain's Canon or the Siddhānta took place, according to unanimously accepted tradition, at the Council of Valabhi, under the presidency of Devardhi. The date of this event (980 or 993 A. V.), corresponding to 454 or 467 A. D., is incorporated in the Kalpasūtra[69]. Here the view of Hemachandra's *Pariśiṣṭaparavan* appears to be wrong as compared to the *Titthogālī Paiṇṇaya* which is an ancient and more reliable book. It is stated that the date of Chandragupta Maurya's accession falls 215 years after the death of Mahāvīra. Moreover, on the same day, Pālaka began to rule in Ujjaini. He ruled over the country for sixty years. Afterwards Nanda's dominion is listed for 155 years. Then commences the enthronement of Chandragupta Maurya[70]. But these sixty years have been omitted in the chronology of the *Pariśiṣṭaparavan* of Hemchandra. Puranachandra and Krishnachandra Ghosa write "Hemachandra must have omitted, by oversight, the period of 60 years of king Pālaka after Mahāvīra[71]. Hemachandra himself appears to have accepted 527 B. C. as the

date of Mahāvīra's death. He says that Kumārapāla of Chālukyakula was born 1669 years after the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra[72] It is now certain that Cālukya Kumārapāla was born in 1142 A. D.[73] Accordingly, the date of Mahāvīra's death falls in 527 B. C. He has also made an attempt to prove 527 B. C. Muni Nagaraj has also made an attempt to prove 527 B. C. as the most likely date of Mahāvīra's (Nātaputta's) parinirvāṇa[74].

Muni Kalyanavijaya,[75] Kailash Chandra Shastri[76], and Shantilala Shah[77], accept this date but reject the evidence of Pāli-Tripiṭka. Vijayendra Suri[78] agrees with them as far as this date is concerned, but thinkes like Basham, that the death of Gosālaka, and not of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, is recorded in Pāli Tripiṭaka. The date of the Buddha's death is accepted by them as 544 B. C. But other references made in Pāli Nikāyas are ignored by them.

On the other hand K. P. Jayasaval[79], Radhakumuda Mokerji[80] and Kamata Prasada[81] favour the view that Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa took place in 545 B. C. (i. e. 57+488=545 B. C.) Their main argument is that the Vikrama era commenced from the accession which took place 488 years after Mahāvıra's death.

But their views are not correct as the evidence to prove 527 B. C. as the date of Nigaṇṭha Nataputta's parinirvāṇa are rather more substential and reliable. J. K. Mukhtar proved successfully this view[82]. The *Jambusuāmicariu* and other *granthas* also support the same opinion. The Pāli records also protest its genuineness. Without going into prolonged discussion, we may now conclude that 527 B. C. seems to be more dependable as the date of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death.

The Place of Nigaṇhṭha Natapuatta's death

According to the Pāli Canon, which has already been referred to in the earlier section, the Buddha was informed while he was at a *Sāmagāma* among the Śākyas, that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had died at Pāvā. In the *Vividhatīrtha-kalpa*, Pāvā is called Apāpapurī, perhaps on account of its religious importance. In the course of his peregrinations Mahāvīra came from

Jṛmbhaka to the forest of Mahāvaṁsa. Eleven Gaṇadharas, Gautama and the rest, were initiated here. Vardhamāna (Mahāvīra) went on a fast for two days. then preached his last teachings and attained Nirvāṇa[83].

But there has been some controversy with regard to the location of Pāvā. The traditional *Pāvā*. is near Rājagaha (Bihar) and is now called *Pavāpuri*. Jacobi[84] thinks that Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa took place at this Pavāpurī, while Mahapandita Rahula Sankrityanais[85] of the opinion that *Pāvā* is the modern Papaura village twelve miles away from Kūsinārā or Kasiya. situated on the little Gaṇḍaka river, to the east of the district of Gorakhpur. Nathuram Premi[86] agrees with Rahul Sankratyana. It is most probable that Pāvā was included in the territory of the Mallas since a Santhāgāra was built by them in Pāvā. It is also said that at this place the Buddha ate his last meal at the house of Cunda, and as a result he had an attack of dysentery. He then left the place and proceeded to Kusinārā where he ultimately attained Parinirvāṇa[87].

The Mallas, a republican tribe of the same type as the Licchavis, were divided at that time into two groups. One having their capital at Pāvā and the other at *Kusinārā*. The *Kalpasūtra* says that on the eve of Niganṭha Nātaputta's death nine Mallas and nine Licchavis, the chiefs of their respective tribes, were among those who went on *Proṣadhopavāsa* to mark the passing away of the great Jina. It is further stated that they ordered illuminations on the day of the new moon saying, "Since the light of intelligence is gone, let us make an illumination of material matter[88]. Since Mahāvīra's nirvāṇa occured early in the morning, the Jainas worship Mahāvīra at that time and illuminate the earthern pots. The whole day is now called Dipāvali. This evidence confirms our view that Pāvā, the place of Niganṭha Nātaputta's parinirvāṇa, is no other than *Papaurā* on the Gorakhapura district.

Schism in the Jaina Order

Signs of schism in the Jaina order might have appeared at the death of Niganṭha Nātaputta as stated in Pāli Nikāyas·

The *Sāmagāma Sutta* describes the state of the Jaina order after the Nirvāṇa of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Ānanda conveys the message of Cunda to the Buddha with elation. He says :—

"Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had just died at Pāvā. At his death the Nigaṇṭhas became disunited into two parts which took to mutual strife and conflict, quarelling and wounding each other with wordy weapons (*tassa kālaṅkiriyāya bhinnā Nigaṇṭhā dvedhikajātā bhaṇḍanajātā kalahajātā vivādāpannā aññamaññaṁ mukhas attīhi vitudantā viharanti*), thou does not understand this doctrine and discipline; but I do understand it. How should thou understand it ? Thou art in the wrong. I am in the right. I am speaking to the point; thou art not. Thou sayest last what should be said first and what ought to come last. What thou hast so long excogitated is quite upset. The challenge is taken up; thou art proved to be wrong. Begone to get rid of thy opinion, or disentangle thyself if thou canst. Truly, the Nigaṇṭhas, followers of Nātaputta, were out methinks to kill"[89].

The Buddha gives the reasons of this disunity among the Nigaṇṭhas. "Their teacher was not supremely enlightened and a doctrine badly set-forth, badly imparted, ineffectual to guide, not conducive to peace[90]." The Commentaries state that Nātaputta realising on his death-bed the folly and futility of his teaching, wished his followers to accept the Buddha's teachings. In order to bring this about, he taught his doctrine in two different ways to two different pupils, just before his death. To the one he said that his teaching was Nihilism (*Uecchеda*), and to the other that it was Eternalism (*Sassata*). As a result they quarelled violently among themselves, and the order broke up[91].

What we are concerned with is not so much the reasons mentioned above for disunity, as the existence of disunity itself. The rift took place actually in the Jaina order after the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's parinibbāṇa, though it might not had been to the extent described[92]. No evidence has yet been discovered to indicate that the final schism took place immediately after his death.. Therefore the passage quoted should

be examined from two angles. Either it is said in hyperbolical language or it is a later addition. The first is more likely as a rival order will naturally exaggerate any differences or disunity in the opponent's group. But the germs of schism could not have been altogather absent. However, judging from the fact that Jainism, like Buddhism, continuied to be favoured by Kuṇiya or Ajātasattu, Aśoka, Ceṭaka, Seṇiya, prodyota, Udayana etc[93]., it can be concluded that the culmination of these schismatic tendencies did not take place untill the famine of Magadha which lasted for 12 years during the period of Chandragupta Maurya.

Later on, the Jaina order divided itself into two divisions, viz. the Digambaras who accepted the complete nakedness as the essential requirement to attain salvation, and the Śvetāmbaras who did not recognize this theory *in toto*, The first is the original sect. All the Tīrthaṅkaras including Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra were Digambaras. All along in Pāli literature Mahāvīra is called Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and his followers Nigaṇṭhas. The reason for this is that they claimed to be free from all bonds (*aṃhākaṃ ganthanakileso palibujjanakileso natthi, kilesaganthirahitamayaṃ ti evaṃ vāditāya laddhanāmavasena Nigaṇṭho*)[94]. The rift, which began immediately after the demise of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, finally took shape in the second or third century B. C., when the Digambara and Śvetāmbara came to be differentiated. The *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*[95] refers to and criticizes both the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects[96].

Philosophical Literature of Jainas

A proper evaluation of Jainism as found in Buddhist literature necessitates some familiarity with Jaina literature. The Jaina contribution to Indian philosophical and religious knowledge is so profound that only a bare outline of the Jaina literature can be attempted here.

We are concerned here with the Jaina philosophical literature which can be divided into four schools[97] :

(i) Canonical School (upto sixth century A.D.).

(ii) Anekānta School (from third century A.D. to eighth century A.D.).

(iii) Pramāṇa School (from 8th A.D. to 17th A.D.), and

(iv) Navya-nyāya School (from 17th A.D).

(i) The Canonical School

Both the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects of Jainas accept unanimously that Mahāvīra or the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is the main source of their scriptures, which are said to have been collected by his disciple called Indrabhūti or Gautama[98]. He died at Rājagṛha at the age of ninety-two, 12 years after Mahāvīraś nirvāṇa. Afterwards, according to the Digambaras, the successors of these teachers could not gain proficiency in all the Aṅgas. As time passed on gradually they decreased and were completely lost 683 years after Mahāvīra's nirbāṇa.[99] But the Śvetāmbara tradition claims to have preserved the Aṅgas and Upāṅgas. It appears to me that upto certain time canonical literature would have been preserved by both sects through the recitation method, but to prove its own antiquity as the original sect, the Śvetāmbara tradition added some elements like the dialogues between Keśin and Gautam or Jāmāli episode, and eliminated some portions of the original literature. Seeing this the Digambara tradition would have completely denied their validity and announced it to have been lost.

The Śvetāmbara Canonical Literature

The Śvetāmbaras preserved a wide and profound canonical literature, though mixed up with some elements. It consists of the following texts[100] :

The twelve Aṅgas : (i) Āyāraṅga, (ii) Sūyagaḍaṅga, (iii) Ṭhāṇāṅga, (iv) Samavāyāṅga, (v) Viyāhapaṇṇatti or Bhagavatī, (iv) Nāyādhammakahāo, (vii) Uvāsagadasāo, (viii) Antagaḍadasāo, (ix) Aṇuttarovavaiyadasāo, (x) Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṁ, (xi) Vivagasuya, and (xii) Diṭṭhivāya.

The twelve Upāṅgas : (i) Ovavāiya. (ii) Rāyapaseṇaijja, (iii) Jivābhigama, (iv) Pannavaṇā, (v) Suriyapaṇṇatti, (vi) Jambuddıvapaṇṇatti, (vii) Canapaṇṇatti, (viii) Niryāvalīo, (ix) Kappāvaḍaṁsiāo, (x) Pupphiāo, (xi) Pupphacūliāo, (xii) Vaṇhidāsāo.

The Ten Paiṇṇas : (i) Causaraṇa, (ii) Āurapaccakkhāṇa, (iii) Bhattapariṇṇaya, (iv) Saṁthāraga, (v) Taṇḍulaveyāliya, (vi) Candāvijjhaya, (vii) Devindatthava, (viii) Gaṇivıjjā, (ix) Mahāpaccakkhāṇa (x) Vīratthav.

The Six Cheyasuttas : (i) Nisīha, (ii) Mahāṇisiha, (iii) Vavahāra, (iv) Āyārādasāo or Dasāsuyakkhandha, (v) Kappa or Bṛhatkalpa (vi) Pañcakappa, or Jīyakappa.

The four Mūlasūttas : (i) Uttarājjhaya, or Uttarājjhayaṇa, (ii) Āvassaya, (iii) Dasaveyāliya, (iv) Piṇḍanijjutti.

The two cūlikā sūttas : (i) Nandi, (ii) Aṇuyogadāra.

Development of Āgama Literature :

Śrutakevalī Bhadrabāhu predicted during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya that there would be a terrible famine in Magadha for twelve years. To ensure the purity of Jaina asceticism, the Saṅgha decided to leave Magadha. A group of monks under the leadership of Viśakhāchārya went to South India. But Sthūlabhadra remained in Magadha with some monks. After the famine was over, Viśākhacharya with his disciples came back to Magadha and found that the pupils of Sthūlabhadra had developed an attachment to clothes.[101]

Viśākhācārya tried to convince them for observing Digambaratva but he could not succeed in his achievement as the Sthūlabhadra and his followers were not ready to live without clothes. Hence the schism was started in the Jaina Saṅgha. On the other hand, Bhadrabāhu, the teacher of Viśakhācārya, with his prominent pupil chandragupta Maurya (Muni Prabhāçandra)[102] left Magadha and went to South India. According to Digambar tradition, he observed there Samādhimaraṇa on the Kalvpra mountain (*Śramaṇa Velagola Inscriptions*, of saka sam. 522).[103]

After some time, according to the Śvetāmbara tradition, there were held four councils in Pāṭaliputra, Mathurā and Valabhī where the Ācāryas tried to gather the Āgamas to the best of their ability. The present form of the Śvetāmbara Jaina Canon is said to be the result of the second Valabhī Council held under the presidency of Devardhigaṇin Kṣamāśramaṇa in the beginning of the sixth century A.D. (980 or 993 years after Mahāvīra attained nirvāṇa .

This indicates clearly that the Śvetāmbara Āgama was not the product of one period. It developed gradually, during the course of several generations. It is not, therefore, unnatural if certain things have been changed[104]. However, a good portion of very important and valuable material compiled in ancient times remains intact. Winternitz rightly says, "The works of the Siddhānta cannot have originated during one period. The canon which Devardhi compiled, and which has come down to us, is the final result of a literary activity that must have begun as soon as the organisation of the order and the monastic life were firmly established. This was in probability the case not long after the death of Mahāvīra. The earliest portions of the Canon may, therefore, quite possibly belong to the period of the first disciples of Mahāvīra himself, or at the latest to the second century after Mahāvīra's death—the period of the maurya Candragupta, in which tradition places the Council of Pāṭaliputra—whilst the latest portions should probably be dated nearer to the time of Devardhi[105]. In support of this statement other evidence are collected by Deo[106].

Resemblance to Pāli literature

The Śvetāmbara Jaina Canon which is the result of several centuries appears to have a close resemblance to Pāli scripture which was compiled in the first or second century after the Buddha's demise. In other words, the Jain Canon has been influenced by Pāli literature. The language and style are good enough evidences in this connection. For instance, a stanza of the *Uttarādhyana* (9.44), viz.

Māse māse tu jo bālo kusaggeṇaṁ tu bhuñjae.
Na so sukkha adhammassa kalaṁ agghai solasiṁ.

has a very close resemblance to the stanza of the *Dhammapada* (70), viz.

Māse māse kusaggena bālo bhuñjetha bhojanaṁ.

Na so saṅkhatadhammānaṁ kalaṁ agghati solasim.

The stanzas of the *Dhāmmapada* (103, 405, 409) can be compared with the stanzas of the *Uttarādhyana* 9.34; 25.22;25.24. Some other stanzas like 49, 66, 362 are similar to the stanzas 1.2, 4.1, 10. 12, of the *Dasavaikālika.* In the same way Puṇḍarīka Addhyana of the *Sutrakratāṅga* and the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka, Vipākasūtra* and *Avadānaśataka,* and *Karmaśataka, Thāṇāṅga* and *Aṅguttara, Uttarādhyana* and *Dhāmmapada* and *Jātaka* are very closely related to each othes in subject matter. The Śvetāmbara Āgamas are called *Gaṇipiṭaka*[107] as the Buddhist scripture are called the *Tipiṭaka*[108] Thus the Śvetāmbara Āgamas are undoubtedly influenced by the Buddhist scripture.[109]

The mixture of prose and verse, fantastic descriptions of the hells, preaching with the help of legends, parables, tales, dialogues and ballads, are the main characteristics of both Pāli and Jain scriptures. But in comparison with Pāli literature, Jain literature is presented in a rather uninteresting style. Winternitz has pointed out that "with rare exceptions, the sacred books of the Jainas are written in a dry-as-dust, matter of fact, didactic tone, and as far as we know them hitherto, are seldom instilled with that general human interest which so many Buddhist texts possess. Hence, important as they are for the specialist, they cannot claim the interest of the general reader to anything approaching so great an extent.[110]

The language of the Canonical literature is a Prākṛt called Ardhamāgadhī. The verses, like the Buddhist Canon, present more archaic forms. But the Commentaries (*Nijjutti, Bhāsa, Cuṇṇi,* and *Ṭīkā*) are in both Prākṛt, (Jaina Mahārāṣṭrī) and Sanskrit.

Digambara anonical literature :

The Digambaras believe that the Cannon as preached by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is no longer available as it was lost during the famine. But they have preserved in their earlist works, written by the ancient Ācāryas, detailed accounts of the structure and the contents of their Cannon. According to such accounts the Digambara Canonical literature is divided into two groups : the *Aṅgapraviṣṭa* and the *Aṅgabāhya* :—

(**A**) **The Aṅgapraviṣṭa :**

The Aṅgapraviṣṭa is of twelve kinds which are similar to the twelve Aṅgas of the Śvetāmbaras with the exception that the last Aṅga "Draṣṭipravādā" is divided into five parts : (i) Five Parikarma ; (a) Candraprajñapti, (b) Sūryaprajñapti, (c) Jambūdvīpaprajñapti, (d) Dvīpaprajñapti and (e) Vyākhyā Prajñapti, (2) Sūtra (3) four, Anuyogas (a) Prathamānuyoga, (b) Karaṇānuyoga, (c) Dravyānuyoga and (d) Caraṇānuyoga, (4) Pūrvagatas are fourteen : (a) Utapādapūrva, (b) Agrāyaṇī, (c) Vīryānuvāda, (d) Astināstipravāda, (e) Jñānapravāda, (f) Ṣatpravāda, (g) Ātmapravāda, (h) Karmapravāda, (i) Prtyākhyāna (j) Vidyānuvāda, (k) Kalyāṇavāda, (L) Prāṇavāda (m) Kriyāvāda and (n) Trilokavindusāra. (5) Five Cūlikas : (a) Jalagatā, (b) Sthalagatā, (c) Māyāgatā, (d) Rūpagatā, and (e) Ākāśagatā.

B. The Aṅgabāhya Śruta.

The Aṅgabāhya śruta is divided into fourteen Prakīrṇakas : (1) Sāmāyika, (2) Saṁstava, (3) Vandanā (4) Pratikramaṇa (5) Vinaya (6) Kṛtikarma (7) Daśavakālika (8) Uttarādhyayana (9) Kalpavyavahāra (10) Kalpākalpa, (11) Mahākalpa Sañjñāka, (12) Puṇḍarika (13) Mahāpuṇḍarıka, and (14) Niṣiddhika.[111]

The fact that the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara traditions agree on fundamental features of the structure of the Jaina Canon establishes beyond doubt :

(a) that a Jaina Canon had been compiled, arranged and recognized before the schism, and

that the traditional divisions were remembered even after the Digambaras rejected the Śvetāmbara Canon as a later innovation.

Ācarya Parampara

The Digambara tradition maintains that its Canon was lost gradully as the Ācāryas who knew one or sveral Aṅgas passed away without ansuring that their pupils had mastered the Aṅgas. An Ācārya-paramparā of such pupils, after the death of Nahāvīra, is referred to by Yatirṣabha, according to which Gautamasvāmī, Sudharmāsvāmī and Jambūsvāmī were Kevalins (having perfect knowledge of Canon) for 62 years, Nandi, Nandimitra, Aparājita, Govardhana and Bhadrabāhu were Śrutakevalin for 100 years, Viśākhā, Proṣṭhila, Kṣatriya, Jaya, Nāga, Siddhārtha, Dhṛtisena, Vijaya, Buddhila, Gaṅgadeva and Sudharama were knowers of eleven Aṅgas and ten Purvas for 183 years, Nakṣatra, Jayapāla, Pāṇḍu, Dhruvasena and Kansa were knowers of eleven Aṅgas for 220 years, and Subhadra, Yaśobhadra, Yaśobāhu and Loha were knowers of Ācārāṅga for 118 yearr. Thus within the period of 683 years after the death of Mahāvīra all these Ācāryas are said to have been perfect in the respective Canon.[112]

Afterwards, according to the *Dhavalā* and *Jayadhavalā*, Dharasenācārya was knower of partly the Aṅgas and Pūrvas. But the *Nandisaṅgha Prākṛta Paṭṭāvalī* does not lend support to this view. According to this, the Ācarya-paramparā (from Gautama to Lohācārya) is enumerated within 565 years. Then Arhadvalī, Māghanandi, Dharasena, Bhūtavalī and Puṣpadanta are said to have kown one Aṅga, and their period was for 28, 21, 19, 30 and 20 years. On the basis of this calculation Bhūtavalī and Puṣpadanta come under the period of 683 years. This view is supported by Bṛhaṭṭippaṇikā[113] which mentioned *Joṇipāhuḍa* written by Dharasenācārya 600 hundred years after the death of Mahāvīra.

(ii) Anekānta School

Fortunately, Puṣpadanta and Bhūtavalī wrote a joint work named *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍagama* of which Puṣpadanta wrote the earlier portion and Bhūtavalī the latter and Guṇadharācārya wrote

Kasāyapāhuḍa on the basis of the third *Pejjadosaprābhṛta* (Vastu-adhikāra) of *Jñānapravādapūrva* in the first century B. C. The rudiments of Jaina philosophy are found in these works which form the basis of all later works on Digambara Jainism by such Ācāryas as Kundakunda, Umāsvāti, Samantabhadra. The Canon considered as lost by Digambaras is preserved by Śvetāmbara tradition, as has already been stated. However in the absence of the original Canon, the Digambaras recognize the works of Puśpadanta, Bhūtavlī, Guṇadharācārya, Kundakunda, Svāmi Kārtikeya, Umāsvāti, Vaṭṭakera and Śivārya as Canonical works.

Ācārya Sumati is mentioned in the Buddhist philosophical literature. Śāntarakṣita refers to him in the course of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa Parīkṣā in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*.[114] We do not know about his definite literary contribution[115] but the above references are a testimony to his recognition as a Jaina logician. As regards his date, he is mentioned in the copper-plate inscription of Karkasuvarṇavarṣa[116] as the pupil of Mallavādi, an Ācārya of the Mūlasaṁgha-sena-āmnāya. The same inscription refers to Aparājita as a pupil of Sumati. This inscription belongs to saka saṁvat 743. Mallavādi referred to Dignāga (5th century A. D.) without mentioning Dharmakīrti's name in his *Nayacakra*. He, therefore, flourished after Diṅnāga and before Dharmakīrti (7th century A. D.). Bhattācārya concludes his date as being near about 720 A. D.[117]

Pātrakeśarī also is mentioned in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*. Śāntarakṣita quotes the famous Kārikā[118] composed by Pātrasvāmin, who was also called Pātrakeśarī[119]. He is also referred to by several other writers[120] as the author of the *Trilakṣaṇakadarthanaṁ* which was written in order to refute Dingnāga's theory or *Trilakṣaṇahetu*. It may be noted here that Pātrasvāmin is not the name of Vidyānanda as Pathak[121] and Vidyābhūṣaṇa[122] suggest, but he is undoubtedly a separate person.[123] *Śramaṇavelagolā Praśasti*[124] mentions his name and some other inscriptions[125] refer to him after Sumati. Pātrasvāmin must have, therefore, lived after Diṅnāga and before Śāntarakṣita. He, therefore appears to have belonged to the last part of the

6th century A. D. and earlier part of the 7th century A.D.[126] Śrīdatta[127] (prior to Pūjypāda) also established the *Anyathānupapatti* as one of the forms of Hetu in the *Jalpanirṇaya.*

The period of Anekānta is marked by the establishment of the *Syādvāda* conception with greater emphasis. The *Saptabhaṅgī* of Ācārya Kundakunda is developed by Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Sumati, Pātrekeśari and Śridatta. A complete discussion of all the doctrines of Jainism is the characteristic of this age. This was a prolific age in other religious traditions too. For instance, the Vedic philosophers produced the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, , *Yogabhāṣya*, *Śāvarabhāṣya* etc. while Buddhist logicians such as Nāgārjuna and Diṅnāga were already advancing their theories in refutation of Vedic and other contemporary philossophical system.

(iii) **Pramāṇa School** :

One of the most revolutionary theories of this period was the concept of *Pratykṣa* as indicated knowledge. While the older Āgamic tradition accepted *Pratyakṣa* to be direct cognition, these new theoreticians rejected this view on the ground that there would be no direct cognition when the sense organs were relied upon for empirical experience. The .cognition through sense organs was therefore held to be Emprical Perception, while only realization through mental perception could be considered Transcendental Perception. Othel Pramāṇās were included in the category of *Parokṣa Pramāṇa* (indirect knowledge). Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa (6th century A. D.) divided first the Pramāṇas systematically into two types, *Sāṁvyāvahārika Pratyakṣa* (Empirical Perception), and *Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa* (Transcental Perception).[128] It may be noted here that the word *Saṁvyavahāra* originally belongs to the *Vijñānavādī* Buddhists.

Conducting logical discussion to establish one's own views is another main feature of this period. The Nālandā Buddhist university had attained fame in this direction in the time of Dhammapāla. His pupil Dharmakīrti and others were engaged in philosophical debates with parties that were opposed to

them. The Jaina philosophy, which is much closer than other religions to the Buddhist philosophy, also came in for a certain amount of criticism. Their main objections were raised against the dual characteristic of reality according to the *Anekāntavāda* conception, which was the result of endeavours to unite all the one-sided views. The *Pramāṇavārtika* of Dharmakīrti and its Commentaries *Pramāṇavārtikaṭīkā* of Devendramati, *Pramāṇavārtikālaṅkāra* of Prajñākaragupta *Pramāṇavārtika-svavṛttiṭīkā* of Karṇakagomin, *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, *Hetubinduṭīkā* of Arcaṭa and other works of Buddhist philosophers had been already written to refute the Vedica views of Kumārila, Īśvarasena and Maṇḍanamiśra, and the Jaina views of Umāsvāmi, Samantabhadra and Siddhasena. At this critical moment Ācārya Akalaṅka and Haribhadra entered the field of controversy against the opponents of Jainism.

Mahendra Kumara established the view that the age of Haribhadra lies from 720 A. D. to 810 A.D. and that Akalaṅka flourished in 720-780 A. D. Both these great philosophers defended Jainism and in due- course formulated a Jaina philosophical ideology on the basis of Syādvāda and non-vilence[129].

Here the personality of Akalaṅka, who is mentioned only once in Buddhist literature,(DHP. p. 246) is very significant. His literary contribution is profound and extensive. All his works *Tattvārthavārtika, Aṣṭaśatī, Laghīyastrayasravṛtti, Nyāyaviniścaya Savivṛtti, Siddhiviniścaya, Pramāṇaśaṅgraha,* etc. "Stand as eloquent testimony to his penetrating mind and show a remarkable advancement in Jaina logic. He had a chivalrous disposition to help the people misled by the Buddhists. In his writings he was very satirical and caustic about Buddhists, particularly about Dharmakīrti, in retorting the euphemistic criticism of Syādvāda by Dharmakīrti."[130] Haribhadra and his works such as Śāstravārtāsamuccaya, Anekāntajayapatākā and Anekāntavādapraveśa, also bear the same characteristics. The later Jaina philosophers developed the Jain philosophy of both these Ācāryas-Akalaṅka and Haribhadra on their own ways.

Thus the pramāṇa school saw the establishment of several new philosophical theories and doctrines. The theory of *Syādvāda* and *Pramāṇas* was further developed by Akalaṅka and his followers, and they defended *Syādvāda* which was bitterly criticised by rival philosophers, using the principles of *Syādvāda* itself for the purpose.

The foregoing is a brief outline of Jaina philosophical literature. It is to be remembered here that Jain literature was of later origin than Vedic and Buddhist literature. Jain literature came to be written while the Vedic and Buddhist philosophers were engaged in debates. Therefore it was naturally influenced by them. The Jain philosophers came into contact with many Buddhist philosophers. That is the reason why the major part of Jaina literature is devoted to the refutation of Buddhist doctrines.

Spread of Jainism

Pāli literature refers generally to northern provinces of India where Buddhism originated and developed. Some facts relating to Jainism, which are found scattered in Buddhist literature, throw light on the expansion of Jainism during the time of the Buddha. It may be noted here that Jainism had already been established as a religion in various provinces of India before the Buddha began his mission. But Pāli literature records only the discussions the Buddha had with certain Jaina followers he met, and not the Jaina doctrines *in toto*

Magadha was a centre of missionary activities of all heretical teachers.[131] The Buddha also selected this province for the propagation of his teachings. *Rājagaha* and *Nālandā* were the main places where the Buddha had to face the Nigaṇṭhas as strong rivals. Bimbisāra was supposed to have been in favour of both the religions. The Buddha came across the Jain ascetics at Kāḷasilā on the side of Isigili mountain in Rājagaha. They were practising severe acts of self-mortification with the idea of eradicating the past Kammas and attaining salvation. The Buddha could not convince them against their views.[132]

But he was able to convert *Upāli Gahapati*,[133] *Abhayarāja-kumāra*,[134] and *Asibandhakaputta Gāmini*[135], the lay devotees of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. *Dīghatapassī*, a Jain monk, is reported not to have changed his religion, though he was convinced by Buddha. (M. i, 371). *Nigrodha* is said to be a follower of Ājīvikism who practised asceticism including *Cātuyāmasaṁvara* of Jainism. He appears to have been a follower of Jainism and a supporter of Ājīvikism. Whatever that be, he also could not be converted to Buddhism.[136] The above incidents happened in Rājagaha and Nālandā. Most of the discourses given here by the Buddha were mainly to refute the teachings. This shows that Jainism in Magadha was on a firm footing, since the Buddha could not win over a number of followers of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.

Kosala was ruled over by Pasenadi during the Buddha's time. He respected all the six Titthiyas.[137] Buddha spent twenty-one Vassas in Kosala. In addition, he visited this place several times Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta also had a good number of followers here. Sāvatthi and Sāketa were the main places where the Buddha came into contact with the Jainas.

In *Sāvatthi* there was a very rich Seṭṭhi named *Migāra* who was a staunch follower of Jainism. His son's wife Visākhā was perhaps a follower of Buddhism. She is said to have persuaded her father-in-law, Migāra, and other members of the family to be converted to Buddhism.[138] Another Seṭṭhi named Kālaka, the son-in-law of Anāthapiṇḍaka, living in Sāketa is also described as having given up the faith of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and embracing the religion of the Buddha.[139]

The *Śākyas* were politically an independent entity. *Kapilavatthu* was he birth-place of the Buddha, but the Śākyas, were not strongly in favour of his doctrines. On the other hand, Jainism was very popular here since the Buddha's parents and their people were followers of Pārśvanātha tradition. But the Buddha and his followers tried to convert the people from their faith. *Mahānāma*, perhaps a relative of the Buddha, was an adherent of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's religion. The Buddha

pointing out the uselessness of severe mortification made an attempt to convert him[140] and ultimately he succeeded in doing so. Hence the *Cula Dukkhakkhandha Sutta* and *Sekha Sutta* were both preached to Mahānāma.

Devadaha was an important town in the eyes of the Jaina mission. Here also the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's view, the theory of Kamma, is reported to have been refuted by the Buddha.[141] But no follower of Jainism, except *Vappa Śākya*[142], the Buddha's uncle who was converted by Moggalāna, is mentioned in the Nikāyas as having given up Jainism. The fact that the Buddha laid down special rules for the entry of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's followers to the Saṅgha, however, seems to indicate that a number of Nirgranthas were converted to Buddhism.

The *Liccahavīs* had a republican form of government, and *Vesālī* was their capital. Since Pārsvanātha's time it had been a centre of Jainism.[143] Nigaṇṭha Nātāputta and his Nāta clan were very closely related to the Licchavīs. He was very much influential in his home town, Vesālī. In the course of missionary activities Jainism came into contact with Buddhists of Vesālī. Saccaka[144], a highly respected follower of Jainism was defeated by the Buddha in a religious disputation. *Sallaka's* parents also were followers of Jainism.[145] On the other hand. *Abhaya* and *Paṇḍitakumāra*[146] were not satisfied with the answers given by their opponents.[147] *Sīha*, a general of the Licchavīs, was, of course, impressed by the Buddha's discourse and he became his follower. Inspite of active apposition of the Nigaṇṭhas, the Buddha continued his work of conversion of the Licchavīs to the newly established religion.

The *Mallas*, like Licchavīs, were republican tribe. They were divided into two groups, the Mallas of Pāvā, and the Mallas of Kusīnārā. They were followers of both Jainism and Buddhism. The Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's nīrvāṇa took place in Pāvā[148] and the Mallas and Licchavīs, as a mark of honour, illuminated the place with earthern pots. This indicates that the Mallas were well disposed towards the Jainas.

The Jainas carried on their missionary work in *Varāṇasī Mithilā, Simhabhūmi, Kausāmbī, Avantī*, etc. but Pāli literature makes no refeence to Jaina ativities in these centres. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta wandered about in Bihar and some parts of Bengal and Uttar Pradeśa in the course of his missionary activities which commenced immediately after the attainment of Kevaljñana. He got much help from his maternal uncle Ceṭaka, king of Vesālī and his son-in-laws Udayana, Dadhivāhana Sātanika, Caṇḍa Pradyota, Nandivardhana and Bimbasāra.

After Mahavira :

After Mahāvıra's parinirbāṇa Jainism was patronized by Śaisunāges, Nandas, Khāravela, Mauryas, Sātavahanas, Guptas, Paramāras, candelas and others. Some of them were followers of Jainism while others provided all possible facilities to develop its literary and cultural activities. The Southern part of India was also a great centre of Jainism. Bhadrabāhu and Viśākhācārya with their disciples migrated to the South and propagated Jainism a lot. Āndhra Sātavāhanas, Pallavas Pāṇdyas, colas, Cālukyas, Raṣṭrakūṭas, etc. were main dynasties which rendered sufficient royal patronage and benefits to Jainism and its followers through the spirit of religious toleration existed in this region. The Jainas were given magnificent grants for their spiritual purposes. Numerous Jaina temples and sculptures were eracted by kings and many facilities were provided for literary services through out India. As a result the Jaina Ācāryas wrote their ample in works Sanskrit, Prākrit, Tamil, Telagu, Kannada, Apabhraṁśa and modern Indian languages.

Jainism in Ceylon

Jainism crossed India from south in about the eighth century B. C., if not earlier, and became one of the important religions of Ceylon, which was known in those days by the name of *Laṅkā, Ratnadvipa* or *Sinhala.*[149]

The *Mahāvaṁsa*, the best-known and most authoritative Ceylonese Chronicle in Pāli verse, refers to the existence of Jainism in Ceylon even before the arrival of Buddhism. It is said there that Vijaya and his followers had to face the opposition of Yakkhiṇīs in their attempt to establish their kingdom in Laṅkā. After the passing away of Vijaya, Paṇḍuvāsudeva, and Abhaya Paṇḍukābhaya captured the whole Island with the help of a Yakkhaṇī named Cetiya who lived in the Dhumarakha mountain near Tumbaraṁyana. Pāṇḍukābhaya then settled his helpers, Yakkhas and Yakhiṇīs in various sides of the city of Anurādhāpura, a capital of Laṅkā. He is also said to have handed over some cities to his relatives. He then made the appointments of hunderds of caṇḍālas to work in the city and erected a cemetary for them. Estward of that cemetery Paṇḍukābhaya built a house for the Nigaṇṭha *Jotiya*. In the same reign there dwelt another Nigaṇṭha named *Giri* and many other ascetics of various heretical sects. At the same place there was also built a chapel for the Nigaṇṭha *Kumbhaṇḍaka*. Towards the west from thence aad eastward of the street of the huntsmen there lived about five families of hertical beliefs (*nānāpāsaṇḍikā*[150]).

The five hundred families of heretical beliefs and the construction of Vihāras to the Nigaṇṭhas on behalf of the king of Laṅkā, Paṇḍukābhaya, indicate clearly that Jainism was a living religion in Ceylon during his reign. Paṇḍukābhaya's period, deduced on the basis of the date of Buddha's death as 544 B. C., is supposed to be 438-368 B. C. Jainism had apparently been introduced to Ceylon before Paṇḍukābhaya. It could have been even before the arrival of Vijaya. One may wonder whether a name like *Ariṭṭha* (i. e. that of Devānaṁpiya Tissa's minister) had any connection with the Jaina Tīrthaṅkara of that name.[151] .

Jainism continued to exist even after the establishment of Buddhism in the Island. Its existence during the first century B. C. is recorded in the *Mahāvaṃsa*. It is said that after a battle with the Tamils, king Vaṭṭhagāmini Abhaya who was

defeated fled out of the city. A Nigaṇṭha named *Giri* saw him and cried out loudly "The great black Sinhal is runninga away" (*palāyati mahākāla Sihalo ti bhusaṁ ravi*). When the great king heard this, he thought "If my wish be fulfilled I will build a Vihāra here" (*siddhe mama manorathe vihāraṁ kāressaṁ*).[152] Hence, after a few years when he drove away the Damila Dathika from Anurādhāpura and regained his throne, he destroyed the Jaina monastery and built Abhayagiri Vihāra in that place.[153]

According to the *Mahāvaṁsa Ṭīkā*, this monastery was the scene of a tragedy in the time of Khallāṭanāga, predecessor of Vaṭṭagāmini. This king, when he discovered a plot against his life by his nephew, went to Giri's monastery and ended his life by burning himself. At the spot, where this event occured, Khallātanāga's kinsman built a Cetiya called the *Kurundavāsoka*[154] *Vihāra*.

Jaina tradition takes the history of Jainism in Ceylon to anera anterior to that reflected by the Ceylon Chronicles. According to Jaina records, the Yakṣas and Rākṣasas who inhabited Ceylon prior to its Aryanization by Vijaya were not only human beings with a well-developed civilization but also Jainas by faith[155]. The *Vividhatīrthakalpa* mentions that at Trikūṭagiri in Kiṣkindhā of Laṅkā there was magnificient Jaina temple which was dedicated by Rāvaṇa, for the attainment of supernatural powers (*Kiṣkindhāyāṁ Laṅkāyāḥ pāṭalaṅkāyāṁ Trikūṭagirau Śrīśantināthaḥ*). To fulfil a desire of Mandodari, the principal queen, Rāvaṇa is said to have erected a Jaina statue out of jewels and this, it is said, was thrown into the sea when he was defeated by Rāmachandra. Śaṅkara, a king of Kalyāṇanagara of Kannaḍa, came to know about this statue and he recovered it from the bottom of sea with the help of Padmāvatīdevī, a prominent Goddess of Jainas[156].

It is said that the statue of *Pārśvanātha* which is worshipped even now at *Śrīpura* Antarikṣa (India) was brought by Māli and Sumāli Vidyādhara from Laṅkā.[157] Another statue of Pārśvanātha found in the caves of Tejapura is also said to

be from Lankā.[158] The *Karakaṇḍucariu* describes how Amitavega, a Jaina king of Malaya, used to visit Laṅkādvīpa as an intimate friend of Rāvaṇa who built a Jaina temple in malaya.[159] This Malaya can be identified with Malaya, the name of the central hill country of Ceylon.

These references seem to point out that Jainism existed in Ceylon even before the birth of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Vibhiṣaṇa, the younger brother of Rāvaṇa, who was a follower of Jainism according to Jain tradition and literature, is referred to as the tutelary Yakṣa of Ceylon (*Vibhīṣaṇastāmraparṇiyaṁ*) in the *Mahāmāyūrī*, a magical text of Northern Buddhists, which was translated into Chinese in the fourth century A. D. Vibhīṣaṇa is still worshipped at Kelaniya and is supposed to be one of the four guardian deities of the Island.

Although the supremacy which Buddhism achieved in Ceylon could have led to the suppression of Jainism and incidents similar to the destruction of Giri's monastry by Vaṭṭa-Gāmiṇī Abhaya could have occurred at different times, Jainism did not disappear from Ceylon till at least after the eighth century. About the tenth century A. D.[160] Muni Yaśaḥkīrti was requested by the then king of Ceylon to improve the state of Jainism in the Island.[161] This shows that Jainism not only was in existence at that time in Ceylon, but it also enjoyed the patronage of Sinhala kings of Ceylon.

As regards the Jaina monuments in Ceylon, the view of S. Parnavitana, an authoritative scholar on Ceylon Archaeology, are relevant :

"No remains of any Jaina monuments have ever been found in Ceylon. The earliest Stūpas and Vihāras of Jainism did not differ from those of Buddhism so much so, that without the evidence of inscriptions or of iconography it would be extremely difficult to differentiate between the two. Jain iconography had not yet developed in the times that we are dealing with. In the period during which this religion was prevalent in Ceylon, there were no monuments built of durable materials. Moreover, when Jainism disappeared, their places

of worship must have been appropriated by the Buddhists as it happened with regard to the monastery of Giri, and any traces of the earlier faith would certainly have been obliterated in this way. Some of the earliest unidentified stūpas of small dimensions may, however, be Jaina in origination."[162]

These meagre bits of evidence prove that Jainism existed in Ceylon from at least eighth century B. C. If any credit is given to the legends of Rāvaṇa, the upper limit may be extended by a few more centuries. If the historicity of these legends is established it would be interesting to find that early Jainism which preceded Pārśvanātha had also founded a foothold in Ceylon.

BUDDHISM AND ITS LITERATURE

The Buddha and Buddhism

Buddhism is a part of purification based on the *Majjhima paṭipadā* (Middle path) which avoids the two extremes *Kāmesu kāma sukhallakānuyoga* (the attitude of sensual indulgence) and *Attakilamathānuyogā* (asceticism and self-mortification). This doctrine was enunciated by the historical personality of Gautama, the Buddha in the sixth century B. C.[1]

Source of Buddhism

There is no consensus of opinion among scholars regarding the source of Buddhism, because Buddhism has been influenced by all the philosophical schools prevalent at that time. As Oldenberg says : "Hundreds of years before Buddha's time, movements were in progress in Indian thought, which prepared the way for Buddhism."[2]

The Buddha, before gaining enlightenment, went to Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka under whom he followed their religious observances. Ālāra Kālāma is supposed to be the Ācārya of Sāṅkhya philosophy. But Keith, while pointing out several similarities between Sāṅkhya and Buddhism, says that "the proof of Sāṅkhya influence is obviously indirect and not in itself complete."[3] Oldenberg also thinks in a somewhat similar way.[4]

On the other hand, Jacobi is of opinion that Buddhism has been derived from a corresponding theory of the forerunners of Jainism.[5] Pande also accepts this view though not very emphatically.[6] This view can be supported by reference to Pāli literature itself. After being dissatisfied with the teachings of Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, the Buddha went at last to mount Gayā-Uruvelā. Following the others, he himself occupied a spot beside the Nairañjarā river and with full purpose of heart he set himself the task of enduring self-mortification, restraining every bodily passion, and giving up thought about substance With purity of heart, he observed the rules of fasting which no worldly man can bear. Silent and still, lost in thoughtful meditation, he spent six years.[7] He himself says that he experimented with the four types of religious practices of severe penance (*tapa*), selfmortification (*lukha*), avoidance (*jegucchā*), and seclusion (*pavivittā*).[8] Here *avoidance* appears to be a reference to Jainism for it is said "I used to walk up and down conscientiously extending my compassion even to a drop of water, praying that even the dangerous bacteria in it may not come to harm.[9] "Such practices are mentioned at another place in the *Majjhima Nikāya*.[10] We shall compare them later with Jaina practices in the chapter on Ethics. These may bear testimony to the Jain view that the Buddha was a Jain muni at a certain stage of his ascetic life.

Ācārya Devasena (8th century) says that the Buddha was a great learned disciple of the saint Pihitāśrava who ordained him as muni Buddhakīrti in the Saṅgha of Pārśvanātha, the twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara of the present era. But after a time the Buddha started taking flesh and dead fish as food and putting on a red cloth, he preached his own Dhamma, saying that there was no harm in taking such food.

Siripāsaṇāhatitthe sarayūtīre palāsaṇayaraṭṭho.
Pihiyā sabassa sismo mahasūdo buddhakittimurṇo.
Timi pūraṇāsaṇehiṁ ahigayapavajjāoparibhaṭṭo.
Rattaṁ varaṁ dharittā pavaṭṭhiyaṁ teṇa eyantaṁ.

Māmsassa natthi Jīvo jahā phale dahiya-duddhasakkarae.
Tamhā taṁ vāṁchittā taṁ bhakkhanto na pāviṭṭho.
Majjaṁ na vajjanijjaṁ davadavvaṁ jahājalaṁ tahā edaṁ [11]
Idī loe ghositta pavatthiyaṁ sabbasāvjjaṁ

There is, however, no direct admission of this fact in any of the Buddhist texts, although the Buddha's own account of his six years of penance leaves little doubt as to the possibility of his being influenced by the doctrines of Jainism. It is also possible that the Buddha's attitude to meat-eating as well as to other forms of ultra-strict restrictions on human conduct (as seen also from his controversy with Devadatta in respect of the five rules, pañcavatthu) was the reason for the establishment of a new religion where self-mortification is denounced as vulgar and futile.

Buddhist Literature

Buddist literature is rich and varied and is found in several ancient and modern languages such as Pāli, Prākrit, Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, Nepale, Japanese, Sinhali, Burmese, Thai, Combodian Uigur, Sogdian, Kuchanese and other languages of Central Asia. But for this survey our attention will be confined only to the Buddhist literature in Pāli and Sanskrit.

Buddhist literature can be classified as follows :—(i) Pāli literature consisting of (a) Canonical, (b) Extra Canonical, and (c) Non-Canonical works. The last is further divided into (a) Aṭṭhakathās, (b) Tīkās, (c) Tippaṇīs, (d) Saṅghas, and (e) Pakaraṇas. (2) Sanskrit literature consisting of (a) Hīnayāna, and ( ) Mahāyāna works.

Pāli literature

The Pāli Canon, which represents the Theravāda Buddhism, is popularly known as Tipiṭaka, the three baskets;[12] the three *Piṭakas* (Baskets-or) parts, are the Vinaya Piṭaka, Sutta Piṭaka and the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Like most other literary works of Ancient India, the *Tipiṭaka* too grew gradually over a period of several centuries. The three Councils stand out as landmarks in the process of its growth and development. It is generally

accepted by scholars today that the *Tipiṭaka*, as we have it, including *Kathāvatthu*, the last work to be attached to it by the Chairman of the Council himself, was accomplished shortly after the Third Council. During the Third Council it was decided to propagate Buddhism abroad. Mahinda, a pupil of Tissa and a son (according to another tradition, the younger brother of Aśoka), was appointed to introduce Buddhism into Ceylon. In Ceylon, the Canon was preserved through oral tradition until it was reduced to writing in 84 B. C. during the reign of king Valagamba,[13]

The *Vinaya Piṭaka* is the head of the Canon and is considered earlier than the *Sutta Piṭaka*.[14] It deals with rules and regulations to be observed by the members of the Buddhist order in their daily life. The Vinaya comprises three main parts : (i) Suttavibhaṅga, consisting of (a) Mahāvibhaṅga, and (b) Bhikkhuvibhaṅga. (ii) Khandaka, consisting of (a) Mahāvagga. and (b) Cullavagga. (iii) Parivāra or Parivārapātha.

The *Pātimokkha* is the main part of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. It is said that the life of a good monk "is restrained by the restraints of the Pātimokkha". (*pātimokkhasamvarasamvuto*).[15]

It contains 227 rules out of which 152 were probably original while the remainder may have been added at the time of the compilation of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. The *Suttavibhaṅga* is a commentary on the Pātimokkha.It deals with *Pārājikadhamma*, *Saṅghādisesadhamma*, *Aniyatadhamma*, *Pācittiyadhamma*, *Paṭidesanīyadhamma*, and *Sekkiyadhamma*. The *Khandhaka* is the supplement of the *Suttavibhaṅga*. It contains the special rules for admission into the order, the Buddhist ceremonies such as *Uposatha*, modes of eating, begging, dwelling etc. The *Parivāra* is of later origin. It consists of nineteen sections.

The Buddhist monachism as an institution was influenced by the Jaina monastic rules and regulations. For instance, *Vassāvāsa*, *Uposatha*, *Pavāraṇā* and rules for admission to the order, are very similar to the rules of Jaina monachism. One may, therefore, expect many references to Jainism in the

Tipiṭaka. But the direct references to Jain monachism are very few in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.

The Sutta Piṭaka is the chief source of our knowledge of the Dhamma; it is, therefore, called Dhamma. It is divided into five Nikāyas, viz. *Dīgha Majjhima*, *Saṁyutta*, *Aṅguttara* and the *Khuddaka*. The first four are mainly in prose and contain discourses, attributed to the Buddha and his disciples. The remaining Nikāya is a miscellaneous collection of smaller works, most of which are in verse. The *Dīgha Nikāya* contains the longest thirty-four Suttas arranged into three parts (Vaggas), viz. Sīlakkhandha (1-13), Mahāvagga (14-23) and Pāṭikavagga (24-34). In several Suttas of Dīgha Nikāya there are references to Jainism and particularly to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta The most significant among them are the Brahmajāla (1). Sāmaññaphala (2), Kassapasīhanāda (8), Mahāparinibbāna (16), Pātikasutta (54), Pāsādikasutta (21), Āṭānāṭīya (32), and Saṅgīti Sutta, which provide invaluable data on the life and thoughts of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. The *Majjhima Nikāya* is a collection of 152 discourses. The Cūlasīhanāda (11), Cūlasaccaka (35), Mahāsaccaka (86), Upāli (56), Kukkuravatika (55), Abhayarājkumāra (58), Dīghanakha (74), Sandaka (76), Cūlasakuladāyī (79), Devadaha (101), and Sāmagāma (104) contain references to Syādvāda and other Jaina conceptions, and are, therefore, helpful in assessing in greater detail the Buddhist attitude to Jainism. The *Saṁyutta Nikāya* and *Aṅguttara Nikāya* consist of various types of Suttas. They are older as well as later, shorter as well as longer. The *Saṁyutta* (grouped together) *Nikāya* is of 56 Saṁyuttas and atleast 2,990 Suttas with the division of five Vaggas, viz the Sagāthavagga (1-11), Nidānavagga (12-22). Khandhavagga (23-34) Saḍāyatanavagga (35-45) and Mahāvagga (45-56). Saṅkhadhammasutta, Acelakassapasutta, Acelasutta, Sattajaṭilasutta and Nānātitthiyasutta refer to Jaina ethics and philosophy. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is very similar to the Ṭhāṇāṅga of the Jainas. It deals mainly with the religious topics under the numbers from one to eleven. The number of the Suttas in the

Nikāya is about 2308 which are divided into Vaggas containing as a rule 10 Suttas each. Aṭṭhāṅgikasutta, Ānandavaggà, Tikanipāta, Tapodhamma-sutta, Vappa-sutta and Lokayatika-sutta provide some very useful data for the understanding of several ancient Jaina concepts. The *Khuddaka Nikāya* is a collection of short pieces which are both diverse and unsystematic both in content and arrangement. There is on unanimity about the pieces which belong to this Nikāya. According to the Ceylonese tradition it consists of (1) *Khuddakapāṭha*, (a collection composed of only 9 short Suttas), (2) *Dhammapada* (a collection of 423 memorial verses), (3) *Udāna* (a collection of solemn sayings of the Buddha), (4) *Itivuttaka* ("Thus-has-been-said" closely resembles the Udāna) (5) *Suttanipāta*, a very archaic in character consisting of four Vaggas. (6) *Vimānavatthu*, (7) *Petavatthu*, (8) *Theragāthā*, (9) *Therīgāthā*, *(10) Jātaka (11) Niddesa Mahāniddesa and Culla Niddesa, (12) Paṭisambhidā-magga, (13) Apadāna, (14) Buddhavaṁsa*, and *(15)* the *Cariyāpiṭaka*. Among these Udāna (Sattajaṭilasutta), Suttanipāta (Dhammikasutta), Therāpadāna, (Abhayattherāpadāna), Jātaka (Mahābodhi) and the Dhammapada have preserved some valuable references to Jainism, though somewhat late.

The *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* is a later development. It is an attempt at scholastic analysis of the Buddhist psychology and philosophy. It does not deal with systematic philosophy. It is merely a supplement to the Dhamma.[16] Abhidhamma is highly honoured particularly in Burma. It comprises the following books : (1) Dhammasaṅgaṇi (2) Vibhaṅga, (3) Kathāvatthu, (4) Puggalapaññatti, (5) Dhātukathā. (6) Yamaka and (7) the Paṭṭhāna. The Abhidhamma of the Sarvāstivādins was entirely different. There is no reference to Jainism in this Piṭaka.

The *Paritta* or *Mahāparitta* is a collection of canonical texts which is used for magical purposes. Such Paritta ceremonies are still in vogue in Ceylon and are believed to avert evil and bring about well-being and happiness.

There is another classification of the Buddhist scriptures into nine aṅgas[17] : (1) Sutta, (2) Geyya (mixed prose and verse), (3) Gāthā (verse), (4) Udāna (ecstatic utterences), (5) Veyyākaraṇa (explanation) (6) Itivuttaka (sayings beginning with the phrase "Thus-said-the-Buddha") (7) Jātaka (stories of former births of the Buddha), (8) Abbhutadhamma (stories of wonders), and (9) Vedalla (questions and answers)[18].

Besides the Canonical literature, there are some other works which were highly honoured and regarded as Extra-Canonical books, such as the *Nettipakaraṇa*, *Peṭakopadesa* and the *Milindapañha*. The first two works are regarded as canonical in Burma. There are no references to Jainism in these two works. The third one the *Milindapañha* P. 259), of course, referes to The Jain theory that water contains small insects and therefore should be used after getting it filtered and heated.

The *Tripiṭaka* consists of speeches, conversations, songs, sayings, narratives and monastic rules and regulations. The most of the Canon is placed in the mouth of the Buddha himself. But it is difficult to pick out with a certainty the actual words of the Buddha as there are in the *Tripiṭaka* contradictions, repetitions, interpolations which are characteristics of ancient religious works.

Rhys Davids[19] has given a chronological table of Buddhist literature from the Buddha's time to the time of Aśoka which is as follows :—

(i) The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.

(ii) Episodes found, in identical words, in two or more of the existing books.

(iii) The Sīlas, the Pārāyaṇa, the Octades, the Pātimokkha.

(iv) The Dīgha, Majjhim, Aṅguttare, and Saṁyutta Nikāyas.

(v) The Suttanipāta, the Thera and Therī Gāthās, the Udānas, and the Khuddakapāṭha.

(vi) The Suttavibhaṅga and the Khandhakas.

(vii) The Jātakas and the Dhammapada.

(viii) The Niddesa, the Itivuttaka and the Paṭisambhidāmagga.

(ix) The Peta-and Vimāna-Vatthus, the Apadānas, the Cariyā Piṭaka, and the Buddha-Vaṁsa.

(x) The Abhidhamma books, the last of which is the Kathāvatthu, and the earliest probably the Puggalapaññatti.

Law reviews this chronological table and concludes that it "is too catechetical, too cut and dried and too general to be accepted inspite of its suggestiveness as a sure guide to the determination of the chronology of the Pāli Canonical texts."[20] In his concluding chapter he presents his conclusions on the chronology of the Pāli Cānonical literature as follows.[21] :—

(i) The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found in the identical words in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.

(ii) Episodes found in identical words in two or more of the existing books.

(ii) The Sīlas, the Pārāyaṇa group of sixteen poems without the prologue, the Aṭṭhaka grous of four or sixteen poems, the Sikkhāpadas.

(iv) Dīgha, Vols. II and III, the Thera-Therī-gāthā, the collection of 500 Jātakas, Suttavibhaṅga, Paṭisambhidāmagga, Puggalapaññatti and the Vibhaṅga.

(v) The Mahāvagga and the Cullavagga, the Pātimokkha completing 227 rules, the vimānavatthu and Petavatthu, the Dhammapada and the Kathāvatthu.

(vi) The Cullaniddesa, the Mahāniddesa, the Udāna, the Itivuttaka, the Suttanipāta, the Dhātukathā, the Yamaka and the Paṭṭhāna.

(vii) The Buddhavaṁsa, the Cariyāpiṭaka and the Apadāna.

(viii) The Parivārapāṭha.

(ix) The Khuddakapāṭha.

On the whole we can say that the present Pāli Canonical literature must have been compiled up to the third century

B. C. In other words the Third Council is the lower limit for this purpose, though some very minor changes could have been made up to the final writing during the reign of king *Vaṭṭagāmaṇi* of Ceylon (Ist century B. C.). Law draws the conclusion that the lower limit is the last quarter of the first century B. C. His conjecture is based on the *Milindapañha* (about the first century A. D.) which refers to the fact that when it was compiled, the division of the canon into three piṭaks and five nikāyas was well established.[22] He furthere says : "The Sinhalese commentaries, the *Mahā-aṭṭhakthā*, the *Mahāpaccariya*, the *Mahā-kuruṇḍiya*, the *Andhaka* and the rest pre-supposed by the commentaries of Buddhadatta, Buddhaghosa, and Dhammapāla, point to the same fact, namely, that the Canon become finally closed sometime before the beginning of the Christian era. Thus we can safely fix the last quarter of the first century B. C., as the lower limit[23].

As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether the Canon compiled in the Third Council was indeed the same which has come down to us in the Pāli Tipiṭaka. For no one can deny that between the third century B. C. and the first century B. C. when then the writing down took place; the Tripiṭaka might have undergone many changes, especially much addition. Thus the *Pāli Tipiṭaka* as it now exists is not exactly identical with the Pāli Tipiṭaka compiled in the Third Council; but the later accretions, interpolations and amendments do not appear to be so numerous and significant as to make the present Canon less valuable as an authentic record of the life and teachings of the Buddha.

(b) Non-Canonical literature

Non-Canonical literature, as we have already stated, can be divided into four categories: (i) Aṭṭhakathās, (ii) Ṭikās, (iii) Tippaṇis, and (iv) Pakaraṇas. Out of these Non-Canonical works only a few like the Aṭṭhakathās of Buddhaghosa were found to be useful for my study. Some of the references to Jainism in Commentaries throw much light on the attitude of the later Buddhist monks to Nigaṇtha Nātaputta and some

of the impressions recorded by them do not coincide with the actual conditions as known to us from more authentic sources.

For instance, in the commentaries on[24] *Dīghanikāya* and *Majjhimanikāya*,[25] Buddhaghosa in the course of explaining the reference to the death of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta states that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta enjoined upon his followers in his last hours to accept the Buddha's teachings as he had realised the folly and futility of his doctrines. Further Buddhaghosa misunderstood the principle of *Syādvāda* and complained that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta taught his followers in two contradictory ways: to one he was supposed to have said that his doctrine was nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) and to the other that it was eternalism (*sassatavāda*). As a result, Buddhaghosa says they quarrelled violently among themselves, and the order of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta was divided into two. This reference certainly indicates the time around the fifth century when religious disputations were creating mutual misunderstanding and certain dogmas were being explained according to their own whims and fancies in order to influence the masses. Such instances are also found in Jaina literature.

Sanskirt Buddhist literature

while Pāli had been the language of Theravāda Buddhists only Sanskrit had been a medium which was utilized by both the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna Buddhists. The *Vaibhāṣika* and the *Sautrāntika* schools belong to the Hinayāna Buddhists and the *Mādhyamika* or (*Śūnyava da* and the *Yogācāra* or *Vijñanavāda* schools are of Mahāyāna Buddhists The vast litereture of these schools is available in different languages. We find there some valuable references to Jain philosophy in the works of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Dharmakirtı, Vasubandhu, Arcaṭa, Śāntarakṣita, Prajñākaragupta, Jetāri etc. who refuted the *Syādvāda* and other Jaina concepts which are dealt with in the present thesis in respective chapters. A large amount of work on Buddhist philosophy is lost and existed only in Tibetan or Chinese translation which could not be used here.

Chapter–II

JAINA PHILOSOPHY

The Six Dravyas

The term *dravya* or *padārtha* (substance) in Jainism denotes any existence which possesses the significant factor of persistence despite its numerous qualities and modifications. The Jaina theory of reality does not leave room for both an absolute permanent reality of Parmenides and an eternal flux of Heraclitus.[1] It accepts only the dynamic reality which has the three fundamental characteristics, viz. *Utpāda* (origin), *vyaya* (destruction), and *dhrauvya* (Permanence).[2]

Dravya is also the substratum of *guṇas* (qualities) and *paryāyas* (modes)[3]. There is neither quality without substance nor substance without quality.[4] *Dravya* is one as a class, and is the inherent essence of all things manifesting diverse forms,[5] In its reality it can neither be created nor destroyed; it has only permanent substantiality. But through its modes it secures the triple nature in character[6]. *Dravya* is of six kinds, namely, *Jīva* (soul), *pudgala* (matter), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest), *Ākāśa* (space) and Kāla(time) The first five types of dravyas are called *astikāyas* (those which exist and have different pradeśas or areas like a body) and the last is named *anastikāya*.[7]

According to another classification it is of three kinds, viz. *sakriya* (active), *niṣkriya* (inactive), and *sakriyaaniṣkriya* (active-inactive). The *sakriya dravyas*, which have the capacity of moving from place to place, are *pudgala* and *jīva*. The *niṣkriya dravya* is against the nature of *sakriya dravya*. It has neither direct nor indirect functional power. Space comes under this classification. *Kāla* is also included in the category of *Niṣkriya drāvyas*, though it accounts for changes in other things. *Sakriya niṣkrla dravyas* are those realities which move about without themselves undergoing changes or motion. These have merely *avagāhana* (place). The *dharma and adharma dravya*

come under this classification. *Jīva, dharma,* and *adharma* have innumerable areas or *pradeśas*, *ākāsa* has infinite pradeśas, and *pudgala* is of numerable pradeśas. *Kāla* has one pradesa.[9] These six *drāvyas* maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities, though they are mutually interpenetrating and accommodate one another and mix up to occupy the same space.[9] *Ākāśa,* *Kāla, Jīva, dharma* and *ādharma* are formless or *āmūrta* dravyas. They do not possess the sense qualities of contact, taste, smell, sound and colour. *Pudgāla* (matter) alone is *mūrta*. All the *dravyas*, except *Jīva*, are *acetana* (devoid of consciousness).[10]

In another classification, the *dravyas* or *Tattvas* are divided into seven categories, viz. *Jīva* (soul), *ajīva* (nonsoul), *āśrava* (inflow of karmic matter into the soul), *bandha* (bondage of soul by karmic matter), *saṁbara* (stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter), *nirjarā* (shedding of karmic matter), and *mokṣa* (liberation of soul from karmic matter). The seven *tattvas* are so arranged here as to provide an epitome of the Jaina doctrine of salvation. The first two, *jīva* and *ajīva* comprise the entire universe. The plight of the *Jīva* in *soṁsāra* is on account of the karmic matter which flows into it. *Saṁvara* and *nirjara* are two states in the process of liberation wherein the inflow of karmic matter is first stopped and all karmic matter is subsequently shed. The *jīvā* thus becomes completely free of karmic matter and attains mokṣa. These seven *tattvas* are *eternal* and "*sat*".[11]

(i) Jīva (soul)

The Jaina theory of soul, though fundamentally similar to the concept of soul in other philosophical schools, is still different from them in certain respects. Soul is eternal, uncreated and beginningless. There is no controversy on this point. The controversial point is its nature. The *Saṁhitās* of the *Ṛigvedā*[12] and *Athārvaveda*[13] state about the nature of the soul that when a man dies, it goes to the world of his forefathers and stays with ceaseless perfect life. The *Sataptha Brāhmaṇa*[14] points out that it is enjoyer of good or evil deeds. The *Upaniṣads* are against

its plural form[15]. According to the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*[16], it is eternal and distinct from body. *Avidyā* is the cause of wandering into birth[17]. Further, Gaudapada says that it is one and neither born nor created. *Māyā* (illusion) is the cause of appearance of births. Śaṅkara follows Gauḍapāda's view, saying "It is due to māyā, pure and simple, that the Great Self (*Ātman*) appears as the threefold states (viz. walking, dreaming and dreamless sleep) even as a rope appears as a snake and the like."[18]

Both the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems are practically one.[19] *Sāṅkhya* presents the doctrfnes while the Yoga prescribes certain practices for the sake of their spiritual development'. The soul in these philosophies is accepted in the form of puruṣa, but it is said to be absolutely non-active or unattached to *prakṛti* or matter and *Puruṣa* is unaffected by the vicissitudes of the *Prakṛti*[20].

According to the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy, the soul itself is responsible for its deeds. Its is eternal and possesses the non-eternal qualities such as consciousness, desire etc. *Jñāna* (knowledge) is distinct from soul and it obtains the capacity of knowing by association with itself. That means *Jñāna* is devoid of knowing power by nature[21].

The Buddha, on the other hand, declined to answer the nature of soul as he felt that it is not indispensible for the removal of suffering. The entire universe in his view is a bundle of Khandhaas, viz. *rūpa* (body), *vedanā* (feeling) *saññā* (perception), *saṅkhāra* (aggregates), and *viññāṇa* (consciousness). All things including even soul are analysed into the elements that can be perceived in them. All things are devoid of soul, just as a chariot is nothing but a congregation of wheel, frame, etc. "I" or "Mine" should not be attached with mundane affairs if one wants to attain salvation. Hence this view is named *ānattā* in Buddism.[22]

Jainism considers soul as the central figure. Its perfect knowledge (*Bhedajñana* or *Ātmajñāna*) is essential to destroy

karmas and attain salvation.[22] The nature of soul in Jainism is to be understood from the standpoint of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*). From the real standpoint (*niścayanaya*), soul is absolutely pure possessing the nature of knowledge and vision (*ahameko khalu siddho dāṁsaṇamiyo sadrūpi*)[24]. It is regarded to be without smell, without sound, not an object of *anumānā* (inference), without any definite bodily shape, imperceptible and intangible and is characterised by consciousness[25]. Ācārya Nemicandra points out that the soul is characterised by *upayoga* (consciousness), is formless (*amutti*), is an agent (*kattā*), has the same extent as its own body (*sadehaparimāṇa*), is the enjoyer of the fruits of karma (*bhottā*), exists in world (*saṁsārattho*), is siddha (*siddho*) and has the characteristic upward motion (*vissasoḍḍhagai*) :

Jīvo ubaogamao amutti kattā sadehaparimāṇo.

Bhottā saṁsārattho siddho so vissasoḍḍhagai[26]

Thus we have seen that the nature of soul in Jainism is dual in character. According to the realistic standpoint, it remains the same under all states, while according to the practical standpoint, it is transformed into modes and thus becomes different in number, place, form, etc.

(ii) Pudgala (matter)

Things perceived or enjoyed by the senses, bodies, mind, karma, and the other material objects are called *Pudgala* (matter) [27]. They can be touched tasted, smelt, and have colour. *Śabda* (sound produced by various means). *bandha* (union caused by man or otherwise), *saukṣmya* (fineness), *sthaulya* (grossness) *saṁsthāna* (figure), *bheda* (division), *tamas* (darkness), *chāyā* (shade) and *ātapa* (sun-shine) are the forms of Pudgala. It has two prominent forms, namely atoms (aṇu) and molecule (*skandhas*)[28]. They unite together to construct reality.

The nature of the universe in Jainism is based on the nature of reality which possesses triple characteristics, *utpāda, vyaya* and *dhrauvya*. The things that exist cannot be

destroyed and the things that do not exist cannot be originated from a realistic standpoint, but they get transformed into their own attributes and modes from a practical point of view.[29] This system of realities results in the universe being infinite as well as eternal in character. The entire universe, according to Jainism, is a compendium of the six *Dravyas* which are a permutation and combination of atoms. The atom in Jainology is the smallest unitary part of *pudgala*. It is characterised by its internal cohesion (*sneha*) and indivisible unity. A molecule (*aṇu*), a kombination of atoms, results in an aggregate of matter (*skandha*)[30]. *Aṇui* s an indivisible entity and cannot be perceived by ordinary men.

Pudgala dravya is always transformed into *skandha* and *paramāṇu*. The *upādāna kāraṇa* (substantive cause) and the *nimitta kāraṇa* (external cause) are responsible for these modifications. For instance, in the manufacturing of a pot, clay is the substantive cause and the potter, stick, water, etc. are external c uses. Each and every entity runs through these two causes and gets its similar modes.

Thus the universe in Jaina philosophy is undivided, uncreated, eternal, self-existent, and infinite from realistic standpoint; while from a practical standpoint of its inter-related parts it is transitory, phenomenal, evanescent, and finite. This theory rejects all the other theories based on the absolute standpoint such as *Kālavāda*, *Svabhāvavāda*, *Niyativāda*, *Yadṛcchāvāda*, *Puruṣavāda*, *Iśvarvāda*, *Bhūtavāda*, etc.

The doctrine of karman seems to have developed against these doctrines of creation. According to Jainism, the vibrations (*yoga*) and the passions (*kaṣāyas*) of soul attract karmic matter and transform it into karmic body. Soul is pure in its intrinsic nature. The relation of karmas is a cause that makes its cycling into births. This is the nature of bondage. Soul, which is *amūrtá* (spiritual), is affected by karmas which are *mūrta* (material). This concrete association of the spiritual and the material leads to the existence of universe, which is beginningless. The material karman (*dravyakarman*) is a *āvaraṇa* (cover) which brings about the *bhāvakarman* (its spirtiual

couterpart) that is called *doṣa* like privation and perversion. This is the mutual relation as cause and effect of both these karmas.

Karmas are classified into eight main types, viz. (1) Jnānāvaraṇa (knowledge-obscuring), (2) Darśanāvaraṇa (vision-obscuring). (3) Vedanīya (feeling-producing). (4) Mohanīya (deluding). (5) Āyu (longevity determining). (6) Nāma (body-making). (7) Gotra (status determining, and (8) Antarāya (obstructive).

These karmas are sub-divided into one hundred and forty eight which may be seen in detail in the *Gomaṭṭasāra Karmakāṇḍa* etc.

The inflow of karmic matter into the soul is called *Āśrava* and the bondage of the soul by karmic matter is called *Bandha* in Jainism Both are related mutually to each other as cause and effect. *Āśrava* is the antecedent and anterior cause of bondage. The stoppage of inflow of karmic matters into the soul is called *Saṁvara* and the shedding of karmic matters by the soul is called *Nirjarā*. Evil thoughts and miseries lead to a suffering in the world as well as in hell. The happiness of heaven is also insignificant when we compare it to the happiness of salvation.[31]

Thus the *Saṁvara* and *Nirjarā* lead to the destruction of the karmas and reveal the purity of self, which is called *Mokṣa.* Umāsvāmi says that Mokṣa is a state of freedom from all karmic matter owing to the destruction of the cause of bondage and to the shedding of the karmas[32]. Pūjyapāda in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* defines *mokṣa* "as the state of the highest condition of purification, unthinkable inherent attitude of knowledge and unobstructed bliss, of a soul which becomes totally free from the defect of karmic dirt and is liberated from the body[33].

(3-4) Dharma and Adharma :

Dharma and *adharma* dravyas convey special meanings in Jainism. *Dharma* is accepted as a kind of Ether which

helps us in motion. *Pudgala* and *Jīva* move with the help of *dharma* as fish move with the help of water. *Adharma* is the exact opposite of *dharma*. It assists *pudgalas* and *jīvas* in staying as ashadow assists travellers to rest[34].

(5) Ākāsa Dravya :

Ākāśa in Jainism provides a place for all substances to exist. It is said to be *anantapradeśī* (possessing infinite pradeśas), *amūrtika* (having a non-physical factor), and *niṣkriya* (inactive), and *sāvayavī* (having parts). It is of two kinds, *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*. The former is co-extensive with the dravyas, whereas the latter is devoid of this characteristic. *Loka* consists of three divisions, *Urdhvaloka* (upper world), *Madhyaloka* (middle world), and *Adholoka* (lower world). They are the abodes of celestial beings, men and other creatures, and the inmates of hell. Beyond this *Lokākāśa* which is said to be eternal, infinite, formless, without activity and perceptible only by the omniscient[35].

(6) Kāla Dravya :

Kāla in Jainism is divided into two categories, *Vyavahārakāla* and *Pāramārthikakāla*. The former helps to change substances into their modes and the latter is understood from continuity. Time is not an apppearance but a reality since we experience it in the form of hours, minutes etc.[36]

The Six Dravyas in Buddhist Literature :

The references to six dravyas of Jainism are found in the Pāli Canon as well as in later Sanskrit Buddhist literature. They are however, not referred to in a systematic order.

(1) The Jaina Conception of Soul (Jīva).

In the course of a conversation with Sākya Mahānāma, the Buddha speaks of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's doctrine as follows :

"If there is an evil deed that was formerly done by you, get rid of its consequences by severe austerity. To keep away from evil deeds in the future, one should exercise for the control of body (*kāyena saṁvuta*), control of speech (*vācāya*

saṁvuta), and control of thought (*manasāsaṁvutā*). Thus by burning up, by making an end of former deeds, by the non-doing of new deeds, there is no transmission of modes in the future for him. From there being no transmission in future is the destruction of deeds (*āyatiṁ anavassavo*), from the destruction of deeds is the destruction of ill, from the destruction of ill is the destruction of feeling, from the destruction of feeling all ill become worn away." The Buddha says further, "That is approved by us; it is pleasing to us : therefore we are delighted[37] "

This is a comprehensive introduction to the seven states or *Tattvas* of the Jainas. The thoughts of *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputtā* represented in this passage are as follows :

(i) The existence of Soul.

(ii) Sukha or Duḥkha is due to previous karmas done.

(iii) By ascetic practices with right knowledge one could get rid of the effects of karmic matter.

(iv) On the complete stoppage of karmic matter, Dukkhas would be arrested, and without dukkha there would be no *Vedanā* (feeling), and the absence of Vedanā leads to the end of dukkhas and this is called mokṣa. Here the first point represents *Jīva* and *ajīva*, the second represents the *āśrava* and the *bandha*, and the third point stands for *saṁvarā* and *nirjarā*, and the last corresponds to *Mokṣa*.

The *Brahmajālasutta* in the *Dīghanikāya* refers to the sixty-two contemporary philosophical views which fall into two categories namely *Pubbantānudiṭṭhi* indicating the ultimate beginningless of things concerned with the ultimate past on eighteen grounds, and the *aparantānudiṭṭhi* concerned with the future on forty-four grounds. All the current views of that time have been classified into these two groups, as the Buddha himself says that there is no other conception beyond them (*natthi ito bahiddhā*).[38]

According to *Pubbantānudiṭṭhis*, the views about the beginning of things in eighteen ways are as follows[39] :

(i) Some *(sassatavādīs)* hold in four ways that the soul *(attā)* and the universe *(loka)* are eternal.

(ii) Some *(Ekaccasassatavādīs)* hold in four ways that the soul and universe are in some respects eternal and in some not.

(iii) Some *(antānantavādīs)* hold that the universe is finite or infinite or finite and infinite, or neither finite nor infinite.

(iv) Some (*amarāvikkhepavādīs*) wriggle like eels in four ways and refuse a clear answer.

(v) Some (*adhiccasamuppannavādīs*) assert in two ways that the soul and the universe have arisen without a cause.

In the context of showing the *aparantānudiṭṭhis*[40] (views about the future), the Buddha mentions them in forty-four ways :

(i) Some (*Uddhamāghātanikā saññīvādīs*) hold in sixteen ways that the soul is conscious after death.

(ii) Some (*Uddhamāghātanikā asaññīvādīs*) hold in eight ways that it is unconscious after death.

(ii) Some (*Uddhamāghātanikā nevasaññī-nāsaññīvādīs*) hold in eight ways that it is neither conscious nor unconscious after death.

(iv) Some (*Ucchedavādīs*) hold in seven ways the annihilation of the soul.

(v Some (*diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādīs*) hold that *nibbāna* consists in the enjoyment of this life in five ways, either in the pleasures of sense or in one of the four trances.

Out of these conceptions, the theories of *Uddhamāghātanikā saññīvādā* should be mentioned here, according to which the soul is conscious and eternal. The Buddha says : "There are brethren, recluses and Brāhmaṇas who maintain in sixteen ways, that the soul after death is conscious and it is not a subject to decay. "The sixteen ways are as follows[41] :

(i) Soul has form *(rūpī attā hoti arogo paraṁ maraṇā saññī)*.

(ii) Soul is formless (*arūpī attā hoti arogo paraṁ maraṇā*).

(iii) Soul has and has not form (*rūpī ca arūpī attā hoti.*).

(iv) neither has nor has not form (*nevarūpi nārūpi attā hoti*).

(v) is finite (*antavā attā hoti*).

(vi) is infinite (*anantavā attā hoti*).

(vii) is both (*antavā ca anantavā ca attā hoti*).

(viii) is neither (*nevantavā nānantavā ca attā hoti*).

(ix) has one mode of consciousness (*ekattasaññi attā hoti*).

(x) has various modes of consciousness (*nānāttasaññi attā hoti*).

(xi) has limited consciousness (*parittasaññi attā hoti*).

(xii) has infinite consciousness (*appamānasaññi attā hoti*),

(xiii) is altogether happy (*ekāntasukhi attā hoti*).

(xiv) is altogether miserable (*ekāntadukkhi attā hoti*).

(xv) is both (*sukhadukkhi attā hoti*).

(xvi) is neither (*adukkhamasukh*) *attā hoti*).

A list of sixteen theories regarding the nature of soul is also referred to in the *Udāna*[42]. The topics listed there are said to be debated by many *Samaṇas* and *Brahmaṇas*, and they are the same type of conception of the soul as we find in the section of *Uddhamāghātanıkā saññīvādā*. The same points are also treated somewhat differently in the list of undetermined questions[43]. There are several other places also in Pāli literature where such questions had been discussed[44].

Out of these views mentioned above, the thoughts of *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* can be detected. As we have already seen, Buddhaghosa thought that Jainism was a combination of eternalism and nihilism. If this is due to an early Buddhist tradition, the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's views might have been recorded in Pāli Literature under these two sections. The *sassatavāda* indicates the eternality of soul which should have been mentioned from the realistic standpoint and Ucchedavāda points out the non-eternality of soul which should have been explained from practical standpoint. That means soul is eternal and having consciousness according to *niścayanaya*, and it is non-eternal and is a subject to change in its modifications from the viewpoint of *vyavahāranaya*. It is also pointed out

that soul is extended over all parts of body which is very similar to the view of Jainas. Jainism is also of view that soul is formless and is possessed of consciousness[45]. Buddhaghosa also refered to this view of Jainas[46].

Poṭṭhapāda[47] describes the theories of *attā* (soul) as follows :

(i) *Attā* has a form and is composed of the four elements enjoying food. This is the theory of material soul (*Olārikaṁ kho, ahaṁ bhante, attānaṁ pacccemi rūpiṁ cātumahābhūtikaṁ kabalikārāhārabhakkhaṁ ti*).

(ii) *Attā* is made of mind (*manomaya*) comprising all parts and not devoid of sense-organs (*manomayaṁ kho ahaṁ bhante, attānaṁ paccemi sabbaṅgapaccaṅgiṁ ahinindriyaṁ ti*).

(iii) *Attā* is formless and with consciousness (*arūpiṁ kho ahaṁ, bhante, attānaṁ paceemi saññāmayaṁ ti*).

(iv) Consciousness is different from Attā (*aññā vā saññā aññā vā attā ti*).

Out of these theories, Guruge is of view that the first theory probably belongs to the Jainas, for Jainism flourished in the same region where the Buddha was active[48]. As a matter of fact, this theory belongs to the Cārvāka philosophy according to which soul, like body, is a congregation of the four elements[49]. No such view is accepted by Jaina philosophy. The third view can be, of course, recognised as the Jaina theory of soul, for soul in Jainism is accepted, as we have already seen, formless and conscious.

Vasubandhu mentions that according to the Jainas, the soul is eternal by nature, and it makes extension according to the body[50].

The *Catuḥśataka* also pointed out that according to some philosophers the soul is spread over the entire body. It shrinks and extends according to the dimensions of the body of man or animal. Therefore, a bee, bird, elephant, etc. have their souls in proportion to their bodies[51]. This view mentioned in the

Catuhśataka is definitely related to the Jaina theory of soul. Umāsvāti says that by the contraction and expansion of the pradeśas, the soul expands according to the body, as the light from a lamp gets expansion and contraction according to the room. That is the reason why a soul can occupy the space represented by an ant or an elephant[52].

Acārya Śāntarkṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* wrote a separate chapter entitled *Ātma Parīkṣā* or the examination of Soul. He there refuted most of the relevant theories. In this context he established the theory of soul according to the Jainas and then refuted it on the basis of the doctrine of momentariness of Buddhism.

The theory of soul, according to the Jainas, as he described, has been established through *Dravyārthikanaya* (substance point of view) and *Paryāyārthikanaya* (successive factors point of view). He says : the soul has the characteristic of consciousness only (*cillakṣaṇa evātmā*). In the form of substance, it remains the same under all states (*anugatātmaka* or comprehensive) by nature, while in the form of successive factors, being distinct with each state, it is exclusive in its nature (*vyāvṛtyātmaka*). This two-fold character of soul is cognised by direct perception, and does not stand in need of being proved by other evidence. Thus consciousness which continues to exist through all states, even though these states are diverse, is a form of pleasure and rest, from the substance standpoint, while the successive factors consist of the diverse states which appear one after the other ; and all these are distinctly perceived[53].

Śāntarakṣita further explains the above view of Jainas stating on behalf of them that if the substance were absolutely different from the successive factors, then no difference in it would be possible; because on the ground of their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held to be one. As a matter of fact, however, the two are different as regards number and other factors. For instance, the difference regarding number is that the substance is one, while the successive

factors are many. By nature, one is comprehensive, while the other is distributive. In number, a jar, for example, is one, while its colour and the rest are many. In this way, their functions, etc. are also different. Thus substance is not absolutely different from the successive factors. Therefore, soul and its modes are also not absolutely different. Having the characteristic of conciousness, it is eternal and constant from the view of substance, while from the view of successive factors it changes in its modes such as pleasure, pain, etc[54].

The Jainas try to convince the opponents by presenting the example of *Narasiṁha*. They say that, like *Narasiṁha*, there is no self-contradiction in the dual characteristic of soul. For, the soul is impartiate (*nirbhāga*); therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately[55].

The theory of soul in Jainism, as referred to by Śāntarakṣita, is also referred to by Arcaṭa in his *Hetubinduṭīkā*[56]. The arguments submitted to refute the theory also are similar. The main defect, according to them, in this theory, is the self-contradiction, which is not accepted by the Jainas. Śāntarakṣita urged that one entity cannot have two forms. He puts forward two points in support of his view. He says if there is an unmodified substance in connection with successive factors, there is no difference in it, and in that case, it is not liable to be modified[57]. Oneness between substance and its modes will involve the substance to be distributed like the forms of successive factors or the successive factors themselves would be mixed into the substance. Hence there would be no difference between them and the theory will be disproved[58]. As regards *Narasiṁha*, he says, it is an aggregate of many atoms, that is why it seems dual in nature (*anekāṇusamūhātmā sa tathaiva pratīyate*).[59] Thus Śāntarakṣita, as well as Arcaṭa[60], refutes the theory on the ground that one cannot have two forms. Otherwise the eternality and the dual nature would be both untrue and unreliable.

As a matter of fact, the dual characteristic of soul is based on the standpoint of non-absolutism which is ignored by the

Buddhist philosophers. The view of Jainas against these objections will be discussed in the chapter on *Syādvāda.* Moreover, we can point out here that there is no self-contradiction in the dual characteristic of soul provided we conceive the problem through Non-absolutistic standpoint.

(2) Ajīva or Pudgala (matter) : Nature of Karmas

The mundane soul attract the karmas and then they stand towards each other in relationship of phenomenal conjunction. This relation, according to Jainism, is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation. Soul and Karmas can be dissociated as they are two separate entities.

Pāli Literature cantains some valuable references to the Jaina doctrine of Karma. *Triyoga* is the most significant aspect of Jaina ethics in that it explains the origin of karmas and their attachment to the soul through the three means of word, deed, and thought. This is also called the *tridaṇḍa Karma*[61]. The Buddha also recognises the *tridaṇḍa* Karma but in a somewhat different way. It is well know how the Buddha generally gave new meanings to old philosophical and ethical terms and taught new doctrines based on them. The famous *triyoga* or *tridaṇḍa* doctrine was originally a Jaina dogma. The Buddha himself has ascribed it to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta before refuting it. He asks a Nigaṇṭha named Dīghatapassī in Nālandā ashow many kinds of wrong doings bring about evil effects according to the teaching of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta ? Dīghatapassī replied that the *Kāyadaṇḍa* is most heinous[62],

Here, *daṇḍa* means *duccarita* or wrong behaviour in body, speech and thought, which brings misery and distress to the mundane soul. The Buddha recognised *kāyakamma, Vacīkamma* and *Manokamma* in place of *kāyadaṇḍa, vacīdaṇḍā* and *manodaṇḍa.* The dispute between the Buddha and the Jainas on the use of *Kamma* and *Daṇḍa* is apparently due to the distinct connotation the term *Karma* has to each system. To the Buddhist it signifies volitional action while to the Jaina it is the endproduct of action which clings on to the soul in a material form. Both *Daṇḍa* and *Kamma* have the same meaning in

Jainism. The use of the word *Daṇḍa* in the sense of Kamma can be seen in the *Ṭhāṇāṅga* (3. 126).

The more important difference of opinion between the Buddha and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta relates to the relative ethical significance of deed, word and thought. Which is the most heinous of all : deed, word or thought ? The Buddha says that the most heinous is thought (*manodaṇḍa*) while Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is said to have held deed (*kāyadaṇḍa*) to be the worst.

The reference in *Upāli Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* to this dispute gives the impression that the Nigaṇṭhas did not realise the importance of the mind or *Manodaṇḍa*. It is really not so and it needs further clarification. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta did not, at any stage, envisage bodily action which is devoid of intention and volition. Involuntary acts-such as mistakes and accidents do not fall within the purview of *Kāyadṇḍa*. Only such action as is preceded by thought is *Kāyadaṇḍa* and the true significance of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's attitude to three-fold action can be conveyed when *kāyadaṇḍa* is translated and understood not as mere bodily action but as "thought converted into action."

Ācārya Kundakunda condemned asceticism, if it is unaccompanied by intention (*bhāva*). The guilt or otherwise of an action depends on the nature and intensity of thought and intention. If one is ever thinking of causing harm to another, he is guilty of malicious thought even though he does not actually cause any injury, while another, who, with no intention of causing any injury, becomes unconsciously the instrument of injury, should not be morally held responsible for that act. For instance, a burglar who fails in robbing after attempting to do so, is to be punished as a felon; and a surgeon, even though his patient may die during an operation skillfully performed with all attention, is not held responsible for such a death[63]. But if any wrong is intentionally committed, he is, of course, more responsible and blamble for such "wrong" than he who merely harbours malicious thought but does not actually cause any injury :

Avidhāyāpi hi hiṁsā hiṁsāphalabhājanaṁ bhavatyekaḥ.
Kṛtvā 'pyaparo hiṁsā hiṁsāphalabhājanaṁ na syāt[64].

Thus in Jainism the Kāyadaṇḍa is worse than either *Manodaṇḍa* or *Vacīdaṇḍa*. The Buddha indicated the same idea but defined its characteristics in a different manner. This is one area where the two do not really disagree. Jainism, like Buddhism, is a religion that gives importance to intention before an ethical judgement is made of any action.

Another reference in this connection is found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* where *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* is designated *kriyāvādī* (activist), while the Buddha is said to be both *kriyāvādī* and *akriyāvādi*. An episode relates how Sīha, the General of Licchavīs, asked for permission to meet the Buddha, and how Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta did not allow him to do so saying that the Buddha taught the *akriyāvāda* However, Sīha decided to meet the Buddha and varified at once whether he is *akriyāvādī*. In response to this question the Buddha said that he is both *Kriyāvādī* and *akriyāvādī*. He is *akriyāvādī* in the sense that he taught beings how to abstain from evil actions, and he is *kriyāvādī* in the sense that he taught them how to perform good deeds. The Buddha's reply is as follows :—

"There is a way in which one might say of me that the ascetic Gotama holds the principle of non-action, teaches the doctrine of non-action, and by this leads his disciples; and there is a way in which one might rightly say of me that the ascetic Gotama holds the principle of action ? I proclaim the non-doing of various kinds of wicked and evil things. And how might one say of me that the ascetic Gotama holds the principle of action ? I proclaim the doing of good conduct of body, speech, and thought. I proclaim the doing of various kinds of goods things[65]."

The question arises here as to why *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta* criticised the Buddha as an *Akiryāvādī* ? and why the Buddha gave an answer like this ? The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* includes Buddhists among the *Akriyāvādins*, since they do not accept the exis-

tence of soul and hence deny karman as well[66]. Further it describes the types of *Akriyāvāda* as follows[67].

(i) On the dissolution of the five elements, i. e. earth, water, fire, wind, air, living beings cease to exist. On the dissolution of body the individual ceases to be. Everybody has an individual soul. The soul exists as long as the body exists.

(ii) When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul, which acts or causes to act (*SūKṛ*. i.1.1.33.).

(iii) There are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance. These six substances are imperishable.

(iv) Pleasure, pain, and final beatitude are not caused by the souls themselves, but the individual souls experience them.

(v) The world has been created or is governed by the gods. It is produced from chaos. (*SūKṛ*. 1.1.3.5.8).

(vi) The world is boundless and eternal.

All these views are reduced to four main types that correspond to those associated in the *Pāli Nikāyas* with four leading thinkers of the time, e. g. atheism like that of Ajita, eternalism like that of Kātyāyana, absolutism like that of Kāśyapa and fatalism like that of Gosāla.

The types of *Kriyāvāda* that do not come up to the standard of Jainism are the following :

(i) The soul of a man who is pure will become free from bad karma on reaching beatitude but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hatred.

(ii) If a man with the intention of killing a body hurts a gourd mistaking it for a baby, he will be guilty of murder. If a man with the intention of roasting a gourd roasts a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder.

But this definition of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* is also not altogether an adequate summary of the doctrine of *Kriyāvāda* and *Akriyāvāda*. In another place the same work presents the characteristics in a better way. It says : the *Kriyāvāda* teaches that the soul exists, acts, and is affected by acts, and this held by

the Jainas in common with the Vaiśeṣikas and Nyāya schools. The *Akriyāvāda* means a doctrine, according to which the soul does not act or is not effected by acts. It is held, according to the Jaina view, by the Buddhists in common with the Vedānta, Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools[68]. It is, therefore, in the light of the negation of a soul by the Buddha that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta called him an *Akriyāvādin*.

Śīlaṅka appears to hold that the Buddhists fall into the *akriyāvāda* category, for they denied the existence of a soul. But, as a matter of fact, the mere denial of the existence of a soul does not mean that Buddhism should be included into *akriyāvāda*. The Buddha believes fully in moral responsibilities and the ethical consequences of both good and bad acts, words, and thoughts. He fully accepted the doctrine of karma which governs the cycles of rebirth. Apparently the Jainas were not fully aware of these facts of Buddhist ethics. But it is somewhat surprising as the contemporary philosophers should have known that the Buddha himself criticised bitterly the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla, a contemporary nihilist, on the ground of *akriyāivāda*.

Another reference to the karma doctrine of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is found in the *Majjhima Nikāya*. According to that the inflow of karmas can be stopped by performing severe penance with right knowledge[69]. The familiarity with the karma theory of Jainas can also be traced in the Mahābodhi Jātaka[70]. It is said there that once the Bodhisattva was born in the family of a Brāhmaṇa. When he came of age, he renounced the world and became a mendicant and lived at the Himālayas. During the rainy season he came down and going on his begging rounds he gradually approached Benaras. There he took up his abode in the royal park, and on the following day he got his meal from the king. Afterwards, the king had a hut of leaves built for him and used to come to pay his respect to the mendicant daily thrice a day. And so twelve years passed.

Now the king had five counsellors who advised him on temporal and spiritual matters. One of them denied the existence of cause (karma). Another believed everything was the act of a Supreme Being. A third professed the doctrine of previous actions. A fourth believed in annihilation at death. A fifth held the Kṣatriya doctrine. He who denied the cause taught the people that existence in this world was purified by rebirth. He who believed in the action of Supreme Being taught that the world was created by him. He who believed in the consequences of previous acts taught that sorrow or joy that befalls man here is the result of some previous action. The believer in annihilation taught no one passed hence to another world, but that this world is annihilated. He who professed the kṣatriya creed taught that one's own interest is to be desired even as the cost of killing one's parents. These men were appointed to sit in judgement in the king's court and being greedy of bribes they dispossessed the rightful owner of property.

Out of these, the third counsellor seems to have represented the thoughts of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta who preached that all things happened in life are due to the previous karmas. Such previous karmic matter, though present, begin to operate only when they become mature and then they produce corresponding psychic states through which they bind the self[71].

The Bodhisattva of the *Mahābodhi Jātaka* critcised this theory along with other theories belonging to the five counsellors of the king. It is said there that while he accepted the offer of the king to be judge of his court, he became very popular within a short period The five counsellors got angry with him and tried to convince the king that the Bodhisattva was seeking sovereignty. Hence the king diminished the honours paid to him and made plans to slay him. The Bodhisattva came to know all these things and went again towards the Himālaya.

The five counsellors in order to prevent him from coming again in the city publicised that the Bodhisattva with

the help of queen wanted to slay the king. As a result, the queen was put to death. Hence the sons became enemies of the king. In the meantime the Bodhisattva came to know this conspiracy and came to the city to save the life of the king. He entered a frontier village and after eating the flesh of a monkey given to him by the inhabitants he begged for its skin which he had dried in his hermit's hut. He went then to the city of Benares and had himself seated in the park on the monkey's skin. The King with his counsellors came to see him. without any response the Bodhisattva began to rub the monkey's skin. The king asked why he was doing so ? The Bodhisattva replied that the monkey was very useful to me but I ate its flesh. The counsellors thought that this man is guilty of taking the life of a monkey. The Boddhisatva, addressing one by one, denied their charge and criticised their theories.

The third counsellor's theory which is supposed to have represented Jainism is criticised as follows :

From former action still both bliss and woe again :
This monkey pays his debt, to wit, his former sin :
Each acts a debt discharged, where then does guilt come in ?
If such the creed thou holdst and this be doctrine true,
Then was my action right when I that monkey slew.
Couldst thou but only see him sinful is thy creed.
Thou wouldst no longer then with reason blame my deed[72].

The Majjhima Nikāya[73] also supports the Jaina theory of Karmas. According to the Jaina Āgamas, Soul enjoys all sorts of fruits of Karmas done[74]. As regards the criticism of this theory made by the Buddha, it does not provide any substantial argument. Moreover the *Mahābodhi Jātaka* is a later development of the Jātaka literature. Śīlāṅka refers to only 500 Jātaka stories belonging to the Jātakas[57], which shows its nature of development.

In the *Aṅguttara Nikāyā*[76] the same idea is found in traditional doctrines of inaction (*tiṇimāni bhikkhave titthāyatanāni yāni paṇḍitehi samanuyuñjiyamānāni akiriyāya Saṇṭhahanti*). They are as follows :—

(i) There are certain recluses and the Brāhmaṇas who hold the view that "whatever happiness or misery or neutral feeling is experienced, all that is due to some previous action (*yaṁ kiṁ cāyaṁ purisapuggalo paṭisaṁvedeti sukhaṁ vā dukkhaṁ vā adukkhamasukhaṁ vā sabbaṁ taṁ pubbekatahetū 'ti*)

(ii) all the pleasure and misery are due to a Supreme Deity *(issaranimmānahetn*).

(iii) Others teach that all such pleasure and misery are uncaused and unconditioned (*ahetu appaccayā*).

Out of these three theories the first is undoubtedly related to the doctrine of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Criticising this view, the Buddha pointed out that owing to previous actions, men will become murderers, stealers, unchaste, liars, etc. For those who fall back on past deeds as the essential cause of present action, there is neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor would they consider it to do this deed or abstain from that deed. The necessity for action or inaction not being found to exist in truth, the term Samana cannot reasonably be applied to yourselves, since you live in a state of bewildering with faculties unwarded[77].

Here the argument raised by the Buddha against the first theory is that if all is due to the previous karmas, then it is not essential to make effort to abstain from them. This conception might have been known to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta when he accused the Buddha as an *Akriyāvādī* (Non-actionist.) Ācārya Kundakunda[78] is of opinion that all the previously bound karmic matters operate only when they become mature. The Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta prescribed severe penance with perfect knowledge to destroy the karmas. The Buddha himself, as we have already seen, expresses his satisfaction with regard to the theory[79].

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[80] describes the six breeds *(chaḷābhijāti*) as the different categories of beings, as declared by Pūrṇa Kassapa. They are,

(i) black breed (*kaṇhābhijāti paññattā*) category includes the mutton-butchers, hunters jailers etc.

(ii) blue breed (*nīlābhijāti paññattā*) includes the monks who live as though with a thorn in the side, and all others who profess the deed and doing so (*bhikkhu kaṇṭakavuttika ye vā pana aññepi keci kammavādā kiriyavādā*).

(iii) the third is the red breed (*lohitābhijāti paññattā*), the category to which Niganṭhas belong;

(iv) the fourth is yellow breed (*haliddābhijāti*) which includes the white-robed householders and followers of the Ājīvikas;

(v) fifth is the white breed (*sukkābhijāti*), which includes the Ājīvikas.

(vi) the last is the purest white (*paramasukkābhijāti*) in which Pūraṇa kassapa is included.

The Buddha hears of this division from Ānanda to whom later on he declares the six breeds according to his own conception. These six divisions are mainly divided into two divisions, black and white. This division is based on the good and bad karmas of man. The Jainas also have about the same division into six categories, but they are not mentioned in Pāli literature. The Jainas have the particular word Leśyā for such division.

The *Leśyas* are different stages of soul influenced by different karmas and activities of mind They are classified into six main types, viz. *kṛṣṇa* (black), *nīla* (blue), *kāpota* (grey), *pita* (yellow), *padma* (pink) and *śukla*[81] (white). These are nothing but the states of beings based on their activities of mind. The *kṛṣṇa* is the worst leśyā of the first three and the *pīta* is the least pure of the latter three leśyās. According to another division, these six divisions are classified into two divisions, *dravyaleśyā* and *bhāvaleśyā*. This is similar to the classification made by the Buddha and the Yogaśāstra.[82] Since the conception of leśyās is not mentioned in the Pāli Canon, we can say that it may have originated later in Jainology as an imitation of Śramaṇa traditions.

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[83] describes three kinds of *yoga* (*manasa*, *vacana* and *kāya*) which cause the inflow of the karmic matter into the soul due to ignorance (*avijjā*). It is said there that at Kapilavatthu, Vappa[84], a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta went to visit Moggalāyana. Moggalāyana asked Vappa "There is some one here, Vappa, restrained in body, speech and thought owing to the waning of ignorance and the arising of knowledge (*kāyena, saṁvuto, vācāya saṁvuto, manasā saṁvuto avijjāvirāgā vijjuppādā*). He then asked Vappa whether he perceives any cause owing to which the āsavas causing pain would flow upon the man at some future time. (*passasi no tvaṁ, vappa, tam ṭhāṇaṁ yato nidānaṁ purisaṁ dukkhavedanīyā āsavā assaveyyuṁ abhisamparāyaṁ 'ti*). Vappa then replied "Sir, I do see such reason. There may be in this case a certain evil deed whose fruit has not yet ripened, owing to the *āsavas* causing pain might flow in upon that man at some future time (*passamahaṁ bhante, tam ṭhaṇaṁ idhassa bhante pubbe-pāpakammam katam avipakkavipākaṁ tato nidānaṁ purisam dukkhavedanīya āsava assaveyyum abhisamparāyaṁ*). At this juncture, the Buddha came there and having a conversation he asked Vappa "As to these *āsavās* which come about as a result of bodily activities, in the case of one who sustains from bodily activities that causes vexation and distress, it follows that those āsavas causing pain do not exist in him. He does not do fresh deeds, as to his former deed, he wears it out of constant contact with it, by a wearing out that is plain to see, not just for a time, one that asks for inspection that leads onward a wearing out that can be understood by the intelligent each for himself. The same is repeated in the context of *vacīsamārambhapaccaayā* and *manosamārambhapaccayā*. The Buddha repeated thrice this question. Upāli answered it in the words "that cannot be". Further, the Buddha explained his views. He said : "Vappa, by the monk, whose heart is perfectly released, six constant abiding-states (*satata-vihārā*) are attained He, seeing an object with the eye, is neither elated nor depressed, but rests indifferent, mindful

and comprehending. Hearing a sound with the ear......smelling a scent with the nose......tasting a savour with the tongue ......with body contacting tangibles......with mind cognizing mental states, he is neither elated nor depressed, but rests indifferent, mindful and comprehending. When he feels a feeling limited by body, he knows that he so feels. He knows : when body breaks up, after life is used up, all my experiences in this world will lose their lure and grow cold. Suppose, Vappa, that shadow is cast by a stump. Then comes a man with axe and basket and cuts down that stump by the root. So doing he digs all round it. Having done so he pulls up the roots, even the rootlets and root-fibres. He chops that stump into logs, and having done so chops the log into chips. The chips he dries in wind and sun, then burns them with fire, then makes an ash-heep. The ash-heap he winnows in a strong wind or lets the ash be carried away by a swifty flowing river. Verily, Vappa, that shadow cast because of the stump, made not to become again, of a nature not to arise again in future time. Just in the same way, Vappa, by a monk, whose heart is the released, six constant abiding-places are won. He, seeing an object with the eye......with mind cognizing mental states, is neither elated nor depressed, but abides indifferent, mindful and comprehending. When he feels a feeling limited by body......limited by life, he knows that he so feels. He knows : "When body breaks up, after life is used up, all my experiences in this world will lose their lure and grow old.'[85]

There is no substantial argument, in fact, in this criticism by the Buddha. Yoga attracts the karmic matter towards the soul and connects the same with it. The soul is obscured by such karmic matter since time immemorial. That is the reason why it experiences fruits, good or bad. The destruction of Karmas, according to Jainism, depends on the restraint of mind, word, any body. By severe penance one can destroy all the past deeds and prevent the flow of new karmas.[86]

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[87] refers to the five ways of falling into sin, according to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. They are destru-

ction of animates (*pāṇātipāta*), taking what is not given (*adinnādāyī*...), passion enjoyment of evil (*abrahmacārī*......), speaking a lie (*musāvādī*.....), and living on liquor and drink (*surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhāyī*......). The *Dīgha Nikāya*[88] mentions the *Cātuyāmasaṁvara* of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. These are the references to the *Pañcāṇuvratas* of Jainas which will be dealt with in the next chapter.

The Buddha at another place in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[81] says to Visākhā that the Nigaṇṭhas took a vow not to go beyond the Eest, West, North, or the South. This vow saves them from violence at least in the prescribed limitation. The *Proṣadhopavāsa* also is said to be a way to destroy the karmas.[90]

Some other ways to make a purified soul also are recorded in Pāli literature. One becomes completely naked with no desire or attachment towards anything in the last stage of asceticism. In this *acelakatva* he should follow a lot of rules and regulations which have been mentioned in the Pāli Canon as well as in the Jaina Āgama. These will be discussed in the chapter on Ethics.

Mokṣa Tattva

The well-known reference of the *Majjhima Nikāya*' to the severe panance of Jainas indicates the state of mokṣa according to Jain philosophy. The Buddha says that by severe penance all the sufferings will be destroyed (*sablaṁ dukkhaṁ nijjiṇṇaṁ bhavissati*). This means the freedom from all karmic matter is *Mokṣa* or Salvation according to Jainism.[91] Kundakunda says : that if the causal condition of karmas disappears through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of karmas get blocked. Wheh the springs of karmas thus get blocked, the dravya karmas get repulsed. When the dravya karmas completely disappear, the person becomes all-knowing and all-perceiving and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and Which is untouched by the sorrows of life :

Hedumbhāve ṇiyamā jāyadi ṇāṇissa āsavaṇirodho.
Āsavabhāveṇa vinā jāyadi kammassa du ṇirodho,

Kammassābhāveṇa ya savvaṇhū sarvaloga darsī ya.

Pāvadi indiyarahidaṁ avvāvāhaṁ suhamaṇantaṁ.[92]

Nature of Universe

The common topics, which are said to have deen debated by the recluses, Brāhmaṇas and Paribbājakas, are referred to in Pāli literature. The Jaina conception of the nature of Universe also appears to be recorded in the *Brahmajāla Sutt.* The four different propositions maintained by contemporary teachers in this connection are as follows[93] :

(i) This world is finite and circumscribed (*antavā ayam loko pariyanto*)

(ii) It is infinite and without limit (*anantavā ca ayaṁ loko apariyanto*).

(iii) It is both finite and infinite (*antavā ca ayaṁ loko apariyanto*).

(iv) It is neither finite nor infinite (*nevāyaṁ loko antavā na pananto*).

The third theory appears to be the view of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Buddhaghosa does not clarify this view. He suggests only that the limited and unlimited character of the world depends on the limited or unlimited view taken by the contemplator in his mental perception or vision.[94] Perhaps he missed here the philosophical aspect of the proposition. If we apply the standpoint of non-absolutism, its inner meaning can be easily grasped. However, we can point out that from the standpoint of substance (*dravya*) and place (*kṣetra*), the world is limited and from the standpoint of *kāla* and *bhāva* it is unlimited.

Records of theories held at the time have been repeated several times in Pāli literature. But they do not add anything substantial to what has been mentioned before. The later Buddhist philosophical literature provides us with more data in this respect. It indicates a development of the concept under discussion.

Śāntarakṣita refers to a view of Ācārya Sūri, a Jaina philosopher, in the course of refuting the doctrine of the "thing by itself" (*svabhāvavāda*), which throws light on the Jaina conception of the nature of the Universe. But to understand that reference it would be best to know first the context on which it is based. It provides a common ground to the Buddhist and Jaina Logicians, as they are not in favour of Svabhāvavāda. According to this doctrine, as shown in the *Tattvasaṅgrahā* and other books, things originate neither from themselves nor from any other things. They are not dependent on causes. To prove this theory the holder of this view queries, 'Who makes the diversity in the lotus and its filament ? By whom have the variegated wings of the peacock and such things been created?" Such arguments can be raised about other things too. For instance, the sharpness and other properties of a thorn or any other thing must be regarded as uncaused, since they are around us bue to the influence of nature [95]

Against this view, Śāntarakṣita argues that if you do not postulate any cause, your view cannot be accepted, as nothing can be proved without adequate evidence. He then supports his arguments with those of Ācārya Sūri. He says that Ācārya Sūri, a Jaina philosopher, also upholds the same objection in the theory of "thing by itself", as he says, "One who declares that there is no cause would demolish his own conclusion, if he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other hand, if he were also to adduce reasons what could be gained by mere assertion ?.[96]

Here the view of Sūri referred to by Śāntarakṣita appears to be in conformity with Jainism. The theory of *Svabhāvavāda* is accurate as far as the opposition to the theory that a God controls the universe is concerned, but if it carries the meaning of ***ahetukavāda***, it cannot be admitted by the Jaina philosophy. According to this theory, the world possesses inumerable causes which have innumerable effects by nature, but its development requires some other material also. For instance, the clay can produce the jar, but it also depends on

the apparatus, as stick, wheel, potter, etc. Lotus comes out of mud, which is a cause of its fragrance and beauty. Therefore, the view that only nature (*svabhāva*) is responsible for the origination of things, is inadmissible to the Jainism. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* also criticises the view of *Svabhāvavāda* :

> Kah kaṇṭakānāṁ prakaroti taikṣṇyaṁ,
> Vicitrabhāvaṁ mṛgapakṣiṇāñ ca.
> Svabhāvataḥ sarvamidaṁ pravṛttaṁ,
> Na kāmacārosti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ.[97]

Another reference to the Jaina conception of the nature of the Universe is recorded by Śāntarakṣita in his examination of the external world. Kamalaśīla, the well-known commentator of Śāntarakṣita, explains the view saying that the universe accordingly is non-perception of external world. They describe its nature as resembling of things (*pratibimbādisannibhaṁ*). In support of this assertion they say that the entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (subjective or immaterial, objective or meterial, and immaginary or fictitious) is mere "ideation". This ideation through the diversity of the "chain of causation" is endless and impure, for they have not realised the truth; but it is pure for those whose karmas have been got rid of. Kamalaśīla further delineates the nature of the universe according to Buddhism saying that the universe is in perpetual flux and affects all living things. This idea of the entire universe is based on two points—(1) there can be no apprehender of the external world, being non-existent, and (2) every cognition is devoid of both "apprehender" and "apprehended", because it is cognition.

The main ground for establishing this principle is that the perception of a thing depends on one's mentality. The diversity of imaginations is responsible for the diversity of realities. For instance, as stated by Ācārya Āryadeva in his philosophical work "*Catuḥśataka*, the corpse of a woman is considered in various forms. The sage considers it as the cause of wandering into the world, a libidinous man thinks about her beauty to fulfil his sexual desires, a cock, on the

other hand, perceives it for the purpose of eating. Therefore, the world is nothing but only the fiction of imagination. If it is not so, reality should be perceived or thought in one form by the whole universe without any sort of *saṅketa* or *saṁskāra*

In this context Śāntarakṣita refers to the view of Sumati and then refutes it from the Buddhist point of view. Ācārya Sumati[98] argues accordingly that "all things have two aspects, the Universal and the Particular. Consequently the universe is a combination of atoms which exist in two forms, viz. the common and uncommon. Of these the common form is apprehended by the senses, and the form of the atoms which is uncommon is held to be amenable to mystic perception." That means the compendium of atoms, the so-called *Skandha* is the universe, which we perceive, and the atoms, which are so subtle that they cannot be perceived by us, are perceived by the omniscient.

Thus the external world in the view of Jainism is not imagination, but a multitude of atoms. It cannot be ignored, as perception of an entity which represents the external world is based on knowlege of feeling. Since an entity has different names, it can be fictitious, but its existence cannot be ignored The entity is *paramārth sat* like knowledge or vijñāna. Knowledge can be dependent on the entity, but the entity cannot be dependent on knowledge. The innumerable things in the world cannot be seen by the ordinary man, but it does not mean that they are not in existence.[99]

Śāntarakṣita does not agree with these views. He remarks that they are the confounded assumptions of some dull-witted persons (*durmatayaḥ*). He argues that the two different forms of a thing must be different from each other. It cannot therefore, be right to say that a single thing has two forms. The second and the most touching argument is raised to the effect that as the particular form of an entity is not entirely different from the universal form, there would be a possibility of the former being apprehended by the senses; and in that case there could

not be the clear cut distinction that "The common form is amenable to sensecognition and the uncommon form is amenable to mystic cognition."[100]

The above objections are met by the Jaina philosophers. They say that from the point of view of *dravyārthikanaya,* reality is the same but from the *paryāyārthikanaya* standpoint its modes are different from each other. On the basis of the conception of non-absolutism, there is no room for self-contradiction[101]

The Nature of word

Śāntarakṣita in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* refers to a view of the Mīmāṁsakas regarding the nature of the word with the idea of establishing his own theory. The mīmāṁsakas hold the view that the word is eternal. Hence there is no author of the Veda, Therefore, it is authoritative, reliable, and of divine origin *(apauruṣeya)* In this way, they set forth the several views that have been held by various philosophers regarding the exact nature of word. Among them the Jainas are said to have held the view that the word is atomic in character (*paudgalo Digambaraiḥ*)[102] In the following kārikā two types of words are mentioned, viz. Universal (*Sāmānya*) and particular (*Viśeṣa*) which are the main features of the Jaina conception of reality.

While the establishing of his own view, Śāntarakṣita criticised the Mīmāṁsakas' conception, but he did not refute the Jaina concception separately. He proved the falsity of the common types of words, while criticising the view of the Mīmāṁskas. He set up a theory that the Veda is not an authoritative and reliable source. Hence word is universal in character and non-eternal in form.

As regards the divine origin of the Veda (*apauruṣeyavāda*), both Jainism and Buddhism are travellers on one and the same path. The arguments against the Mīmāṁskas' view are adduced by both parties in a similar way, though they are based on their own fundamental principles, and, therefore, they differ in some places.

The Buddhists say that the words are not representative of their meanings, because they are used even for denoting the past and future realities. If they were having an inseparable connection, their usage would be restricted and no meaning would come out of them. They, therefore, think that the word signifies only the imaginary universalised reality.[103]

On the other hand, the Jainas postulate a theory that words are of two kinds, universal and particular. If words were not valid to show the existence of the external world, they would be meaningless and therefore useless and knowledge would be impossible.[104] Kundakunda says that there are four different kinds of material objects, viz. *Skandhas, ṣkandhadeśas, skndhapradeśas,* and *Paramāṇūs. Skandhas* are the aggregates of atoms. The next two are the differences in molecular constitution. The last one is a primary atom which constitues the other three classes.[105] The atom cannot be divided (*paramāṇū ceva avibhāgī*).[106] Sound is generated by skandhas when they strike against one another The sound produced by skandhas may be natural (*svābhāvika*) or artificial (*prāyogika*).[107] Thunder of cloud and the roar of the sea are natural sound while the artificial sound is purposeful, which is divded into wo types, *bhāṣātmaka* (language) and *abhāṣātmaka* (non-language). The language sound again may be *akṣarātmaka* (articulate) and *anakṣarātmaka* (inarticulate). The *akṣarātmaka* sound is made up of alphabetical sounds while the anakṣarātmaka is the language of animals. *Anakṣarātmaka* sounds are of four kinds, viz (i) *tata* sound produced by musical instruments covered by leather, (ii) *vitata* sound produced by viṇā, etc. (iii) *ghana* produced by metallic instruments like tāla, etc, and (iv) *sausira* produced by wind-instruments.[108] These sounds can be heard and recognized as they are *paudagalika*

(3, 4, 6) Dharma, Adharma, and Kāla Dravyas :

There are no references to dharma, adharma, and Kāla Dravyas in Pāli literature. The *Dharmāstikāya* is almost similar to the *paṭiccasamuppāda* (dependent origination) of the

Buddhists, but the *adharmāstikāya* is quite unknown to them. The *kāla* dravya is recognized in Buddhism in the form of *prajñaptimātra* in the *Aṭṭhasālinī*.[109]

(5) Ākāśa Dravya

A reference is made to the Jaina conception of ākāśa in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* by the Mīmāṁsaks. Śāntarakṣita raised a question against the Mīmāṁsakas' view regarding the eternality of works like *ghaṭa* (jar). They say that if the auditory organ is *ākāśa*, several objections could be brought against this theory. For instance, being all-Pervasive there would be equality of contact with all sounds and all organs. How then could the answer be provided on the basis of the auditory organ ? The Mīmāṁsakas try to reply that ākāśa cannot be regarded as being without parts, and therefore it is ths auditory organ. They support their view of the Jainas and the Sāṅkhyas both of whom have accordingly the idea of the auditory organ consisting of parts (*Jainairārhataiḥ Sāṅkhyaiśca niravavavyavasya vyomaḥ niṣiddhatvāt* [110])

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla refute this view. They urge that if the divisible ākāṣa is held to be eternal, then all the objections that have been urged against the view "the indivisible ākāṣa is eternal" would become applicable [111] The defects pointed out by Śāntarakṣita in this theory are as follows. If *ākāṣa* is eternal and consists of parts, words should remain in the form "this is the same". Another argument, in support of this idea, is presented by him in the form that what is eternal does not stand in need of the help of anything. Hence, the cognitions that would proceed from the eternal source, should all appear simultaneously. Therefore, he concludes that *ākāśa* is neither eternal nor consists of parts.[112] In the *Abhidharmakośa ākaśa* (*I.5*) is enumerated in the asaṁskṛta dharmas and described as "without covering" (*tatrākāśamanāvṛttiḥ*).[113] Accoıding to Buddhaghosa, *ākāśa* is infinite.[114]

The Jainas are of view that *ākāśa* is eternal and consists of parts (*sāvayava*) and having infinite parts or pradeśas it

provides to *Jiva* and *ajīva.* The etymology of *ākāśa* itself indicates that it allows space to other substance to enter into or penetrate itself.[115] This entering or penetration is oxpressed by the word avagāha.[116] Different places occupy different locations of *ākāśa.* Its manifoldness connotes, as in the case of matter itself, Its possession of parts [117]

Conclusion

This brief acount of the Jaina philosophy as found in Buddhist literature shows us that :—

(i) the six *dravyas* and the seven *Tattvās* of Jainism were known to early Pāli literature and further refuted in Sanskrit Buddhist philosophical literature.

(ii) Among the sixty-two contemporary Philosophies depicted in the *Brahmajālasutta* and some other places in the Pāli Canon. The Jaina view is described as both *Ucchedāvāda* and *sassatavāda.*

(iii) According to the Jaina philosophy, the soul is formless and consists of consciousness.

(iv) Mundane soul attracts karmas and then both stand towards each other in a relationship of phenomenal conjunction. This relation is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation.

(v) *Kāyadaṇḍa* is more heinous than *Manodaṇḍa,* if a wrong deed is committed intentionally. That means intention is the main source of evil or virtuous acts. Soul will have to enjoy the fruits of karmas done. All is, therefore, a result of previous karmas.

(vi) The destruction of .karms depends on *triyoga* and severe penance with right understanding.

(vii) Universe is not a creation of any god, but it is a combination of atoms

(viii) Word is atomic in character, and

(ix) *Ākāśa* (space) is eternal and consists of parts.

These data also indicate that, inspite of minor errors, the knowledge of Jain Philosophy which Buddhist scholars possessed was of a very high order.

CHAPTER III

JAINA ETHICS

The Duties of Jaina House-holders

Emancipation through the removal of karmic matter from the soul is attainable only through righteous living according to ethical discipline. One should abstain from the five faults (*pañcapāpa*) viz. injury (*himsā*), falsehood (*asatya*), stealing (*steya*), unchastity (*abrahma*) and worldy attachment (*parigraha*)[1]. These vows are of two kinds : Partial vows (*Aṇuvratas*) or limited abstention from the five aforesaid faults and Full vows (*Mahāvratas*) or total abstention from five faults. The former is prescribed for house-holders and the latter for ascetics. Five kinds or training (*bhāvanā*) have been prescribed for each of these vows for the sake of securing stability in them[2].

The above-mentined five vratas have been unanimously accepted by the Ācāryas, on the basis of *Pratimas* or *Vratas* or *Pakṣa*, *Caryā* and *Sādhanā*. The difference of opinion is only with regard to the *Guṇavratas*, *Śikṣāvratas*, *Mūlaguṇas* and *Pratimas* The great Ācārya Kundakunda described house-holder's duties on the basis of *Pratimas*. He simply presented the names of *Guṇavratas e.g. dikparimāṇa*, *anarthadaṇḍavarjana* and *bhogopabhogaparimāṇa* and *Śikṣāvratas e.g. sāmāyika proṣadha*, *atithipūjā* and *sallekhanā*. Svāmi Kārtikeya followed his line but placed *deśāvakāśika* in place of sallekhanā, Vasunandi included *sallekhanā* in *Śikṣāvratās*. These Ācāryas described neither *Aṣṭamūla guṇas* nor *aticāras* of *Vratas*.

Ācārya Umāsvāmi and Samantabhadra are prominent figures among those who described the house-holders duties on the basis of twelve vratas. Umāsvāmi divided *Vratī* Into two e. g. *Agārī* who follows *aṇuvratas* and *Anagārī* who follows *Mahāvratas*. He took pains to describe the *aticāras* of each *vrata* but did not refer to *Aṣṭamūlaguṇas* and *pratimas* He might have followed the tradition of *Upāśakdasāsūtra*. Umāsvāmi could not recognize the names of *vratas* given by Kundakunda. He changed them into *Digvrata*, *deśavrata* and *anartha-*

daṇḍavrata in *Guṇavratas* and *sāmāyika, proṣadhopavāsa, upabhogaparibhogapaśimāṇa* and *atithisaṁvibhāga* in *Sikṣāvratas. Deśāvakāśika* has been included into *guṇavratas* and *bhogopabhogaparimāṇa* into *śikṣāvratas*, Samantabhadra borrowed his views from kundakunda, Kārtikeys and Umāsvāmi and put them in a reviewed ways. He regareded *deśāvakāśik* as a part of *śikṣāvratas* and placed *vaiyāvratya* in place of *sallekhanā*. He is perhaps the first Ācarya who presented *Mūlaguṇas* in the *Ratnakaraṇḍakaśrāvakācāra*.

Jinasena represents those Ācaryas who described the householder's duties on the basis of *pakṣa, caryā* and *sādhanā* in the *Ādipurāṇa*. Later Ācāryas followed either of these three traditions. The *pāli* literature does not mention any of these controvertial names of *vratas*. We can therefore come to the conclusion that at the time of pārśvanātha or Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta no such tradition was in force.

The five faults are the causes of recurrent births and therefore they are personified as "*Dukkha*" (pain) itself. For the sake of removing such *dukkha* one should meditate upon the benevolence (*maitrī*) for all living beings, delight in looking at better qualified beings (*pramoda*), compassion (*kāruṇya*) for the afflicted, and indifference to both praise and blame (*mādhyastha avinayeṣu*).[3]

The duties of a Jaina House-holder as reflected in Pāli Litt.

Pāli Literature contains only scanty and scrappy bits of information on the duties of a Jaina House-holder. But they are invaluable as the gradual development of the vows could be traced with the help of such information.

The *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* refers to the *Cātuyāmasaṁvara* as a part of the doctrine of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. This is not an accurate record, for *Cātuyāmasaṁvara* is of Pārśvanātha, and not in the doctrine of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. We shall discuss this matter later on. The four vows of Pārśvanātha were revised by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta who found it necessary to specify *Brahmacarya* as a separate vow in view of the laxity

be observed among the followers of Pārśvanātha. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, thus, established a discipline based on five vows as opposed to that of pārśvanātha[4]. The Buddhist circles were apparently unaware of this innovation by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.

Asibandhakaputta Gāmiṇi, a Jaina house-holder, goes to see the Buddha at *Nālandā*. In response to a question of the Buddha he says : Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta teaches a doctrine to his laymen (*Sāvakā*) according to which a slayer of living creature (*pāṇaṁ atipāteti*), one who steals (*adinnaṁ ādiyati*), one who indulges in sensual pleasures wrongly (*kāmesu micchā carati*), and one who tells a lie (*musā bhaṇati*), would go to the purgatory (*so āpāyiko nerayiko*). In short his destiny depends on the life he leads.[5]

The above reference deals with the vows of house-holders who are said to be followers of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, but the vows recorded are four and not five in number. Another remarkable point is that "*Kuśīla*" which was separated from *parigraha* in the form of *Kāmesumicchācarati* in *Pāli* is referred to individually here. This shows that the Buddhists were aware of the reformation made by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta in the Pārśvanātha's religion, but the fact that *Kuśīla* was not postulated in place of *Parigraha* but in addition to it was apparently not understood.

A reference to five vows of Jainism is found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*;[6] this mentions the five ways of falling into sin as taught by Nigaṇṭh Nātaputta. The five ways are :

(i) destruction of living beings (*pāṇātipātī hoti*).

(ii) taking what is not given (*adinnādāyī hoti*).

(iii) passionate enjoyment of evil (*abrahmacārī hoti*).

(iv) speaking lies (*musāvādī hoti*).

(v) taking liquor and intoxicants (*surāmerayamajjappamādaṭṭhāyī hoti*).

This, again, is only partially accurate. The first four kinds of sins are referred to correctly, though not in the Jaina order. As to the fifth, it is "*Parigraha*" which should have been mentioned. According to Jaina ethics, "*Surāmeraya-*

majjappamādaṭṭhāna" is an aspect of *Hiṁsā* and not a separate category. This list omits *Parigrah* altogether.

These references lead us to two observations : (i) According to the Pārśvanātha tradition, there were four vows, and (ii) Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta formulated five vows dividing the last into two *Akuśila* and *Aparigraha*. The defects in these references are : (i) they do not follow the traditional Jaina order of precedence, and (ii) the *Parigraha*, which is placed as the last way of falling into sin, is ignored in *Pāli* Literature. The compilers of the *Pāli Tipiṭaka* either were not well acquainted with the reformation of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta or they did not consider it very important.

The omission of *Parigraha* in all the references in th Pāli Canon is significant. *Parigraha* is the most important Jaina contribution to Indian Ethics. It was altogether a new concept when it was first included in Pārśvanātha's doctrine. It embraced all aspects of indiscipline and abstinence from it and was recognized as the removal of the very root of all immorality. It was founded on the role which desire and craving played in human affairs. But the moral significance of Pārśvanātha tradition was not adequately understood by the Buddha or his followers, for, if they did, they would have observed how the vow relating to Pārśvanātha agreed with the second Noble Truth of Buddhism as a diagnasis of suffering.

The *Nikāyas* also recorded the Jaina notion with regord to *Hiṁsā*, its causes, and their remedies. To *Majjhima Nikāya* says that Nigaṇṭhas uphold three ways of committing *Hiṁsā* viz. (i) by activity (*kṛta*), (ii) by commission (*kārita*) and (iii) by approval of the deed (*anumodana*). To get a violence comitted or to approve a violence committed is about the same as to commit violence by one's self, for one is involved in the activity directly or indirectly and shares it. Therefore, one who refrains from *Hiṁsā* will not utter even a word which is likely to give pain to another, will not commit any act which may cause injury to another, will not harbour any thoughts prejudicial to another, will not make anybody else

utter words likely to cause pain to another, nor entertain feelings of ill will towards another, and will not encourage others to cause pain by word, deed, or thought to another.[7]

In another place, the *Majjhima Nikāya*[8] states that in *Nālandā*, Dīghatapassī informed the Buddha that the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta did not lay down *Kamma Kamma*, but his teaching was based on *Daṇḍa daṇḍa*[9]. Wrong doings, according to him, as we have already mentioned, are of three kinds, viz. *Kāyadaṇḍa* (wrong of body), *Vacīdaṇḍa* (wrong of speech), and *Manodaṇḍa* (wrong of mind). Further he says that *Kāyadaṇḍa* is more heinous in the opinion of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta than either of the other two. This is supported by Nātaputta himself. He appreciates the statement of Dīghatapassī and says that he has answered Gotama in a very proper way (*sādhu sādhu tapasīi*). For how can an insignificant wrong of mind overshadow an important wrong of body, since a wrong deed of body is the more blamble ? (*kiṁ hi sobhati chabo manodaṇḍo imassa evaṁ oḷārikassa kāyadaṇḍassa upanidhāya. atha kho kāyadaṇḍo vā mahāsāvajjataro pāpassa......*). Upāli goes then to discuss the matter with the Buddha. The Buddha asked him "If Nigaṇṭha, who although suffers from sickness, refuses cold water and takes only hot water, passes away, what result does Nātaputta lay down for him ?" Upāli answers that he will be born among the Manosatta Devas. He also says that according to Nātaputta, the blame is less; Because before he passed away, he was devoted to mind. The Buddha says : "House-holder, take care of how you explain. Your earlier statement does not tally with your latter, nor your latter with your earlier "(*manasi karohi, Gahapati...na kho te sandhīyati purimena vā pacchimaṁ. pacchimena vā purimaṁ*), and then asks Upāli : "While going out or returning, Fourfold restrained Nigaṇṭh Nātaputta brings many small creatures to destruction. What result, house-holder, does Nātaputta lay down for him ? Nātaputta lays down that being unintentional, there is no great blame. "But if he does in-

tend it, it is of great blame. And this intention is included in that of wrong of mind," (*taṁ kiṁ maññasi, Gahapati, idhassa Nigaṇṭho..... so abhikkhamanto paṭikkamanto bahu khuddake pano saṅghātaṁ apadeti, imassa pana, Gahapati, Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto kaṁ Vipākaṁ paññāpeti 'ti? "asañcetanikaṁ bhante, Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto no mahāsāvajjaṁ.. manodaṇḍasmin, bhante.*" The Buddha urges then, "If a man comes here with a drawn sword and says that in a moment I will take all the living creatures in this Nālandā into one heap of flesh, one mass of flesh, what do you think about this? Is that man able in one moment, one second, to make all the living creatures in this Nālandā into one heap of flesh? (*ahaṁ yāvatikā imassa Nālandāya pāṇā te ekena khaṇena ekena muhuttena ekam māṁsakhalaṃ ekaṁ māṁsapuñjaṁ karissāmi ti.. so puriso katuṁ ?..*). Upāli replies: "Even ten men, revered Sir, even twenty, thirty, forty men, even fifty men are not able in one moment, one second, to make all the living creatures in this *Nālandā* into one heap of flesh, one mass of flesh. How then can one insignificant man shine out at this stage?" The Buddha again points out the self-contradiction in the statement of Upāli.[10]

In fact, attachment and intention are very important in Jainism. They are regarded as the main sources of *Hiṁsā*. If one, who observes the rules of conduct conscientiously, walks along, carefully looking ahead, end intent on avoiding injury to the crawling creatures, were to injure an insect by trampling it under foot by chance, he would not be responsible for *Hiṁsā*. And if one acts carelessly or intentionally, he would be responsible for that whether a living being is killed or not. For, under the influence of passions, the person first injures the self through the self whether there is subsequently an injury caused to another being or not:

Yuktācaraṇasya sato rāgādyāveśamantareṇā' pi
Na hi bhavati jātu hiṁsā prāṇavyaparopaṇādeva.
Vyutthānāvasthāyāṁ rāgādīnāṁ vaśapravṛttāyāṁ
Mryantāṁ Jīvo mā vā dhāvatyagre dhruvaṁ hiṁsā.
Yasmātsakaṣāyaḥ san hantyātmā prathamamātmanātma-
nāṁ ..

Paścājjāyeta nā vā hiṁsā prāṇyantarāṇaṁ tu.[11]

Both, non-abstinence from Hiṁsa, and indulgence in *Hiṁsā*, constitute *Hiṁsā*; and thus whenever there is careless activiy of mind, body or speech, there is always injury to living being. Mere possession of a sword would not make one guilty of *Hiṁsā*. Even then such possession can be the cause of some injury to somebody. Therefore, to prevent all possibility of *Hiṁsā*, one should not entertain even the desire for the possession of such objects as are likely to cause injury.[12]

Thus all these references indicate that intention is the main source of injury in Jainism and if injury is caused by body intentionally, it will be considered more blamable. If killing of living beings is made an offence even when it is without intention, no one on earth can be an *Ahiṁsaka*, for the entire world is full of vitalities of all types which a man may kill in large number without knowing them at all :

Viṣvagjīvacito loke kva caran ko' pyamokṣyat.
Bhāvaikasādhanau bandhamokṣau cennābhaviṣyatāṁ.[13]

As regards the eating of flesh, the *Vinaya Piṭaka* has a good record of the Jaina point of view. It is said there that Sīha, a General of the Licchavis and a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, had served meat to the Buddha. Knowing this Nigaṇṭhas, waving their arms, were murmuring from road to road in *Vaiśālī* : Today a fat beast killed by Sīha Senāpati has been served into a meal for the Buddha. The Buddha made use of this meat, knowing that it was killed on purpose for him."[14] This incident took place immediately after Sīha was converted to Buddhism. The Nigaṇṭhas, therefore, might have tried to blame both, the Buddha and Sīha. Whatever that may be, this reference indicates clearly that the Jainas were completely against the eating of flesh. The followers of the Buddha appear to have been influenced by this idea of the Jainas. *Jīvaka* visits the Buddha and asks if it is true that animals are slain expressly for the Buddha's use. The Buddha replies that he forbids the

eating of meat only when there is evidence of one's eyes or ears as grounds for suspicion that the animal has been slain for one's expressed use. Anyone who slays an animal for the use of a monk and gives it to him, commits a great evil. Jīvaka is pleased with the reply and declares himself a follower of the Buddha.[15]

Likewise, Devadatta asked the Buddha for the imposition of the following five rules on all the members of the Saṅgha.[16]

(i) that monks should dwell all their lives in the forest.

(ii) that they should accept no invitations to meals, but live entirely on alms obtained by begging.

(iii) that they should wear only robes made of discarded rags and accept no robes from the laity.

(iv) that they should dwell at the foot of a tree and not under a roof, and

(v) that they should abstain completely from fish and flesh.

But the Buddha thought that ruch sules should not be laid down for the Saṅgha as a whole. He left them for monks to observe purely on a voluntary basis.

Amṛtacandra, a Jaina Ācārya argues against the eating of flesh that it cannot be procured without causing destruction of life. One who uses flesh, therefore, commits *Hiṁsā*, unavoidably. Even if the flesh be that of a buffalo, oxe, etc., which has died of itself, *Hiṁsā* is caused by the crushing of creatures spontaneously born. He who eats or touches a raw or a cooked piece of flesh, certainly kills spontaneously-born creatures constantly gathering together.[17] In conclusion he says that those who wish to avoid *Hiṁsā*, should first of all take care to renounce wine, flesh, honey and the two *udumbaras* (gular and fig) and fruits of *Pippala*, *Pākara* and *Banyan* which are the birth places of small mobile beings.[18]

Guṇavratas or Multiplicative Vows

The early Scriputres seem to have been familar with the *Guṇavratas*. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* the Buddha is said to

have discussed the *Uposatha* ceremony while he was near Sāvatthī at Visākhā's house. Visākhā, the Migāra's mother, was perhaps not perfectly converted from Jainism to Buddhism at that time. One day she, having observed the *Uposatha,* came to meet the Buddha at noon. Then the Buddha described to her three types of *Uposatha*. It is to be noted here that the *Uposatha* is the tenth vow in Jainism.

(1) Digvrata

The Buddha says to Visākhā : "There is a sect of naked ascetics (*Niganṭho nāma Samaṇajātikā*), who exhort a disciple thus : "Now my good fellow, you must lay aside injury (*Daṇḍaṁ nikkhipāhi*) to beings that exist in the East beyond the yojana from here, likewise to those in the West, North, and the South beyond a yojana from here. Thus they exhort them to kindness and compassion towards some creatures only[19]." This is a correct description of the *Digvrata* which is a life long vow to limit ones mundane activities in all directions from well-known objects,[20] But in subsequent lines the Buddha is reported to have criticised the doctrine saying : In this way they enjoin cruelty by making them not spare other living beings (*ekaccānaṁ pāṇānaṁ nānuddayāya nānukampāya samādapenti*). This criticism is made only for the sake of criticism. For, he who confines his activities within a limited sphere, follows a complete vow of *Ahiṁsā* as regards what is beyond those limits, because of total absenee of non-restraint there[21]. He, therefore, tries to follow the vow of *Mahāvrata*"[22].

Thus, this is undoubtedly an unfair attack on the Jainas. Jacobi says in this respect : "we cannot expect one sect to give a fair and honest exposition of the tenets of their opponents : it is but natural that they should put them in such a form as to make the objections they want to raise against them all the better applicable. In the *Jaina Āgamas*[23] also we find misrepresentation of Buddhist ideas"[24].

Another reference to this vow is found in the *Dīgha Nikāya*. It is mentioned there that the Buddha met at *Vesāli* a certain

ascetic named Kaṇḍara-Masuka, who maintained seven life-long vows in order to gain fame and honour. The seven vows are : As long as I live I will be naked, and will not put on a garment (*yāvejjīvaṁ acelako āsssṁ na vatthaṁ parideheyyaṁ*), as long as I live, I will observe the vow of chastity (*yāvajjīvaṁ brahmacārī āssaṁ na methunaṁ dhammaṁ patiseveyyaṁ*), so long as I live, I will maintain myself by spirituous drink and flesh, eating no rice-broth or gruel (*yāvajjīvaṁ surāmāṁseneva yāpeyyaṁ na odana-kummāsaṁ bhuñjeyyeṁ*), I will never go beyond the Udena shrine in Vesālī in the East (*puratthimena Vesāliṁ Udenaṁ nāma cetiyaṁ taṁ nātikkameyyaṁ*); I will never go beyond the Gotamaka shrine in Vesālī in the South (*dakkhiṇena Vesāliṁ Gotamakaṁ nama cetīya taṁ nātikkameyyaṁ*); I will never go beyond the Sattamba shrine in Vesālī in the West (*Pacchimena*); and I will never go beyond the Bahuputta shrine in Vesālī in the North (*Uttarena*... [25]

Here all the vows, except the third (i.e. the one referring to spirits and meat), represent the Jaina vows. It is quite possible that this vow which is inconsistent with the spirit of the other six vows, is either a mistake or an interpolation. The first two are common vows of most ascetics of that time, while the last four are vows of a Jainistic type, and they represent the *Digvrata*. No other sect adhered to these last four vows. As regards the *Ājīvikas*, I would prefer to quote the words of Basham, an accepted authority on Ājīvikism. He says : "The ascetic Kaṇḍara-masuka is regularly referred to as acela, but nowhere as Ājīvika, and we have no evidence that any of his vows, with the exception of the first, were taken by the organized Ājīvika community.[26]" Now, we can say that kaṇḍara-masuka must be either an ascetic fallen from the Jaina asceticism, or his vows have been mixed up. For they cannot be accepted campletely, neither by Jainas, nor by *Ājīvikas*, since both religions prohibited meat-eating completely.

(ii-iii) Deśavrata and Anarthadaṇḍavrata

Deśavrata means one should take a vow for a certain time not to proceed beyond a certain village, market place etc. No

clear reference to this vow is yet found in Pāli literature, as it is not much different from *Digvrata.*

In the *Anarthadaṇḍavarata*, one should never think of hunting, victory, defeat, battle, adultery, theft, etc, because they only lead to sin.[27] With regard to this vow nothing is mentioned separately, but we can trace its nature from other references. *Dīghatapassī* describes to the Buddha the three ways of falling into sin according to the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, viz. the *Kāyadaṇḍa*, *vacīdaṇḍa*, and the *manodaṇḍa*[28]. This indicates that to resist the *kāya*, *vacana*, and *mana* from doing wrong deeds is the aim of *Anarthadaṇḍavrata.*

The Śikṣāvratas or Disciplinary Vows

(i) **Sāmāyika** :

There are several illuminating references to the *Śikṣāvratas* in the *Pāli* Canon. It is *Sāmāyika* or Contemplation of the self that the *Mjjhima Nikāya*[29] refers to when the Buddha says to Mahānāma that he had seen Nigaṇṭhas on the Vulture peak, standing erect, refraining from sitting, experiencing pain ..etc. This is an allusion to the *Kāyotsarga* of the Jaina ascetics, but we can have an idea of the nature of *Sāmāyika* prescribed for Jaina laymen since it is the pre-stage of *Kāyotsarga*. As this reference indicates, *Sāmāyika* should be performed by sitting or standing at a tranquil place.

(ii) **Proṣadhopavāsa**

The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* presents a picture of a *Proṣadha.* While the Buddha was staying near *Sāvatthi*, he criticises the opponents' *Upoṣathas* and preaches the nature of Buddhist *Uposatha* to Viśākhā. He says : "There are three kinds of *Upoṣathas*, the *Gopālak Uposatha*, *Nigaṇṭha Upoṣatha*, and the *Āryana Upoṣatha*.

In explaining what the *Gopālak Upoṣatha* is, the Buddha said, "Suppose, Visākhā, the herdsman at evening restores the kin to their owners. Then he thus thinks : the kine grazed today at such and such a spot, and drank at such a spot. Tomorrow they will graze at such and such a spot. Likewise,

the holder of *Gopālaka Uposatha* thinks thus : tomorrow I shall eat such and such food, both hard and soft. And he spends the day engrossed in that covetous desire. This sort of *Uposatha*, therefore, is not fruitful. It is not very brilliant. It is not very brilliant. It is not of great radiance.[30]

He then describes the *Nigantha Uppsatha* : "There is a sect of naked ascetics, the so called *Niganthānanha Samanujātikā*. Then again on the Sabbath day they exhort the disciple thus : "I have no part in anything, anywhere, and herein for me there is no attachment to anything." The Buddha then makes a remark on this sort of *Uposatha*. He says : "Yet for all that, his parents know him for their son and he knows them for his children and wife. Yet for all that his slaves and workmen know him for their master and he in turn knows them for his slaves and workmen. Thus at a time when one and all should be exhorted to keep the sabbath, it is in falsehood that they exhort them. This, I declare, is as bad as telling lies. Further the Buddha criticises that as soon as that night has passed he resumes the use of his belongings, which had not been given back to him really. This I declare as bad as stealing. This *Uposatha* of the Niganthas, therefore, is not of great fruit or profit. It is not very brilliant. It is not great radiance." Thereafter, the Buddha points out his own attitude towards the *Upsoatha*. He says that both these sorts of *Upcsatha* are not fruitful. The *Upcsatha*, which he exhorts, is perfectly right, is named *Ārya Uposatha*. It brings the purification of a soiled mind by a proper process. For this purpose the *Ārya* disciple calls to mind the Tathāgata thus : The Exalted One, the *Arhanta*, is a fully Enlightened One, perfect in knowledge, and in practice, a benevolent person, a world-knower, Unsurpassed, Charioteer of Beings to be tamed, Teacher of Devas and mankind, a Buddha is the Exalted One. As he thus bethinks him of the Tathāgata, his mind is calm; delight arises, the soil of the mind is abandoned. It is just like cleaning the head when it is dirty. Thus this sort of *Uposatha* is more fruitful.[32]

Here, the second *Upoṣatha* belongs to the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and the third to the Buddha. But what about *Gopālka Upaoṣatha*? Whom does it belong? I think that it should belong to either *Brāhmaṇas* or *Ājīvikas*, or it may be a part and parcel of the Nigaṇṭhas' *Upoṣatha*. As regards the Brāhmaṇa tradition. *Upoṣatha* is observed with sacrifices and complete fasting[33], and the Ājīvikas are no-where mentioned as observers of any sort of *Upoṣatha*. Now, if we go through Jaina literature, we will find that there was a tradition of having *Upoṣatha* both with and without meals. For, selfmortification is said to have been performed according to one's capability. The *Upoṣatha* is observed to carry on contemplation in a better way: and that can be fulfilled by a lay devotee with or without meals, though without meals is preferred :—

Sa proṣadhopavāso yaccatuṣparvyāṁ, yathāgamaṁ.
Sāmyasaṁskāradārḍyāya caturbhuktyujhanaṁ sadā.
Upavāsakṣamaih kāryo' nupavāsastadakṣamaiḥ.
Ācāmlanirvikṛtyādi śaktyā hi śreyase tapaḥ.[34]

Another point is that the Nigaṇṭha Upoṣatha is said to be performed by observing *Digvrata*, the sixth vow of a Jaina lay devotee, and abandoning all attachment during that period. Here the Buddha is reported to have blamed the Jainas, accusing them of violence, since they have compassion towards beings existing only within a certain limited sphere, not to others. But as already pointed out, according to Jainism, a layman is to observe the partial vows (*aṇuvratas*), according to which, he is not to go beyond a certain limit. How then is there any possibilty of violence?

Another criticism of the Buddha compares *Nigaṇṭha Upoṣatha* to lyeing and stealing. He says that during the period of *Upoṣatha* a Jaina layman becomes unclothed and thinks that nobody is his and he is of nobody's, and gets rid of worldly attchment for a limited time. After performing his Upoṣatha he accepts his belongings and knows the parents as parents and so forth. We know, the vow was taken for a limited

time, not on a permanent basis. It should be remembered here that this is the partial vow (*aṇuvrata*) prescribed for the lay-men to practice a monk's life. Further a question of lyeing or stealing does not arise here.

Arguments, which were prevalent in those days are recorded in the *Bhagavatī Śataka.*[35] Gaṇadhara named Gautama (not the Buddha) asked Mahāvīra a question about some Ājīvikas, the followers of Gosālaka, who had doubt about the *Jaina Upoṣatha*. They asked them : 'Suppose a Jaina layman observes Upoṣatha and proceeds to meditation abandoning all his properties including the wives and suppose someone during his absence appropriates his properties and his wives, does that layman become guilty of taking other people's things on his return if he takes his properties and wives from the person who had appropriated them ? Māhāvīra answered the above question saying that layman uses his own things, and not of others. For the belongings were abandoned for only of limited period, not for all time.

This reference makes it very clear that the impressions which the Buddha and the Ājīvikas had of *Nigaṅṭh Upoṣatha* were alike. If Gopālaka of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is the Gośālaka of the *Bhagawatī Śataka*, we can say that the *Gopālaka Upoṣatha* might have belonged to the Ājīvika sect. Because the founder of Ājīvikism, Makkhali Gosāla, was formerly a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Several of its doctrines were, therefore, influenced by the doctrines of Jainas. Whatever that may be, one thing is certain, that is, all sects and schools of *Samaṇa* Cult had the *Upoṣatha*, though in varying forms, as a common religious institution.

With regard to removing all clothes during the *Sāmāyika* or *Upoṣatha*, Jacobi says, "The description, however, does not quite agree with the *posaha* rules of the Jainas." He depends on the definition of *Posaha* according to the *Tattvārthasāradīpikā* as given by Bhandarakar. He says : "Posaha, i.e., to observe a fast or eat once only on the two holy days, one must give up bathing, unguents, ornaments, company of women, odours.

incense, lights, etc. and assume renunciation as an ornament. Though the *Posaha* observances of the present Jains are apparently more severe than those of the Buddhists, still they fall short of the above description of the Nigaṇṭha rules : for a Jain layman does not, to my knowledge, take off his clothes during the posaha days, though he discards all ornaments and every kind of luxury; nor must he pronounce any formula of renunciation similar to that which the monks utter on entering the order. Therefore, unless the Buddhist account contains some mistake or is a gross mis-statement, it would appear that the Jainas have abated somewhat their rigidity with regard to the duties of a layman.[36]"

Jacobi's findings are based on the findings of Bhandarakar or on the *Tattvārthasāradīpikā* and are supported by his observation that the Jain laymen do not take off clothes during the *Sāmāyika*, and therefore, he thinks that the Jainas have somewhat relaxed the rigidity with regard to the duties of a layman. But, it appears, Jacobi had no opportunity to collect the references from Jaina literature, we have already pointed out from the *Bhagawatī* Śataka that the Jaina laymen who wish to be initiated to the vows of monkhood take off their clothes at the time of *Sāmāyika*. The *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*[37], which is only concerned with the duties of the Jaina laymen, also clearly refers to the fact that during the *Upoṣatha* days senior observers of *Sāmāyika* removed their clothes during the *Sāmāyika* period. It is a personal observation of mine that even now the senior members who are on the verge of becoming muni (Digambara monk) renounce their clothes at night during the performance of *Sāmāyika*. It should, therefore, be clear that the Jaina laymen still observe the rigid duties which are referred to in *Pāli* literature.

The afore-mentioned reference to Nigaṇṭha-Uposatha in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* points out the duties coming under *Bhogopabhogaparimāṇavrata*, the eleventh vow of lay devotees, which enjoins that one should limit the enjoyment of consumable and non-consumable things. When this vow is observed,

there is no scope for *Hiṁsā* or violence. Because of the control of speech, mind and body, there is no room for telling a lie or stealing or for other kinds of *hiṁsā*. Further because of abstinence from all sexual intercourse and attachment to worldly affairs, there is no *Abrahmacarya* and *Parigraha.*

The twelfth obligation of a Jaina layman is perhaps the most widely practised. It is due to the munificence of the laity which practised *atithisaṁvibhāgavrata* that Jaina monks, could, despite the numerous vicissitudes of time, preserve the Jaina tradition. In the *Pāli* records we have references to the generosity of such Jaina laymen as Upāli who gave alms and requisites not only to Jaina monks but also to other religious persons of the time. It is also this vow which has made Jainism one of the best-endowed religions of India with a very impressive group of temples of exquisite artistic excellence.

The Stages of Ethical Evolution of a Jaina House-holder

The stages of ethical evolution of a Jaina house-holder are called the *Pratimās* and are eleven in number. Ten of them (i.e. excepting *Rātribhuktityāga*) are referred to indirectly in the *Pāli* Canon. Their main characteristics have been discussed in the course of our discussion on the Twelve Partial Vows (*dvādaśāṇuvratas*). The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[38] gives us a list of ascetics who were prevalent at that time, and it refers to Nigaṇṭhā, Muṇḍasāvakā, Jaṭilakā, Paribbājakā, Māgandikā, Tedaṇḍikā, Aruddhakā, Gotamakā, and Devadhammikā. The Nigaṇṭhas are undoubtedly the followers of Nigaṇṭha Nātputta who performed very severe penances. The same *Nikāya*[39] enumerates six *Abhijātis* and in that account the Nigaṇṭhas are said to have worn one yellow stained cloth (*kāṣāyavastra*). This may be a reference to *Elaka* or *Kṣullaka* (i.e. the vow of wearing small loin,cloth with or without a cloth to cover the upper body[40]).

Buddhaghosa in his Commentary on the *Dhammapada* says that more assiduous Nigaṇṭhas cover their water-pots so that no soul and sand should enter it.

Commoner ascetic practices are also mentioned in the *Nikāyas*[41]. Out of them, *Nābhihataṁ* (refusing to accept the food especially prepared for them), is related to the eleventh stage of Jaina House-holder called Uddiṣṭatyāga Pratimā.

From these indirect references we come to the conclusion that at that time no such name was given to the *vratīs*. However, it shows that there were some types of categories of vratīs.

Jaina Monachism

After completing the practice of *Aṇuvratas* and *Pratimās*, a house-holder seeks permission from his relatives to renounce completely mundane affairs and become a Jaina monk. Then after worshipping *pañca Parameṣṭhins* (*A*rha*nta*, *Siddh*a, *Ācārya* *Upādhyāy*a, and *Sādhu*) he requests the Gaṇin to admit him into his Order. Being accepted by the Gaṇin, he pulls out his hair and becomes a completely naked ascetic according to the *Digambara* tradition.

There were at first no caste restrictions to be a Jaina monk, but later on Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, and vaiśys are said to have been preferred.[42] Robbers, sick persons, slaves, blinds, debtors, etc. are not to be admitted into the Order.[43]

The new monk makes gradual progress in monkhood and attains the position of *Sthavira*, *Upādhyāy*a *Ācārya*, *Gaṇadhara*. and *pravartaka*.[44] There are three Monastic Units which are recognized by the Jainas :—

(i) *Gaṇa* consists of at least three monks and maximum a thousand.[45] It is a unit made up of many kulas (*parasparasāpekṣānekakulasamudāyaḥ*).[46]

(ii) *Kula* forms the *Gaṇa* (*gaṇah kulasamudāya*ḥ)[47].

(iii) *Gacchā* consists of seven monks (*saptapuruṣako gacchaḥ*)[48]

It is under a particular Ācārya (*Guruparivāraḥ.*)[49] The entire Order consists of monks, nuns, laymen, and women, and is called Saṅgha. If one breaks any rules or regulations, he should observe *Prāyaścittas* like *Ālocanā*, *Pratikramaṇa*..

Ubhaya, Viveka, Vyutsarga, Tapa, Cheda, Parihāra, and *Upasthāpana*.[50] During the rainy season a Jaina ascetic should stop his touring and abstain from walking on green grass or water. One should move about only during the day taking proper care not to tread on any living creature (*sāmyak iriyā samiti*).[51]

Complete nakedness (*jahājāya*) is one of the essentials of Jaina (*Digambara*) monkhood.[52] He should have 27 qualities *Prāṇātipātāvirmaṇa etc.*[53] Among the requisites he is permitted to have a broom made of peacock feathers and a water-pot made of wood for using after answering calls of nature. He sleeps either on the bare ground or on a plank of wood. He never uses blankets and the like, even during the cold season. He is not supposed even to touch money.

A Jaina ascetic takes his meal and water once a day between about 9 A. M. and 18 Noon. He eats out of his own palms in a standing position. The concept behind this rule is to abstain from all botherations and mundane affairs. The food should be pure in nine ways (*navakoṭi-pariśuddham*).[48] The faults pertaining to the improper begging of food are generally grouped into four, viz. *Udgama* (preparation of food), *Utpādana* (the ways of adopting food), *Eṣaṇā* (the method of accepting food), and *Paribhoga* (way of eating food, its quantity, etc).[55] The main purpose of eating is to gain physical strength adequate for the purpose of Performing religious duties.

The fundamentals of moral discipline consist of the twenty-eight *Mūlaguṇas*, the *Uttaraguṇas*, five-fold *Ācāras*, the twelve *Anuprekṣās* or reflections, the twelve-fold penance or *Tapas*, ten kinds of *Vaiyāvṛtya*, and the twentytwo kinds of *Parīṣaha*. They are as follows :

The twenty-eight Mūlguṇas :

(1) *Pañca Mahāvratas* : total abstention from five great sins, i.e. *Hiṁsā* (violence), *Asatya* (telling a lie), *Steya* (theft), *Abrahma* (sexual intercourse), and *Parigraha* (worldly attachment).

(2) *Pañca Samitis* : five religious observances, viz. (i) *Iriyā* or walking with proper care looking 3½ yards ahead, (ii) *Bhāṣā* or speaking with proper care, (iii) *Eṣaṇī*, or taking only pure food which was not specially prepared for him, (iv) *Ādānanikṣepaṇa* or proper care in lifting and laying, and (v) *pratiṣṭhāpanā* or proper care in excreting.

(3) ṣaḍ āvaśyakas : five daily duties, viz. (i) Sāmāyika or equanimity of soul, (ii) *Vandanā* or saluting of *Tīrthaṅkaras* images in the temples. (iii) *Stuti*, praising the qualities of holy beings. (iv) *Pratikramaṇa* or repentence of faults, (v) *Svādhyāya* or reading the scriptures, and (vi) *Kāyotsarga* or giving up attachment to the body and practising contemplation of the self.

(4) *pañcendriyanirodha* or restraint of five senses.

(5) *Pañcācāra* : five kinds of *ācāras*, viz. *Darśanācāra* or to induce strong and steady faith, (ii) *Jñānācāra* or to increase knowledge, (iii) *Cāritrācāra* or to improve one's daily life, (iv) *Tapācāra*, and (v) *Vīryācāra*, to increase the power of one's inner self.

(6) *Triguptis* : the three-fold restraint of mind, body and speech.

Besides, a monk is said to have seven other duties, viz. (i) *Keśaluñcana* or pulling the hair with one's own hands, (ii) *Acelakatva*, or Nakedn ss, (iii) *Asnānatva*, or not to bathe, (iv) *Bhūśayanatva*, or sleeping on the ground, (v) *Ekabhukti* or taking only a little food once a day, (vi) *Adantadhāvanatva*, or not applying a brush to the teeth, and (vii) Taking food in a standing posture, and only in the hollow of the folded hands.

A monk, as we have already referred to in the last chapter, is supposed to meditate on the twelve *Anuprekṣās* or *Bhāvanās* (reflections) and observe the austerities (*tapas* and *Pariṣahas*).

References to Jaina Monachism in Pāli Literature

Pāli, as well as Budhist Sanskrit, literature refers to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta as the head and teacher of a very large Order (*saṅghī ceva gaṇī ca gaṇācariyo ca*), well known (*ñāta*), famous (*yasassī*), the founder of a sect (*titthakara*).[57]

Here *Sanghi*, *Gaṇi*, and *Gaṇācariyo* indicate the stages of gradual development in Jaina hierarchy. The *Sādhu* or *Nigaṇṭha* is mentioned as the ordinary category of monks. Such monks (seha or antevāsin) are of four types in Jaina literature, and their main duties are to practise the monastic conduct and study. *Ācārya* is superior to *Upādhyāya* and is supposed to be head of a small group of monks. The *Āvaśyakaniryukti* mentions the qualities of a *Ācārya* viz. that he should possess the five-fold conduct (*ācāra*) knowledge (*jñāna*), faith (*darśana*), good behaviour (*cāritra*), penance (*tapa*), and fortitude (*vīrya*). *Gaṇi*, a head of a *gaṇa*, is separated from *Ācārya*, but his duties are not much different. He is said to be equipped with eightfold *gaṇisaṁpadā*, viz. *Ācāra*, *Śruta*, *Śarīra*, *Vacana*, *Mati*, *Prayoga*, and *Saṅgraha*.[58] *Gaṇadhara* is a chief disciple of *Tīrthaṅkar*. The *Tīrthaṅkara karma* is obtained by meditation of *Darśanaviśuddhi* (purity or right belief), *Vinayasampannatā* (reverence for means of liberation and for those who follows them). *Śīlavrateṣvanaticāra* (faultless observance of the five vows, and faultless subdual of the passions), *Abhīkṣṇajñānopayoga* (ceaseless pursuit of right knowledge), *Saṁvega* (perpetual apprehension of mundane miseries), *Śaktitastyāga* (giving up according to one's capacity) *Sādhusamādhi* (protecting and reassuring the saints or removing their troubles), *Vaiyāvṛttyakaraṇa* (serving the meritorious), *Arhadbhakti* (devotion to arhats or omniscients), *Ācāryabhakti* (devotion to Ācāryas), *Bahuśrutabhakti* (devotion to Upādhyāya), *Pravacanabhakti* (devotion to scripture), *Āvāśyakaparihāni* (not neglecting one's duties), *Mārgaprabhāvanā* (propagation of the path of liberation), and *Pravacanavatsalatva* (tender affection for one's brothers on the path of liberation).[59]

Church Units

The monks were grouped in various Units under their respective Heads. The whole congregation of monks, nuns, laymen, and lay-women is called *Saṅgh*. *Gaṇa*, *Kula*, and *Gaccha* were the main Units. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is

said to be a head and a teacher of such *Saṅgha* and *Gaṇa* (*Saṅghī ceva gaṇī ca gaṇācariyo ca*).[60] The *gaṇa* was the largest unit made up of many kulas (*parasparārasanākakulasamudāyaḥ*).[61] The maximum number of the members of a *Gaṇa* is said to be a thousand ('*utkṛṣṭāḥ purupuṣapramānaṁ sahasṛbyāptharktvaṁ*,[62] It was headed by *Gāṇadhara* or *Tīrthaṅkara*.[63]

Vassāvāsa or stay in rainy season

During the rainy season a Jaina ascetic is suposed to stop his touring. The rule was so popular that the people criticise the Buddhist monks for not adhering to it at the beginning, "How can these recluses, Sākyaputtiyas, walk on tour during the cold weather and hot weather and rain trampling down the crops and grasses, injuring life that is one-facultied and bringing many small creatures to destruction ? Shall it be that these members of other sects, whose rules are badly kept, cling to and prepare a rains-residence, shall it be that birds having made their nests in the tree-tops, cling to a proper rains-residence, which these recluses trample on walking."[64] Then the Buddha prescribed the rules pertaining to the observance of indoor residence in the rainy season.

Here the word *aññatitthiyā* refers to the heretical teachers. We are not aware of this rule in their doctrines, except in those of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. The *Mūlācāra* Mentions that a Jaina monk should stop touring in the rainy season and abstain from causing injury to vegetable beings which grow profusely during this time.

Taṇarukkhaharidachedaṇatayapattapavālakandamūlāiṁ.
Phalapupphabīyaghādaṁ ṇa karenti muṇī ṇa kārenti.
Puḍhavīya samārambhaṁ jalapavaṇaggītasāṇamārambhaṁ.
Ṇa karenti ṇā kārenti ya kārentaṁ ṇāṇumodanti.[65]

The *vassāvāsa* in Jainism[66] as well as Buddhism[67] commences on the full-moon day of *Āṣāḍha* and ends on the full-moon day of *Kārtika*. The *Ṭhāṇāṅga* permits the monks to go to another place under certain circumastences.[68].

Requisites

A Jaina monk has no attachment to the world. Nakedness or acelakatva is considered one of the essential of monkhood (*liṅgkappa*).[69] *Pāli* literature refers to Jaina ascetics as Nigaṇṭhas, for they claimed to be free from all bonds (*aṃhākaṃ ganthānakileso palibujjhankileso natthi, Kilesaganthirahitaāyaṃ ti evaṃ vāditāya laddhnāmavasena Nigaṇṭho*).[70]

Cloth and other requisities are considered *parigraha* (possession) which is an obstacle to the attainment of salvation. Ācārya Kundakunda says : '"If (you were to say) it is (found) stated in certain texts that monk accepts a piece of clothing and possesses a pot, (we are to ask) how can he (with these) be independent and without activities involving preliminary sins ? If he accepts a piece of clothing, gourd-bowl or anything else, necessarily there is involved harm to living beings, and there is disturbance in mind.[71] Somadeva also puts forth the same view.[72] According to *Digambaras*, no body can attain complete emancipation from karmas without being naked.

The Buddha was completely against nakedness (*Acelakatva*). He criticised this rule along with others on several occasions. In Pāli literature the word *Acela* is used quite loosely and referred to any naked ascetic rather than a member of any single organised religious sect.[73] In the *Vinaya*[74] both *Acelaka* and *Ājīvika* are used synonymously. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*, the Buddha is said to have followed the *Acelakatva* before he had attained Buddhahood. But in the *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*, a person with an unsettled mind is compared to one who starts as an *Acelaka*, Nigaṇṭha and Tāpasa.[75]

In the same work an incident is referred to where the Nigaṇṭhas wearing a piece of cloth are considered better than those who are completely unclothed (*Acelakas*). The reason given for wearing a garment was the prevention of dust and dirt falling into their alms-dishes. For even dust and

comprise beings endowed with life[76]. This reference appears to the *Śvetāmbara* sect of Jainas which apparently had come into existence at the time of Buddhaghosa.

The same work mentions another incident which happened during the marriage of Visākhā, a lay-woman who was a follower of Buddhism. It is said there that her father-in-law Migāra, follower of Jainism, escorted the naked ascetics (perhaps Jainas) into his house for a meal, and called Visākhā to pay homage to them. As she entered the hall where the naked ascetics were eating and looked at them, she said "Men like these are totally bereft of a sense of modesty and fear of mortal sin and have no right to the title of *Arhant*. Why did my fathar-in-law send for me[77]?

Another story[78] gives a dialogue between Sirigutta and Garhadinna, the followers of Buddha and the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Garahadinna says to Sirigutta that the Nigaṇṭhas (Jaina monks) are omniscient. They know the past, present and the future. Afterwards Sirigutta, a follower of the Buddha, trys to test this boast of the naked ascetics. He prepared a ditch to be dug between two houses. On invitation, when the Nigaṇṭhas came, they fell into the pit and their bodies were covered with mud etc. Then it is said that he had them beaten with sticks and brought humiliation upon them. In the end it was proved that Buddhist monks were omniscient for they could avoid the pit which was secretly dug for them too. One factor is important here, that is, the Jaina monks who figure in this story are only ordinary monks and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is not connected with the incident at all.

All these references to *Acelakas* and Nigaṇṭhas indicate that the Buddha and his followers were not only opposed to nakedness, but they also ridiculed it. On the other hand, it is clear that Acelakatva or nakedness was one of the essentials of Jaina monkhood.

Ascetic Practices

Some ascetic pratices which were prevalent at that time

among *Samaṇas* and *Brāhmaṇas* are referred to by the name of Acela Kassapa[79]. The same practices are said to have been practised by the Buddha himself before he attained enlightenment[80]. The Ājīvikas are also said to have followed them[81]. These practices are as follows :

(1) He goes naked (*acelako hoti*).

(2) He is of loose habits (performing his bodily functions, and eating food in a standing posture, not crouching down, or sitting down, as well-bred people do. (*muttācāro*).

(3) He licks his hands clean (after eating, instead of washing them, as others do)-(*hatthāpalekhano*).

(4) When on his rounds for alms, if politely requested to stop nearer, or to wait a moment, he passes solidly on (*na ehi bhaddantiko na tiṭṭha bhaddantiko*).

(5) He refuses to accept food brought to him (*nābhihataṁ*)

(6) He refuses to accept food if prepared especially for him (*na uddissakataṃ*).

(7) He refuses to accept any invitation (na nimantānaṁ sādiyati).

(8) He will not accept food straight from the mouth of a pot or pan (*so na kumbhīmukhā paṭigganhāti, na kalopimukhā paṭigganhāti*).

(9) He will not accept food placed within the threshold (*na elakamantaraṁ*).

(10) Nor among the sticks (*na daṇḍamantaraṁ*).

(11) Nor among the pestles (*na musalamantaraṁ*).

(12) Nor when two persons are eating (*na dvinnaṁ bhuñjamānaṁ*).

(13) Nor from a pregnant woman (*na gabbhaniyā*).

(14) Nor from one giving suck (*na pāyamānāya*).

(15) Nor from one in intercourse with a man (*na purisantaragatāya*).

(16) He will not accept food collected (*na saṅkattīsu*).

(17) Nor accept food where a dog is standing (*na yattha sa upaṭṭhito hoti*).

(18) Nor where flies are swarming (*na yattha makkhikā saṇḍasaṇḍacārinī*).

(19) Nor accept fish, nor meat, nor drink, nor intoxicants, nor gruel (*na maccham, na thusodkaṁ pivati*).

(20) He is one-houser accepting one mouthful or a two-houser accepting two-mouthfuls or a seven-houser accepting seven mouthfuls (so *ekāgāriko vā hoti ekālopiko vā hoti dvālopiko, sattāgāriko vā hoti sattālopiko*).

(21) He keeps himself going on alms given by only one or only two, or so on, up to seven (*ekissāpi dattiyā yāpeti, dvīhi pi dattīhi yāpeti, sattāhi pi dattīhi yāpeti*).

(22) He takes food only once a day, or once every two days, or so on upto only seven days. Thus does he dwell observing the practice of taking food according to rule, at regular intervals, upto even half a month. (*ekāhikaṁ pi āhāraṁ āhāreti, dvīhikaṁ pi āhāraṁ āhāreti, sattīhikaṁ pi āhāraṁ āhāreti, iti evarūpaṁ addhamāsikaṁ pi pariyāyabhottabhajanānuyogamanuyutto viharati.*)

Out of these practices, several are reminiscent of the eight faults pertaining to food, which are mentioned in the *Mūlācāra* viz. *Udgama*; *Utpādana*, *Eṣaṇā*, *Saṁyojana*, *Aṅgāra*, *Dhūma* and *Kāraṇa*.[32] These are identical with the rules prescribed for Jaina monks. Jacobi also accepts that "many are quite clear, and bear a close resemblance to well known Jaina usages.[33]"

The *Udgamadoṣa*[34] are of sixteen kinds. viz. *Adhaḥkarma, Auddeśika, Adhyadhi, Pūtimiśra, Sthāpita, Bali, Prāviṣkarama, Krita, Prāmṛṣya, Abhighāta, Udbhinna, Malāroha, Acchedya* and *Anisṛṣṭa*. Among these faults some are referred to in the above reference. They are as follows :

Nābhikaṭaṁ (5) is the *abhighāta doṣa* of the *Mūlācāra*, according to which a Jaina monk should not aceept the food brought from other places[35] :

Na uddissakataṁ (6) is *Auddesika Doṣa* of the *Mūlācāra* which means : whatever is prepared specially for any saint or Śramaṇa or Nirgrantha, should not be accepted by a Jaina

monk.[86] The reason behind this rule is that the lay-devotees of Jainism should always take pure food and be prepared to offer faultless food to a monk at any time.[87] *Na kumbhīmukhā paṭigganhāti, na kalopimukhā paṭigganhāti, na elakamantaraṁ, na daṇḍamantaraṁ, na musalamantaraṁ* (8-11) are the *Sthāpita* and *Miśra doṣas* pertaining to food in Jaina asceticism.[88] According to these rules, the utensils and things cooked therein should not be mixed :

Pāsaṇḍehi ya saddhaṃ sāgarehiṁ ya jadaṇṇamuddisivaṁ.
Dādumidi saṁjadāṇaṁ Siddhaṁ missaṁ viyāṇāhi.
Pāgādu bhāyaṇāo aṇṇamhi ya bhāyaṇaṁhi pakkhaviya,
Saghare vā paraghare vā ṇihidaṁ ṭhavidaṁ viyāṇāhi.[89]

saṅkattisu (16) is the *Prāduṣkara* (*saṅkramaṇa*) and *Ṛṇadoṣa* of the *Mūlācāra*. According to them, the food for Jaina monks should neither be collected nor be borrowed from any other places.[90] This indicates that a donation should be made according to one's capacity.[91] So *ekāgāriko va. dvāgāriko vā. sattagāriko vā hoti* (20) are identical with the *Ācinna doṣā*. A *muni* should not go begging beyond seven houses. He is supposed to have returned in case he could not get alms[92]. *Na dvinnam bhuñjamānānaṁ*, (12) *Na gabbhiniyā*[93], (13) N*a pāyamānāya*[94] (14) *Na puri santaragatāya* (15) are identical with the Dāyaka Doṣas, according to which a woman who is eating (ghasatti), is pregnant (*gabbhinī*) or is nursing a baby (*piyamānaṁ dārayaṁ*) is not eligible to offer alms to a monk.[95] *Na ehi bhadantiko, Na tiṭṭha bhadantiko* (4) *Na uddissakataṁ* (6) *are related to Uddiṣṭa-tyāga*, according to which a Jaina monk does not accept any invitation. (*uddiṣṭam piṇḍamapyujjhed*).

Mode of eating

We have already seen that a Jaina monk (Digambara) does not possess anything except a water-pot and a broom. He therefore eats food in the hollow of his palms in a standing position.[96] The *hatthāpalekhano* (3) indicates the same mode of eating of Jaina saints in an ironical way. *The Muttācāro* (2) also perhaps hints the same. Somadeva points out here that

although no body attains salvation by observing this mode of eating but it gives an impression that an ascetic takes an oath that he should take his meals till he could keep food in the hollow of his palms in standing position.[97]

Quantity of food

A Jaina monk is supposed to fill half his belly with food, one fourth with water, and one fourth with wind. The maximum quantity of food to be taken ordinarly is 32 morsels (kavala).[98] the '*Ekālopiko, dvālopiko, sattālopiko* indicate further restrictions on the quantity of food consumed by a monk.

The Circumstances under which Food could not be taken

A long list of circumstances under which food could not be taken is given in the *Mūlācāra*. If a crow touches the food or if some one vomits or if the monk happens to see blood or flesh or somebody crying or if living beings like flies fall into his food, no food should be accepted under such circumstances. *Na yattha su upaṭṭhito hoti* (17), *Na yattha makkhikā saṇḍasaṇḍacārinī* (18), *Na maccham, na māṁsaṁ, na suraṁ, na merayaṁ, na thusodakaṁ pivati* (19) point out further circumstances.

Fasting

The reference "*Ekāhikaṁ pi āhāraṁ āhāreti, dvihikaṁ pi āhāraṁ āhāreti, sattihikaṁ pi āhāraṁ āhāreti, iti evarūpaṁ aḍḍha māsikaṁ pi pariyāyabhattabhojanānuyogamanuyutto viharati,*" (22) shows that fasting was prevalent in the Ācelaka sect, especially in Jainism. According to Jaina ethical standpoint, one should fast according to *dravya* (substance), *kṣetra* (place), *kāla* (time), and *bhāva* (mental state). Various methods fasting are mentioned in Jaina literature and monks used to fast even for months.[99]

Thus the above mentioned references to Acelaka's practices in Pāli literature are related in many respects to the practices of Jaina monachism.

Supernatural Powers

Supernatural powers of Jaina monks are referred to in Jaina literature.[100] But they were prohibited to show them in public for such purposes as obtaining food.[101] Later on, certain occasions the Jaina monks were allowed to make us of such powers.[102] Acārya Samantabhadra[103] and Siddhasena Divākar[104] are famous for displaying such supernatural powers.

The *Vinaya Piṭaka*[105] mentions that the six heretical teachers including Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta approached a great merchant of Rājagaha to get a bowl. But all of them failed and Piṇḍola Bharadwāja, a follower of the Buddha, fetched it down. Likewise, the Dīgha Nikāya refers to an incident where a Nigaṇṭha failed in manifesting the supernatural powers which he claimed. How far these references are correct, we cannot say. But the Jaina literature, does not preserve any record of such incidents which could tally with these references in Pāli literature.

Daily routine

As regards the routine of a Jaina monk, he is supposed to spend more time in study and meditation. He gets up early in the morning and pays his homage to the *Pañcaparameṣṭhins* during *Sāmāyika* or *Kāyotsarga*. Besides begging and preaching he engages himself in the performance of duties without transgressions. His duties are to observe the *Pañcamahāvratas*, *pañcasamitis*, *Ṣaḍāvaśyakas* *Pañcendriyas* *Dvādaśānuprekṣas*, twenty two *Pariṣahas*, *Pañcācāras*, and *Triguptis*. References to them as found in the Pāli literature are as follows :

Pañcamahāvratas

The *Sāmaññaphala* Sutta *of the Dīgha Nikāya* mentions the *Cātuyāmasaṁvara* of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. We have already discussed this matter to some extent in the section on the duties of laymen. The *Yama* means *Mahāvrta* or perfect vow. And *Cātuyāmasamvara* means four restraints attained by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. These four Restraints are as follows according to the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*:

(i) *Sabbavārivārito* or restrained as regards all water.

(ii) *Sabbavāriyuto* or restrained as regards all evil.

(iii) *Sabbavāridhuto* or all evil washing away.

(iv) *Sabbavāriphuṭo* or he is filled with a sense of all sins avoided.

This is undoubtedly a very faint picture of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's doctrine. Buddhaghosa's *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* also does not help much in this respect. Jacobi remarks : "This is certainly, neither an accurate nor an exhaustive description of the Jaina creed, though it contains nothing alien from it and successfully imitates the language of the Jaina Sūtras." He further says that "The Buddhists, I suppose, have made a mistake in ascribing to Nātaputta Mahāvīra's doctrine which properly belonged to his predecessor Pārśva. This is a significant mistake; for the Buddhists could not have used the above term as descriptive of the Nigaṇṭhas creed unless they had heard it from followers of Pārsva, and they would not have used it if the reforms of Mahāvīra had already been generally adopted by the Nigaṇṭhas at the time of the Buddha."[108]

There are several versions of the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* different from each other. For instance, the Tibetan *Dulva* retains Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's authentic teaching of wiping and karma by penance, while in one of its Chinese versions dated 412-13 A.D. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta claims omniscience, and in another Chinese version dated 381-395 A.D., he is mentioned to hold the view of karma.[109] Basham thinks that *SāmaññaphalaSutta* shows a completeness and consistency lacking in the rest, and perhaps represents the original source of the other references"[110] This, however, does not seem to be quite correct. As a matter of fact, the *Cātuyāmasamvara* followed by Pārśvanātha tradition comprised : (i) *Sarvaprāṇātipātaveramaṇa*, (ii) *Sarvamṛṣāvādaveramaṇa*, (iii) *Sarvādattādānaveramaṇa*, and (iv) *Sarvabahiddhādānaveramaṇa*. Here the *Maithuna* (sexual intercourse and *Parigraha* (worldly attachment) were included in the last vow, that is *Sarvabahiddhādānaveramaṇa*.

In course of time its real meaning was forgotton and the followers of Pārśvanātha tradition or *Pasāvaccijja* considered the *Sarvabahiddhādānaveramaṇa* (Parigraha) as concerned only, with wealth, and not sexual desires. As a result, they did not consider the *Strīsambhoga* to be a falt if it is done for getting a son.[113] This is the reason why one was advised not to have contact with them.[114]

Observing this slackened conduct, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta separated the last into two vow viz *Brahmacarya* (celibacy) and *Aparigraha* (non-attachment to the worldly enjoyment), and made it into five. Since then the Jainas are called the followers of five great vows (*Pañcamahāvratas*).[115] It seems, as we have already seen that the Pāli Canon was also familiar with *Pañcamahāvratas*.

Pañcasamitis

The *Majjhima* Nikāya[111] describes the kind of language which should be used by a Jaina monk. It is said there that "Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta sent Abhayarājakumāra to the Buddha to ask a question whether he (the Buddha) utters a speech that is disliked by others, or disagreeable to them. If he speaks so, what is the difference between him and a common man." This indicates that according to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta no monk should speak harshly.[117]

Ṣaḍ āvaśyakas

Among the *Ṣaḍāvśyakas*, only the *Kāyotsarga* (kāussaggo). is referred to in Pāli literature. In the *Majjhima* Nikāya[118] the Buddha told Mahānāma that while he was staying at Rājagaha, he had seen a number of Niganthas on the Isigili Kālasilā standing erect, refraining from sitting, and experiencing acute, painful, sharp and bitter sensations.

This reference indicates the *Kāyotsarga* or *Sāmāyika* as prescribed for the Jaina monks. It should be performed without movement of or attachment to the body (*sthitasyāsinasya sarvāṅgacalanarahitasya subhadhyānasya vṛttiḥ Kāyotsargaḥ*.[119]

Loca or Keśaluñcana

One should pull out his hair of head and beard in five handfuls with intervals of two, three or four months following a *upavasa* and *Pratikramaṇa*.[120] Before the attainment of Buddhahood, Prince siddhārtha had himself observed this rule. He says, "I was one who plucked out the hairs of head and beard intent on the practice of doing so (*kesamassulocako hoti, kesamassulocanānuyogamanuyutto*).[121]

Acelakatva

Acelakatva (nakedness) with non-attachment to anything is essential to attain salvation.[122] According to the Majjhima Nikāya[123], the Buddha, too, followed this rule before attaining Buddhahood.

Triguptis

Trigupti is the essence of a monk's creed to which he should thoroughly adhere to destroy karmas.[124] The Nigaṇṭhas, who were engaged in severe penance on Gijjhakūṭapabbata at Rājagaha said to the Buddha that according to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, the past deeds could be destroyed by preserving the proper control over the mind, body, and speech (*yaṁ panetha etarahi kāyena saṁbutā; vācāya saṁvutā, manasā saṁvuta taṁ āyatiṁ pāpassa kammassa akaraṇaṁ*.........). As its corollary it is said that the *kāyadaṇḍa*, *vacīdaṇḍa* and *manodaṇḍa* are said to be the causes of sins.[125]

Meditation[126] (dhyāna) and concentration (*samādhi*) are fundamental obligations of a Jaina monk. Meditation is of four kinds, namely *Ārtadhyāna* (painful concentration) *Raudra dhyāna* (wicked concentration), *Dharmadhyāna* (righteous concentration) and *Śukladhyāna* (pure concentration). The first two are the causes of bondage to the karmas, while the last two lead to salvation,[127] The severe penance observed by the Nigaṇṭhas at Rājagaha was to attain the last two *dhyānas*, for which the self-realization was essential. The regular study, the right conduct, right attitude, and non-attachment, are the factors which pave the way to *Dharma*-

-*dhyāna*.[126] The *Śukladhyāna* contributes to the steadiness of the mind which ultimately results in the attainment of omniscience.

Thus the reference to Jaina ethics as found in Pāli literature are, though meagre and sometimes defective, very important. From our survey of these references, we may conclude that:

(i) *Cātuyāmasaṁvara* was followed by the Pārśvanātha tradition, and not Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta tradition, and the Buddha and his followers were not perfectly aware of this difference in the two traditions.

(ii) Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta separated the last vow of *Cātuyāmasamvara* into two *Brahmacarya* aud *Parigraha*, which was known to the Pāli Canon,

(iii) The *Guṇavratas* and *Śikṣāvratas* were so popular among both the monks and the laity that their nature and implications were well known to Buddhist circles.

(iv) *Acelakatva* and other severe forms of penance were put into practice in Jaina community during that period, and Jainism had already acquired a fame for the severity of its vows and observences.

CHAPTER IV

JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

1—Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa (Direct Knowledge)

Logical discussions

Epistemology evolved as a result of logical discussions. Such discussions and debates as the sceptics and sophists engaged in, in ancient Greece, were prevalent in Ancient India. They aimed at defending their own theories while refuting those of their opponents

The *Sutta Nipāta*, which is supposed to be one of the earliest parts of the Pāli Scripture, states that such debates took place among the *Śramaṇas*[1] and *Brāhamaṇas*[2]. Sometimes the *Titthiyas* (including Ājivikas and Nigaṇṭhas)[3], the so called *Vādasīlas* (habituate in the debate), have also been associated with these debates.[4]

All these debates are named *takkī*[5] or *takkikā*[6] In Pāli literature the ten possible ways of claiming knowledge have been criticised by the Buddha in addressing Kālāma.[7] One of them is called "*takka-hetu*" which has been explained in the Commentary as "*takka-gahena*" (addhering to reason)[8]. This takki-hetu appears to be closely realated to *prāmaṇa* or epistemological or logical ground, which is perhaps used first by Umāsvāmi, a Jaina Acārya of about the lst century A. D.[9] The word *hetu* is also referred to in this sense in the *Bhagwatī Sūtra* (336) and the *Thāṇāṅgasūtra* (309-10).

Such discussions were held for the sake of gaining triumph in arguments or to defend religions. The debaters used the *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* forms which are the classifications of *kathā* or discussion in the Nyāya tradition. Pāli literature also makes similar references to this classification. The *Sutta Nīpāta* mentions the *vāda*[12], *kathā*[13] and *vitaṇḍā*.[14] Buddhaghose associates this *vitaṇḍāsattha* with the Brāhmaṇas, while

the *Saddaniti* refers to the Titthiyas. It shows the *vitaṇḍā* was utilized at that time by all schools of thought, since the term *Titthiya* was applied to both the samaṇas and the Brāhamaṇas.

The discussion through which knowledge is gained about doctrines is called the *Vāda*; that which is only for gaining victory over the opponents is *Jalpa*; the debate where the quibbles (*chala*) analogues (*jāti*) and respondent's failures (*nigrahasthāna*) are utilized to vanquish the opponent is called *vitaṇḍā* in Nyāya system and was used to defend their own views by right or wrong means.[15]

The Buddhist tradition also could not escape being influenced by this practice. The old logical compenda like the *Upāyahṛdaya, Tarkaśāstra,* etc. appear to have allowed the use of quibbles analogues etc. for the specific purpose of protecting the Buddhist order, but Dharmakīrti, realising that it was not in keeping with the high standards of truth and non-violence, completely denied their usage in the *Vādanyāya*. Hence, Dharmakırti refers the qualities of the debater who speaks more or less than necesssary. Therefore he accepts only the two *Nigrahasthānas, Asādhanāṅga* and *Adoṣodbhāvana* for-*vādi* as well as *prātivādī*.[16]

The Jainas, on the other hand, lay more stress on truth and non-violence. They think of the *Vitaṇḍā* as *Vitaṇḍābhāsa*.[17] Akalaṅka rejects even the *Asādhanāṅga* and *Adośodbhāvana in* view of the fact that.they are themselves the subjects of discussion. He then says : a defendent should himself indicate the real defects in the established theory of a disputant and then set up his own theory.[18] Thus he should consider each item from the point of view o' truth and non-violence.

The above fact is supported by Pāli literature which contains references to the logical discussions of that period. Some adherents of Jainism had also participated in such discussions. Saccaka, Abhaya and Asibandhakaputta Gāmīṇi are the main characters who took an active part in them.

Saccaka is described in the *Nikāyas* as one who indulged in debate, a learned, controversialist, who was highly esteemed by the common people.[19] He is said to have debated with all the six teachers, including even Māhāvīra (Nigaṅtha Nātaputtta), although Saccaka was a staunch follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. This may imply that he was a follower of the Pārśvanātha tradition. But as Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta became a Tīrthaṅkara of Jainism, Saccaka would have examined him through discussions and then accepted his religion, which was nothing but the refarmation of the Pārśvanātha tradition. Saccaka boasts about his dialaectical skill in magniloquent language and speaks to the Licchavīs at Vaiśālī : "To-day there will be a conversation between me and recluse Gautama.If Gautam takes up his stand against me, even as a powerful man, having taken hold of the fleece of a long fleeced ram, might tug it towards him." Further it has been mentioned there that the Buddha had asked a question which could not be replied by Saccaka. And the result was that he became a follower of the Buddha.[20]

Another reference is recorded in the *Abhayrājakumāra Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*[21] to the effect that Abhayarājakumāra was sent by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta to ask a question from the Buddha about his speech, as to whether the Tathā. gata utters unpleasant words and is unkind to others.

The statement that "Abhaya was sent by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta" is not supported by Jaina literature. Whatever its reason, the fact is evident that the Jainas participated actively in discussions and tried to indicate the defects of others religious utterence made about the future of Devadatta. Abhaya then went to inquire as to how far he was correct in his view. He does not appear to have questioned merely with the idea of imputing faults to his opponent's theory. This seems to be the first and most fundamental principle of Jaina conception of logical discussions of that period. The propositional question put by Abhaya Rājakumāra to the Buddha is as follows :

(i) Would the Buddha make statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others ? (*bhāseyya nu kho......Tathāgato taṁ vācaṁ yā sā vācā paresaṁ appiyā amanāpā*).

(ii) If so, how is he different from the ordinary individual who also makes statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others ? (*atha kiñcarahi......puthujjanena nākaraṇaṁ, puthujjano pi hi taṁ vācaṁ bhāseyya, yā sā vācā paresaṁ appiyā amanāpā*).

(iii) The Buddha would not make statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others (*na Tathāgato taṁ vācaṁ bhāsati yā sā vācā paresaṁ appiyā*) :

(iv) Then why has he pronounced about Devadatta that he is doomed to hell .....that he is incorrigible (*atha kiñcarahi......Devadatto byākato : āpayiko Devadatto vyākato ; āpayiko Devadatta atekicco Devadatto*) ?

Here Abhaya tried to show that the Buddha made a self-contradictory statement. Likewise, *Asibandhakaputta Gāmaṇi*[22] a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta made the following remarks about the Buddha as he understood him :

(i) The Buddha in various ways speaks showing compassion to people (*Bhagavā anekapariyāyena kulānaṁ anuddayaṁ vaṇṇeti*).

(ii) The Buddha during a famine......goes about with a large number of disciples and behaves in a way detrimental to the interest of people (*Bhagavā dubbhikkhe......mahatā bhikkusaṅghena saddhiṁ cārikaṁ carati, ucchedāya Bhagavā kulānaṁ paṭipanno*).

The questions asked by Abhaya Rājakumāra and Asibandhakaputta Gāmaṇi are based on such type of framed questions : If he qestioned thus and he answers thus, we shall join issue (vādaṁ) with him thus."[23] They are called "dupadaṁ *peñhaṁ or "ubhayatokoṭikaṁ pañhaṁ"* (dilemmas)[24] As a matter of fact, these are the conditional questions, which would have been thought out or taught before embarking on a dispute.

The Jaina attitude to these debates and discussions was that they were meant only to investigate the real defects in opponents theories. There were not allowed to gain a victory through evil means, like quibbling, analogues, power and so on. That is why *Vitaṇḍa* is considered *Vitaṇḍābhāsa* in Jainism.[25] The Buddha himself appreciates the attitude of such Paṇḍitas and agrees with them on other matters.[26] He called them *Viññū* or intelligent persons who are supposed to be hypothetical rational critics.[27] They used to make an impartial and intelligent assessment of the relative worth of conflicting theories.[28] On the basis of the above view the later Jaina philosophers established the definition and means of debates. Akalaṅka is perhaps the first to point out clearly such definitions. He says that if one is capable of establishing his own view (*pakṣa*) through right devices, it is *Jaya* (victory) for him and *Parājaya* (defeat) for the other.[29]

The Buddhist philosohical literature which developed later, has not mentioned any discussions and refutations of Jaina conception in this connection. This may be due to the fact that both philosophies had similar rules and regulations regarding such dabates, except for a few differences (especially in the case of *Nigrahasthānas*).

Evolution of Epistemology

Epistemology and Logic are mainly concerned with the validity of knowledge and have been subjects of controversy among philosophers from time immemorial.

The Buddha classified such thinkers into three groups in a Sutta of the *Majjhima Nikāya*. It is said there that a Brāhmaṇa student went to ask the Buddha "in which category he stands". The Buddha replied "there are some recluses and Brāhamaṇas who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight (*diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosonapāramippattā*) into this life. "where does the venerable Gotama stand among them ?" The Buddha replied "I say that there is a distinction among those who profess their doctrines after finding a final

and ultimate insight in this life. There are some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who are traditionalists (*anussavikā*), who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life, such as the Brāhmaṇas of the three Vedas (*tevijja*). There are also some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life on mere faith alone (*kevalaṁ saddhā mattakena*) such as the reasoners (*takkī*) and metaphysicians (*vimaṁsi*, lit. speculators). There are some other recluses and Brāhmaṇas who profess their dogmas after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by assimilating a higher knowledge (*diṭṭhadhammābhiññāvosānapāramippattā*) personally (*samaṁ Yeva*) of a doctrine (*dhamaṁ*) among doctrines not traditionally heard of before. Now I am one of those who profess the basis of their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by gaining a higher knowledge personally of a doctrine among doctrines not traditionally heard of before"[30].

This reference seeks to classify the pre-Buddhist and contemporary thinkers into three groups : (i) the Traditionalists (*anussāvikā*), who obtained knowledge on the basis of their scripture and interpreted it according to them The Brāhmaṇas or the followers of the Vedas are enumerated in this group. (ii) The Rationalists or Reasoners (*takkī*) who gained knowledge through reasons. Sceptics, and Materialists come under this group, and (iii) Experientialists, who attained higher knowledge on the basis of personal experience (Samaṁ Yeva). Jainas, Buddhists, and Ājīvikas would fall into this category.

Like the Buddha, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is said to have professed his doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight by gaining a higher knowledge personally, not traditionally heard of before. That is why he emphasised more on knowledge rather than belief. (*Saddhāya kho Gahapati ñāṇaṁ yeva paṇītataraṁ*).[31] It is reported that he claimed to have perfect knowledge (*sabbaññū*) and vision (*sabbadassābī*). This insight can be obtained after attaining Right Vision

(*Samyagdarśana*), Right-Knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*), and Right Conduct (*Samyagcāritra*).[32] Right view in the seven principles (*Jīva* or soul, *Ajīva* or matter, *Āsrava* or inflow of karmas, *Bandha* or bondage of karmas, *Saṁvara* or checking of karmas, *Nirjarā* or shedding of karmas, and *Mokṣa* or complete liberation from karmas) is the *Samyagdarśana*, which is the basis of Right knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*). Purification of the attitude is regarded as the *sine qua non* of the purification of knowledge and conduct. While *Darśanamoha* (delusion of vision) destroys, immediately after Right Vision and Right Knowledge emerge. Then through Right Conduct one can attain the Perfect knowledge, the so-called *Kevalajñāna* or *Sarvajñatva* in Jainism.[33]

Knowledge and Vision (*Jñāna and Darśana*)

In Jainism, knowledge and vision or jñāna and *darśana* or omniscience are the result of penance (tapa) and contemplation (dhyāna .[33] That is why Nātaputta is called *Jñānavādin* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*ahaṁ anantena ñānena anantaṁ lokaṁ jānaṁ passaṁ viharāmi*).[34]

*A*ccording to Jaina literature, *Jñāna* or *cetanā* (consciousness) also called *Upayoga*, is the main characteristic of soul in Jainology.[35] This upayoga is of two kinds, viz. *sākāra* (determinate) and *anākāra* (indeterminate). The former is called *jñāna*, while the latter is *darśana*. Sākāra upayoga consists of five classes of knowledge, viz. *Matijñāna* (sensitive knowledge), *Śrutajñāna* (scriptural knowledge), *Avadhi jñāna* (visual knowledge), *Manaḥparyaya* jñāna (mental knowledge) and *Kevalajñāna* (perfect knowledge). *Anākāra upayoga* is divided into four classes, viz. *Cakṣudarśanāvaraṇa* (non-obscuring), *Acakṣudarśanāvaraṇa* (non-ocular-obscuring), *Avadhidarśanāvaraṇa* (visual-obscuring), and the *Kevaladarśanāvaraṇa* (perfect-conation-obscuring). Consciousness develops into the two forms, knowledge and vision (*jñānākāra* and *Jñeyākāra*).[36] We can say that jñāna is determinate knowledge (*sākāra jñāna*) and *darśana* is indeterminate knowledge (*anākāra jñāna*). This is the distinction between jñāna and

darśana. According to the *Prajñāpanā Sūtra* also both *upayoga* and *paśyattā* can be *sākāra* as well *as anākāra.*

Ācārya Kundakunda mentions the view of his predecessors that vision reveals the self (*diṭṭhī appapayāsayāceva*). Hence, he considers the problem from the empirical as well as the transcendental standpoint[37] and concludes that the soul and its knowledge and vision are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as non-self.

Vīrasena considers reality as a complex of universal-cum-particular and says in his commentary called Dhavalā on the ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama of Puṣpadanta that *jñāna* comprehends external meaning of the nature of reality, while *darśana* is the comprehension of the true form of that nature.[39] That means *jñāna* reveals the external reality while darśana intuits its internal characteristics. Siddhasena Divākara defines vision (darśana) as an apprehension of sāmānya and knowledge (*jñāna*) as an apprehension of viśeṣa *jaṁ sāmaṇṇaggahaṇaṁ daṁsaṇameyaṁ visesiyaṁ ṇāṇaṁ*).[40] By this time the defination of *darśana* had been developed to mean the apprehension of sāmānya of an entity.

It is clear that vision or *darśana* was originally considered to be the revealer of self (*ātma-prākāśaka*). That is the reason why *matijñāna*, *śrutajñāna* and the *avadhijñānā*, which reveal external nature of reality, can be wrong if they are viewed from the wrong angle, whereas cakṣudarśana, acakṣudarśana and avadhidarśana, which come prior to them, are not so. If *Viśeṣa* (particular) had been considered as having a meaning of general observation of an entity, the *Saṁśaya* (doubt), *viparayaya* (perversion), and the *anadhyavasāya* (indecision) would have existed in its perception made earlier, and darśana would have been divided, like *jñāna*, into darśana-adarśana etc. This defect would not arise if we define vision as a revealer of self. For, it always exists prior to, as well as at the time of knowledge.[41]

This idea was expressed in logical terms by Pūjyapāda

Devanandi in his Sarvārtha Siddhi.[42] No endeavours had been made upto that time to consider darśana as a valid standard of knowledge (pramāṇa). Whether it should be regarded as pramāṇa or not was the main problem for the logicians. Abhayadeva Sūri, a commentator on the *Sanmati Tarka*, expressed his view that *Darśana*, like *Jñāna*, could be pramāṇa (valid)[43] while Māṇikyanandi and Vādideva Sūri[45] considered it as a *Pramāṇābhāsa* (falsely valid). It may be that Nirvikalpaka darśana of Buddhism and not Darśana of Jainism was in their minds when darśana was declared a pramāṇābhāsa.

Pāli literature makes reference to the fact that Nātaputta possessed "infinite knowledge and vision". The Jaina Āgamas[46] confirm the ancient view and say *jāṇadi passadi* and "*Jāṇamāṇe pāsamāṇe*". This indicates that the activities of both, knowledge and vision in an object can take place together and reveal its knowledge and vision simultaneously.

In the later period, some of the Śvetāmbara Ācāryas tried to explain this original idealogy in a different way. They said that *Jñāna* and *darśana* were conscious activities, and the two conscious activities could not occur simultaneously. But there is a controversy among them with regard to the case of one who is omniscient (Kevalin). Some stick to the Āgamas, while others do not and assert either that a Kevalin's *Jñāna* and *darśana* are simultaneous or that they are mutually identical and have no separate identity. Siddhasena Divākara and Jinabhadra are the exponents of these views.[47]

On the other hand, the Digambara Ācāryas unanimously hold that the *jñāna* and *darśana* of a kevalin occur simultaneously Kundakunda, a great Digambara Ācārya states that *jñāna* and *darśana* of a kevalin occur simultaneously even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously.[48] Umāsvāmi[49] and his follower Pūjyapāda Akalaṅka[51], Vidyānanda[52] etc. also support this view.

Later, for the first time in the Jaina logical tradition it is analysed that knowledge and vision of an entity reveal its

knowledge and vision simultaneously. A further explanation is given that an entity has two forms, viz. Universal and Particular. The former is the subject of vision and the latter of knowledge. Here knowledge and vision become separate. That is why perhaps Abhayadeva Sūri accepted both as valid.

Another point may be noted here. The etymology of Pramāṇa (*pramīyate yena tatpramāṇaṁ*) points out that jñāna is the more important cause of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) since it is an attribute of soul *Sannikarṣa* (contact of an organ of senses with its effect) and sense-organs cannot be pramaṇa.[53] Akalaṅka made a great coutribution towards the development of the definition of pramāṇa. He maintains non discrepancy (*avisaṁvādin*) as a test of pramāṇa which adds one more characteristic, namely, that of *anadhigatārthagrāhi* (knowledge which is not cognised).[54] Akalaṅka, therefore, recognised only the validity of knowledge which is determinative (*nirṇayātmaka*), non-discrepancy (*avisaṁvādin*) and useful in *sāṁvyavahāra* (empirical stand-point). In this way, the *savikalpakajñāna* (conceptual knowledge), not the *nirvikalpakajñāna* (non-conceptual knowledge), is considered as perception, The concept that *nirvikalapāka jñāna* could be regarded as perception is successfully refuted by Śāntarakṣit in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*.

Classification of Knowledge

Jainism classifies Knowledge in two ways : (i) Canonical (*Āgamika*), and (ii) Philosophical *Dārśanika*. The five kinds of knowledge such as mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevalajñāna are based on the former, while *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge) are developments of the latter. The *Pratyakṣa* is defined as knowledge obtained by self without the assistance of an external instrument.[55]

It is only to the Jainas that "akṣa" means "Soul."[56] Thus *Pratyakṣa* in Jaina Āgamika tradition does not mean empirical perception, i.e. Knowledge obtained through sense organs. According to this definition the *Avadhijñāna* (visual knowledge), *Manāḥparyaya jñāna* (intuition of mental knowledge)

and *Kevaljñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge) are comprised *Pratyakṣa*, and *Matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge) and *Śrutajñāna* (scriptural Knowledge) in *Parokṣa*.[57]

The Jaina definition of *pratyakṣa* was quite different from those of other philosophical systems. According to the latter, pratyakṣa is aknowledge gained through sense organs. It created a serious difficulty for Jaina philosophers. The rivals began to question their standpoint. Having examined the arguments, the later Jaina philosophers accepted pratyakṣa as the knowledge produced by the sense-organs also. Jinabhadra and Akalaṅka designated it as *sāṁvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (empirical perception), while the real pratyaksa of āgamika tradition was called *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* (transcendental perception).[58] *Indriyapratyakṣa* and *mānasapratyakṣa* accepted by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas are included in the first category. Thus *matijñāna*, which was put under parokṣa in the Āgamika tradition, came under the category of *pratyakṣa* in philpsophical tradition Likewise smṛti, sañjñā, Cinta and abhnibodha, which were synonymous with *mati* in the Āgamic tradition[59] are synonymous with *smaraṇa*, *pratyabhijñāna*, *tarka*, and *anumāna* in the philosophical tradition. Therefore *parokṣa pramāṇa*, are five including Śruta (āgama).

Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa or (direct knowledge)

As we have already observed Pratyakṣa in Jainism is accepted as self-cognition. Umāsvāmi[60] presented this definition in the *Tattvārthasūtra*. Samantabhadra.[61] defined it as knowledge which is of self-revealing charactar. Siddhasena Divākara in his Pramāṇa Mimāṁsā added to it one more characteristic, namely, "*Bādhavarjit*" (admitting of no contradiction).

Akalaṅka developed the theory further by adding *avisaṁvadī* (non-discrepancy) and *andhigatārthagrāhī* (knowledge of object which is not yet cognised) as characteristics of the validity of knowledge.[62] This definition could remove several inner contradictions of the earlier definitions.

There are four sub-divisions of matijñāna, viz. *avagraha*

(perception), *īhā* (speculation), *avāya* (perceptual judgement) and *dhāraṇā* (retention)[63].

They are dependent of their pre-knowlede, but the emerge from sense-organs and acknowledge the modes of a particular object. It is, therefore, considered *Sāṁvyāvahārika pratyakṣa*.[64]

Except Cārvaka, all other systems[65] have classified *Jānya-partyakṣa* (generated perception) as (i) *Laukika* (Empirical) and (2) *Alaukika* (transcendental). The nature of these perceptions is the same as the nature of *Sāṁvyāvahārika* and *Pārmārthika Pratyakṣa* of Jainas. *Yogipratyakṣa* or *Yogi-jñāna* of the Sāṅkhya–Yogas,[66] Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas[67], and the Buddhists[68], *Ātmajñāna* of the Mimāṃsakas[69], are synonymous with Transcendental perception (*Pārmārthika* or *Alaukika Pratyakṣa* which is the special competence of the soul *viśiṣṭātma ṣakti*). According to Śāntarakṣita in the *Taitvasaṅgraha*, the Jainas[70] called this knowledge name *Yagi-pratyakṣa* or *Yogaja-pratyakṣa*.

The philosophers are not agreed on the question whether transcendental perception is determinate (*Savikalpaka*) or indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) or both determinate and indeterminate (*ubhaya*). The Buddhist tradition[71] regards it as being only indeterminate, (Kalpanāpoḍhaṁ), while the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṁsakas[72] are of the view that it can be either determinate or indeterminata.

The Jainas, on the other hand, like the Sāṅkhyas, think that determinate (*savikalpaka*) is the only real perception[73]. Śāntarakṣita[74] refuted this idea. He referred to the view of Sumati who considered the *Akṣaja pratyakṣa* (sensory perception) as *Sāmvyāvahārika praiyakṣa* and *Yogī pratyakṣa* (intuitive perception) as *Pārmārthika pratyakṣa*. He also added that according to the Jainas the determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) is the real perception.[75]

Savikalpaka pratyakṣa or determinate perception

Knowledge (jñāna) and vision. (*Darśana*), the two main

characteristics of the soul which we had already discussed, are also called *Darśanopayoga* (indeterminate cognition) and *Jñānopayoga* (determinate cognition).[76] The former is called the *Nirvikalpaka* while the latter is called *Savikalpaka*.[77]

Te Āgamika tradition accepts both *Savikalpaka* and *Nirvikalpaka* as valid due to spiritual considerations. According to the real standpoint in this tradition, a man obtains Right knowledge, is right in his cognition and a man who holds a wrong view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), is wrong in his cognition, while from a practical standpoint both views are right. Therefore in the Āgamika tradition, both Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka are valid from relative stand-points. Ācārya Umāsvāmi divided cognitions into right and wrong ones. The *Avadhidarśana*, and *Kevaldarśana* are indeterminate transcendental perception, while *Avadhijñāna, Manaḥparyayajñāna* and *Kevalajñāna* are determinate (transcedental perception).[78]

However, in the logical tradition the validity of pramāṇa has been changed. To refute the opponents views, specially those of the Buddhists, the Jaina Ācāryas used in their respective definitions of pramāṇa some words like *nirṇaya* (detrmination) or *jñāna* with a view to indicate that *darśana* or determinate cognition, which stands for cognition of the general (sāmānya-upayoga) falls outside the purview of these definitions.[79]

It may be noted here that the Buddhist philosophy accepts only the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* or indeterminate perception as valid knowledge. As regards the definition of perception there are two Buddhist traditions, one is headed by Diṅnāga who does not accept non-illusory (*abhrānta*) nature of perception, and the otber headed by Dharmakīrti who does so. Śāntrakṣita and his followers support the latter stating that Sense-perception is free from conceptual contents and hence not erroneous.[80] We see a thing first; th n realise its name. Thus the determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka jñāna*) depends on indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka* . Jñāna)

and, therefore, only indeterminate knowledge is perception.[81]

In connection with establishing his own view Śāntarakṣita refuted the view of Ācārya *Sumati*. According to Sumati, both *nirvikalpaka* and sa*vikalpaka pratyakṣa* should be recognised as valid as the first reflects the general form of a thing or, in other words, its existence as an indefinite thing, while the second (*savikalpaka*) reflects the special characteristic of an entity thus perceived.[82]

This theory appears to be in conformity with the Jaina Āgamika tradition, but not with the Logical point of view. Abhayadeva, the commentator of the *Sanmatitarka* also took up the same position[83]. As we have already seen, the process of general perception commencing from avagraha (mere apprehension) and ending with Dhāraṇā (retention) passes from the indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) state of knowledge to determinate (*savikalpaka*).[84]

Kamalaśila has explained the view of Sumati that a thing is amenable to non-conceptual perception in the form of mere observation, or purely sub jective ideation.[85] But the Jaina philosophy does not accept it. Jainism asserts that a thing is perceived by *Darśan* or cognition, not by Ālocana or observation,[86] The *viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* criticises the view, viz "*kei dihaloyaṇapubbaamoggahaṁ venti*" which means a thing can be apprehended by a purely subjective ideation In his *commentatery* Hemacandra Maladharideva referred to a kārikā by Kumārila "*asti ālocanā jñānaṁ prathamaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ* " It is possible that the commentator thought this view was that of Kumārila and it is also probable that Kamalśila misunderstood the view of Sumati.

Kumārila, a Mīmāṁsaka philosopher, asserted two kinds of sense-perception. According to him, non-conceptual perception is purely subjective ideation as apprehending the "specific individuality of the particular (*ālocanā jñānaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ vyaktisvalakṣaṇaṁ*), and the conceptual perception (*sāvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) is the apprehension of the universal (*sāmānyaviṣayaṁ tu savikalpakaṁ*).[87]

Ācārya Sumati does not agree with this definition. He questions : is the thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else ? or is it not so apprehended ? If Kumārila answers : there is non-apprehension of the thing in a form distinguished from other things, then Sumati states that in this position either there would be apprehension of the thing itself only, or there would be no perception of the thing at all. He illustrated his theory by reference to the perception of a Jar. The Jar should be either apprehended without having the form of others or it should not be apprehended. There could be no escape from these alternatives[89].

Kumārila's view is based on the definition of perception given in the *Jaiminīyasūtra*[90] It is refuted by all non-Mīmāṁsaka philosophers, Vedic[91] as well as Buddhist[92] and Sumati appears to be the first Jaina Ācārya to join them in refuting this view.

Having criticised the view of Kumārila, Sumati proceeds to criticise the view of Buddhist Ācāryas, especially, that of Śāntarakṣita. As we have seen, Śāntarkṣita, a follower of Dharmakīrti, defines perception as knowledge free from conceptual contents and not erroneous[93] He tries to prove his theory by means of inference and establishes that the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (indeterminate perception) is the only real perception. Śāntarakṣita further clarifies his own view by citing examples. He says : in case a thing has no particular form, it cannot be accepted as a particular thing. For instance, the white house owing to different charactristics cannot be mistaken for a cow. It is the same case with the perception.[94]

Here in this definition the *kalpanā* is the main figure which has been defined in various ways by Buddhist Philosophers. Śāntarakṣita defined it as *viśiṣṭaviṣayāvabodhaḥ* (knowledge of qualified object). Sumati is said to be against this view. He

argues that a thing cannot be qualified without having a connection with the qualifications, as in the case of a stick (*daṇḍa*) and the stick-holder (daṇḍin). Hence the cognition which apprehends the qualifications (*viśeṣatā*) is conceptual (*savikalpaka*).[95] He again draws our attention to this defect of self-contradiction in this theory pointing out that if there is always the apprehension of the things as distinguished from homogeneous (*sajātīya*) and heterogeneous (*vijātīya*) things, then the apprehension would becom determinate (savikalpaka) for it can be conveyed "this is different". Otherwise how does it apprehend the difference between things.[96]

Sumati pointed out another defect in the Buddhist theory. He asserts that there is no particular (*viśeṣa*) without a touch of the universal (*Sāmānya*). It cannot be argued in his opinion that the universal or "being" is not touched at all by the sense-perception at the time of apprehension, because in this position the particular would be devoid of existence and thus it could become characterless; and as such could not be apprehended by sense-perception, because it would be devoid of "being" and become like the sky-flower (*ākaśa-kusuma*).[97] Thus Sumati is of the view that the particular is perceived with the character of the universal.

All Jaina logicians have tried to refute the Buddhist theory of sense-perception following in the footsteps of Sumati. Akalaṅka is the main figure to raise the question in this respect. Adding the adjectives *anadhigatārthagrāhin*, *arisaṁ-vādin*, and *viśada* to the existing definition of perception[98] he established that the *Nirvikalpaka prātykṣa* gets transormed into the savikalpaka is the *pramāna*.[99] Later on most of the Jaina logicians such as Ācārya prabhācandra,[100] Anantavīrya,[101] Vādirāja, Vidyānanda,[102] imitated him and elaborated his ideas to refute the opponent's views.[102]

Refutation of the Jaina conception of *savikalpaka Pratyakṣa* by Śāntrakṣita

The Jaina conception of *Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa* has been

refuted by the Buddhist philosophers. Śāntarakṣita, even having defined perception as lucid knowledge without reflection (*kalpanā*) criticised the view of Sumati on the ground that an entity does not have any particular qualities by which it can be differentiated at the moment of apprehension. He thus sought to assert that there is no particular thing at all. But the particular characteristic of a thing is implicit in his classification of the universal (Sāmānya) into two types, viz. (i) distinguished by qualifications, and (ii) not distinguished by qualifications. The first is *Nirvikalpaka*, and next is *Śavikalpaka pratykṣa* (conceptual-preception). The former is the real pratyakṣa while the latter is practical.

On this basis, Śāntarakṣita presents two arguments to refute Sumati's theory. The first is that an entity does not possess any characters by which it can be differentiated. We see a thing first and then realise it as a pot or any particular thing. When the thing is apprehended, the nagation of all other things comes forth naturally. Hence, the non-conceptual perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) in the specific form of colour, shape, etc. appears and then there follows the conceptual content (*vikalpātmaka jñāna*) associated with the words *it is different*.[103]

Here the words do not lead to cognition. The reason behind this is that the specific individuality (*svalakṣaṇa-vastutva*) itself is independent of the words. The perception generated by them also should be deprived of the words. The words do not have any relation with the meaning. In the absence of words a thing exists, and in the absence of a thing we use the words, which are dependent on gestures and intentions. There is, therefore, no possibility of words in the *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The second argument which Śāntarakṣita puts forth is that in particular thing there should be no other characteristics except that of the "Particular".[104]

Thus, whatever cognition appears with regard to the "specific individuality" of things it beyond the range of

words and is hence non-conceptual perception. In his opinion, the lucidity and determination in the *savikalpaka pratykṣa* is not its own characteristic, but it really comes from *nirvikalpaka pratpakṣa*. After a moment of *nirvikalpaka pratykṣa*, the *saṁkalpaka pratyakṣa* is generated and the ascertainment and lucidity of a thing which comes from *nirvikalpaka pratakṣa* appears to be of *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. In this manner *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* also determinates a thing and is called perception from a practical viewpoint (vyavahāra), but the real perception is only the non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception.

In the above criticism Śāntarakṣita's main arguments are that the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is the real pratyakṣa and a thing cannot be both universal and particular. Both these arguments are met by the later Jaina Ācāryas. They say that the *nirvikalpaka jñāna* of the Buddhists is the formless perception which is not capable of determinating the nature of a thing. Therofore, it is determinate (*Sākāra*) and lucid (*viśada*), and could be accepted as a *pramāṇa*.

It appears that to refute the validity of the Veda, the Buddhist philosophers denied the real relation between the words and their meanings. All sorts of knowledge generated in connection with words which are not supported by the *nirvikalpaka*, are declared to be invalid. As a matter of fact Buddhism also acccepts *Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa*. In the *Vibhaṅga*.[105] Knowledge (jñāna) is divided into two types Cognitative (*Savitakkā*) and Non-cognitative (*Avitakka*). Both these types are similar to *Savikalpaka* and *Nirvikalpaka Pratykṣa*.

The object of perception

We have mentioned earlier that the *pratykṣa* is of two kinds, viz. *Sāṁvyāvahārika* (knowledge obtained through the senses and mind) and *Pārmārthika pratyakṣa* (knowledge obtained by the soul itself, without the help of the senses and the mind). The object of perception is related to both types of perception.

The validity of *Pramāṇa* in Jain philosophy is based on the nature of things, It asserts that a reality is a multitude of atoms and possesses a characteristic of being substance-cum-mode (*dravyaparyāyātmakam*). The permanence-in-change is its common nature. Out of six substances the *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, ākāśa, and *Kāla* are said to be perceived only by the omniscient who has the *pārmārthik pratyakṣa* while the mundane souls perceive the objects of inference, not of sense-generated perception. The rest pudgala dravya is a subject to be perceived by mundane souls through sense-generated perception (*indriyajanya pratyakṣa*).

Jainism is absolutely realistic in nature. Each atom or reality, in its conception is quite indestructible and independent and always changes into different modes. This system is both natural and eternal. The whole universe continues in this way. There is no need to postulate a creator-god to explain the origin and evolution of the universe.

In connection with the examination of the external world, Śāntarakṣita refers to the view of Sumati, He says the atoms have two qualities, General (*Sāmānya*) and Particular (*Viśeṣa.*) The objects perceived by sense-organs possess the general character. These objects are conglomerations of atoms which appear as an entity with a shape and size. The true quality of atoms is known only by the emancipated one who attained the *pāramārthika Pratyakṣa* or *Yogipratyakṣa*.[106]

This conception is made more clear in the *Syādvādamañjarī*. It is said that atoms which are co-related generate paryāyas. They have infinite and continuous changes which depend on the types of contact or relation with others. For instance, when the atoms of the soil come into contact with each other, they become compact and with their becoming compact produce a pot This process does not come about due to external pressure but is the result of an internal connection with each other. Therefore Jaina philosophy does not assert the extra avayavidravyas.

As regards the existence of atoms, we have both, *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna*. We see the atoms in the form of a pot (*ghaṭa*). The atoms, that cannot be perceived by ordinary men due to their minuteness, are perceived by the Yogins. By inference also the Jainas try to prove the existence of atoms. The body itself is a mass of atoms wherein they get combined by such forces as time and cause the gross body[107].

This conception of object of perception has been a subject of criticism, especially with the Buddhist logicians. The Vijñānavāda, an extreme form of idealism which is propounded by the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools, asserts that there is no causal (*yadākāraṁ jñānṁ*) world of external (reality. In its opinion reality is only the *Vijñāna* (idea).

Thus the *Vijñānavāda* denies the external world by denying the atoms. It says that the heap of atoms or a single body cannot be said to be in the external world. Both the *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* are unable to prove their existence because ordinary mortals have never seen atoms even in a dream. As regards the *Pratyakṣa* of Yogī, it demands great faith. The Anumāna also is not helpful in this respect; Because for want of *pratyakṣa* of atoms now can we get at the *hetu* (reason) and the *sādhya* (to be proved). Nor does the external world consist of bodies. When the atom itself could not be proved, how can we hope to prove a body which consists of many atoms. It is thus nothing but only a superstition caused by a hypothesis of *vāsanā* due to *avidyā* or ignorance.[108]

Ācārya Śāntarakṣita also denies the existence of atoms. He refutes the view of Sumati stating that one object cannot have two qualities. Otherwise the object also will be considered as two. Another argument is raised that if the two qualities are not defferent from each other, why do you say that the special quality of the atoms is perceived by the emancipated only ?[109] By denying the existence of two qualities in one object, Śāntarakṣita tries to refute the view of Sumati.

The above criticism is based on the *Vijñānavāda*, which asserts that there is no existence of the external world. We see it only on account of the hypothesis of *vāsanā*. This criticism is answered by Jaina philosophers in latter works. Hemachandra tries to reply that the existence of the world cannot be refused, since knowledge is the action (*kriyā*) in which the object is supposed to be directed. Without the external object there can be no perception. Therefore, Jainism admits the existence of both, the atoms and the body (*avayavī*).

As regards the criticism that the atoms of the body would be conflicting with one another, Jaina philosophy admits this fact, but it tries to solve this problem through *Anekāntavāda*. As Hemachandra says, 'criticism' of atoms, therefore, cannot affect those who believe in Syādvāda,[110] according to which a body is one and yet manifold.

Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa (Trancsendental Perception)

The Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa is the outcome of the destruction of *Jñānāvaraṇakarma* (knowledge obscuring karma). It springs forth from the puiified soul itself without the assistance of sense-organs or any other external internal instruments. That is the reason why it is called the perfect lucid perception (*viṣada pratyakṣa*). It is of two kinds : *Sakala pratyakṣa* (complete direct knowledge), and *Vikala pratyakṣa* (incomplete direct knowledge)' *Kevalajñāna* (perfect knowledge or omniscience) comes under the former, and the *Avadhijñāna* (visual knowledge), *Manaḥparyāyajñāna* (mental knowledge) under the latter.

Avadhi jñāna, as its name indicates, is limited by *dravya* (substance), *Kṣetra* (place) *Kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (emotion). It is of three kinds—*deśāvadhi* (partial visual knowledge), *paramāvadhi* (high visual knowledge), and *sarvāvadhi* (full visual knowledge). Viewed from another aspect it is divided into *Bhāvapratyaya* (birth-born visual knowledge) and *guṇapratyaya* (acquired by merit). The former is possessed by those in heaven and hell by birth,[111] while the latter can be

secured by human beings as well as five-sensed sub-human beings after destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant kārmic veil (*Kṣayopaśama-nimitta*).[112] Only the forms having shapes (rūpin) can be known by *avadhijñāna*.[113] The formless, such as soul (*jīva*), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest). *ākāśa* (space), and *Kāla* (time) are not within its scope of perception. It can penetrate infinite number of cycles, both past and furure.

Manaḥparyāya jñāna reveals the thoughts of human beings. It is of two kinds, viz. *ṛjumati* (simple direct or mental knowledge) and *vipulamati* (complex direct or mental knowledge). Umāsvāmi distinguishes them on the ground that the latter is purer and everlasting, while the former has less purity and infallibility.[114] Pūjyapāda,[115] and Akalaṅka[116] support his view. But Jinabhadra is of somewhat different view viz. that *manaḥparyāya jñāna* knows the states of mind directly by intuition, but the external objects thought of by the mind can only be inferred.[117] Later Ācāryas followed both these views.

Umāsvāmi makes a distinction between *avadhi* and *manaḥparyaya*. He says that (i) the former is less pure than the latter, (ii) the former can extend to the whole universe, while the latter is limited to the centre of the middle world. (iii) The first can be secured by all beings possessed of mind; while the other only by saints having supernatural powers, and (iv) the subject matter of the first is gross, while that of the latter is very subtle. But Siddhasena Divākara does not recognise any distinction between *avadhi* and *manaḥparyaya*, since "subhuman organisms possessed of two or more sense-organs are also found to strive by means of attraction and repulsion, and thus are possessed of minds and as such it will be proper to extend the scope of manaḥparyaya to the minds or the objects of the minds of them as well, or otherwise it will be improper to postulate manaḥparyaya as a separate category of knowledge.[118] It can however, be considered a specific type of Avadhijñāna.

Kevalajñāna is perfect knowledge of all substance and their modifications. It is generated after complete destruction of the veil of the *Mohanīya karma* (delusing) which is the most powerful in the Kārmic matter. Hence the soul comes to perceive all things past, present and future. When a person achieves perfect knowledge, he is called Omniscient.

According to Jaïnism, no ône can be a teacher (Tirthaṅkara) without being omniscient. This perfect knowledge can be obtained by the purified soul which has consiousness (*cetanā* or *upayoga*) as its sole characteristic.[119] The term *Upayoga* is used to denote the darśana and jñāna which are the main features of the soul. *Darśana* is perception and *jñāna* is knowledge.[120] Soul, its knowledge, and its intution all these are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as non-self.[121] Akalaṅka is of the view that when the soul cognises the object, it is called *Jñāna*; and when the soul perceives itself, it is called Darśana.[122]

It is apparent now that at the destruction of *Jñānāvaraṇā*, *Darśānāvaraṇa*; *Mohanīya*, and *Antarāya*, the soul obtains inner illumination and becomes omniscient.

According to Jaina philosophy, each and every entity is somehow related to all other entities in the universe. Such relations are called modes or paryāyas of the entity. If one knows an entity completely, these modes will also be known completely. That is why it is said that one who knows one, knows all, and one who knows all, knows one. In the *Pravacanasāra*, Kunda-Kunda says: One who does not know simultaneously the realities of past, present and future, and the three worlds, cannot know even a single object with its infinite modifications, if one does not know all objects, how will he be able to know one ? For instance, if one is inclines to have a knowledge of ghaṭa, he should have knowledge of its intrinsic nature as well as ghaṭa itself, since knowledge reveals all the objects. As the soul has infinite capacity to know all the objects, when one attains such power, he has to know all the objects.[124] severe penance with Right vision, Right knowledge,

and Right conduct is required to attain such purified stage of soul.

The early Pāli Canon as well as the latter Buddhist philosophical literature criticised the view of Jainas that their Tīrthaṅkaras were omniscient. In the *Majjhima Nikāya* the Buddha says to Sandka Paribrājaka that "Some teacher, all-knowing (*sabbaññū*), all seeing (*sabbadassāvī*) claims all-embracing knowlledge and vision (*aparisesaṁ ñanadassanaṁ*), Saying whether I am walking or standing still or sleep or awake, knowledge and vision are constanly and perpetually (*satataṁ samitaṁ*) before me." Further the Buddha says, "he enters an empty place, and he does not receive alms and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a village or market town and the way". So if any one asks him why he need question in this manner if he is omniscient, then he replies this : "I had to enter an empty place, therefore I entered [125]"

At another place the Buddha says to Mahānāma that he had seen the Nigaṇṭhas performing severe penance at Rājagaha on the Isigili kālasilā. He then asked them "why do you people do so ? They replied that the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta was omniscient and he had said that by severe penance all past deeds would be destroyed and the new deeds would be prevented. In this way, they would attain salvation. Then the Buddha asked them "Do all of you know the past and the future of yourselves and your deeds. He went on to say "You do not know whether you did an evil deed like this or that. You do not know the getting rid of unskilled states of mind, the uprising of skilled states." Getting the reply "no" from them the Buddha remarked "these beings, revered Nigaṇṭhas, do those who are born again among men in the world, and are wrathful (*luddha*), blood handed (*lohitapāṇino*), dealing in cruelty (*kurūrakammāntā*) do these go forth among the Nagaṇṭhas."[126] Likewise Udāyi Paribrājaka says to Gotama

"the all-knowing omniscient (Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta), on being asked a question by me concering the past, shelved the question by asking another, answered off the point and evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness, (*purimāni, bhante, divasāni purimatarāni, sabbaññu sabbadassāvī......so mayā pubbantam ārabbha pañham puṭṭho samāno aññenaññam paṭicari, bahiddhā katham apanamesi, kopaṁ ca dosaṁ ca appaccayaṁ ca pātvākāsi*).[127]

The *Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā* presents a very interesting story regarding the dialogues that took place between Sirigutta and Garahadinna, the followers of the Buddha and the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta respectively. Garahadinna, a follower of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta said to Sirigutta that the Nigaṇṭhas are omniscient; they know the past, present and future. Afterwards, Sirīgutta, a follower of the Buddha decided to try the boastful claim of the naked ascetics (*Nigaṇṭhas*). He got a ditch dug between two houses and had it covered. Nigaṇṭhas were then invited to alms. When the Nigaṇṭhas came, they fell into the pit and their bodies were covered with mud and filth. Then it is said that he had beaten them with sticks and brought humiliation upon them. After a similar trial he proved that Buddhist monks were omniscient.[128] It may be noted here that all the Nigaṇṭhas are not said to be omniscient, but only a very few who could attain the perfect knowledge after performing the required duties. This story, however, refers to the Jaina tradition that its Tīrthaṅkaras and some prominent monks were omniscient.[129]

Likewise, later Buddhist philosophical literature also referred critically to the Jaina conception of omniscience or *Kevalajñāna*. Dharmakīrti, in the course of establishing the "*Dharmajñatva*" in the Buddha, points out the superfluity of Jaina view of omniscience and says that the *anuṣṭhānagatajñāna* (a knowledge that has a bearing on life or practice) is more important, than having a knowledge of the number of bacteria (*kīṭasaṅkhyā*), which is of no use at all for hu-

man beings. The real *tattvadrașțā* (knower of scripture) in the opinion of Dharmakīrti is one who knows what is to be abandoned and what is to be accepted and not everything. It is immaterial whether one knows everything or not, but what matters is whether he knows the essentaial thing, that is. what he ought to know. If the mere range of knowledge was valuable in itself, without its bearing on life, why not worship vultures who soar in to the atmosphere and thereby get a long range of sight.[130] Thus he asserts the view that a absolute purity in life and not unlimited knowledge is the essential characteristic of a Teacher.

Prajñākaragupta, the commentater of Dharmakīrti also supports Dharmakīrti's view, but he goes one step further and establishes the omniscience of the Buddha. He also says that it can be attained by any spiritual aspirant, who masters the art of subduing passions.[131]

Thus it is only for the sake of argument that this conception of omniscience had been recorded in the Pāli Canon as well as in later Buddhist philosophical literature, since no Jain view regarding this problem is correctly and completely mentioned. It was therefore not possible to give an accurate picture of the Jaina theory of omniscience. This much, however, we can say that the conception of omniscience in Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras is not a new one. It might belong to Pārśvanātha or the period prior to that tradition, since the Niganṭhas, whom the Buddha saw performing severe penance on Ṛiṣigiri Kālasilā at Rājagaha would be the followers of Pārśvanātha or an earlier tradition.

The whole Jaina literature seeks to establish the fact that Jaina Tīrthaṇkaras are omniscient, while denying the omniscience of any other. The *Bhagavatī Sūtra* (9.32) says that the Nirgranthas who belonged to the Pārśvanātha tradition did not accept the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta as a porphet or head of a Jaina sect unless it was proved that he was all-knowing and all-seeing.[132]

Later ācaryas such as Kundakunda, Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda try to establish omniscience on the basis of inference. We have already mentioned Kundakunda argument in this connection. Then Samantabhadra says that there are three kinds of entities, viz. the subtle (*sūkṣma*), proximate (*antarita*), and remote (*dūravartī*). They must be perceived simulataneously by somebody, since all objects are to be perceived. Hence there must be some one omniscient.[134]

Vīrasena presents another argument in support of omniscience. He says that *Kevalajñāna* (omniscience) is innate in the soul. Due to destruction-cum-subsidence of karmas, it functions as *matijnāna*. The self-cognised mati implies the fractional kevala jñāna, just as the observation of a part of a mountain leads us to the perception of the mountain itself.[135]

The Jaina philosophers did not emphasise *Dharma jñatva* like Dharmakīrti or early Buddhist tradition, but they endeavoured to point out that a person is omniscient when he is both *Dharmajña* as well as *Sarvajñā*, because Dharma jñātva depends on sarvajñatva.

Akalaṅka presents another argument which is also referred to by Dharmottara, a Buddhist philosopher in the *Dharmottara-pradīpa*.[136] His argument is that if we deny supersensorial knowledge, how can astrological divinations be made ? Hence, it must be accepted that there is a faculty of super-sensorial knowledge which is nothing but *Kevalajñāna* or omniscience.[137]

After the destruction of the evil of karmic bondage one can attain the inherent capacity of his own soul, and perceive all things.[138] The very progressive gradation of knowledge implies the highest magnitude of knowledge attained by man. If one has no capacity to know or perceie all things at once he will not be able to do so even by means of the Veda.[139] Hence we have to accept that one can become omnisceint. Impossibility of omniscience cannot be established unless one has knowledge of persons of all times. Consequently, one who rejects omniscience for all times must himself be omni

scient.[140] Presenting the positive arguments in this way, Akalaṇka relies on the negative arguments that there is no contradictory *pramāṇa*[141] to reject the established omniscience and therefore it is certain. He then substantiates this argument by examining the various so-called contradictory pramāṇas.[143]

Dharmakīrti and his commentator, Prajñākargupta, think that the Jaina conception of omniscience cannot be accepted for want of *Sādhaka-bādhakapramāṇa*[145] (assisting and contradicting evidence). Akalaṅka replies this criticism by saying that one cannot establish the non-existence of omniscience without being omniscient. He further says that there is no *bādhaka pramāṇa* to refute omniscience in Jainism, and the absence of *bādhaka pramāṇa* is itself a *sādhakapramāṇa*.[145]

As regards *Anuṣṭhānagatajñāna* urged by Dharmakīrti, Vādirāja, a commentator of Akalaṅka, questions "By which pramāṇas does the Buddha perceive the *Anuṣṭheyagatāvastu ?* Neither can *Pratyakṣa Prāmāṇa* be helpful in this respect, otherwise what will be the use of *Anuṣṭhāna* ? Nor will the *Anumāna* (inference) *pramāṇa* will solve our problem, because it depends on the pratyakṣa. Thus the *Anuṣṭheyagata Jñāna* in itself has no importance.[143]

So far as *Kīṭasaṅkhyā-parijñāna* and its *puruṣārthopayoga* are concerned, he says that it is essential to include *Kīṭasaṅkhyā-parijñāna* as an integral part of omniscience, as *caturāryasatya* implies the *Duhkhasatya* of creatures living around. If the Buddha has not grasped the *Caturāryavedanatva*, how could he preach to his disciples convincingly ? He then remarks that if the *Kīṭasaṅkhyā-parijñāna* serves no useful purpose, what then is the use of *Bhikṣu-saṅkhyā-parijñāna* in Buddhism.[146] ?

Thus the Jainas established the theory of omniscience, whereas the Buddhist refuted it in Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. According to Jainism its adherents could aspire to be omniscient. But it was only Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta who attained this

spiritual height at that time. However, the masses considered all Niganthas to be omniscient, because some of them gained various powers of insight. The Buddha, apparently under the impression that this was the actual claim of Jainism, criticised it. The later Buddhist philosophers also followed him. Latem, on the imitation of Jainism, the Buddha is also made an omniscient in Buddhist Literature.[147]

2. Parokṣa Pramāṇa (*Indirect Knowledge*)

Non-distinct (a*viśada*) knowledge is *parokṣa*, and it unlike *pratyakṣa*, dependent on others. It is of five kinds, namely, *smarana*, *pratyābhijñana*, *tarka*, *anumāna* and *āgama*. Out of these pramāṇas in Jaina logic, only the anumāua pramāṇa has been discussed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Yet it is helpful to get a brief picture of other pramāṇas also, since the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers vary in their attitudes to other pramāṇas on account of the different stand-points they had adopted.

Smṛti pramāṇa

Smṛti is the remembrance of a thing perceived or known before and it is a source of knowledge of a particular thing in association with earlier experiences. Therefore, it is regarded on *Pramāṇa* by Jaina logicians. But the Vedic philosophers are not ready to accept it as an independent pramāṇa on the ground that it depends on the vaildity of earlier experience (*grahītagrāhitva*).[148] The Buddhists joined hands with the Vedic philosophers like Kumārila.[149] and rejected the validity of smṛti.[150] Their main argument, like that of the Mimānsakas or the Vaiśeṣikas, is that the validity of smṛti is conditioned by previous experience and it is wholly dependent on experience.[151] As a matter of fact, the question of memory being treated as a pramāṇa does not arise in a system like Buddhism where all knowledge-involving-thought (*vikalpa jñānamātra*) is considered no pramāṇā.[152]

On the other hand the Jaina logicians unanimously accept the validity of smṛti pramāṇa. Their main argument is that

the *Saṁskāras* recall for any particular purpose the things experienced in the past. The memory of such things is a source of knowledge gainend through senses. Therefore *smṛti* is declared to be a *Pramāṇa*, since it is true of facts *saṁvādin* just as perception. The validity of pramāṇa cannot be ascertained merely by relation to its depedence or independence of experience. If this argument is accepted even *pramaua* will cease to be a *pramāṇā*, for inference also depends on knowledge already acquired through direct emprical perception.[153]

While examining *smṛti pramāṇa*, we may also discuss *Dhārāvāhika pramāṇa* (continuous cognition). The Dhārāvāhikajñāṇa is accepted as a pramāṇa by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas[154] and the Mīmāṁsakas.[155] In Buddhist tradition only Aracata accepts it.[156] He says that only the Yogin's *dhārāvāhika Jñāna* is pramāṇa, because it involves awareness of *Sūkṣmakālakalā* (minute divisions of time), while ordinary man's continuous cognition is not a pramāṇa, because it does not involve such awareness.

The Jain logicians have two traditions regarding *dhārāvāhika Pramāṇa*. According to the Digambara tradition,[157] it is valid provided it produces a viśiṣṭa pramāṇa.(a knowledge of special objects), while the *Śvetāmbara* tradition accepts the *dhārāvāhika jñāna* as a pramāṇa without any conditions.[158]

Pratyabhiñāna

Prātyābhijñāna (recognition) is the result of perception and recollection. Its nature is of *tadevedaṁ* (that is definitely this), *tatsādraśaṁ* (it is similar), *tadvilakṣaṇaṁ* (it is somewhat dissimilar), and *tatpratiyogī* (it is different from that), which are *avisamvādin* (non-discrepant) and therefore are pramāṇas themselves.[159]

Kumārila[160] as well as Jayanta[161] includes pratyabhijñāna in pratyakṣa. But the Buddhists do not accept it as a separate pramāṇa. In support of their theory, they advocate the idea that *pratyabhijñāna* is nothing, but only a combination or recollection or remembrance and perception. Further they urge that a thing is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) if it dismisses the

permanence of entities that are corelated with *pratyabhijñāna.*[162]

The Jainas, on the other hand, uphold the view that because the *pratyabhijñāna* presupposes an entity in its antecedent and subsequent model condition, it should be recognised as a separate pramāṇa, like smṛti.[163]

Tarka pramāṇa

Tarka or inductive reasoning is an essential feature to have the concomitance of an entity[164] which is the instrument of inference. Pratyakṣa, smaraṇa and pratyabhijñāna are associative reasons to originate tarka. It decides the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva sambandha*) among the objects known through inference and āgama. Akalaṅka is the first to fix the definition and subject of tarka in Jaina philosophy,

Mīmāṁskas do not accept Tarka as a separate pramāṇa. The word *Uhā* used by them[165] in the sense of reasoning is synonymous with the *Ihā* of matijñāna of Jainas.[166] The Buddhist, also deny its validity on the ground that tarka can oniy help one to know further an object which is already known through perception.[167]

Akalaṇka recognised tarka as a pramāṇa, since concomitance cannot be known without tarka.[168] If we do not accept the validity of tarka, we will not be able to accept either, as they both (inference and tarka) depend on the same basis for their validity as pramāṇas.[169]

Āgama Pramāṇa :

The words of an Āpta are called āgama. Āpta means a person of superior intellect and character, who is non-discrepant (*avisaṁvādin*) in his respective subjects.[170] The Jainas believe that their prophets were Āptas and therefore they accepted āgamas as an independent pramāṇa. The Jainas did not restrict the definition of *Āpta* to the field of spiritual experiences and attainments. An Āpta may, according to Jaina logicians, be any authority on the subject even if it is only a secular subject.

The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddists include āgama in inference. But as a matter of fact, it should not be considered as a part of *anumāna*, since, unlike anumāna, it arises without having perceived signs and their concomitance. It may be noted here that the Jainas as well as the Buddhists rejected the claim of the Vedic philosophers that the Vedas are *apauruṣeya* (not of human authorship but of devine origin).[171]

Thus *smṛti*, *pratyabhijnāna*, *tarka*, *anumāna* and *āgama* are accepted as separate pramāṇas in Jaina philosophy and included into *parokṣa pramāṇa*. That means, according to Jainas, there are two pramāṇas, viz pratyakṣa and parokṣa, while the Buddhists assert the reality of pra- tyakṣa and anumāna.[172]

Anumāna Pramāṇa

Anumāna means a cognition which takes place after some other cognition, specially perception (*anu vyāptir nirṇayasya paścādbhāvī mānaṁ*).[173] The Vedic thinkers may have been the first to attempt a definition of anumāna and their definition influenced both the Jainas and the Buddhists, although there was no unanimity among them as regard the exact nature of this pramāṇa.

Diṅnāga (5th A.D.) a great Buddhist philosopher, is among the earliest to oppose the Vedic tradition. He offered a new definition which was latter adopted by his disciples. This Buddhist definition influenced the Jaina logicians like Siddhasenadivākara (5th A. D.), Akalaṅka (8th A.D.), and Vidyānanda (9th A. D.)

In the Jaina tradition Ācārya Akalaṅka presents a comprehensive definition of *anumāna* as follows :—

Cognition of *Sādhya* (what is to be proved) or major term produced by the *Sādhana* (the instruments to prove the sādhya) is called *Anumāna* which follows *liṅga-grahaṇa* (apprehension of the predicate of proposition) and vyā*pti-smāraṇa* (remembrance of invariable concomitance). He emphasises that because it is avisaṁvādin (non-discrepant) in its own subject and remo-

ves the defects arising due to doubt (saṁśaya), perversion (viparyaya) and indecision (anadhyavasāya), it should be recognised as a pramāṇa.[174]

Vyāpti (invariable concomitance) is the main feature of anumāna. *Avinābhāva* *anyathāuupapannatva*, *vipakṣavyāvṛtti*, and *niyatasāhacarya* are well-known charctetistics, of vyāpti. *Sahabhāvaniyama* (having co-relation) and *kramabhāva-niymā* (having successive relation) are the main factors of Vyāpti.[175] Sahabhāva-niyama is understood as a character of the probandam (vyāpākadharma) like rūpa (form) and rasa (taste) and kramabhāva-niyama is understood as a character of the probandam (vyāpakadharma). This definition indicates that anumāna is not restricated only to the *tādātmya* (identical nature) and *tādutpātti* (fdentical cause of origination) but it can also be applied to those things which do not possess of the tādātmya and tadutpatti relation, For instance, we can make an inference about the taste of something looking at its form, which has no tādātmya relation. Likewise, the rise of Sāketa can be inferred by looking at the rise of kṛttikā.[176]

Sādhya and *sādhana* are also two of the other main features of anumāna. A thing which is to be perceived is called sādhya and a thing which is related positively with Sādhya, is called sādhana.[177]

Anumāna is of two kinds, viz. *Svārthānumāna* (inference by one's own self) and *Parārthānumāna* (inference by others). The former is valid knowledge which arises in one's own mind from determinate sādhana, while the latter is a result of reasons standing in relation to invariable concomitance (vyāpti) with sādhya.

The organs or *Svārthānumāna* are said to be three in number, viz. *dharma*, *sādhya*, and *sādhana*. *Pakṣa* (minor term) and hetu middle term are also prescribed as its organs. Here, sādhya and sādhana are included in *pakṣa*. The remaining one is *dharmī* which is to be proved by pramāṇas (prasiddha).[178]

As regards the types of Hetu, the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* (9.2.1) refers to fives kinds such as kārya, *kāraṇa*, *samyogī*, *samavāī* and *virodhī*. The Buddhists accept only three hetus, viz. *svabhāva*, *kārya*, and *anuplabdhi*. The Jainas, on the basis of definition of *avinābhāva*, recognise *svabhāva*, *vyāpaka*, *kārya*, *kāraṇa*, *purvacara*, *uttarācara* and *Sahacara*. Upalabdhirupa and anupalabdhirūpa are also said to be the types of hetu.

Regarding the organs of *pārarthānumāna*, there is no unanimity among the philosophers. The Naiyāayikas have laid down five organs, viz. *pratijñā* (proposition), *hetu* (reason) *udāharaṇa* (example), *upanaya* (application) and *nigamana* (conculusion).[179] The propositions, according to them, would be as follows :

(i) There is a fire on the mountain (*pratijñā*).

(ii) Since there is smoke (*hetu*),

(iii) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire (*udāharaṇa*).

(iv) There is smoke on the mountain (*upanāya*), and

(v) Therefore there is a fire on the mountain (*nigamana*).

The Sānkhyas[180] and the Mīmāṁskas[181] do not accept the last organs, viz. *Upanaya* and *Nigamana*.

In the field of Buddhist Logic, Ācārya Diṅgnāga appears to have accepted three organs such as, *Pakṣa*, *Hetu*, and *Dṛṣṭānta*,[182] while Dharmakīrti includes *Pakṣa* in *Nigrahasthāna*, and divides *Hetu* into three types.[183] According to him, the three Hetus are, (i) *Pakṣādharmatva* (its presence of the reaason in the subjects totally), (ii) *Sapakṣasatva* (its presence in similar instances, althugh not in their totality) (iii) *Vipakṣvayāvṛttatva* (its absence in dissimilar instances in their totality). These reasons are also called the *Ayogavyavaccheda*, (impossibility of absence), (ii) *Anyayogavyavaccheda*, (impossibility of otherness in similars, but not in the totality of the similars), (iii) *Atyantāyogavyavaccheda* (impossibility of others completely), i. e. absence of totality of the dissimilar instances) : For instance.

(i) whatever is sat, is kṣaṇika (*Pakṣadharmatva*).

(ii) the pot is sat, therefore it is ksaṇika (*sapakṣāsatva*).

(iii) because all entities are sat (*vipakṣavyavṛtattva*).

Thus, here the *Pakṣa* and *Nigamana* are denied and *Dṛṣṭānta* and *Upanaya* are indirectly accepted. Hetu is the main feature according to the Buddhist view (*viduṣāṁvācyo heturevā hi kevalaṁ*).[184]

On the other hand, the Jainas accept only two organs, *Pratijñā* (proposition) and *Hetu* (middle term-reason). They urge in support of this theory that without accepting the *pratijñā* or *pakṣa* what is the use of the hetu, and for what would it be utilized.[185] Hence, they say that *Udāharaṇa* is necessary and deny that Upanaya and Nigamana are conclusive factors.[186] For instance :

(i) there is a fire on the mountain (*pakṣa*).

(ii) since there is smoke (*hetu*).

The above view of the Jainas is recorded in Buddhist literature. Both Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita criticised this theory. Dharmakīrti examines the Jain propositions with the following example :

(i) trees are sentient beings—cetanās taravah (*pratijñā*).

(ii) because they sleep (*hetu*).

He then refutes this theory stating that this instance is fallacious, since sleep which is manifested by closing of the leaves at night is found only is some trees, not in their totality.[187] The same thing is explained in the *Darmottarapradīpa* by Dharmottarara.

Śāntaraksita referred to a view of Pātrakeśarī with regard to the conception of types of hetu. He puts a number of examples to establish his own view showing that there are only two organs, *Pratijñā* and *hetu*. For instance :

1. (a) the hare-marked (*śaśa-lāñchana*) is the Moon (*pakṣa* or *pratijñā*).

(b) because it is spoken of as the Moon (*hetu*). Likewise :

2. (a) the pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect (*pakṣa*).

   (b) because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect. (*hetu*).

3. (a) the soul, jar and other things are somehow essentially non-existent (*pratijñā*).

   (b) because they are somehow inpprehensible in any way, like the horns of the hare (*hetu*).

In the last case, there is no Corroborative Instance of dissimilarity. *The jar and other things* include the entire group of Positive Entities and they have been mentioned in the Proposition as essentially non-existent. And the negative entity has been put forth as the Instance. Apart from the *Positive* and the *Negative*, there is no third category wherein it could be pointed out that the exclusion of the Probandun implies the exclusion of the Probans. Therefore, according to Pātrasvāmin, there are only two organs of hetu, wherein other organs can easily be merged. This is the shortest and most well-defined way of making inference.

As a matter of fact, the Janias are of the view that the number of steps in a proposition cannot be fixed as it depends entirely on the level of competence of the hearer.[191] Māṇikyanandi recognizes *pratijñā* and hetu as the minimum essential steps, but he concedes that other steps may also be required in dealing with certain types of hearers.[192] Hemacandra[193] is also of the same view. Vādideva's view, however, is somewhat different. He accepts, like the Buddists, one step for the particular type of hearers and two, three, four, and five for other general hearers.[194] But Pātrasvāmin's view is more important in this respect as he does not go beyond the two steps of *Pratijñā* and *Hetu*.

Śāntarakṣita, following in the foot-steps of Dharmakīrti criticises the theory of Pātrasvāmin. He says that *being spoken of as the moon* is present also in thihgs where the Probandum (*sapakṣa*) is known to be present. It is also

sometimes present in the Man (who is spoken of as the moon) or in Camphor, Silver and such other things which are also called *moon*.[195] Likewise, in the second instance Śāntarakṣita points out as a defact that there is no distinction between the probans (the pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect), since the proban is a part of the Proposition itself. The same fact is asserted in different words in the Probans.[196] Similarly, he indicates defects in other examples[197] put forward by Pātrasvāmin and tries to prove the two steps of *Pratijñā* and *Hetu* to be inadequate and incomplete.

This criticism is based on the conception that Jainas recognize only hetu. Dharmakīrti includes *Pakṣa* in *Nigrahasthāna* and then divides hetu in three categories, viz. *Pakṣadharmatva*, *Sapakṣasatva*, and *Vipakṣavyāvṛtti*. These are called *Trairūpya hetu*. Both, *Draṣṭānta* and *Upanaya* are included in the *Hetu* of the Buddhists. But pātrasvāmin does not accept this view on the ground that the *Trirūpa* can also be found in *Hetvābhāsa* (fallacious middle term). Further he asserts *Pakṣa* and *Hetu* as steps of hetu. Since he establishes *Anyathānupapatti* as the definition of hetu, how could he include the *Pakṣa* or *Pratijñā* into other organs as Dharmakīrti did ? It was essential to him as well as other Jaina Ācāryas, therefore, to recognise Pratijñā as a separate organ of Hetu.[198]

As regards the aspects of the nature of a probans, the Buddhists, like the Vaiśeṣikas[199] and Sāṅkhyas,[200] assert that there are three aspects of a probans, vis. *pakṣasattva* (presence in the subject), *sapakṣasattva* (presence in a homologues), and *Vipakṣāsattva* (absence from hetrologues). The Naiyāyikas accept, in addition to the above three, two more aspects of the nature of probans viz. *abādhitaviṣaytva* (absence of a counter-balancing probans), and asatpratipakṣatva.[201] Both. the Buddhists and the Jainas criticise the view of the Naiyāyikas.[202] The Buddhists include the *abādhitāviṣayatva* in *pakṣa* and show the superfluity of *asatpratipakṣatva*. The three aspects of the

Buddhists are also called the *Sādhanāṅga*, wherein the *asiddha*, *viruddha* and the *anaikāntika* are all included.

On the other hand, the Jaina tradition admits that only the *anyathānupapannatva*, also called *avinābhāva*, or *vyāpti*, or *vipakṣavyāvṛtti*, is the essential characteristic of a probans (*hetu*).

Pakṣadharmastadanśena vyāpto 'pyeti hetutām.

Anyathānupapannatvaṁ na cettarkena lakṣyate.[203]

Jainas, however, are not so strict upon this view, and allow any number of aspects in particular places, even though these aspects are actually details. Pātrasvāmin is the first to establish this view in Jaina tradition. The earliest mention of his position is found in *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, where his view is mentioned and then refuted. The gist of Pātrasvāmin's theory is that *anyathānupapannatva* in only one feature of hetu since it is the shortest way of making an inference. It has capacity to absorb and assimilate all other aspects of probans.

This conception of Jainas is criticised by the Buddhist logicians, Dharmottara, a commentator of Dharmakīrti, says that according to *Anhrīkas*, the inference proceeds from one-feature hetu (*ekalakṣaṇajamanumānaṁ*)[204] which is called *ekarūpya* or *anyathānupapannatva*, It indicates that *anyathānupapannatva* should not exist apart from the probans.

Śāntarakṣita, the distinguished commentator of Dharmakīrti, has also refuted this view. He quotes a well-known kārikā[205] of Pātrakeśarin which, though not extant, is mentioned in the works of other writers. He is first mentioned in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Pramāṇavārtika* Svavṛttiṭīkā by the name of Pātrasvāmin. Ācarya Anantavīrya says that this kārikā belongs traditionally to Pātrakeśari who wrote a philosophical treatise named *Trilakṣaṇakadarthanaṁ*[206] The *Śravaṇavelagola inscription* also supports this view of Anantavīrya.[207]

Śāntarakṣita and his commentator explain the view of Pātrasvāmin with regard to the various aspects of proban. They say that according to Pātrasvāmin, the probans is valid only when it is found to be otherwise impossible and not when it has the three features (*anyathānupapannatva eva śobhano hetunā punastrilakṣaṇaḥ*). This view is elaborated as follows : Pātrasvāmin justifies that *anyathānupapannatva* is the principal characteristic of a probans. Through presumption (*arthāpatyā*) the same characteristic implies three features, viz. *Pakṣadharmatva*, *Sapakṣasattva*, and *Vipakṣavyāvṛttatva*, but the *Vipakṣavyāvṛtti* or *anyathānupapatti* can imply all other features which do not serve any useful purpose. As a matter of fact, the relation of invariable con-comitance (*avinābhāva*), which is, the heart of hetu, is not present in the three-featured reasons (*trairūpya hetu*), but found in the one featured (*ekarūpya hetu*) [208]

Śāntarakṣita then quotes a renowned kārikā of Pātrasvāmin from the *Trilakṣaṇakadarthana* as follows :—

anyathānupannattvaṁ yasya tasyaiva hetutā.
drasṭāntau dvāvapi stāṁ vā ma vā tau hi na kāraṇaṁ
nānyathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kiṁ.
anyathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kiṁ.

It means *anyathānupapannatva* is the only probans. There may be three corroborative intstances, but really they cannot be depended upon. If the *anyathānupapannatva* is not there, what is the use of three features ? and if the *anyathānupapannatva* is there, what is the use of the three features (*trairūpya*) ? He illustrates this point saying that the man who has three sons is called *ekaputraka* on account of having one good son (*Suputratvāt*). Similarly in the case of the three featured probans only feature would be useful in making inferences.

Pātrasvāmin has tried to prove that there can be no *anyathānupapannatva* hetu in the three-featured probans. For instance, "one must be dark (*pakṣasatva*), because one is the son of so and so (*sapakṣasatva*), whose other sons are found to be dark (*vipakṣasatvavyāvṛtti*)". This example contains

the three-featured probans, Even then it cannot lead to any valid and definite knowledge and conclusion. For there is no a*vinābhā*va-*sambandh*a (relation of invaribale con-comitance) between his son and his darkness. The climate and eating of vegetables by his mother during the pregnancy is real cause. Therefore, the *Trairūpya* is not a correct theory.

Sa śyāmastasya putratvāddraṣṭā śyāmā yathetare.

Iti trilakṣano heturna niścityai dravartate.[209]

Pātrasvāmin again pointed out that the one-featured probans has the requisite capacity of leading to valid knowledge. It has no external corroborative instances, either of similarity or of dissimimilarity, either in the form af statment or in the form of actual things, because all things have been included under the subject or *pakṣa* (minor term) *Positive and Negative entities* (*bhāvābhāvātmakaera sarvapadārthasya pakṣīkṛtattvāt*), and there is nothing apart from these. As regards the character of "being present in the Minor term", this is the *anyathānupapannatva hetu* and noting apart from the latter. Hence the probans here is *one-featured*.[210]

But the Buddhist philosophers do not accept this view and they try to criticise it. For instance, Śāntrakṣita questions whether Pātrasvāmin's definition of hetu refers to the general position or to a particular subject on which knowledge is sought or to a particular instance. If the first alternative is accepted, then, what would be indicated, would be the existence of the probans in the object where the probandum is present; and it would not accomplish what is sought to be accomplished.[211]

If Pātrasvāmin's definition of the Probans is that *Anyathānupapanniva hetu* is found in the Minor term (*dharmī*) only, the same means of cognition, which has made the Probans known, would make know Probandum (*sādhya*), also. Both these depend on each other. If the Probandum does not become known, the Probans also cannot become known. Thus the probans would be useless, and the Probandum would

be known by other means. There would be the incongruity of "mutual interdependence" (anyonyāśrayadoṣa), if the definite cognition of the Probandum followed from the Probans. Hence, the cognition ot one would be dependent upon the cognition of the other.[212]

Regarding the third alternative, Śāntarașita says that if the probans were known as exisent in the Corroborative Instance, that would not bring about the cognition of the probandum in the Minor term, since its invarible concomitance will not have been definitely cognised all over.[213] He then refutes the instances[214] put forward by Pātrasvāmin in the course of his arguments.

For instance, in regard to the first instance concerning Śyāmaputra, he says that "One is dark, because he is the son of so and so" is not the natural reason (*svabhāvāhetu*), as "being product" (*kṛtakatvaṁ*) has a character of non-eternality. The *Śyāmatva*, in his opinion, is the aggregate of five ingredients (*pañcopādānaskandha*). Nor is the probans based on the effect (*kāryahetu*), as there is no causal relation between his son and darkness. Nor is it of the nature of the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is the probans cannot prove the negation of complexions other than darkness.[215]

Further Śāntarakṣita criticises the theory of Pātrasvāmin on the grounds of other inferences and concludes that the one-featured probans is really an importent theory (*klībāstenaikalakṣaṇaḥ*). He then tries to prove that three-featured probans has no such defects.

This refutation of the theory of one-featured probans is based on the *asiddha*, *viruddha* and *anaikāntika* defects (*hetvābhāsas*). However, the Jaina philosophers like Prabhācandra and Anantavīrya say that these defects are really not on the side of the one-featured hetu of Jainas, but on the side of the three-featured hetu of they Buddhists, because it can be applied to even Hetvābhāsas. They finally conclude that the one-featured hetu is the shortest and the simplest route to make an inference regarding anything.[216]

But as a matter of fact, the three-featured probans are more convenient for the middle-term (hetu). For, even without knowing the words *homologue* and *hetrologue* everybody can easily understand the major and the middle term.

With regard to the importance of this reference we are in a position to say that the earliest mention of Jaina conception of *anythānupapannatvā* as an aspect of a probans has been made by Ācārya Dharmakīrti. Afterwards, Śāntarakṣita referred to it and proceeded to examine it critically. There he mentioned Pātrasvāmin as the holder of this view. For the sake of Jaina philosophical history, this reference to Pātrasvāmin and his view is very important.

Prmāṇasaṁplavavāda

Pramāṇasaṁplava is an application of more than one pramāṇa to one object (prameya).[217] Jainas are appropritely called *Prāgmāṇasaṁplavdvādīn*[218] in the *Hetubindu Tīkā* This is because the theory of relativity of knowledge (*anekānta-vāda*) is the basis of Jaina philosophy. It means that an entity is not in perpetual flux, but it is relatively eternal and having universal and particular characters (*sāmānyaviśesāt-maka*).

A thing consists of infinite attributes which cannot be apprehended by one by merely superficial knowledge. Other Pramāṇas, therefore, have clear scope to know the un apprehended elements of a particular thing. In the definition of pramāṇa Ācāry Aklaṅka added a word *anadhigatārthagrāhī* which itself indicates that *prāmāṇasaṁplava* can be accepted provided there is *upayoga-viśeṣa* to determine the definite or indefinite part of an entity.[219] The Naiyāyikas have on such term in their definitions of pramāṇa. But they accept the *pramāṇasaṁplava* in each case.

But on the other hand, Buddhist philosophy does not recognise the validity of *pramāṇasaṁplava*. According to its theory, an object is in perpetual flux : it cannot last for more than a moment. One object cannot have two validi-

ties, simultaneously. On this ground the Buddhist logicians criticise the Jaina and other systems. These criticisms will be analysed in the next chapter where, Anekāntavāda of Jainism will be discussed.

Conclusion

From this brief survey of the epistemological and logical concepts of Jainas as recorded in the Buddhist philosophical literature; we have seen that

(i) Among the ancient thinkers, the Jainas were classified as a group of philosophers who attained higher knowledge on the basis of personal experience.

(ii) Knowledge and vision were two characters of self. of these, vision (*daraśna*) was originally considered to be the revealer of self (*ātmaprakāśaka*). This idea was developed in logical form and darśana, like *Jñāna*, was considered to be valid knowledge.

(iii) Knowledge (*jñāna*) was classified as Canonical or Āgamic, and Philosophical or Dārśanic. The five kinds of knowledge, namely, *mati*, *śruti*, *avadhi*, *manaḥparyaya*, and *kevalajñāna* were based on the former, while *Pratyakṣa* and *Parokṣa* are devolopments of the latter. Pratykṣa was divided into *sāṁvyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika*, while *parokṣa* into *smṛti*, *tarka*, *pratyabhijñā*, *anumāna*, and *āgama*. Unlike Buddhism, *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* was *savikalpaka* (determinate). Summati's theory was referred to in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* in this connection.

(iv) Pure self could attain omniscience. Hence Jaina Tirthaṅkaras achieved this stage of complete purification and became omniscient.

(v) The idealogy of omniscience was gradually developed in Buddhism as a result of Jaina influence.

(vi) *Pratijñā* and hetu were the only organs of *Parārthānumāna*. Pātrakeśari's view was referred to by Śāntarakṣita in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* in this connection,

It was also mentioned there that *anyathānupapatti* was the essential characteristic of Hetu, and

(vii) Apart from the knowledge of each other's epistemological theories, the Jainas and the Buddhists, through centuries mutual criticism, contributed substantially towards the enrichment of philosophical speculation in India and added to the sum total of human experience in its quest for the Truth.

Chapter-V

The Theory of Anekāntavāda

1. The Nature of Reality (*Anekāntavāda*)

Anekāntvāda is the heart of Jaina philosophy. Reality possesses infinite characters which cannot be perceived or known at once by an ordinary man. Different people think about different aspects of the same reality and therefore their partial findings are contradictory to one other. Hence, they indulge in debates claiming that each of them was completely true. The Jaina philosophers thought over this conflict and tried to reveal the whole truth by establishing the theory of non-absolutist standpoint (anekāntavāda) with its two wings, *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda.*

There are two mutually distinct and fundamental standpoints from which all things can be considered. They are universalization and particularization. Universalization starts with the observation on a synthetic basis of similarities, and gradually reacts the level where distinction exists and finally concludes that any object of consciousness is in reality an element. On the other hand, Particularization is based on observation of dissimilarities which finally leads one to the conclusion that the universe is but a conglommeration of completely dissimilar existences.

These two standpoints have given rise to several other conceptions in Indian Philosophy. They can be classified into five principal categories[1] as follows :

(i) the conception of identity.

(ii) the conception of difference.

(iii) the conception of subordinating difference to identity.

(iv) the conception of subordinating identity to difference and

(v) the conception of identity-in-difference.

(i) The conception of identity

The conception of identity means that all things are permanent, homogenous and universal as in Vedānta. Here the Brahman is considered to transform itself into the universe and to re-absorb the universe into itself. It is called the *Brahmādvaitavāda* or *ekatvavāda*, *vikāravāda* or *Brahmapariṇāmavāda*, which realized *brahman* as the basic realty. Later on, Śaṅkara established a theory called *vivartavāda* which means that an effect is a false or apparent transformation. According to this, the brahman is the sole reality and universe is intrinsically unreal (*mithyā*).

(ii) The conception of difference

The Buddhist philosophy represents this view. It asserts that everything is impermanent, soulless and a cause of pain (*sabbaṁ aniccaṁ, sabbaṁ anattaṁ, sabbaṁ dukkhaṁ*). The conception of anattā or nairātmya establishes *asatkāryavāda*. Reality is momentary and flexible since it transforms into modes in a moment. The imagination (*kalpanā*) is the cause of the co-relation of modes which leads to casual efficiency (*arthakriyā*). The Śunyavāda, Kṣaṇikavāda etc. are co-related with this doctrine.

(iii) The conception of subordinating difference to identity

The Sāṅkhya upholds the view of subordinating difference which means that the nature of reality is a plurality of the statically permanent (*kūṭasthanitya*) and the dynamically constant (*pariṇāmanitya*). The *Puruṣa* (self) is kūṭasthanitya, while the *Prakṛti* is pariṇāmanitya Owing to different combinations of three guṇas (*sat, rajas,* and *tamas*), Prakrti is transformed into modes, while the Puruṣa ramains unchanged. The causes and effects are not entirely identical, but different in certain respects. Its fundamental principal *Satkāryavāda*, that affirms the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, is based on the non-distinction (*abhedavāda*), whcih is considered to be different from the *ārambhavāda* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

(iv) The conception of subordinating identity to difference

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold the view that the *Viśeṣa* (the particular) is the prominent feature that distinguishes the elements, and the *samavāya* (intimate relation) is the cause of relation between two inseparable (*ayutasiddha*) substances and their modifications.

(v) The conception of identity-cum-difference

Conflicting views and heated arguments about the nature of reality confused the minds of the people to such a degree that it became essential to reconsider this burning philosophical question in a conciliatory spirit. This important step was taken by the Jainas and the result was the theory of *Anekāntavāda*, which postulates a theory of manifold methods of analysis (*Nayavāda*) and synthesis (*Syādvāda*).

According to Jaina Philosophy, as we have already seen, an entity consists of infinite characteristic which cannot be perceived all at once. Therefore one who perceives a thing partially, must be regarded as knowing one aspect of truth as his position permits him to grasp. Even though he is not in a possession of the entire truth, the aspect he has come to know cannot be altogether disregarded or ignored. The question arises as to how the whole truth of reality could be known. According to Jaina standpoint, all the theories contain a certain degree of genuineness and hence should be accepted from a certain point of view; but the nature of reality in its entirety can be perceived only by means of the theory of manifoldness (*anekāntavāda*). The Jaina philosophers synthesize all the opponents views under this theory.

The nature of reality, according to this theory, is permanent-in change. It possesses three common characters, viz. *utpāda* (origination) *vyaya* (destruction) and *dhrauvya* (permanence through birth and decay). It also posesses the attributes (*guṇas*) called *anvayī*, which co-exist with substance (*dravya*) and modifications (*paryāyas*) called *vyatirekī*, which

succed each other. Productivity and destructivity constitute the dynamic aspect of an entity and permanence is its enduring factor. This view is a blended form of the completely static view held by the Vedāntins and the completely dynanic view held by the Buddhists.[2]

Jaina literature[3] mentions three different views with regard to the relation of guṇa and paryāya with a substance (dravya). viz. the bhedavāda, abhedavāda and the bhedābhedavāda. The *bhedavāda* represents the view that the attributes and the modifications are a combination with the substance which gives birth to the triple characters (*dravya, guṇa* and *paryāya*) of an entity.[4] Both, guṇa and paryāya are two distinctive elements in this view. The former is called *sahabhāvī* or intrinsic, while the latter *kramabhāvī* or extrinsic[5]. This ideology was promulgated by Kundakund, and supported by Umāsvāmi, Samantabhadra and Pūjyapāda.

According to *abhedavāda*, the guṇas and the paryāyas are synonymous (*tulyārthau*) signifying the conception of change inherent in which are both external and internal modificattions of all realities without creating any contradictory position.[6] Siddhasena Divākara is the chief supporter of this view and he is supported by Siddhasenagani, Haribhadra and Hemachandra.

The third view *bhedābhedavāda* held by Akalaṅkadeva has been accepted by all his commentators and followers such as Prabhāchandra, Vādirājajsūri and Anantavirya. This view appears in a more developed and hormonized form and clarifies further the relation between guṇa and paryāya. While commenting on the Sūtra *Guṇaparyayavaddravyam* of the *Tattvārthasūtra*, Akalaṅka suggests that guṇas are themselves a distinct category from, as well as identical with, *paryāyas*[7]. It means guṇas always exist with realities and their modifications which follow one after another. Prabhāchandra[8] in the *Nyāyakumudacandra* gives a more critical and comprehensive explanation.

All these three views are not fundamentally different from one another, since they unanimously accept the common factors, utpāda, vyaya, and dhrauvya simultaneity (*sahabhāvitva*) and modifications with successivity (*kramabhāvitva*). The Buddhist philosophers are familiar with the first and the last view, but they do not make any distinction between them.

Anekāntavāda in Buddhist literature

The rudiments of the theory of *anekāntavāda* can be gleaned from early Pāli literature. The *Brahmajāla Sutta* pointed out the sixty-two Wrong views (*Micchadiṭṭhis*) according to the Buddhistic standpoint. Out of them, the *Ucchedavāda* (nihilism) and *Sassatavāda* (Eternalims), Buddhaghosa says, were taught by Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta to two of his pupils, *just* before his death[9].

This account of Buddhaghosa cannot be accepted as true since he had quite understandably misunderstood the teachings of Nigaṇtha Nātaputta. Buddhaghosa had not been fully conversant with all aspects of anekāntavāda and he had thought that Nigaṇtha Ṇātaputta had taught contradictory doctrines. This is quite understandable because the theory of permanence in-changa which forms the basis of the Anekāntavāda is completely at variance with the Buddhist theory which accepts only change. Due to this difficulty thoughts of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta are considered in Pāli literature under the headings *Sassatavāda* and *Ucchedavāda*.

Rudiments of Anekāntavāda are traceable in the Buddhisf approach to questions : Pāli literature[10] describes how he answered a question in four ways. The four ways are :

(i) *Ekaṁsa-vyākaraṇıya* (answerable categorically).

(ii) *Paṭipucchāvyākaraṇiya* (answerable by putting another question).

(iii) *Ṭhāpaṇīya* (question that should be set aside).

(iv) *Vibhajjavyākaraṇīya* (answerable analytically).

The Buddha, who adopted these techniques in answering numerous metaphysical and ethical questions put to him by various disciples and disputants, himself claims to be a *Vibhajjvādin.*[11] The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* of the Jainas requires the Jaina monk to explain a problem with the help of *Vibhajjavāda.*[12] It shows that the Jainas as well as the Buddhists followed the analytical method of explanation. It is possible that the earliest division of the above questions was divides into *ekaṁsavyākaraṇiya-pañha*, and (2) *anekaṁsavyākaraṇiya-pañha* corresponding to the Jaina classification of two kinds of statements (*ekaṁsika dhamma and anekaṁsika dhamma*). Leter, the latter class would have been sub-divided into the (i) *vibhajja-vyākaraṇiya* and the (ii) *ṭhāpaiya*. *Paṭipucchī-vyākaraṇiya* is a subclass of *vibhajja-vyākaraṇiya*.[13]

A point to be noted here is that the Buddha used the word *anekaṁsa* in his preachings. For instance, in reply to a question asked by Poṭṭhapāda, the Buddha says "I have taught and laid down doctrines of which it is possible to make categorical assertions and I have taught and laid down doctrines of which it is not possible to make categorical assertions" *ekaṁsikā pi.. .. mayā dhammā desitā paññattā*[14], *anekaṁsikā pi.. ...mayā dhammā desitā paññattā*). Here *anekaṁsikā*, like *Vibhajjavāda*, is similar to *Anekāntavāda* of Jainas. The etymology and meaning are also similar. But the difference between these two theories is that the Jainism accepts all statements to possess some relative (*anekāntika*) truth, while the Buddhism does not accept that all non-categorical statements (*anekaṁsika*) can be true or false from one standpoint or another. Anekāntavāda, unlike anekaṁsikavāda, conceives of the possibility of knowing reality from one or more standpoints Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra, in the Hetubinduṭīkāloka, summarized this concept as follows : *Syācchabdo 'nekāntavacano nityatosti tena syādvādo anekāntvādo yadvā syādakṣaṇikaḥ syādkṣaṇika ityādi......)*[15] A developed form of this doctrine is referred to in a later Sanskrit Buddhist philosophical literature. As we have already seen, this theory continued develop still further up to the time of Kundakunda.

After Kundakunda, Samantabhadra tries to explain it further with the help of examples. This is referred to by Karṇakagomin in the *Pramāṇavārtika Svāvṛttiṭīka*[16] and Durvekamiśra in the *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*. According to Samantabhadra, the triple characters abide with a substance at one and the same time. They are not mutually independent. *Utpāda* can never exist without *vyaya* and *dhrauvya*. The other two characters too are mutually dependent. Samantabhadra uses an example to clarify this view. If a jar made of gold is turned into a crown it will please a man who has an attachment to the crown, but it will displease a man who dislikes the crown, while the third man who is netural about the crown but is interested in the gold, will have no objection to it at all. Here origination, destruction, and permanence abide in one reality. Another example is presented to make this controversial point clearer. He says: he who takes a vow to live on milk, does not take curd, he who takes a vow to live on curd, does not take milk; and he who takes a vow to live on food other than supplied by a cow, takes neither milk nor curd. Thus Samatabhadra cancludes that utpāda, vyaya, and dhrauvya may exist in a relative sense.[17] Kundakunda has also given such example in this conneetion.[18]

The etymology of the word *dravya* itself indicates that a thing is permanent-in-change taking a new form simultaneously with the disappearance of the previous form.[19] This view was also accepted by Durvekamiśra according to Krdanta section.[20] Śāntarakṣita[21] and Arcaṭa[22] have also recorded this conception in their respective works.

Trayātmakavāda and Arthakriyāvāda, in Buddhist Literature

The *arthakriyākāritva* (causal efficency) is the essence of the doctrines of Bhedavāda, Abhedavāda, and Bhedābhedavāda. The Sa*tkārya*v*āda* of Sāṅkhyas, *Asatkārya*v*āda* of Naiyāyikas and Buddhists and *Sadasatkā*ryav*āda* of Jainas are well-known to us in this respect. Here we are concerned only with the views of the Buddhists and Jainas.

The Buddhists assert that the "Particular is the only real element of an entity charactersed as *svalakṣaṇa* (thing-in-itself). It is supposed to be momentary and a congregation of atoms. A thing accordingly is born and immediately afterwards it is destroyed [23]. The substance is *nirhetuka* (devoid of causes) in the sense that it originates without the assistance of cause other than its own cause of origination. Each moment produces another moment destroying itself and thus it presents a sort of continuisyly of existence. Thus it manages to maintain a cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) relationship.

According to Buddhism, Momentariness (*kṣaṇabhaṅgu-ratā*) and causal efficiency (*kārya-kāraṇabhāva*) are inseparable. It treated momentariness, efficiency, causality and reality as synonyms, and hence argued that an entity is momentary because it was efficient and it was efficient because it was momentary. On the basis of this idea, the Buddhists criticise causal efficiency in a permanent thing. They say that entities come into Being either simultaneously (*yuga-padena*) or successively (*krameṇa*). But in a permanent thing, both these ways cannot be effective, since they are not able to originate it immediately due to the non-proximity of a cause. In the first alternation, the substance should originate all the possible effects in the very first moment of its existence, As regards the type of causal efficiency that takes place simultaneously, a permanent thing cannot have any effects, because it can be neither perceived nor inferred. As Śāntarakṣita says, after having brought about all the effects simultaneously, the nature of a thing comprising its capacity for effective action, disappears, and therefore the momentary character of a thing is an essential factor for causal effeciency. Furthermore they point out that auxiliaries (*sahakārī*) must follow the things with which they are connected. These auxiliaries, as a matter of fact, cannot abide with permanent things, because the peculiar condition produced in a thing by auxiliaries would neither be simailar

nor dissimilar. Ib they make any difference, the efficiency of the permanent thing in producing the cause is compromised and becomes dependent upon other things in order to be efficient. If, on the coutrary, they are not able to make any difference, the arguments for inoperative and ineffective (*akiñcitkara*) elements in a thing have no meaning. The Buddhists, therefore, conclude that causal efficiency is the essence of the simple and unique moments each of which is totally differents from the others.[24]

On the other hand, the Jainas believe that a substance is dynamic (*pariṇāmī*) in character. It means a thing is eternal from the real standpoint (*niścayanayena*) and momentary from a practical viewpoint (*vyavahāranayena*). Causal efficiency, according to them, is possible neither in a thing which is of the static nature (*kūṭasthanitya*) nor in a thing which is incongruous with the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*), but it is possible only in a thing which is permanent-in-change To make a clarification of this view, they say that efficiency takes place either successively or simultaneously. Both these alternations cannot be effective in the momentary existence, since the spatial as temporal extension which requires the notion of *before* and *after* for efficiency are absent from the momentary thing of the Buddhists. *Santāna* (continuous series) is also not effective in this respect, since it is not momentary in the opinion of the Buddhists [25]

This view of the Jainas is recorded by Durvekamiśra in the *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*. The writer of the *Vādanyāya* called *Syādvādakeśarī* who is supposed to be the same as Akalaṅkadeva, is said to have defeated the opponents and established the Jaina Nyāya. According to Syādvādakeśarī, Durvekamiśra says, every entity is *anaikāntika* (having infinite characters), which is the basis of *arthakriyā* (casual efficiency). Kulabhūṣaṇa, a commentator on the *Vādanyāya*, explains this view that the *anyathānupapatti* is the main character of reality, and *ārthakriyā* is possible only in that character.[26] He, then,

on the basis of the above view, tries to point out defects in the theory of absolute momentariness and absolute eternalism stating that causal efficiency is possible in either of these theories of reality. Clarifying his own position, Kulabhūṣaṇa asks whether momentary character has causal efficiency during its own existence or in another. If the first alternative is accepted, the entire universe would exist only for a moment. The effect produced by a certain cause during its own existence would be a cause of others, despite being caused itself and this sereis will never end. The argument "Cause makes an effect during its own existence and an effect comes into being during the existence of others "is not favoured since an effect is supposed to be originated during the existence of its own cause and not of another". Otherwise, an effect cannot take place and there will be the defect of "*Samanantarapāda-virodha*"[26], according to which the effects would emerge in the distant future. The next moment is also not powerful to generate the thing, since it is not a creator. Otherwise what would be the difference between *sat* and *asat*, and *kṣaṇika* and *akṣaṇika* We could conclude therefore, that *arthakriyā* is possible only in permanent-in-change character. [28]

Afterwards, Durvekamiśra tries to criticise the view of Syādvādakeśari not by advancing arguments but by merely hurling insults. As a matter of fact, whenever the Buddhist philosophers came across people whose views were different to theirs, especially when they could not refute their theories, they resorted to the practice of rediculing them by means of ironical speech. It is in this manner that the arguments of the Jainas against the theory of kṣaṇikavāda came to be dismissed by Paṇḍit Durvekamiśra with cursory remarks that a wise-man should disregard the above objections raised by the above *Anhrīkas* or *Digambaras* (*yadi nāmānhrīkoktirupekṣaṇīya prekṣāvatāṁ*)[29]. He then tries to show that only the momentary character has a capacity of casual efficiency.

Śāntarakṣita also refers to view which seems to belong to the Jaina tradition, but it is attributed to Bhadanta Yoga-

sena, who is claimed by certain scholars to be a Buddhist philosopher. For instace, Bhattacarya says in his introduction to the *Tattvasaṅgraha* that "nothing definite is known about *Yogasena*; he is not mentioned in the Nanjio's catelogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka nor in any of the Tibetan catalogues". He then tries to prove that Yogasena was a Buddhist philosopher on account of his appellation *Bhadanta* saying "But the word *Bhadanta* is always used in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* to denote a Buddhist, or more preferably a Hīnayāna Buddhist. Our authors have not made a confusion in this respect anywhere in this book, and on this ground we can take Yogasena to be a Buddhist.[30]

But Śāntarakṣita has not indicated anywhere that the word *Bhadanta* should be limited only to the Buddhist Ācaryas. It has been widely used in Jaina literature as a term of respect to elder Bhikkhus. It is, therefore, not impossible that Yogasena was a follower of Jainism or was influenced by its conceptions, as his views against *Kṣaṇikavāda* represent the Jaina standpoint.[31] Further Śāntarakṣita did not mention anywhere explicitly the criticism made by Jainas against the *Kṣaṇikavāda*. Moreover, it is unlikely that in such a comprehensive work he should forget to mention the refutation of the Buddhist theory of momentariness by the Jainas, when the Jainas were their greatest opponents.

Some schools of thought opposing the doctrine of momentariness (*Kṣaṇābhaṅgavāda*) were rising even within Buddhist system. For instance, Śāntarakṣita refers to the view of *Vātsīputrīyas* who classified things under two headings momentary and non-momentary.[32] The conception of soul, according to them, has also been refuted by Śāntarakṣita.Stcherbatsky mentions the Vātsīputrīyas who admitted the existence of a certain unity between the elements of a living personality. In all probability they have been influenced by the Jaina views as their arguments are very similar to the Jaina arguments raised against the view of *Kṣaṇikavāda* and *anātmavāda*.

There are, however, two important points of difference between the Buddhist and the Jaina in the meaning they attach to *dravyavāda* in their common denunciation of the view which connects this notion of *arthakriyākāritva* with *dravyavāda*. First, the Buddhist is against dravyavāda. Secondly, the Buddhist's attack actually turns out, whatever his profession may be, to be on the hypothesis of the static (*kūṭsthanitya*) drayya whereas the Jaina's attack is also on the same hypothesis but only as a contrast to his own theory of the dynamic (*pariṇāmi*) dravya.[34] We have already discussed the Jainas view against *ekāntadravyavāda*.

Dual character of an entity

Some systems of thought accept only the Universal (*Sāmānya*) character of reality. Advaitavādins and the Sāṅkhyas are the typical representatives of this view. Some other schools led by the Buddhists recognise only Particular (*Viśeṣa*) character of reality. The third school of thought belongs to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, who treat Universal and Particular (*Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa*) as absolutely distinctive entities.

Śāntarakṣita first establishes the Jainistic view on the nature of reality. He says that according to Jainism, an entity has infinite characteristics which are divided into two categories, viz. Universal and Particular. Just as different colours can exist in a lustrous gem without conflicting with each other, so the universal and particular elements could abide in a reality.[35]

We find two kinds of existence in an entity, viz. existence of own nature (*Svarūpāstiva*) and existence of the similar nature of others (*Sādraśyāstitva*). The former tries to separate the similar (*sajātiya*) and dissimilar (*vijātiya*) substances and indicates their independence. This is called Vertical Universal (*ūrdhvatāsamānya*), which represents unity (*anugatapratyaya*) in plurality of different conditions (*vyāvṛttapratyaya*) of the same individual. In other words, the permanent character of an entity is called *ūrdhvatāsāmānya*.[36]

Sādṛśyāstitva, the so-called *Tiryaksāmānya* (horizontal), represents unity in the plurality of different individuals of the same class.[37] The word *cow* is used to denote a particular cow and it also refers to others of the same class, because of similarity.[38] Likewise, *Viśeṣa* is also of two kinds, *Paryāya* and *Vyatireka*. The former distinguishes the two modes of same entity, while the latter makes a distinction between the two separate entities.

Thus each and every reality is universalized-cum-particularzed (*sāmānya-viśeṣātmaka*) along with substance with modes (*dravyaparyāyātmaka*). Here *dravya* represents the universal character and *paryāya* represents the particular character of a thing. The adjective *Sāmānya-viśeṣātmaka* indicates the apprehension of *Tiryaksāmānyātmaka* and *Vyatirekasāmānyātmaka*, while *Dravyaparyāyātmaka* points out the *ūrdhvatāsāmānyātmaka* and *Paryāyaviśeṣātmaka* character of a reality. Though the qualily of *sāmānyaviśeṣātmaka* is included in the *dravyaparyāyātmaka*, its separate use indicates that no entity is beyond the limitation of *dravyāparyāyātmakatva* of *utpādaryayadhrauvyātmakatva*. While *Sāmānyaviśeṣātmaka* indicates the character of reality, the *dravyaparyāyātmaka* shows its dynamic nature. Thus in Jainism an entity is of a dual nature. Both these types of sāmānya have been dealt with by Śāntarakṣita, Karṇakagomin and Arcaṭa. They take the traditional example of a jar (ghaṭa) made of gold which can be changed into several modes, while preserving gold as a permament substance.[39]

Another example has been given by Buddhist philosophers on behalf of Jainas. They say that the identical-in-difference (*bhedābheda*) between the substance and the modes is accepted by the *Anhrikas* as the nature of reality.[40] When a substance is spoken of as one, it is with reference to space, time and nature; when it is spoken of as different, it is with reference to number, character, name and function. For instance, when we speak of a jar and its colour and its other attributes, there is difference of number, and name; there is also also a

difference of nature, inasmuch as an inclusiveness or comprehensiveness is the nature of the substance of the jar, while exclusiveness or distributiveness is the nature of successive factors in the form of colour and so forth. There is also a difference of function; inasmuch as the purposes served by the two are different. Thus the substance is not totally undifferentiated, as it does become differentiated in the form of the successive factors.[41]

Kamalaśīla explains the Jaina view as to why it stresses on the universal-cum-particular character. He says, as the Jainas assert : "If the above doctrine is to be denied, all things would have to be recognized as one. If a certain thing spoken of, for instance, as a jar was not different from other things, such as cloth, then there would be no difference between the jar and sky-flower (i. e. sky-flower is a thing that does not exist at all–hence an absurdity (*ākāśa-kusuma*)). Likewise a thing that is always differentiated from all other things, can have no other state save that of the sky-flower. Consequently, the general character in shape of universal entity, has to be admitted.[42]

Kamalśila further explains the Jaina conception of the particular characters of an entity. He says that if the same entity, jar, was devoid of dissimilarity, then the jar could not be regarded as anything different from the cloth etc. in the form of *this is jar, that is cloth*, but in fact it does differ from other things. Therefore the particular character is always present in reality.[43]

As the Buddhist do not admit the universal character of an entity, the Jainas endeavour to convince them that the universal character is merged in the particular character of an entity. They set forth the argument that if any entity is not similar to other things, it ceases to be entity. For, that which is excluded from an entity, could have no position, but non-existence, as in the case of a sky-flower.[44]

In support of the aforesaid view, another argument is presented, on behalf of the Jainas, that is, if an entity were not

similar to or different from every other entity, how then is it possible that the common idea of "being an entity" is found to appear only in connection with the jar and such things, and not in connection with the crow's teeth. It is so because the said restriction is due to a certain capacity in their natures. Though, according to Jainism, all things in the form of entities are not different from one another, their capacity may be regarded as the required "commonality. This is also called the *Niyatavṛtti*. Without accepting this limitation anything could be transformed into any-thing else.

Later the Jainas dealt with the difference among things. They say that if a jar were entirely devoid of dissimilarity to those other things, then there being no difference between them the jar could not be anything different from those things. This would involve a self-contradiction. When one is ready to accept some sort of difference among things, he has also to accept dissimilarity as a particular character.[46]

Thus according to the Jainas' view, like the gleaming Sapphire, every entity, while being one, has several aspects. Of these, some are apprehended by inclusive notions, and others by exclusive notions. Those that are apprehended by inclusive, and hence spoken of as *Common*, while others, which are apprehended by exclusive notions, are exclusive and hence said to be *Particular*. The inclusive notion appears in the non-distinctive form of "This is an Entity", while the exclusive appears in the distinctive form "this is *jar*, not cloth".

Vastvekātmakamevedamanekākāramiṣyate.
Te cānuvṛttivyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyatayā sthitāḥ.
Ādyā ete'nuvṛttatvātsāmānyamiti kīrtitāḥ.
Viśeṣāstvabhidhīyante vyāvṛttatvāttato 'pare.[47]

Nature of relation of an entity

The nature of an entity is also a controversial point among the philosophers. For instance, the Naiyāyiikas, the extreme realists, think that relation is a real entity. According to them, it connects the two entities into a relational unity through conjunctive relation (samavāya sambandha). Conju-

nction is a subject of quite separate, while the other relates with inseparable realities. *Samavāya* is said to be eternal, (*nitya*), one (*eka*) and all-pervasive (*sarvavyāpaka*).[48]

The Vedāntins and the Buddhists, the idealists, are against the view of the Naiyāyikas. The Buddhists assert the subjective view of relations. A relation, according to Dharmakīrti, is a conceptual fiction (*sambandhaḥ kalpanākṛtaḥ*), like universal, and hence it is unreal. He also rejects the two possible ways of entertaining a relation in universal. They are dependence (*pāratantrya sambandha*) and interpenetration (*rūpaśleṣa sambandha*).[50]

On the other hand, the Jainas, on the basis of non-absolute standpoint, try to remove the extreme externalism of the Naiyāyikas and the extreme illusionism or idealism of Buddhism and Advaitism. They maintain that a relation is a deliverance of the direct and objective experience. Relation is not merely an inferable but also an indubitaly perceptual fact. Without recognising relation, no object can be concrete and useful and atams would be existing unconnected.[51]

As regards the rejection of two possible ways of relation, the Jainas say that they should not be rejected. For, *paratantrya-sambandha* is not mere dependence, as the Buddhists ascribe, but it unifies the relata[52]. *Rūpaśleṣa* is also untenable for purpose.[53] The two points are here to be noted: the first is that according to Jainism, the relata never lose their individuality. They make internal changes having consistent internal relation with the external changes happening to them. In adopting this attitude the Jainas avoid the two extremes of the Naiyāyikas' externalism and the Vedāntins internalism. Another point is that the Jainas consider relation to be a combination of the relata in it as something unque or *sui generis* (*jātyantara*). It is a character or trait in which the natures of relata have not totally disappeared but are converted into a new form. For instance, *nara-siṁha* is a combination of the units of *nara* (man) and *siṁha* (lion).

They are neither absolutely independent nor absolutely dependent, but are indentity-in-defference. Hence the Jainas are of the view that relation is the structure of reality which is identity-in-difference.[54]

2. The Theory of Nayavāda

Nayavāda or the theory of partial truth is an integral part of the conception of *Ānekāntavāda*, Which is essential to concieve the sole nature of reality (*vastu nayati prāpayati saṁvedanākoṭimārohati*). It provides for the acceptance ot different viewpoints on the basis that each reveals a partial truth about an object. Naya investigates analytically a particular standpoint of the problem[55]. But if the problem is treated as the complete truth, it is not *Naya*, but *Durnaya* or *Nayābhāsa* or *Kunaya*. For instance, *it is is Naya*, and *it is and is only* is durnaya, while "it is relatively (*syāt*)" is an example of *Syādvāda*[56].

Nayas can be as many as there are ways of speaking about a thing. This infinite number of nayas has been reduced to seven, viz. *Naigama* (figurative), (ii) *Saṅgrha* (general or common), (iii) *Vyavahāre* (distiributive), (iv) *Ṛijusūtra* (the actual condition at a particular instant for a long time), (v) *Śabda* (descriptive), (vi) *Samabhirūḍha* (specific), and (vii) *evaṁbhūta* (active). The first four nayas are *Śabdanayas* and the rest are the *Artha Nayas*, for thoughts and words are the only means by which the mind can approach reality. These seven *Nayas* have been also divided into two categories, *Dravyārthika* or *Sāmānya* (noumenallor intellectual intuition relating to the substance), and *Paryāyārthika* or *Viśeṣa* (phenomenal view relating to the modifications of substances). The first three nayas are connected with the former division and the rest with the latter. In the scriptural language these are named the *Niścayanaya* (real standpoint) and the *Vyavhāranaya* (prartical standpoint). The *Tattvārthavārtika* (1·33) mentions the *Drvyāstika* and the *Pāryāyāstika* in place of *drvyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*.

As regards *nayābhāsa*, the Nyāya-Vaiśesika systems are called in *Naigamābhāsa*, as they hold the absolute distinction in the characters of a thing, The *Sāṅkhya* and the Advaita schools are enumerated under the *Saṅgrahābhāsa*, the Cārvaka under the *Vyavhārnayābhāsa*, the Buddhist conception of *Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* in the *Ṛjusūtranayābhāsa*, the *Śamabhirūdhanayābhāsa* and so on.

The theory of Naya in Buddhist literature

Pāli literature indicates some of the characteristics of *Nayavāda*, The Buddha mentions ten possible ways of claiming knowledge in the course of addressing the Kālāmas. The ten (i) anussavena, (ii) paramparāya, (iii) itikirāya, (iv) piṭakasaṁpadāya (v) bhavvarūpatāya (vi) samaṇo na guru, (vii) takkıhetu, (viii) nayahetu, (ix) ākāraparivitakkena, and (x) *diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā* [58] *Out of these, the eighth* way, viz. *Nayahetu* is more important for our study. Here *Naya* is a method of statement which leads a meaning to a particular judgement.[59] The Jātaka says that the wise man draws a particular standpoint.[60] In about the same meaning. Naya is used in Jaina philosophy, as we have already seen, This *Nayahetu* of Buddhism appears to indicate the Jaina influence of Naya, and it would have been made a part of its own in the form of two types of Saccas, viz. *Sammutisacca* and the *Paramatthasaccā*,[61] which are used in about the same sense as *Paryāyārthikanaya* and *Dravyārthikanaya* or *Vyavahāranaya* and *Niścayanaya*. The words *Sunaya* and *Dunnayā* are also found fn Buddhism used in identical way [62]

The *Suttanipāta* indicates that the *Sammutisacca* was accepted as a common theory of Recluses and the Brāhamaṇas,[63] and the *Paramatthasacca* was treated as the highest goal [64] These two Saccas are characterised as *Nītattha* (having a a direct meaning) and *Neyyattha* (having an indirect meaning).[65] The Commentary on the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* says that there is no third truth (*tatiyaṁ n'ūpalabbhti*). *Sammuti* (conventional statement) is true because of convention and

Paramattha is true because of indicating the true characteristics of realties :

Duve saccāni akkhāsi Sambuddho vadataṁ varo.
Sammutiṁ paramatthañca tatiyaṁ n' ūpalabbhati.
Paramatthavacanaṁ saccaṁ dhammānaṁ tathalakkhaṇaṁ[66]

On the other hand, it is also said that there is only one truth, not second (*ekaṁ hi saccaṁ na dutīyamatthi*).[67] This contradictory statement appears to give the impression that even in Buddhism the nature of things is considered through some sort of relativistic standpoint which is similar to the theory of *Nayavāda* of Jainism,

Buddhism was aware of the conception of the Nayavāda of Jainism, since the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* refers to the several *Paccekasaccas* (individual truths) of the several Recluses and Brāhmaṇas. If it is so, the conception of *Paccekasacca* (Partial truth) of Buddhism is definitely influenced by the *Nayavāda* of Jainism. There is no doubt that Jainism founded this theory earlier than Buddhism.

3. The Theory of Syādvāda

We have observed in our discussion on *Nayavada* that it is not an absolute means of knowing the nature of relaity. The further examination of truth is attempted by the theory of Condtional Dialecitc or *Syādvāda*. The *Nayavāda* is analytical in character, while the *Syādvāda* is a synthetical in method. The latter investigates the various standpoints of the truth made possible by *nāya* and integrates them into a constent and comprehensive synthesis. Dasgupta describes the relation between these two methods as follows : "There is no universal or absolute position or negation, and all judgements are valid only conditionally. The relation of the *naya* doctrine with the *syādvāda* doctrine is, therefore, this, that for any judgement according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by *Syādvāda*. [69]"

The prefix *Syāt* in the *Syādvāda* represents the existence of those characters which, though not perceived at the mom-

-ent, are present in reality (*nirdiśyamānadharmavyatirikta-śeṣadharmāntarasaṁsūcakena Syāt yukto vādo'bhipretadharma-vacanaṁ Syādvādaḥ*). Syādvāda reveals the certainty regarding any problem and not merely the possibility or probability. It is a unique contribution of Jainism to Indian Philosophy. *Syādvādin* is a popular appellation given by later philosophers to Jainas. Dharmakirti, Arcaṭa and Śāntarakṣita used this term for the Jainas in their respective works.

Syāt is generally rendered into English as "may be" or "perhaps" which is far from appropriate. As a matter of fact, there is no appropriate word for *Syāt* in English, but we can translate it with the term *relatively* which is closer and more suitable to convey the significance of the theory. The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of *relatively* as "having mutual relations, corresponding in some way, related to each other".[70] H,G.A.[71] Van Zeyst writes : "When a function indicates some difinite relationship in which the object stands to some other object, the term must be described as "relative". There is a word *Kathañcit* in Sanskrit literature which is used as a substitute for *Syāt* by Jaina as well as non-Jaina philosophers. These connotations tally with the inner meaning of *Syāt*.

Further Sy*ādvāda* makes an effort to respect other doctrines by warning us against allowing the use of *eva or only* to proceed beyond its prescribed limits and penetrates the truth patiently and non-voilently. The uniqueness of *Syādvāda* as the most peaceful and non-violent means of arriving at the Truth through argumentation is emphasised by Tatiya in his assessment of *Syādvāda* in Jaina Philosophy : "It is the attitude of tolerance and justice that was responsible for the origin of the doctrine of non-absolutlsm (*anekāntavāda*). Out of universal tolerance and peace-loving nature was born cautiousness of speech. Out of cautiousnes of speech was born the habit of explaining a problem with the help of *Siyavāya* (syādvāda) or *Vibhajjavāya*. This habit again developed into a non-absolutistic attitude towards reality."[72]

It would be helpful to remember that the nature of reality is determined in Jainism by refering to the *dravya* (matter), *Kṣetra* (place), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (state). This is the positive factor. The negative factor is that of refering to the negative counterpart (*niṣedha-pratimukha*) or a particular object such as the absence of *ghaṭatva* (jarness) in cloth and vice versa. This negative factor constitutes the full-fledged nature of the Jar as the positive one.

According to the conception of *Syādvāda*, both identity and difference must exist in reality. But opponents categorically deny this claim on the ground that a dual character can never exist in an entity. The critics of Syādvāda object to it on the basis that Syādvāda gives rise to the following erroneous results[78] : (i) *Virodha* or self-contradiction, like hot and cold, (ii) *Vaiyadhikaraṇya* or absence of a common abode, (iii) *Anavasthā* or *regressus ad infinitum*, (iv) *Saṅkara* or confusion, (v) *Vyatikara* or exchange of natures, (vi) *Saṁśaya* or doubt, (vii) *Apratipatti* or non-apprehension, and (viii) *Uvayadoṣa* or fallacies on both sides. Out of these defects *Virodhadoṣa* is considered by them to be the most glaring. The Jainas do not accept that there is any self-contradiction in *Syādvāda*. They put forth three possible forms in which virodha can occur :

(i) *Vadhyaghātakabhāva* or destructive opposition, like mongoose (*nakula*) and the serpent (*ahi*).

(ii) *Sahānavasthānabhāva* or the non-congruent opposition, like *śyāma* and *pīta* in a ripe mango.

(iii) *Pratibādhyapratibandhakabhāva* or the obstructive opposition, like the moonstone which protects the sun's rays. And they maintain that these forms of virodhas cannot effect their theories of reality. They also say that an entity is *anantadharmātmaka* (having innumerable characters) which cannot be perceived at once by ordinary men until and unless, we conceive the problem through negative and positive aspects (*bhāvābhāvātmakatattvena*), identity-in-difference (*bhedābhedena*) eternality-in-non-eternality (*nityānityātmakena*),

universal-cum-particular elements (*sāmānyaviśeṣātmakena*), or substance-in-modes (*dravyaparyāyātmakena*). Each and everything is related to the four-fold nature of itself (*svadrayacatuṣṭaya*) and is not related to the fourfold nature of the other-than-itself (*paradravyacatuṣṭaya*). For instance, the jar is the jar in itself, but it is not the jar in relation to others, as cloth, fruit, etc. No one can deny this dual characteristic of a thing, otherwise its negative aspects or non-existing characteristics would disappear and their modes would commingle.[74]

According to the Jainas, the non-existences (abhāvas) are of four kinds, viz. *Prāgabhāva, Pradhvaṁsābhāva, Itaretarābhāva* and *Anyonyābhāva*.

(i) *Prāgabhāva* means the non-existence of an effect in the cause.[75] The substance is eternal which can neither be newly created nor completely destroyed.[76] The effect accordingly does not exist before its own existence, which is a result of causes. The substance in itself is an effect and the modes are the causes. That means the pre-modes are the pragabhāva of post-modes. The clay or the curd is the Prāgabhāva of jar (ghaṭa) and butter (ghṛta). If this previous negation were not there, the product clay or curd would always exist in their effects jar or butter.

(ii) *Pradhvaṁsābhāvr* means the non-existence of an effect after destruction.[77] *Prāgabhāva* is the *upādāna* (material cause) and *Pradhvaṁsābhāva* is the *Nimitta* (determining cause). The first destroys then the other originates. If this negation were not in an entity, milk would still be there in curd.

(iii) *Itaretarābhāva* or *Anyonyābhāva* means mutual non-existence. Each entity exists in its nature which cannot be transferred to others. The cow cannot possess the form of the horse.[78] If this mutual negation were not in entities, the horse would become every other thing.

(iv) *Atyantābhāva* means the absolute non-existence of an entity. As for instance, the sky-flower (ākāśa-kusuma)

or Śaśa-viṣāṇa (horns to the hares), which have no existence at all.[79]

On the basis of above exposition, the Jainas endeavour to answer the objections raised by opponents through the different aspects of the nature of reality. They are dealt with below :

The Identity-in-difference (*bhedābhedātmaka*)

The identity-in-difference is the main figure which guards the Jaina standpoint against the attacks of opponents. The exposition of this central idea has been a necessary talk to the Jaina Ācāryas. They postulate a theory that a substance is neither absolutely different than other things, nor absolutely alike. Otherwise how could the quality (*guṇa*) and qualified (*guṇī*) be distinguished ?

An entity is characterised by birth (*utpāda*), death (*vyaya*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*). All entities are included in this definition *Sat* or substance is *abheda* and *guṇas* are *bheda*. Apart from guṇas or paryāyas, there is no existence. Therefore, reality is called the identity-in-difference.

Eternal-cum-non-eternal aspects (*nityānityātmaka*)

In the same way the substance can be nither absolutely eternal nor absolutely non-eternal, but it is eternal-cum-non-eternal. If we do not accept this, causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*) would not be possible with an entity and all the transaction would fail due to the static or perpetual fluxive character of thing. Pre-existence would be dis-connected with the post-existence. How then could the doer and enjoyer be recognized ?

Likewise, reality is universalized-cum-particularised, one-cum-innumerable, etc. from real and practical standpoints. There is no self-contradiction in this recognition, since the nature of reality is conceived relatively.

Saptabhaṅgī or a theory of Sevenfold predication

Saptabhaṅgī or the theory of sevenfold predication is a method of cognition to apprehend the correct nature of reality-

through a sevenfold relativist dialectic method. It is treated as complementary to the Syādvāda doctrine. Akalaṅka thinks of it as a way which considers the modes of a thing in a positive (*vidhimukhenā*) and negative (*niṣedhamukhena*) manner without incompatibility in a certain context. The sevenfold predications are as follows :

(i) *syādasti* or relatively it is.

(ii) *syānnāsti* or relatively it is not.

(iii) *syādasti nāsti* or relatively it is and is not.

(iv) *syādavaktavya* or relatively it is inexpressible.

(v) *syādastyavaktavya* or relatively it is and is inexpressible.

(vi) *syānnāstyavaktavya* or relatively it is not and is inexpressible.

(vii) *syādastināstyavaktavya* or it is, is not, and is inexpressible.

Here the radical modes of predication are only three in number-*syādasti*, *spāyānnasti*, and *syādavaktavya* which construct other predications by combining themselves. The first two modes represent the affirmative or being (*astitva*), and the negative or non-being (*nāstitiva*) characters of an entity. The third is a combination of both being and non-being. The fourth is inexpressible in its predicate. The remaining three modes are the combined forms of the first, second, and the third. The first two and the fourth predications are consequently the assertions of simple judgements, and the remaining four of complex judgements. According to the mathematical formula, the three fundamental predications make seven modes and not more than that.

The first mode represents the existence of the jar (*ghaṭa*) and the non-existence of cloth (*paṭa*) in the jar. The second predication shows the negative aspect of jar that it does not exist as cloth or anything else. There is no contradication here, since the predication asserts the relative and determinate abstraction. The third mode offers a successive presentation (*kramārpaṇa*) of negative and positive aspects of an entity, while the fourth one offers a simultaneous presenta-

tion (*sahārpaṇa*) of the two concepts. According to Jains conception, one word represents one meaning. The relation between a word and its meaning is described by Jainas as *Vācyavācakaniyama.* The characters of *being* and *non-being* in the jar cannot be expressed at once (*yugapat*). Therefore this predication is designated as inexpressible (*avaktavya*). The remaining are the combined modes derived from bringing together the first, second and the third with the fourth one, which express the complex judgements.

Each of these modes contains one alternative truth while altogether contain the complete truth. Observing the importance of this method Padmarajiah says : "The whole method, therefore, may be said to be one which helps a patient inquiring mind in its adventure of mapping out the winding paths running into the faintly known or unknown regions of reality and bringing them within the bounds of human knowledge."[80]

Syādvāda conception in Buddhist literature

The rudiments of the Syādvāda conception are found in Vedic and Buddhist literature. It appears to have originally belonged to the Jainas, if we accept Jainism as pre-Vedic religion, and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it as a common approach to the nature of reality. That is the reason why various forms of *Syādvāda* are found in the different philosophical schools.

Vedic literature records negative and positive attitudes towards problems. The *Ṛgveda* which is supposed to be of the earliest period, preserves the rudiments of this doctrine in the *Nāsadīya Sūkta*. It manifests the spiritual experience, of the great sage, who describes the nature of the universe as :

Nāsadāsinno sadāsīt tadānīṁ nāsīdrajo no vyomāparo yat. Kimābarībaḥ kuha kasya śarmannambhaḥ kimāsīdgahanaṁ gabhīraṁ. Na mṛtyurāsīdamṛtaṁ na tarhi na rātryā ahna āsīt praketaḥ Ānīdavātaṁ svadhayā tadekaṁ tasmāddhānyanna paraḥ kiṁ canāsa.

"There was not the non-existent nor the existent : there was not the air nor the heaven which is beyond. What did it

contain ? Where ? In whose protection ? Was there water, unfathomable, profound ? There was not the becon of night, nor of day. *That one breathed, windness by its own power.* Other than that there was not anything beyond".[81] This indicates inexpressibility (*anirvacanīyatva*) about the nature of the universe.

The Upaniṣadic period presents this speculation in a more concrete form by taking positive steps. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad*[82] represents the idea that Being (*sat*) is the ultimate source of existence, while some *Upaniṣads* uphold the view that Non-being is the source of Being (*asad vā idaṁ agra āsīt. tato vai sat ajāyato*).[83] On the other hand, some Upaniṣads assert that it is both, Being and Non-being (*sadāsadavareṇyaṁ*),[84] and some later Upaniṣads maintain that Non-being cannot be expressed by using a particular name and form (*asad avyākṛta nāmarūpaṁ*).[85]

Thus the concept or *Syādvāda* found in Vedic literature commences from polytheism and goes on to monotheism and is later replaced by monism. This indicates that the theory was not rigid. The later developed Vedic philosophical systems were also influenced by this idea and they concived the problems from different standpoints with the exception of that of complete relativism.

The Naiyāyikas,[86] though they used the word *anekānta*,[87] could not support the *Anekāntavāda* entirely and they accepted the atoms, soul, etc. as having absolute unchangeable characters. The Vedānta philosophical attitude also runs on the same lines. Even considering a thing through empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and real (*pāramārthika*) standpoints, it asserts that all standpoints are inferior to the standpoint of *Brahman*.[88]

The *Syādvāda* conception is found in a more developed form in Buddhist literature. The *Brahmajālasutta* refers to sixty-two Wrong-views (*micchādiṭṭhis*) of which four belong to the Sceptics. They are known as *Amarāvikkhepikā* (who

being questioned resort to verbal jugglery and eelwriggling) on four grounds.[89] The Commentary of the *Dīghanikāya* presents its two alternative explanations. According to first, *Amarāvikkhepikā* are those who are confused by their endless beliefs and words. The second explanation gives meaning that like a fish named amarā, the theory of *Amarāvikkhepikā* runs hither and thither without arriving at a definite conclusion.[90]

The first of these schools is defined thus : "Herein a certain recluse or brāhmin does not understand, as it really is, that this is good (*kusalaṁ*) or this is evil (*akusalaṁ*). It occurs to him : I do not understand what is good or evil as it really is. Not understanding what is good or evil, as it really is, if I were to assert that this is good and this is evil, that will be due to my likes, desires, aversions or resentments. If it were due to my likes, desires, aversions, or resentments, it would be wrong. And if I were wrong, it would cause me worry (*vighāto*) and worry would be a moral danger to me (*antarāyo*). Thus, through fear of lying (*musāvādabhayā*), and the abhorrence of being lying, he does not assert anything to be good or evil and on questions being put to him on this or that matter he resorts to verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling, saying : I do not say so, I do not say this, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials (I do not say, "no no").[91]

According to this school, it is impossible to achieve knowledge which is a hinderance to heavan or salvation (*Saggassa c'eva maggassa ca antarāyo*).[92] The second and the third school of sceptics do not assert anything to be good or evil through fear of involvement (*upādānabhayā*) and a fear of interrogation in debate (*anuyogabhayā*).

The fourth school of Sceptics followed the philosophy of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta who fails to give a definite answer to any metaphysical question put to him. His fourfold scheme or the five-fold formula of denial is based on the negative aspects which are as follows :[93]

(i) *evaṁ pi me no* (I do not say so).
(ii) *tathāpi me no* (I do not say thus).
(iii) *aññathāpi me no* (I do not say otherwise).
(iv) *no ti pi me no* (I do not say no).
(v) *no no ti pi me no* (I do not deny it).

This formula is applied with regard to the answering of several questions as :[94]

(i) *atthi paro loko* (there is another world).
(ii) *natthi paro loko* (there is not another world).
(iii) *atthi ca natthi ca paro loko* (there is and is not another world).
(iv) *Natthi na natthi paro loko* (there neither is nor is not another world).

The commentary offers two explanations of the meaning of this formula. According to the first explanation, proposition (1) is an indefinite rejection or denial (*aniyamitavikkhepo*). Proposition (2) is the denial of a specific proposition, e. g. the eternalism (*sassatavāda*) when asked whether the world and the soul are eternal. Proposition (3) is the denial of a variant of (3) e. g. the rejection of the semi-eternal theory *ekaccasassataṁ*), which is said to be somewhat different from (*aññathā*). Proposition (4) is the denial of the contrary of (2), e. g. the denial of the nihilist theory (*ucchedavādaṁ*) when asked whether a being (*tathāgato*) does not exist after death. Proposition (5) is the rejection of the dialectian's view (*takkivādaṁ*) of a double denial, e. g. denying the position if asked whether a being neither exists nor does not exist after death.

According to the second explanation, Proposition (1) is the denial of an assertion e. g. if asked whether this is good, he denies it. Proposition (2) is the denial of a simple negation, e. g. if asked whether this is not good, he denies it. Proposition (3) is a denial that what you are stating is different from both (1) and (2) e. g. if asked whether his position is different from both (1) and (2) (*ubhaya aññathā*) he denies it. Propo-

sition (4) is a denial that you are stating a point of view different from the above e. g. if asked whether his thesis (*laddhi*) is different from the three earlier points of view (*tividhena pi na hoti*), he denies, it. Proposition (5) is a denial of the denials, e. g. if asked whether his thesis is to deny everything (*no no te ladhhi ti*) he denies it. Thus he does not take his stand (*na titthati*) on any of the logical alternatives (*ekasmiṁ pi pakkhe*).

Both these explanations show that the fifth proposition of Sañjaya's philosophy is the rejection of denial. Therefore only four propositions of the theory remain. They can be compared with the first four predications of the *Syādvāda* theory of Jainas :

(i) *Syādasti* (relatively it is).
(ii) *Syānnāsti* (relatively it is not).
(iii) *Syādasti nāsti* (relatively it is and is not).
(iv) *Syādavaktavya* (relatively it is inexpressible).

Observing this similarity, several scholars like Keith[96] are ready to give the credit to Sañjaya for initiating this four-fold predication to solve the logical problems. On the other hand, some savants like Jacobi think that in opposition to the Agnosticism of sañjaya, Mahāvīrā has established *Syādvāda*. Miyamoto asserts in his article "The Logic of Reality as the Common Ground for the development of the Middle Way" that Sañjaya's" system is quite close to the Buddhist standpoint of the indescribable or inexpressible."[97]

These views are not quite correct. As a matter of fact, the credit should not go only to Sañjaya for the adoption of the four-fold scheme, since there were other schools of sceptics who also accepted a similar scheme. Śilaṅka referred to four groups of such schools *Kriyāvādins*, *Akriyāvādins*, *Ajñānavādins*, and *Vaineyikas*. These are further sub-divided into 363 schools based on purely the nine categories (*nava padārthas*) of Jainism.[98] These schools were mainly concerned with four quesitions. They are as follows :

(i) Who knows whether there is an arising of psychological states ? (*Sati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vetti*) ?

(ii) Who knows whether there is no arising of psychological states ? (*Asati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vettiḥ*) ?

(iii) Who knows whether there is and there is no arising of psychological states ? (*Sadasati bhāvotpattiḥ ko vettiḥ*) ?

(iv) Who knows whether the arising of psychological states is inexpressible ? (*Avaktavyo bhāvotpattiḥ ko vettiḥ*) ?

These questions are similar to first four *Syādvāda* predications. The main difference between the Predications of Sceptics and Jainas was that the former doubts or denies the logical problems altogether whereas the latter asserts that they are true to a certain extent,

Makkhali Gosāla and Syādvāda

Makkhal Gosāla, the founder of the Ājīvika sect and an earlier companion of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, has contributed to the development of the *Syādvāda* conception. He considered problems through the three-fold standpoints, called *Trirāśis*,[99] a short version of Sapta-bhaṅgī.

On the basis of the *Nandīsūtra* commentary, Basham observes : "The Ājīvika heretics founded by Gosāla are likewise called *Trairāśikas*, since they declare everything to be of triple character, viz. : living, not living, and both living and not living : world, not world, and both world and not world; real, unreal, and both real and unreal, in considering standpoints (naya) regarding the nature of substance, of mode, or of both. Thus since they maintain three heaps (*rāśi*) or categories they are called *Trairāśikas*". Further he says "the Ājīvikas thus seem to have accepted the basic principal of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme of Saptabhaṅgī, as in the orthodox Jaina *Syādvāda* and *nayavāda*."[100]

This reference indicates that the Ājīvikas were aware of the Saptabhaṅgī of the Jaina logic and they reduced them to three. Dr. Jayatilleka remarks on this reference : "But jud-

ged by the fact that the three-fold scheme of predication is simpler than the four-fold scheme of the Sceptics and Buddhists and the corresponding seven-fold scheme of the Jainas, it would appear to be earlier than both the Buddhist and the Jain schemes, with which the Ājīvikas could not have been acquainted when they evolved theirs," Further he says, "In fact, it can be shown that in the earliest Buddhist and Jaina texts the very doctrine of the *Trairāśikas*, which seems to have necessitated the three-fold scheme, is mentioned, thus making it highly probable that it was atleast earlier than the Jain scheme". He accounts for this view by saying that "while the earliest stratum of the Pāli Nikāyas knows of the four-fold scheme, one of the earliest Books of the Jain Canon, the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, which makes an independent reference to this *Trairāśika* doctrine, does not mention the seven-fold scheme, although it is aware of the basic principles of Syādvāda.[101]

Here Jayatilleke tries to prove that that three-fold schame appears to be earlier than the Jaina scheme. He gives a reason in support of his view that the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* does not mention the Seven-fold scheme. I too hold the three-fold scheme had come into existance earlier than the four-fold scheme. Dīghanakha pribrājaka, who seems to be a follower of the Pārśvanātha tradition, also maintains, as we have already found, this scheme.

As regards the absence of the reference in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, it should be remembered that it is not totally unaware of the basic principles of Syādvāda, as Jayatilleke himself accepts. It is said that "the wise man should not joke or explain without conditional propositions."[102] He should "expound the analytical theory (*vibhajjavāyaṃ ca vyāgrejja*) and use the two kinds of speech, living among virtuous men, impartial and wise.[103] Further it does not deal with the Jaina philosophy. It is a concise compilation of the Jaina doctrines as well as others of that time. It was, therefore, not essential to deal with Syādvāda in detail. Kundakunda, who flourished in the first

century B. C. or in the beginning of the Christian era, described to the Saptabhaṅgī, himself in the *Pañcāstikāyasāra*. He says that "Dravya can be described by the seven-fold predication : (1) *siyā atthi* or *syādasti*, (ii) *siya nathi*, or syānnāsti, (iii) *siya uhayaṁ* or *syādastināsti*, (iv) *siya-avvattavva* or *syādavaktavya* (v) *siya atthi-avvatavya* or *syādastyavaktavya*, (vi) *siya natthi avvattavva* or *syānnāstyavaktvya*, and (vii) *siya atthi natthi avvattavva* or *Syādstināstyavaktavya* :

Siya atthi natthi uhayaṁ avvattavvaṁ puno ya tattidayaṁ.
Davvaṁ khu satta bhaṅgaṁ ādesavasena sambhavadi.[104]

This means that the Syādvāda and its predications were well known at the time of the Buddha, and upto the time of Kundakunda they were developed still further.

This Buddhe and Syādvāda

During the Buddha's time there were certain philosophical points which became the subjects of violent debate. Having realised the futility of such debates the Buddha became an analyist, like the Jainas.[105] In the *Dighanikāya* the Buddha is reported to have said that he had taught and laid down his doctrines with categorical (*ekaṁsikā*) and non-categorical (*anekaṁsikā*) assertions.[106] The theory of Four-Noble-Truths is an example of the former, and the theory of *Avyākatas* is of the latter.

Here the term *ekaṁsikā* and *anekaṁsikā* are very similar to *ekāntavāda* and *anekāntavāda*. The former is concerned with the non-Jaina philosophies and the latter with the Jaina philosophy. The difference between the Buddha's and Nigaṇṭha Nātputta's standpoints is that according to the former's conception the non-categorical assertions are not true or false, from some standpoint or another, unless we analyse them; while the latter upholds the view that all the statements are relatively (*syāt*) correct, i. e. they contain some aspect of the truth. The theory of *Avyākata* does not consist of any such quality.

The Buddha adopted the four-fold scheme to answer the logical questions of that time as outlined below :

(i) *atthi* (it is).
(ii) *natthi* (it is not).
(iii) *atthi ca natthi ca* (it is and it is not), and
(iv) *n'ev'atthi na ca natthi* (it neither is, nor is not).

This four-fold scheme has been used in several places of the Pāli Canon. For instance :

(i) *Channaṁ phassāyatananaṁ asesaviraganiṛodhā atth' aññaṁ, kinci ti* ? (is there anything else after complete detachment from and cessation of the six spheres of experience ?).

(ii) *Channaṁ...natth'aññaṁ kiñci ti ?*
(iii) *Channaṁ...atthi ca n'athi c'aññaṁ kiñci ti ?*
(iv) *Channaṁ ··n'ev'atthi na n'atth'aññaṁ kiñci ti ?*

Miyamoto observes that the seven-fold scheme of the jainas is equivalent to the four-fold scheme of Buddhists in the following manner :

(i) Syādasti	=	I
(ii) Syānnāsti	=	II
(iii) Syādastināsti	=	III
(iv) Syādavaktavya		
(v) Syādastyavaktavya		
(iv) Syānnāstyavaktavya	=	IV
(vii) Syādastināstyavaktavya		

But this observation is not perfectly right, since the Jainas pondered over the prblems more profoundly than the Buddhists. It would be more appropriate if we think of the first four propositions of the Buddhists, But there are differences between the Jaina and the Buddhist schemes. According to the Jaina scheme, all the seven propositions could be true from relative standpoints, while in the Buddhist scheme only one proposition could be true. the propositions are not considered logical alternatives in Jainism as considered in Buddhism.

It is more probable that the Buddha's *Catuṣkoṭi* formula has been influenced by the four-fold formula of Sañjaya,

although there are also traces of the influence of the seven-fold formula of the Jainas. Such formulas, it must be remembered, were commonly accepted at that time by teachers with different attitudes.

Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and *Syādvāda* in Pāli Literature

The Pāli Canon considers ***Anekāntavāda*** or ***Syādvāda*** a combination of both *Uccedavāda* and ***Sassatavāda***. As we have already mentioned, Buddhaghosa was of the opinion that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta presented his views in contradictory ways.[108] We have seen how this was due to the fact that Buddhaghosa could not understand the real nature of *Syādvāda*.

We know that Jaina Philosophy considers problems neither by absolute eternalism nor absolute nihilism, but erernalism-cum-nihilism. Apart from the confusion regarding *Sassatavāda* and *Uccedavāda*, there are no explicit references to *Syādvāda* in the pāli Canon. The absence of direct references does not mean that the *Syādvāda* conception was not a part and parcel of the doctrines of the Nātaputta at that tlme. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that Buddhist books appear to be aware of some characteristics of *Syādvāda*, which might have belonged to the tradition of Pārśvanātha.

In the course of a discussion, the Buddha says to Saccaka, who was a follower of the Pārśvanātha tradition and converted later to the Nātaputta's religion, that his former statement is not keeping with the latter, nor the latter with the former (*na kho te sandhiyati purimena vā pacchimaṁ pacchimena vā purimaṁ*).[109] Here attention is drawn to self-contradictions in Saccaka's statements. This might have been an early instance of adducing self-contradiction (*svātmavirodha*) as an argument against *Syādvāda*. This has been an oft-repeated criticism against Syādvāda by opponents of different times.

Likewise in the course of a conversation held between Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and Citta Gahapati, the latter blames the former for his self-Contradictory conception. He says; If your former statement is true, your latter statement is false, and

if your latter statement is true, your primer statement is false. (*sace purimaṁ saccaṁ, pacchimaṁ te micchā, sace* pacchimaṁ saccaṁ purimaṁ te micchā).[110]

Another reference found in Pāli literature helps us to understand the position of Syādvāda. The *Dīghanakha* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* mentions the three kinds of theories upheld by Dīghanakha Paribbājakā. They are as follows :[111]

(i) *Sabbaṁ me khamati* (I agree with all (views),

(ii) *Svbbaṁ me na khamati* (I agree with no (views).

(iii) *Ekhaccoṁ me khamati, ekaccaṁ me na khaṁati* (I agree with some (views) and disagree with other (views).

The Buddha criticises Dīghanakha's views in various ways, and expresses his own views towards the problem. Dīghanakha's views are similar to the predications of Syādvāda, and represent its first three *bhaṅgīs* as follows :

(i) *Sabbaṁ me khamati* = Syādasti,

(ii) *Sābbaṁ me na khamati* = Syānnāsti.

(iii) *Ekaccaṁ me khamati; ekaccaṁ me na khamati* = Syādastināsti..

Now the problem is to consider to which school of thought Dīghanakha belonged. According to the commentary on the *Majjhima Nikāya*, he is said to be a holder of the view of *Ucchedavāda*,[112] which is a part of Syādvāda school in the opinion of Buddhaghosa. He might have belonged to Sañjaya's of Paribbājakas who were followere of Parśvanātha tradition converted later to Nātaputta's religion before he joined the Buddha's order.[113] Dīghanakha was a nephew or Sañjaya. It seems, therefore, that he was a follower of Jainism. This inference may be confirmed if Dīghanakha can be identified with Dīghatapassī of the *Upālisutta* of *Majjhima Nikāya*, who was a follower of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.

In the above propositions of Saccaka, Citta Gahapati and Dīghanakha Paribbājaka, we can trace the first four predications (including *Syādavaktavya*) of *Syādvāda* conception of Jainism.

It is not impossible that the term *Syāt* had been used by Jainas in the beginning of each predication justify correctly

the others' views on the basis of non-absolutism. The word *Syāt* (*Siyā* in Pāli), which indicates the definite standpoint towards the probelems, is also used in the *Cūla Rāhulovāda-sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, where the two types of the *Tejodhātu* are pointed out in definite way. [114] It seems that the word *Syāt* originally belonged to the Jainas and was later used by the Buddhists in a particular sense. The defect of self-contradiction in *Syādvāda* conception of the Jainas is a criticism levelled against it by the Buddhists. It happened so, only because of ignorance of the meaning of *Syāt*. As a matter of fact, the Jainas had concentrated their attention on the controversial points in different theories of then philosophers and had tried to examine their views from different stand-points. By this method the Jainas could figure out the real nature of reality and consider the problem in a non-violent way.

The refutation of Syādvāda in Buddhist literature

The Buddhist Ācāryas at different times criticised the *Syādvāda* conception of the Jainas on the grounds of self-contradiction, commingling, doubt, etc. The main arguments of the foremost Buddhist logicians were as follows :

Nāgārjuna and Syādvāda

Ācārya Kundakunda and Umāsvāti were among the earliest who established clearly the theory of the triple character (production, destruction, and permanence) of reality in Jainism. Nāgārjuna (about 150-250 A. D.), the propounder of *Śūnyavāda* made the charge that the theory of triple character is itself a self-contradictoy formula, as it cannot be associated with reality, since such a thesis is faulty on account of *anavasthādoṣa* (regressus ad infinitum).[115]

Dharmakirti and Syādvāda

In the *Pramāṇa-Vārtika* (*svavṛtti*) Dharmakīrti remarks that the *Anekāntavāda* is mere non-sensical talk (*pralāpa-mātra*). He says in the course of refuting the *Bhedābhedavāda* theory that the *Digambaras* (Jainas-*Anhrīkas*), who present

their doctrines in a fantastic way, could be refuted in the same way as the Sāṅkhya philosophy, which thinks of the nature of reality as absolute difference (*atyantābheda*). He then mentions that the Jainas hold a view : "All is one, and all is not one (*sarvaṁ sarvātmakaṁ na sarvaṁ sarvatmakaṁ*).[116]

Dharmakīrti tries to clarify his remark by presenting a traditional example of the Jainas. The Jainas explain their theory of the nature of reality with the illustration of a golden jar (*svarṇaghaṭa*), where gold is considered the general, and not the particular, character. Here Dharmakīrti points out why the Jainas do not recognize the jar or pot itself as a general character, since *Dravyatva* is in all of them according to Jainism.

Dharmakīrti is of the view that the Jaina theory of dual character, viz. universal and particular, is so formulated that the character of particularity is relegated to the background and made less significant. He explains this with reference to the famous example of camel and curd. If the particularity which distinguishes camel from curd or vice verse is not an important factor, he says one may as well eat a camel when he wants to eat curd. He tries by this argument to demolish the Jaina theory as he understood that curd is not only curd by itself (*Svarūpeṇa*) but also camel in a relative sense (*pararūpeṇa*). According to Dharmakīrti, there cannot be a universal character between camel and curd and even if such a character exists, their mutual difference or particularity is all that matters for both identification and use.[117]

Against the Jaina conception of the universal character of a thing, he says : if all realities are *sat* (being or isness), there would be no difference between knowledge and word (*dhī* and *dhvani*) that imparts a knowledge, which is quite impossible. Therefore Syādvāda conception in Dharmakīrti's opinion is defective.[118]

Prajñākaragupta and Syādvāda :

Prajñākaragupta (660-720 A. D.), the well known commentator and a pupil of Dharmakīrti, also refutes the Jain theory

of reality. His criticism is very similar to the criticism of Nāgārjuna. Prjñākara says : origination, destruction, and permanence cannot exist together. If is destroyed how can it be a reality; if it is permanent, how can there be destruction, and if it is permanent, it should always be in mind. He then argues that the reality cannot be realised as both eternal and non-eternal. It should be accpeted as either eternal or non-eternal.[119] Here Prajñākara pointed out that the triple character of a thing is a self-contradictory theory.

Arcaṭa and *Syādvāda* :

Samantabhadra's view mentioned in the "*dravyaparyāya-yoraikyaṁ*" and "*saṁjñāsaṁkhyāviśeṣāśca*" has not been refuted by Dharmakīrti. Whatever may be its reason, it is criticised by his commentator Arcaṭa (about the seventh century A. D.) who followed the arugments of Nāgārjuna.[120] He says : origination and destruction cannot exist together in one dharmi, since they are contradictory in character. The argument "they take place relatively" would not solve the question, because in the course of origination and destruction, permanence would not be there, and likewise in the presence of a permanent character the other two would be absent. Therefore, a triple-charactered nature of reality as the Jainas assert, is not possible according to Arcaṭa's way of thinking.[121]

An another place he tries to refute the *Bhedābhedavāda* (identity-in-difference) conception which means the substance and its modes cannot be separated from a realistic stendpoint, but they are different in name, number, nature, place, etc. from a practical viewpoint. It appears as if he does not see much difference between *ubhayavāda* of Vaiśeṣikas and *bhedābheda* of Jainas. That is the reason why he conceives the substance as being completely different from its modes.

He refutes the view first in prose under the heading "*Ankrikādisammatasya dravyaparyāyāḥ bhedābhedapakṣasyanirāsaḥ*" and then the same arguments are repeated in fourty-five stanzas, The gist of them is as follows :

The difference between substance and its modes by the name, number, etc. and unity of them into one by place, time, and nature, is not possible as the nature of reality, since an entity cannot assume more than one character.[122]

He further points out that *saṁjñā* is the cause of an intimation (*saṅketa*) which depends on desires. How then can one differentiate it by name, since it is also one, not two? Words are fictitious, the difference therefore, would be imaginative. *Saṅkhyābheda* also is not possible as there is a difference between *vācya* (to be spoken) and *vācaka* (speaker), which is also *kalpita* (imaginative).

Further he points out that without the destruction of a substance there would be no destruction of its modes. Hence, they can be identified neither as *bheda* nor as *abheda*. If the modes are different from the substance, words would not be connected with them. If they are accepted as non-different, their natures would be one. How then could the *Lakṣaṇābheda* be applied? *Kāryabheda* is also not possible as there is no difference in nature.[124]

The theory "substance and its modes are not different (*abheda*) in place, time, nature" is also defective in Prajñākara'sviews. He says: "position, the form, smell, juice, touch etc. are different in modifications. If the nature stays with substance and modes in the form of destruction and otherwise, the substance would be two as ghaṭa and paṭa, not one which removes *abhedatva* with them. Further he says, if the *bhedābheda* is accepted, the *bheda* (difference) would be fictitious due to not leaving the *abheda* (identity), and hence *abheda* would be proved as false in character. Here Arcaṭa thinks in terms of *ubhayavāda* that if the substance and mode are completely different, all the evils of both the "identity-view and difference-view" will lay upon this conception.[124]

Arcaṭa refers to the Jaina's view that they analyse reality through *sui-generis* (*Jātyantarā*) which exposes the combination of identity and difference, although it makes a distinction

between the particular and general character of reality. For instance, *Narasiṁha* is a combination of man and lion, which is not self-contradictory because of the theory of *sui-generis*.

Opposing this theory, Arcaṭa points out that Narasiṁha is a compendium of atoms which cannot be transformed into *narasiṁha*. Due to a combination of the forms which is called *śabalarūpa*, a place of existence of diverse naturas. How then could a unity in nature be proved ? Arcaṭa finally remakrs that this is the philosophy of block-heads (*darśanakṛto'yaṁ viprāyaso mūḍhamatinām*):

This criticism is based on the understanding that the nature of reality is completely in two different forms. This is the view of Vaiśeṣikas, not Jainas. This criticism made by Āraṇyakas is answered by the later Jaina philosphers such as Vādirājasūri, Anantavīrya, Prabhācandra.

Śāntarakṣita and S*yādvāda*

Śāntarakṣita examined the Syādvāda doctrine of the Jainas in a separate chapter of his *Tattvasaṅgraha*. The main defects, according to him, are as follows :

If the oneness between substance and modes is real (*agauṇa*), then the substance also should be destructive like the form of the successive factors or those successive factors themselves should be comprehensive (*anugatātmaka*) in their character, like the substance. Therefore it should be admitted that either there is absolute destruction of all characters or it consists of the elments of permanence, exclusiveness and inclusiveness, which can-not exist in any single thing.[126]

Hence he turns to the universal and the particular character of an entity. He says : there would be a comingling (*sāṅkarya*) and a confusion (*Sandeha*) in the dual nature of reality, the result of which would not be helpful to decide which is general and which is particular (*parasparasvabhāvatve syātsāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ. sāṅkaryatattvato nedaṁ dvairūpyamupapadyate*).[127]

If the general and the particular are regarded as non-different from one and the same thing, how could there be

any difference in the nature of these two characters? And being non-different why should it not be regarded as one?[127]

The diversity of properties (*dharmabheda*) also cannot be accepted there, since the diversity or plurality cannot be one. As regards the potencies (*śaktīnāṁ*), their diversity is merely a creation of the speakers' desire to speak. As it is crystal clear that both, affirmation and denial, cannot exist in one thing, we hava to regard the self-contradiction between unity and plurality. Hence, he observes that any diversity of properties of a single entity can only be a creation of fancy (*kalpita*).[128]

In diversity (stage of an entity which is excluded from several like and unlike things to this and that) even a single thing may be assumed to have numberless diverse forms; but in reality no single thing can reasonably have two forms.

Śāntarakṣita further gives a traditional example of *Narasiṁha*. He says: such entities as *narasiṁha* and others which have been described as possessing dual characters are also not real but conceptual (*kalpita*). These arguments of Śāntarakṣita resemble those of Arcaṭa.[129]

Thus he arrives at the conclusion that duel character of a thing is figment of mere imagination.

Karṇakagomin and Syādvāda

Karṇakagomin in the *Pramāṇavārtikasvavṛttiṭīkā* refers to the Digambaras' theory of relativity, according to which they accept the mutual negation (*anyonyābhāva*) to distinguish the realities, so that they should not be confused. He then starts to criticise the view that the distinction among things, cannot be identified by mutual negation, which is possible in entities produced by non-different causes. If they originate from different causes, how does *anyonyābhāva* come into existence?[130]

Further he tried to show the defects in the Jaina's theory of universal-cum-particular character of *ūrdhvatāsāmānyātmaka* and *tiryaksāmānyātmaka vastu*. He then rejects the theory saying that there should be either *abheda* or *atyantābheda*.

Both characters cannot co-exist in the same substance. Hence the *ūrdhvatāsāmānya* could be destroyed because things are not permanent.

As regards *tiryaksāmānya*, that is also defective in character in his opinion. He says : if the universality were in the substance, the *ghaṭa* (pot) and *paṭa* (linen) or *dadhi* (curd) and *uṣṭra* (camel) would be identical. Hence a shape or a water-pot should be found in cloth and a curdeater should consume a camel.[131] Therefore *Syādvāda* doctrine is false (*mithyāvāda*) in his opinion.

Thus Karṇakagomin makes his refutation following Dharmakīrti's arguments, and tries to prove that the dual characteristic of an entity is not possible as it invites serious defects in the theory.

Jitāri and Syādvāda

Jitāri, another Buddhist logician wrote a complete book *Anekāntavādanirāsa* to refute the *Anekāntavāda*. Padmaraja summarizes its arguments as follows :—

When the *Anekāntavādin* maintains that *dravya* and *paryāya* are identical, owing to the identity of their nature, it means that he affirms nothing short of their total identity (*ekarūpataiva*) Difference, based on (the secondary consideration) number etc. (*saṅkhyādi*), will then be fictitious (*Kalpanāmātrakalpitaḥ syāt*). For, a real difference (*pāramārthikobhedaḥ*) between the two cannot proceed from the identity of their nature (*na hi yayoḥ svabhāvabhedaḥ tayoḥ anyathā pāramārthiko bhedaḥ saṁbhavati*).[132]

Or conversely, when the *anekāntavādin* pleads that *dravya* and *paryāya* are different, it means that he affirms their unqualified difference. Identity will then be fictitious. For real identity (*svabhāvabhedaḥ*) cannot proceed from the difference which is their basic and total nature. The truth about the whole position, according to Jitāri, is that one cannot have identity as well as difference by the same nature (*na ca tenaiva svabhāvena bhedaścābhedaśca*).

Padmarajah then says: "the entire argument, from the Buddhist side, may be said to have been grounded on the basic truth of the fundamental Buddhist dictum : "It cannot be right to affirm and deny a thing at once, affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory,"[133]

Likewise the same arguments are found in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiṭīkā* According to that, both the affirmative and negative aspects cannot exist in one thing.[134]

Evaluation

To sum up, in very ancient days there was a three-fold or four-fold common predication to satisfy the burning philosopical questions of mind. Pāli, as well as Jain Prākṛt literature, mention them as Scepticism or agnosticism. The *Anekāntavāda* (non-absolustic standpoint) which strives to incorporate the truth of all systems, has two main organs that of *Nayavāda* (the doctrine of standpoints), and *Syādvāda* (the dialectic of conditional predication). The whole theory is more renowned by the name of *Syādvāda* and its apprehenders are called *Syādvādinaḥ* or Jainas.

The nature of reality is the main problem of philosophy. On the basis of *Syādvāda* the Jainas established the dual character of reality. In the medieval period of logic the non-Jaina philosophers, especially the Buddhists, such as Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Arcaṭa, Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri attacked the theory and blamed the Jainas for several defects and ultimately called their theory *Mithyāvāda* and *Jālmakalpita*.

The Jaina philosphers tried their best to explain the theories which these critics held to be defective. Akalaṅka (720-780 A. D.), who can be hailed as the propounder of the Jaina logic, answered the opponent' arguments. The entire Jaina tradition appears to have more or less followed him in their endeavours to refute the objection brought against Jaina conceptions.

The main arguments of the Buddhists to reject the Syādvāda doctrine, as we have already mentioned, is that the two

characters cannot exist together in one reality. Otherwise there would be a self-contradiction of affirmative and negative characters. Other defects to be mentioned are confusion and commingling that follow self-contradiction.

As a matter of fact, the Buddhist philosophers misunderstood the theory of Syādvāda, since they treated the dual characteristic of the nature of reality as absolutely different from each other. This theory originally belonged to the vaiśeṣikas, and not the Jainas. The theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, called *Ubhayavāda* is criticised by the Jainas themselves, who observed in it the defects of self-contradiction, commingling, doubt, etc. The Buddhist philosophers have found the very same defects in the Jainas' theory of Syādvāda.

The foremost argument against this doctrine is the violation of the Law of Contradiction, which means that "be" and "not be" cannot exist together. But the Jainas do not accept this formula in *toto*. They say that the validity of the Law of Thoughts should be considered by the testimony of experience (*saṁvedanā*) and not by pre-conception. Experience certifies that the dual character of entities exists in respect of its own individuality and does not exist apart from and outsitde this nature (*sarvamasti svarūpeṇa pararūpeṇā nāsti ca*), as we have already seen. In relativistic standpoint both, being and non-being, can exist together. Everything is real only in relation to and distinction from every other thing. The Law of Contradiction is denied absolutely in this respect. The point is only that the absolute distinction is not a correct view of things, according to Jainism.

As regards the triple character (origination, destruction, and permanence) of reality, the Jainas support it through *anyathānupapannatvahetu* as explained before. The Buddhists themselves are of the view that a thing perishes immediately after its origination, and this continuity never ends. The continuity of moments or similar moments (*sajātīyakṣaṇas*) is considered the material cause (*upādana kāraṇa*). This is

in fact nothing but only *dhrauvya* or a permanent feature of the Jainas and the *Santāna* (continuity) of the Buddhists. Without accepting *dhrauvya* or *santāna*, memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), bondage-salvation (*bandha-mokṣa*), etc. would disappear from field of experience. Therefore, the permanent element is essential for the circulation into the modes.

The permanent element possesses the character of identity in-difference (*bhedābhedavāda*). Identity is used in the sense that the substance and its modes cannot be separated from a realistic standpoint, and difference in the sense that they are different in name, number, etc. from a practical viewpoint.[185] In other words, the modes are not absolutely different from substance, as in that case, the modes would not belong to the substance. With past reflections the substance is transformed into present modes and proves itself as a cause of future modes that are necessary for the understanding of the permanent character of an entity. To understand the difference between *guṇas* and *paryāyas*, the terms *saṅkhyā*, *lakṣaṇa*, etc. are used. From a realistic standpoint there is no such difference which could indicate the separation between them. After refuting the objections of Arcaṭa, Vādirāja comments that the latter is not capable of finding defects in the Syādvāda by his powerful voice.[186]

To preserve the unity of terms in relation to different characters, the Jainas assert an element which is called *Jāty-antara* (*sui generis* or *unque*). They maintain that a reality is a synthesis of identity-in-difference and each synthesis is *Jātyantara*.[187] This is illustrated by the instance of *Narasiṁha* which is criticised by the Buddhist philosophers. Prabhācandra says in response to the Buddhist criticism about *narasiṁha* that it is neither *nara* nor *siṁha*, but because of their similarities they are called *Narasiṁha*. While having mutual separation they exist non-differently in relation to substance and like waves in water they emerge and sink in each other.[188] Thus

there is no self-contradiction in dual characters of an entity in relative sense, as the Jainas assert.

Dharmakīrti urged with regard to the universal-cum-particular character of reality that this theory compelled one to recognize the curd and camel as one entity. In connection with the fallacious middle term (*hetvābhāsa*) Akalaṅka points out that the Buddhist philosophers discover defects to censure the Jainas on the basis of invalid arguments (*Mithyājāti*).[139] For instance, Dharmakīrti ignores the formula *sarvobhāvāstadatatsvabhāvah* and tries to establish equality between curd and camel. Hence he questions why one who intends to eat curd, does not go to eat a camel in place of curd, since according to Jainism, both have the universal character,[140]

Akalaṅka tries to disarm critics like Dharmakīrti by pointing out the deffinition of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. Vādirāja, a commentator of Akalaṅka, explains that the similar transformation of a thing into its modes (*sadraśapariṇāmo hi sāmānyaṁ*) is called *Sāmānya*.[141] According to this definition, the modes of curd and camel are not similar, they are really completely different, as well as similar. How is it then possible that these elements are mixed ?

Another argument used for the refutation of the Buddhist standpoint is that the identity is only among the modes of curd, as hard, harder, hardest, etc., but they have never any sort of relation with the modes of camel. Hence, they can never be mixed with each other. Vādirāja refers to a traditional fiction that Dharmakīrti proved himself as a *Vidūṣaka* (jester) because he did not possess a good knowledge of the opponents theory.[142]

Akalaṅka again criticises the view of Dharmakīrti saying that if the argument that "the atoms of curd and camel may have been mixed sometimes before and the atoms of curd have still the capacity to be transfered into the modes of camel" is to be raised, it would not be advisable. For the past and the future modes of an entity are different, and all transactions and

transformations run according to present modes. The curd is for the purpose of eating, while the camel is for riding. The words for them are also completely different from each other. The word "curd" can be applied only to curd, not camel. It is the same case with the word "camel" too.

Akalaṅka further points out if in relation to past modes, the unity between curd and camel is derived, then *Sugata* was *mṛga* (deer) in his previous birth and the same Mṛga became Sugata. Why then should Sugata only worshipped and Mrga be considered edible ?[143]

1. Sugato'pi mṛgo jāto mṛgo'pi Sugataḥ smṛtaḥ,
   Tathāpi Sugato vandyo mṛgaḥ khādyo yatheṣyate.
   Tathā Vastubalādeva bhedābhedāvyavasthiteḥ.
   Codito dadhi khādeti kimuṣṭramabhidhāvati.

Thus he tries to prove that as the transformations of *sugata* and *Mṛga* are quite different, and their being worshipped and eaten are related to their modes, all substances have the capacity to be transformed only to their possible modes, not to others. Therefore the identity between the modes of curd and camel cannot lead to the truth. Their transformations do not have the *Tādātmyasambandha* and *Niyata-sambandndha*.

In fact, Akalaṅka and other Jaina Ācāryas tried to meet the arguments of the Buddhist philosophers in forceful words. The innumerable examples of scathing attacks against Buddhists can be seen in Akalaṅka's and other Jaina Ācāryas' works. The caustic remerks' such as *jāḍyahetavaḥ, ahnīkalakṣaṇaṁ, paśulakṣaṇaṁ*, etc. made by Dharmakirti himself on opponents' views are criticised by Akalaṅka in the Pramāṇa-saṅgraha.[145]

Thus the Jaina Ācāryas do not accept any self-contradiction in the Syādvāda conception. Likewise, the other defects such as confusion, commingling. etc. which are based on the self-contradiction, are also proved as "*mithyādoṣāropaṇa*". And, according to them, the criticism made by the Buddhists or others is not effective in this context. As a matter of fact, in their opinion, *Syādvāda* has no defects provided it is clearly understood.

Conclusion

From these comments we may conclude that :—

(i) The rudiments of *syādvāda* conception of Jainas can be gleaned from early Pāli literature.

(ii) *Syādvāda* conception originally belonged to Jainas and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it in a somewhat different way as a common approach to conceive the nature of reality.

(iii) *Syādvāda* is neither *Ucchedavāda* nor *Sassatavāda* as Buddhaghosa understands, but is permanence-in-change. According to this theory, the triple characters, viz, origination, destruction and permanence, can abide with a substance at one and the same time.

(iv) *Arthakriyā* (causal efficiency) is the essence of Syādvāda conception. According to the Jainas, the *arthakriyā* is possible in only the dynamic (*pariṇāmi*) substance.

(v) The nature of reality is universal-cum-particular; and the nature cf relation of an entity is deliverance of the direct and objective experience.

(vi) There is neither self-contradiction nor any other defect which the *Bubbhist Ācāryas* tried to point out.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

Antiquity of Śramaṇa System

1. Upadhye, A. N. *Mahāvīrā and his Philosophy, Lord Mahāvīra and his Teachings*, Bombay, 1961.
2. Eliot, Sir Charles, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. 1. p. 53.
3. Williams, S. M., *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (s. v. *Brāhmaṇa*), p. 741.
4. See the *Upaniṣad* and *Vedāṅga* literature.
5. *Chaup.* Viii. 7. 1.
6. Dasgupta, S. N., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1. p. 22.
7. *Ṛgveda*, 10. 90. 12.
8. *A.* i. 167; *D.* iii. 16; *S.* i. 45; *Dhp.* 164.
9. *Sanskrit. English Dictionary* (Williams), s. v. *Śramāṇa*, p. 1097.
10. Samacariyā samaṇo ti vuccati, *Dhp.* 388. Cf. Samitā pāpattā Samaṇā, *DhA.* iii. 84.
11. *Mahābhāṣya*, 2. 4. 9.
12. Jetly, *Historical Position of Jainism, Ahiṁsā and* Jainism, Bombay, 1959-60.
13. Deo, S. V., *History of Jaina monachism*, p. 56; also see R. Garbe, *Philosophy of Ancient India*, p. 12. ; *Jainism*, Mrs. N. R. Guseva. P. 4-18.
14. Vrātya āsīdiyamāna eva sa Prajāpatim samaisyat...... *Atharavāveda*, 15. 1-4; The Pāli literature (*Theragā thā*) also refers Vrātyas. Confer; Ananda Guruge, *Vidyodaya Lipi*, Colombo, 1962, p, 71, where arguments are adduced to prove that Vrātyas of an Eastern Indian were the survivals of Indus Valley Civilisation.

15. Caturo samaṇā na pañcamatthi te te avikaromi Sākkhaputtho. Maggajino maggadesiko ca, magge jīvati yo ca maggadūsin, *Sn*. 83–4.
16. Yama assa vādaṁ parihānamāhu, apahataṁ pañhavimānskesū. Paridevati saccati hīnavādo, upaccagomam'ti anutthunanti. *Sn*. 827; Ete vivādā samaṇesu jātā, *Sn*. 828.
17. 54, 151, 786 etc.
18. Ye kec'ıme titthiya vādasīlā, ājivikā vā yadi vā Nigaṇṭhā. Paññāya taṁ nātitaranti sabbe, ṭhito vajantaṁ viya sighagāmiṁ. *Sn*. 381.
19. Shastry, N. Aiyasvami, *Śramaṇas or non-Brāhmaṇical Sects, The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. 1. p. 389 ff.
20. p. 949, 342 b. 21. *ibid*. p. 949.
22. Cf. yato, kho, Kassapa, bhikkhu averaṁ avyapajjaṁ mettacittaṁ bhāveti, āsavānaṁ khayā anāsavaṁ cetovimuttiṁ paññavimuttiṁ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṁ sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati, ayaṁ vuccatı, Kassapa, bhikkhu, Samaṇo ti, *D* i. 170.
23. Hirottappaṁ, parisuddho kāyasamācāro.........*M*. i. 271; *D*. i. 170.
24. *Op. Cit*. Vol. 1. p. 386 ff. 25. *Op. Cit*. p. 45.
26. *Samvāyāṅga*, 10. 1. 27. *ibid*. 12. 2.
28. v. i, Pārājika. *A*. i. 229
29 The sixty two *Micchādiṭṭhis* as mentioned in the *Brāhmajālsutta* are as follows in chief eight heads: viz. Sassatavādin, Ekaccasassatavādikā, Antānantikā, Amarāvikkhepikā, Adhiccasamuppannikā, Uddhamāghātin, Ucchedavādin and the Diṭṭhadhammavādin.
30. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* refers to 363 views under four main sects, viz. Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Ajñānavāda and Vinayavāda, 1. 1 12 ff.
31. *Lalitavistara*, ed. Lefmanna, Vol. 1. p. 380; *Mahāvastu*,
32. *Saddarma* Puṇḍarika, (Kern), pp. 275-6.
33. *Brahatkathākośa*, intro. p. 13.
34. See the Buddhist literature; *Sn*., *Selasutta*.

35. *A*. 276. 36. *Utta*. Chap. xxv;

37. *Uvāsaga*. pp. 108.

38. *Dialogues of Buddha*, II, intro., p. 165.

39. *Op. Cit.*

40. *Cf*. *D*. i. 5; ii. 150; *A*. i. 110, 173 sq ; *Iti*. 64 : *Sn*. 189 : *V*. ii. 295.

41. Upadhyaya, B. D., *Sanskrit Sāhitya kā Itihāsa*, p. 148.

42. *Mahābhāṣya*. 2. 4. 9.

43. Kalasi Rock. Edict, III; Girinara Rock Edict, IV, VIII, etc.

44. *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India*, p. 49; *The Buddha and Five Year After Centuries*. p. 3.

45. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 10.

46. *D*. i. 49.

47. *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, pp. 275.

48. *History and Doctrines of Ājīvikas*. p. 10.

49. Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosala, and Sañjaya Belatthiputta are referred to in Jaina Literature.

50. Kārato kho kārayato... . panam atimāpayato...natthi puññassa āgamo. *D*. i. 52.

51. *Pre-Buddhist Philosphy*, p. 279.

52. Sūkṛ. 1 1 12. 15. v. p. 209.

53. *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. I. p. 35.

54. *S*. iii. 69; V. 126. 55. *A*. iii 383; also see *J*. v. 227.

56. *A*. iv. 428. 57. *DA*. i. 142.

58. *DhA*; Cf. *Divyāvdāna*, *Prātihāryasūtra*, pp. 100.

59. *Bhāvasaṅgraha*, 175-179.

60. *D*. i. 53. 61. *M*. i. 513; *Milindapañha*, 4-5.

62. *Dārsanasūra*, 176. 63. 1. Cf. *Sūkr*. 2. 1. 345.

64. *A*. i. 33. 65. *A*. i. 289.

66. *DA*. i. 166 f. 67. *Mahābhāṣya*, 5. 1. 154.

68. *Sūtrā*, 216.

69. N'tthi ayaṃ loko ti paraloke ṭhitassa pi ayaṃ loko n'atthi, n'atthi paraloke ti idha loke ṭhitassa pi paraloko n'atthi. Sabbe tattha tattha'eva ucchijanti ti dasseti. *Sum*. Vil. i. p. 165.

70. *Op. Cit.* P. 166.
Also see *Uttarādhyayana* (SBB), p. 62.
Modgalāyana was also a name of Jaina clans, Sūkṛ 7–8

71. N'atthi......dinnaṁ, n'atthi yiṭṭham, n'atthi hutam, ...ucchijjanti vinassanti, na hontiparam maraṇā. (Digha, I, p. 55. A remarkable parallel to this passage is to be found in the *Sūtrākṛtāṅga* (II. i. 9 Fol. 375 FF. i. *SBE.* XIV. II. i. 15–17; *History and doctrines* of *Ājīvikas*—Basham. PP. 15–16.

72. *DA.* i. 144., *MA.* i. 422–3.

73. Satt' ime......kāyā akatā akata-vidhā animmitā animmāṭā vañjhā kūṭaṭṭhā esika-ṭṭhāyi-ṭṭhitā. Te na iñjanti na vipariṇāmanti na aññaṁ-aññaṁ vyābādhenti n' ālaṃ aññaaññassa sukhāya vā dukkhāya va sukkha-dukkhāya vā. Katame sattā ? Paṭhavikāyo āpo-kāyo tejokāyo vāyokāyo sukhe dukhe jīvesattme......Tattha n'tthi hantā vā ghātetā vā sotā vā Sāveta vā viññātā vā viññāpetā vā. Yo pi tiṇhena satthena sīsaṃ chindati na koci kiñci jīvitā voropeti, sattaññaṃ yeva kāyānaṃ antarena sattha-vivaraṃ anupatati. *D.* i. 56. Compare with the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1. 1. 10, fol. 280 ff. SBE. XIV, i. 20–4. *History and doctrines of Ājīvikas*, p. 16.

74. *DA.* i. 144.

75. "Atthi paro loko ?" ti iti ce taṃ pucchasi," atthi paro loko" ti iti ce me assa, "atthi paro loko" ti te maṁ vyākareyyāṁ. Evaṁ pi me no. Tathā ti pi me no. Aññathā ti pi me no. No ti pi me no. No no ti pi me no... *D.* i. 58.

76. *V.* i. 42, 391.

77. Ruṣṭaḥ Śrīvīranāthasya tapasvī Maudgalāyanaḥ. Siṣyaḥ Śrīpārśvanāthasya vidadhe Buddhadarśanaṁ. Suddhodanasutaṃ Buddhaṁ paramātmānambrabīt. *AS.* 6.

78. *DPPN*, p. 1000.

79. Tarhyastīti na bhaṇāmi, nāstīti ca na bhaṇāmi, yadapi ce bhaṇāmi, tadapi na bhaṇāmīti darṣanamastviti kaścit, so 'pi pāpīyān......*Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 129.

80. *Dīghanikāya*, *Brahmajālasutta*.
81. Sabbavāriyuto ti sabbena pāpavāraṇena yutto. Sabbavāridhuto ti sabbena pāpavāraṇena dhutapāpo. Sabbavāriphuṭṭho ti sabbena pāpavāraṇena phuṭṭho......
Catatto ti koṭippattacitto. *Sum. Vil.* i. p. 168.
82. Nigaṇṭho cātuyāmasaṁvarasaṃvuto hoti. Kathañca... Nigaṇṭhā sabbavārivārito ca hoti, sabbavāridhuto ca, sabbaphuṭṭho ca. evaṃ kho, Mahārāja, Nigaṇṭho...... Ayaṃ vuccati, Mahārāja, Nigaṇṭho gatatto ca yatatto ca ṭhitatto ca ti. *D*. i. 37.
83. *Jaina* *Sūtras*, pt II. *SBE*. xiv. intro. pp. xx-xxi.
85. *D*. i. 58. 84. *S*. iv. 317-8.
86. *A*. iii, 276-7.
87. *Milinda Pañha*, 159 FF. *Sum. Vil.* i. 168.
88. A. ii. 199. 89. M. i. 374. F.
90. *V*. i. 233. F.; *A*. iv. 179 F, See also the *Telovāda Jātaka*. 91. *M*. ii, 31, *A*. i. 220. F.
92. *M*. ii, 31; *A*. iii, 74.
93. *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. 1 p. 40.
94. *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* (s. v. *Ājīvika*), p. 330.
95. *M*. i. 238
96. Ye keci 'ime titthiya vādasīlā Ājīvikā vā yadivā Nigaṇṭhā. Paññāya taṁ nātitaranti sabbe ṭhito vajantaṃ viya sighagāmin. 321.
97. *Sandakasutta*. 98. *DHA*. i. 309.
99. *ibid*. pp. 390. 100. p. 427.
101. *Sugiura, Hindu Logic* as *preserved in China and Japan*, *Philadephia*, 1900, p. also see ERE. i. p. 269.
102. *Abhidhāna Ratnamālā*, ii. 189 ; Vaijayanti, Ed., Oppert. p. 202, v. 16.
103. *ERE*. i. pp. 266-7.
104. *History and Doctrines of Ājīvikas*, p. 184. See, *Jaina Sāhitya kā Itihāsa* : *Pūrvapīthikā*, pp. 463 for refutation of the theory of Hoernle.
105. Te Gosālakamatānusārinā Ājīvikādayaḥ (sic) Boṭikā vā. *SūKṛ. Com.* i. 3. 3. 14, fol. 92. Eke ye

parasparopakārarahitaṁ darśanamīyantaṁ ayaṁ lata-kakalpaḥ, te ca Gosālakamatānusāriṇā Ājīvikā Digambarā vā, *ibid.*, 3. 3. 8. v. p. 91.

106. *ERE*: i. p. 262.
107. *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, pp. 332 f.
108. Varahamihira in his *Bṛhajjātaka* (15. 1.) also refers to the Ājīvikas. For a full discussion of this reference see Ajaya Mitra Shastri, *Barahamihira's reference to the Ājīvikas*, *J. O. I.* Vol. xii, p. 44-50.
109. Samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ, *Tsū* 1. 1; Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta*.
110. *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Māhamāluṅkya Suttaṃ*.
111. Bandhahetvabhāvanirjarābhyāṁ kṛtsnakarmavipramokṣo mokṣaḥ, *Tsū*. 10. 2; SS. p. I.
112. Gataddhino visokassa, vippamuttassa sabbadhi. Sabbagaṇṭhappahinassa, pariḷāho na vijjati. *DhP*. 90.
113. *M*. i. 03; ii. 214 ff.
114. The Buddha condemned the *Nigaṇṭhas* as unworthy in ten respects : they were without faiths, unrighteous, without fear and shame, they chose wicked men as friends, extolled themselves and disparaged others, were greedy of present gain, obstinate, untrustworthy, sinful in their thoughts and held wrong views., *A*. *v*. 156.
115. *IA*. IX. 162; quoted by Kamata Prasada, *Bhagawāna Mahāvīra*, p. 263 fn. 4.

2. Jainism And ItS Literature

1. There are two great cycles (kalpas) *Utsarpaṇī* (Evolution) and *Apasarpaṇī* (Involution). Each of these is divided into six periods; (i) *Sukhamā sukhamā* or the period of great happiness. (ii) *Sukhamā* or the period of happiness, (iii) *Sukhamā duḥkhamā* or the age of happiness and some misery, (iv) *Duḥkhamāsukhamā* or the age of misery and some happiness, (v) *Duḥkhamā* or the age of misery. The present era is the fifth one

which is to last twenty-one thousand years. Two thousand and fiive hundred years have already passed.

The present Kalpa is *Utsarpaṇī*, in which twenty-four *Jain Tīrthaṅkara* appeared : (1) Ṛṣabhadeva (2) Ajitanātha (3) Sāṁbhavanātha (4) Abhinandananātha (5) Sumatinātha (6) Padmanātha (7) Sūparśvanātha (8) Candaprabha (9) Puṣpadanta (10) Śītalanātha (11) Śreyāṅśanātha (12) Vāsupūjya (13) Vimalanātha (18) Ārahanātha (19) Mallinātha (20) Munisuvratanātha (21) Naminātha (22) Neminātha (23) Pārśvanātha, and (24) Māhāvīra (Vardhamāna) or *Nigaṇṭha Nāta-putta* of Pāli literature.

2. *Kalpasūtra, SBE.*, xxii., pp. 281-285 : *Harivaṁśa-Purāṇa*, 8. 15. *Mahāpurāṇa* of Puṣpadanta, Sandhis 1-3.
3. *Atharvaveda*, Chapt. xv.; They may be purified with the vrātyastoma method and treated as follower of Vaidic religion. (*Kātyāyana* and *Āpastambha Śrauta-sūtra*). Munayo vātaraśanaḥ piśaṅga vasate malā (*Ṛgveda*, 10. 136, 2-3), Keśyagniṁ keśī viśaṁ (*ibid.* 10. 136. 1), and Kakardave Kraṣabho yukta āsīd (*ibid.* 10. 102.6) etc. are the references to prove the antiquity of Jainism.
4. *Ṛgveda*, 10. 102. 6.
5. *Viṣṇu Pūrāṇa* (ed. Wilson), 2. 1. p. 163; *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*, 5. 3. 6.; *Markaṇḍeya Purāṇā*, 50; *Kurma Purāṇa* 41; *Agni.* 1(; etc.
6. Jain, K. P., *JA*. Vol. I. No. ii., 1935, p. 19. Also see *Modern Review*, August, 1932-*Sindhu Five Thousand Years Ago.* Ramchandran, T. N., *Hadappa and Jainism, Anekānta*, October, 1972. pp. 159.
7. *JBORS*. iii. 465.
8. *The Philosophy of India*, p. 60.
9. Weber, (Indische Studian, xvi. 210; Jaina Itihāsa Series, No. 1. p. 6; Jainism in North India, introduction.) adduces four points of coincidence. which, according to his opinion, prove that Jainism, has branched off from Buddhism, (Indische Alterthumskunde,

iv. p. 763). This theory has been refuted by Jacobi. See Jain Sūtras, 1. intro. xxi.

10. *IA.*, Vol. ix. p. 163.
11. *The Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist terms*, p. 184.
12. *Mañjuśrimūlakalpa*, 45. 27, ed. Ganapati Shastri, Trivendram, 1920; *Buddhist Sanskrit Dictionary*, (s. v. *Nirgrantha*); *Mahāvastu*, vol, i. p–369.
13. p. 286.
14. *ThegA.*, i. 68.
15. *S.*, ii. 192.
16. *J.*, i. 36.
17. *ThegA.*, i. 335; *Ap.*, i. 287; see also., iii. 70, and *PVA.*, 75.
18. *Ap.*, i. 50.
19. *Bu.*, xxi. 122.
20. *J.*, vi. 133 ff.
21. M., iii. 70; *Ap.*, i. 107.
22. *Ap.*, i. 205; *ThegA.* i. 115.
23. *Dhammajātaka.*
24. p. 212.
25. *DPPN.*, S. V. Dhamma.
26. *A.*, iii. 373.
27. *Isigilisutta.*
28. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, iii. p. 60.
29. Paccesanti pakā-senti tatolā tattalā tatotlā, Ojasi tejasi tatojasi sūro rājā Ariṭṭh Nemi. *D.*, iii. 291.
30. *Mhv.*, trans. 72. n. 3.
31. *Mhv.*, x. 63-72.
32. *A.*, i. 290; ii. 11, quoted by J. C. Jain, in the *Life in Ancient India*, p. 19; also see .*Kalpasūtra* 6.149; Schubring, *Die Lehre Der Jainas*, p. 24.

    Jacobi, *SBE.*, xiv. pp. intro., xiv–xxi; Dasagupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*. 1. p. 173.
33. p. 236.
34. *A.*, ii. 196 ff.
35. *M.*, i. 371 ff.
36. *ibid.*, 392 ff.
37. *ibid.*, 237 ff.; *MA.*, i. 450.
38. *ibid.*, 371. ff.
39. *S.*, iv. 312 ff.
40. *Ninkha* (Nika) is a Deva .who visits the Buddha in the company of several other Devas and utters a verse in praise of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta :
    Jegucchi tapako bhikkhu Cātuyāma susaṁvuto.
    Niṭṭhaṁ sutaṁ ca ācikkhaṁ na hi nūna kibbisī siyā.

41. *Mahāvagga* 42. *S*. i, 65. f.
43. *J*. iii., 1. 44. M. i. 371 ff.
45. *Jaya Dhavalā*, Vol. i. p. 78.
46. *Tiloyapaṇṇatti*, 4. 550.
47. *Ācārāṅga*, 2. 3. 402,; *Kalpasūtra*, 110.
48. According to the Śvetāmbara tradition, however, Mahāvira was married. But the tradition is now challenged by the result of researches done by Shri Parmananda Shastri, See, *Anekānta*, kiraṇa 9, March, 1955, p. 233.
49. *SnA*' ii., 432; Tiloya Paṇṇatti, 4.550.
50. *MA*., 423; Cf. *MV*., 1.113.5; *Mahāvyutpatti*, 3550; *Sp*., 276;3; *Divyā*., 143.12; *AS*., i. 231.5; *LV*., 380.12; *Bodhisatvabhūmi*, 246.6; Cf. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, p. 300. The *Dharmottarapradīpa* and the *Tattvasaṅgraha* refer to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta as Vardhamāna. 3.11.
51. See in detail my article "*Bhagavāna Mahāvīra aura Mahātmā Buddhake vyaktigata samparka*", published in *Jaina Milana*, Vol. 1. 1968.
53. *D*. i. 57.
54. *D*., iii. 119 (*Pāsādika Sutta*); *M*., ii. 244 (*Sāmagāma Sutta*); Here the Buddha is referred to have seated at Sāmagāma among the Śākyas; *D*., iii. 209 f. Here he is said to have seated at Pāvā.
55. *SBE*., Vol. xxii. intro., p. xxvii. 1884.
56. *SBE*., Vol. xxii. intro., p. xxxvii. 1894.
57. Evaṁ ca Mahāvīramukte varṣaśate gate.
Pañcāśadadhike Candragupto bhavennṛpaḥ 8.339.
58. *IA* , 1914, pp. 118; also see the *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. i. pp. 139-140. Charpentier here thinks that the Vikrama era commences 410 years after the Mahāvīra's death, 527-60-467. B. C.).
59. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 74.
60. *ibid*., 75.

61. *An Advanced History of India*, pp. 85-6. Jacobi also seems to have supported this view later on, see his article *Jainism*. in *ERE.*, 7. pp, 465.

62. *Uvāsagadasāo*, ii. p. lll, n; *History of the Ājīvikas*. p. 76.

63. Vikkamarajjarambhā parao sirivīranibbu bhaṇiyā. Sunnam muniveyajutto vikkamakālau Janakāle. *Vicāraśreṇi*.

64. *IA.*, Vol. 43.

65. Cunningham, A. *Book of Indian Eras* p. 49.

66. Sattari cadusadjutto tiṇkālā Vikkamo havai jammo. Aṭhavarsa bālalīlā soḍasavāsehi bhammie dese. *Nandisaṅgha's second Prākṛita Paṭṭābalī*. This verse is also found in the *Vikrama Prabandha* : see, *JSB*. kiraṇa, 4, p. 75.

67. *Subhāṣitaratnasandoha* of Amitagati.

68. *IA.*, 1914, pp. 118.

69. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, *SBE.*, Vo. xxii., intro., p. xxxvii.

70. Jaṁ rayaṇiṁ siddhigao arahā titthaṅkaro Mahāvīro.
Taṁ rayaṇimavantie abhisitto pālao rāyā.
Pālagaraṇṇo saṭṭho paṇa paṇasayaṁ viyāṇi ṇandaṇaṁ.
Muriyāṇaṁ saṭṭhisayaṁ tīsā puṇa pūsamittāṇaṁ.
—*Titthogāli Paiññaya*, 620–621.

71. *Epitom of Jainism*, Appendix A, p. iv.

72. *Trisaṣṭaśalākāpuriṣacaritra*, 10. 12. 45.

73. *An Advanced History of India*, p. 202,

74. *Mahāvīra aura Buddhakī Samasāmayikatā*, *Anekānta*, 16. 1-4. *Āgama aura Tripiṭaka; Eka Anuśīlana*, pp. 47.

75. *Vīr-Nirvāṇa Samvat aura Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā*, 1930.

76. *Jaina Sāhitya kā Itihāsa* (*Pūrva-piṭhikā*), p. 336-7.

77. *Chronical Problems*, Bona, Germany, 1934; *Jaina Bhāratīyā*, Varṣa 10, aṅka, 1. p. 5-21.

78. *Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra*, Bombay, 1963, Vol. II. p. 319-324.

79. *JBORS* 1, 203.
80. *Hindu Sabhyatā* (Hindu Civilization), pp. 216.
81. *Bhagawāna Mahāvīra aura Mahātmā Buddha*, pp. 100.
82. Praśasti Khandya, padya, 1.
83. Law, B. C; *Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, p. 178.
84. *Bharatīya Vidyā*, Varṣa, 3, aṅka, 1.
85. *Darśana Digdarśana*, p. 444, fn. 3.
86. *Jain Sāhitya aura Itihāsa*, pp, 424.
87. Majjhima Nikāya
88. *Kalpasūtra*, 128.
89. *M*. ii, 243 F.; *D*. iii, 117, 210.
90. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, iii. p. 112.
91. *DA*, iii, 906; *MA*. 11, 651; 851; *DPPN*., *S. V. Nigaṇṭha*.
92. *Āvāśyaka mūl.*, bhā., v. 127.
93. Jain, Jyoti Prasad, *Bhāratīya Itihāsa : Eka Dṛaṣṭi*, Khaṇḍa I.
94. *MA*. i, 423.
95. *DPPN*. Pt. II. p. 64.
96. For detailed discussion please see my article "*Schism in Jaina Order*".
97. Jain, M. K., *Jaina Darśana*, p. 14.
98. It is to be mentioned here that the Digambaras relate their scriptures to Gautama Gaṇadhara, the first and direct disciple ofMahāvīra, while the Śvetāmbaras relate to Sudharma Svāmi, the successor of Gautama Gaṇadhara.
99. *Tiloya Paṇṇatti*, 4. 1476-90.
100. See *Jaina Sāhitya kā Bṛahad Itihāsa*, Vol. 1-5
101. *History of Jaina Monachism*.
102. *Jaina Śilālekha Saṅgraha*, Vol. 1. p. 1.
103. The Svetambara tradition believes in his coming back to Magadha and then going to Nepal for Mahāprāṇadhyāna, *Pariśistuparvan*.
104. *Samacariśataka* of Samayasundarigani, Cf. Doshi, Vechar Das, Jaina Sāhityamām Vikāra thavathi thayeli hani, ». ;

105. Winternitz, M. A.; *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. ii. p. 434-5.

106. *History of Jaina Monachism*, p. 22. *op. cit.*, p. 22.

107. Sūkr. v. 136. p. 253.

158. *Milinda Pañha*, p. 19. (Bombay edition); *DhA*. Vol. i. p. 129.

109. Eliot, Sir Charles, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. i. p. 117; *A History of Jaina Philosophy*, Vol. i. p. 170.

110. Winternitz, M. A., *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. ii. p. 426.

111. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1. 20.

112. *Tiloyapaṇṇatti*, 4. 1476-90. Also see the *Harivaṁśapurāṇa*, *Dhavalā*, *Jayadhavalā*, *Ādipurāṇa*, and *Śrutāvatārā*; *Jayadhavalā*; Vol. i. intro. p. 47 50.

118. *Dhavalā*, Vol. i. intro., p. 23-30.

114. *Syādavādaparīkṣā*.

115. Vādiraja referred to Sanmati in the *Pārśvanāthacarita* as a Commentator on the Sanmati which would be the Sammati Prakarana of Siddhasena. Another contribution made by him is referred to in the *Malliṣenapraśasti* of *Sravaṇavelagolā*. There is mentioned his work "*Sumatisaptaka*" which is not available.

116. *EL* , Vol. xxi. intro. p. 45.

117. *TS*. intro. p. 92.

118. Nānyathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kiṁ.
Anvathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayena kiṁ.
ibid. 1369.

119. *NVVI*. Vol. ii. p. 234.

120. *SVT*. p. 371; *TSV*. p. 205; *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, p. 72; *JTV*. p. 135; *SKT*. p. 225.

121. "Dharmkīrti ke Trilakṣanahetupara Pātrakeśarikā Ākramaṇa", *Bharatiya Prachina Vidyā*, 12. pp. 71-80.

122. *History of Indian Logic*. p. 187.

123. Shastri, K. C., Svāmī Patrakesarī aura vidyānanda, *Anekants*, Varsa 1. p. 67.; *NKC*. 1. intro. p. 76

124. *ibid.* p. 76. 125. *EC.* Vol. viii, No. 39.
126. *SVT.* Vol. i. intro. p. 36, 127. *Jaina Darśana,* p. 23.
128. *VBH.* 95. 129. *SVT.* Vol. i. intro. pp. 53-62.
130. *ibid.* p. 69-70. 131. *D.* i. 47 f., *M.* ii. 2 f.
132. *M.* i. 31. 380.; *A.* i. 220 f.
133. *ibid.* 371 ff.
134. *ibid,* 392 ff. 135. S. iv. 312 ff.
136. Dutt, N. *Early Monastic Buddhism,* Vol. i, p. 145.
137. *S.* i. 68; *M.* i. 205; 400, 426.
138. *DPPN.* (s. v. *Migara*). DhA. i. 387 ff.; *AA.* i. 220; *MA.* i. 471.
139. *A.* ii. 25; *AA.* ii. 482 f.
140. *M.* i. 91 ff.
141. *M.* ii. 214 ff.; *M.* ii. 31; *A.* i. 220; *M.* 92 B.
142. *A.* ii. 196 ff.
143. *Jaina Sutras,* Vol. xxii. p. 194.
144. *M.* i. 234; *MA.* i. 450. 145. *MA.* i. 450.
146. *A.* i. 220-ff. 147. *V.* 233. f; *A.* iv. 179 f.
148. M. ii. 243. ff; *D.* iii. 117, 210. See *Early Monastic Buddhism,* p. Vol. 1. pp. 145 ff.
149. Mahāvamsa, 10. 53-99 (tram).
150. *Mahāvaṁsa,* pp. 67.
151. *ibid.* 10. 65. 152. *ibid.* xxxiii. 43-44.
153. *ibid,* xxxiii. 79. 154. *Mahāvaṁsaṭīkā,* p. 444.
155. See, *Harivaṁśapurāṇa; Pauma Cariu,* etc.
156. *Vividhatīrthakalpa,* pp. 93.
157. *ibid.* p. 102.
158. *Brahatkathākośa of Hariṣeṇa,* p. 200.
159. *Karkaṇḍu cariu,* pp. 44-69.
160. *Mahāmāyūri,* ed. by Sylvian Levi, *JA.* 1915, pp. 40; cf. *The Society of the Rāmāyaṇa,* p. 68.
161. *Jaina Śilālekha Saṅgraha,* p. 133
162. *Pre-Buddhist Religious Beliefs, JRAS.* (Ceylon). Vol. xxxi, No. 82, 1929, p. 325,

C. Buddhism And Its Literature

1. See my article *Historicity of the Buddha* published in the *Mahabodhi Journal*,
2. *Buddha*, Trans. by Hoey, p. 6.
3. *Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 142-3.
4. *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfange des Buddhism*, p. 296.
5. Referred by T. W. Rhys Devids in his book *Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 27.
6. *Studies in the Origin of Buddhism*, p. 547.
7. Beal, *Life of Buddha*, *SBE*. Vol. xix. p. 141; *Buddhistic Studies*, pt. II; p, 118.
8. M. ii. 77.
9. So.........sato va abhikkamami sato patikkamami, yava udabindumhi me dayā paccupaṭṭhitā hoti, ma 'ham khuddaka pane visamagate sanghatam apadessan ti, M. i. 78. Also see *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p· 465.
10. M. i. 238.
11. *Darśanasāsa*, 6–9.
12. According to Buhler, *Pitaka* is a basket, in which manuscripts were preserved (Indian Studies, iii, 2nd Ed., Strassburg, 1898, p. 86 ff.), Rhys Davids, (SBE Vol. 35, p. 28) and Trenckner (JPTS. 1908, p. 119 f.) think that Piṭaka does not mean "receptacle" but rather "tradition". See also Winternitz's *Indian Literature*, Vol. i. p. 8. fn. 1.
13. *Mahāvaṁsa*,
14. Kern : *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 2. In the opinion of Franke, the *Mahavagga* and *Cullavagga* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* would be later then the *Dighanikāya* (*JPTS*. 1908, pp. 8ff , 58 ff.. See *Indian Literature*, p. 21 fn. 3.
15. *D*. ii. 42. cf. *DHP*. 185.
16. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism* (American Lectures), p. 62.

17. *M.* i, 133; *Milindāpañha*, 345 etc. According to records of Mahāyāna Buddhism, there are twelve Aṅgas, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 7.
18. Childers, *Dictionary of Pāli Language*, under there words.
19. *Buddhist India*, pp. 121-2.
20. *A History of Pāli Literature*, Vol. i. p. 1.
21. *ibid.*, p. 42.
22. *Milindapañha*, (Trenckner Ed.), pp. 13, 190, 21 13; *A History of Pāli Literature*, p. 12.
23. *A History of Pāli Literature*, p. 12.
24. *DA*. iii. 117, 220 25. *MA*. ii. 243.

CHAPTER II

Jaina Philosophy

1. Ghosal, S. C., *Pañcāstikāya*, intro. p. xxix.
2. Utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat, *TSū*. 5. 30.
3. *PK*. 10. 4. *ibid*. 13.
5. *ibid*. 8. 6. *ibid*. 10-11.
7. *DS*. 23. 8. *ibid*. 25.
9. *PK*. 7. 10. *ibid*. 104.
11. *DS*. 24-48.
12. ix. 113. 9. 11; x. 14. 3-10; *A History of Indian Literature*, p. 2.
13. xviii. 2. 27.
14. vi. 2. 2. 27; 6. 3. 1; xi. 7. 2. 23; *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 2-3.
15. *BUp*. iv. 4. 19; cf. *KUp*. ii. 4. 10-11.
16. 1. 1. 20; 1. 2. 18-19; 1. 2. 22; *History of Indian Literanture*, p. 3.
17. *Āgamaśāstra*, 111.
18. *Sāṅkhya Bhāṣya*, *Brahmasūtra*, II. 1. 9.; *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 125.
19. *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 125-8.

20. *Sāṅkhya* Kārikā, 62.

21. *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* and Vratti, 1. 1. 10; *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 643-44. *studies in Jain Philosophy*.

22. *Milinadapañha*, pt. 1.

23. *TSū*. 1. 4; 1. 2.

24. *Samayasāra*, 38.

25. *ibid*. 49.

26. *DS*. 2.

27. *TSū*. 5. 23.

28. *ibid*. 5. 24-25.

29. *PK*. 15.

30. *ibid*. 77.

31. *TSū*. 6.2.

32. *ibid*. 10. 2.

33. *SS*. p. 1.

34. *PK*· 90-96.

35. *DS*., 19-20.

36. *PK*., 107-108., *DS*. 21.

37. Atthi kho vo Nigaṇṭhā, pubbe pāpakammaṁ kataṁ taṁ imāya kaṭukāya dukkarakārikāya nijjiretLa; yaṁ panettha etarahi kāyena saṁvutā, vācāya saṁvutā, manasā saṁvutā, taṁ āyatiṁ pāpāssa kammassa akaraṇaṁ; iti purānaṁ kammānaṁ tapasā vyantībhāvā, navānaṁ kammānaṁ akaraṇā, āyatiṁ anavassavā kammakkhayā, kammakkhayā dukkhakkhayo, dukkhakkhyayā vedanākkhayo, vedanākkhayā sabbaṁ dukkhaṁ nijjiṇṇaṁ bhavissati 'ti. Taṁ ca panamhākaṁ ruccati ceva khamati ca. tena camhaṁ attamanā' ti. M. i. 93; cf. M. ii. 31; N. ii. 214 FF; also see A. i. 220.

38. *D*. i. 31-39.

39. *ibid*. i. 32.

40. *ibid*. i. 31-39.

41. *ibid*. i. 32.

42. *Udāna*, p. 67.

43. *D*. i. 187; *M*. i. 431; *Dharma Saṅgraha*, 137.

44. *Cf D*. i. 195; *S*. ii. 60.

45. *DS*. 2.

46. Arūpa-samāpatti-nimittaṁ pana atta ti samāpattisaññaṅ c' assa saññī gahetvā vā Nigaṇṭho-ādayo paññāpeti, viya takkamattena eva vā, arūpi attā saññī ti nam, *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*. p. 110.

47. *D*. i. 186-7.; iii. 137.

48. The Place of Buddhism in Indian Thought, *Journal of Vidyodaya University of Ceylon*, Vol i. No. 1., p. 25.

49. Bhāskarabhāṣya; *Baudhadarśana tathā anya Bhāratīyadarśana*, p. 824; Cf. *Sandakasutta* of *Majjhimanikāya*.

50. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 7.
51. Catuḥśataka, 10–10.
52. *TSu.* 5. 16; *DS.* 10.
53. digambarāsta eva prāhūḥ. cillakṣaṇa evātmā sa ca dravyarūpeṇa sarvāvasthāsvabhinnatvāt anugamātmakaḥ, paryāyarūpeṇa tu pratyavasthaṁ bhinnatvāt vyāvṛtyātmakaḥ etacca pratyakṣataḥ eva siddhamāṭmano dvairūpyamiti na pramāṇāntarataḥ prasādhyaṁ. tathāhi *TSP*, p. 118, Kā. 311.
54. *TS*. 313–315. 55. *ibid*. 325.
56. *HBT*. p. 98–104. 57. *TS*. 312.
58. *ibid*. 316-18. 59. 327.
60. Dravyaparyāyarūpatvāt dvairūpyaṁ vastunaḥ khalu. Tayorekā tmakatve'pi bhedaḥ saññādibhedataḥ. Indriyajñānanirbhāsi vasturūpaṁ hi gocaraḥ. Śabdānāṁ naiva, tat kena saññābhedād vibhinnatā.
61. Tao danda pannattā, tam jahā-manadande, vayadande, kāyadande., *Samavāyāṅga*, 3.1.
62. seyyathidaṁ-kāyadaṇḍaṁ, vacīdaṇḍaṁ, manodaṇḍaṁ ti. imesaṁ kho, āvuso Gotamo, tiṇṇaṁ daṇḍānaṁ evaṁ paṭivibhattānaṁ evaṁ paṭivisiṭṭhānaṁ kāyadaṇḍaṁ Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto mahāsāvajjataraṁ paññāpeti pāpassa kammassa kiriyāya pāpassa kammassa pavattiyā, no tathā vacidaṇḍaṁ, no tathā manodaṇḍaṁ 'ti., *M*., i. 372. FF.
63. Bhāvā rahino sijjhai jai vi tavaṁ carai koikoḍio. Jammaṁ tarai bahuso lambiya hattho galiyayaṭṭho.
64. *PSU*., 51.
65. ahaṁ hi sīha, akiriyāṁ vadāmi kāyaduccaritassa vacīduccaritassa manoduccaritassa; anekavihitānaṁ pāpakamānaṁ akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ akiriyaṁ vadāmi......kusalānāṁ dhammānaṁ kiriyaṁ vadāmi. *A*., iv. 182 f. tran. by Thomas. *The Life of the Buddha*, p. 207.
66. Lavayasaṅkinaḥ Lokāyatikaḥ Śākyādayaśca. Teṣāṁ ātmaiva nāsti kūṭastatkriyā tajjānito va karmavan-

dha iti.........asthitānāṁ kūṭaḥ iti Akriyāvāditvaṁ. 12. 4. v. p. 218.

67. Law, B. C., *Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, p. 189.

68. *SBE.*, xiv. p. xxv. quoted in the *Heart of Jainism*, p. 90. Jacobi is also of such opinion, *SBE.*, Xiv., P. 316, Fn. 3. Attāṇa jo jāṇāti jo ya logaṁ gaim ca jojāmai ṇāgaiṁ ca. Jo sāsayaṁ jāṇa asāsayaṁ ca jātiṁ ca maraṇaṁ ca jaṇovavāyaṁ. Aho'vi sattaṇa viuṭṭhaṇāṁ ca jo āsavaṁ jāṇati saṁvaraṁ ca. Dukkhaṁ ca jo jāṇati nijjaraṁ ca so bhāsiumarihai kiriyāvādaṁ. *SūKṛ.* 1 12. 20-21. *kriyāvāda* is of 180 types and *Akriyāvada* 84, *ibid*, l. ll. 119-121.

69. *M.* i. 93; ii. 31; 214 f.; *A.* i. 220.

70. *Jātaka Stories*, v. pp. 116. Compare to the story of four councillors in the *Uttarapurāṇa* of Guṇabhadra where the Karma has been accepted as a main cause for having birth in a high or low class. 46. 112-118.

71. Savve puvvanibaddhā du paccayā santi sammadiṭṭhassa. Uvaogappāogaṁ bandhante kammabhāveṇa. *Samayasāra*, 173.

72. *Jātaka Stories*, V. p. 118 ; *Jātaka* (Nagari), Vol. ii. v. 145-7. p. 53.

73. *M.* ii. 31, 214 f; *M.* i. 93; Cf. *A.* i. 220.

74. *DS.* 9.

75. *SKr.* 1. 12. 5. v. p. 215.

76. *A* i. 174.

77. Tena āyasmanto pāṇātipātino bhavissanti pubbekatāhetu, adinnādāyino musāvādino abrhmacārino...pisuṇavācā...pubbekataṁ kho pana, bhikkhave, sārato pacchāgacchataṁ na hoti chando vā vāyāmo idaṁ vā karṇiyaṁ idaṁ ca akaraṇīyaṁ ti. iti karaṇīyākaraṇīye kho pana saccato ṭhetato anupalabbhiyamāne muṭṭhassatīnaṁ anārakhānaṁ vihartaṁ na hoti paccattaṁ. sahadhammiko samaṇavādo......*ibid.*, i. 174 f.

78. *Samayasāra*, 173.

79. *M.* ii. 214.

80. *A.* iii. 383 f. cp. *DA.* i. 162.; *S.* iii. 210.; *D.* iii. 250 F..

81. *SS*. 2. 6. 82. 4. 7. 83. *A*. iii., 196 f.

84. *AA*., ii. 559 says he was the Buddha' s uncle (cūlapitā) and a Sākyan rājā. *DPPN*., S. V. *Vappa*.

85. *Gradual Sayings*, Pt. ii., P. 207.

86. (Kāyena saṁvutā; vācāya saṁvutā, manasā saṁvutā taṁ āyatiṁ papassa kammassa akaraṇaṁ iti purāṇaṁ kammānaṁ tapasā vyantībhāvā......).

87. *A*. iii. 276-7. 82. *D*. i. 57.

89. *M*. ii., 214. 90. *A*., iii. 276-7.

91. *M*. i. 93. 92. *PK*. 157-8.

93. *D*. i. 23 FF. 94. *Sumaṅgala Vil*., i. 115.

95. *Ts*., 112-2. 26. *TsP*., P. 66.

97. *SūKr*., 1. 2. 12. Vṛatti.

98. Tulyaṁ rūpaṁ yadā grāhyamatulyaṁ naiva grāhyate... Aṇūnāṁ dvyarūpatve tadā kiṁ nopapadyate. Tatsāmānyaviśeṣātmarūpatvātsarvavastunaḥ. Tulyātulyasvarūpatvādvirūpa aṇavaḥ smṛtaḥ. Samānaṁ tatra yadrūpaṁ tadakṣajñānagocaraṁ. Ekākārmatojñānamaṇuṣvevopapadyate. Asmānaṁ tu yadrūpaṁ yogipratyakṣmisyate. Iti durmatayaḥ kecit kalpayanti samākulaṁ—*TS*. 1980--83.

99. *NKC*., p. 134; *NVV*., pt. 1. p. 344; *SVT*., pt. pt. 1. p. 158; *PKM*., yt. i. p. 25.

100. Dve hi rūpe kathaṁ nāma yukte ekasya vastunaḥ. Dve tadā vastuni prāpte aparāsparārūpataḥ. Parasparātmatāyāṁtu tadvairūpyaṁ viruddhate.

101. See, chapter. v. of the book.

102. *TS*., 2310.

103. *PV*., 3. 296-7.

104. *NKC*., p. 565; *LT*., 26-29; 64-65.

105. *PK*., 80.

106. *ibid*., 81. 107. *ibide*., 86.

108. *Iv*. 5. 24. 109. *Atthsālinī*, 1, 3. 16.

110. *TSP*, p. 605, 2133-84. Cf. *PK*., 97 ff; *DS*., 19 ff.

111. *TS*., 2567. 112. *ibid*. 2548.

113. *Abhidharmakosa*, 1.5.

114. Aṭṭhasālinī 160; *Diologues of the Buddha*, pt. i. p. 36. fn. 2. akasante' smin dravyāṇi śvayaṃ vā kāśata ityākaśam. Jivādīni dravyāṇi svaiḥ paryāyaiḥ avyatirekeṇa yasminnākāśante. prakāśante tadakaṣaṃ svayaṃ cātmīyaparyāyamaryādaya ākāśata ityākāśaṃ. Avakāśādānādvā. 22. athavā itareṣaṃ dravyāṇaṃ avakāśadānādākāśamiti pṛṣodarādiṣu nipātitaḥ śabdah. Kundakunda defines ākāśa :—

Savvesiṃ Jīvaṇāṃ sesāṇāṃ tahāya puggalānam ca.
Jaṃ dedi vivaramakhilaṃ taṃ loe havadi āyāsaṃ.

115. *Iv.*, 5. 1., 21-22.
116. Ākāśasyavagāhaḥ, *TSū.* V. 18. ākāśasya......sāvaya vatvaṃ ghaṭādir ivopapannaṃ sāvayavamākāśaṃ himavat-vindhyāvaruddhavibhinnadeśattvāt,
117. *TBV.*, p. 641; *Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 277. *CF. PKM.*, p. 563; *NKC.*, 245.

CHAPTER III

Jaina Ethics

1. Hiṁsā' nṛtāsteyābrahmaparigrahebhyo viratirvrataṁ, *TSū.*, 7. 1.
2. *ibid.*; 7. 4-8.
3. Maitrīpromodakāruṇyamādhysthāni ca sattvaguṇādhikakliśyamāna' vinayeṣu, *TSū.*, 7. 11.
4. *Ṭhaṇāṅga*, 4.1 (*ṭīka*). Udakapedalaputta (*Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 7th Addhyana), Kālāsavesiyaputta (*Vyāhāpaṇṇati*, lst sataka), ect. are referred to in the Jaina Āgamas who renounced Cāturyāmadharma of Pārśvanātha and accepted the Pañcamahāvratas of Mahāvira.
5. Asibandhakaputto Gāmaṇī Nigaṇṭha-sāvako yena Bhagavā tena upasaṅkami.......taṃ ca bhagavā uvāca-Ko nu kho Gāmaṇi Nigaṇṭho-Nātaputto sāvakānaṁ dhammaṁ deseti ti ? (Gāmaṇi uvāca)—evaṁ kho

bhante Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto sāvakānaṁ dhammaṁ deseti—yo koci pāṇaṁ atipāteti sabbo so āpayiko nerayiko, yo koci adinnaṁ ādiyati sabbo so āpayiko nepayiko, yo koci kāmesu micchā carati sabbo so āpayiko nerayiko, yo koci musā bhaṇati sabbo so āpayiko nerayiko. yaṁ bahulaṁ yaṁ bahulaṁ viharati tena tenniyati, 'ti.—*S.*, iv. 317.

6. Pañcahi bhikhave, dhammehi samannāgato Nigaṇṭho .. devadhammiko yathābhataṁ nikhatte evaṁ niraye. katamehi pañcamehi ? pāṇātipātī hoti, adinnādāyī hoti, abrahmacārī hoti, musāvādī hoti, surāmeraymajjapamādaṭṭhāyī hoti. A. iii. 276–7.

7. Kṛtakāritānumatairvākkāyamanobhiriṣvate.
Autsargiki nivṛttirvicitrarūpāpavādikī tveṣā.
PSU. 76.

8. ime kho āvuso Gotama, tiṇṇaṁ daṇḍānaṁ evaṁ paṭivibhattānaṁ evaṁ paṭivisiṭṭhānaṁ kāyadaṇḍaṁ Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto mahāsāvjjataraṁ paññāpeti pāpassa kammassa kiriyāya pāpassa kammassa pavattivā, no tathā vacīdaṇḍaṁ, no tathā manodaṇḍaṁ ti. *M.* i. 372.

9. The *daṇḍa* is synonymous with "*duccarita*" which means wrong behaviour in body, speech, and thought, and which afflicts injures and brings to trouble and distress. *SnA*.. 63. *ND.* ii. 293, quoted by Horner in the *Middle Length Sayings*, ii. p. fn. 3.

10. taṁ kiṁ maññasi gahapati, idhassa Nigaṇṭho abādhiko duhito bālahagilāno sītodakapaṭikkhitto uṇhodakapaṭisevī. so sītodakaṃ alabhamāno kalaṅkareyya. imassa pana, gahapati, Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto kathūpapattiṁ paññāpettī 'ti . . . asañcetanikaṁ, bhante, Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto no mahāsāvajjaṁ paññāpeti......, *M.* i. 377.

11. *PSU.* 45–47.

12. Hiṁsāyāmaviramaṇaṁ hiṁsopariṇamanamapi bhavati hiṁsā.

Tasmāt pramattayoge prāṇavyaparopaṇaṁ nityaṁ.
Sūkṣmāpi na khalu hiṁsā paravastunibandhanāṃ bhavatī puṁsaḥ.
Hiṁsāyatanānivṛttiḥ pariṇāmaviśuddhaye tadapi kāryā; *PSU.*, 48-49.

13. *Pāhuḍa.*

14. tena kho pana samayena sambahulaṁ Nigaṇṭhā Vesāliyaṁ rathikāya rathikaṁ...baha paggayha kandanti—ajja Sīhena Senāpatinā thūlaṁ pasuṁ badhitva Samaṇassa Gotamassa bhattaṁ kataṁ, taṁ Samaṇo Gotamo jānaṁ uddissa kataṁ māṇsaṃ paribhuñjati paticcakammaṁ' ti. *Mahāvagga* (Vinaya Piṭaka), 237.

15. *M.*, i, 368 f: *DPPN.*, s. v. Jīvaka Sutta.

16. *DPPN.*, s. v. Devadatta.

17. Na vinā prāṇivighātānmāṁsasyotpattirisyate yasmāt.
Māṁsaṁ bhajatastasmātprasaratyanivāritā hiṁsā.
Yadapi kila bhavati māṁsaṁ svayameva mṛtasya mahiṣāvṛṣabhādeḥ.
Tatrāpi bhavati hiṁsā tadāśritanigodanirmathanāt.
Āmāsvapi pakvāsvapi vipacyamānasu māṁsapesīṣu.
Sātatyenotpādastajjātīnāṃ nigodānām.
Āmāṁ vā pakvāṁ vā khādati yaḥ spṛśati vā piśitapesiṁ.
Sa nihanti satatatanicitaṁ piṇḍaṁ bahujīvakoṭīnāṁ.
PSu. 65-68.

18. Mādyaṁ māṁsaṁ kṣaudraṁ pañcodumbaraphalāni yatnena.
Hiṁsāvyuparatikāmairmoktavyāni prathamameva. 61.
Yonirudumbarayugmaṁ plakṣanyagrodhapippalaphalāni.
Trasajīvānaṁ tasmāttesaṁ tadbhakṣane hiṁsā.
ibid, 72.

19. Ātthi, Visākhā, Nigaṇṭhā nāma Samaṇajātikā. Te sāvakaṁ evaṁ samādapenti—ehi tvaṁ ambho puriso, ye puratthimāya disāya pana paraṁ yojanasataṁ

tesu daṇḍam nikkhipāhi, ye pacchimāya;. ye uttarāya.........ye dakkhiṇāya......'ti. Iti ekaccānaṁ pāṇānaṁ anuddayāya anukampāya samādapenti.

—*A.*, i. 206.

20. Digprācyādiḥ tatra . prasiddhairabhijñānairavadhiṁ kṛtvā niyamānaṁ digvratiḥ., SS., p. 176. : also see *TV.*, p. 547.
21. *PSU.*, 138.
22. *SD.*, 5 3–4.
23. *Jaina Sūtras, Uttarādhyayana*, p. 414, v. 26. ff.
24. *Jaina Sūtras*, Pt. 11. *SBE*, Vol. 45., intro. xviii.
25. *D.* iii. 9. F.
26. Basham, *A. C. History and doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 104.
27. *SU.*, 141. also see, *SD.*, 5. 12.
28. *M.* i. 372 *FF.*
29. *Cūladukkhandha Sutta*,
30. *A.* i, 206. 31. A. i. 207. 32. ibid.
33. *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra*, 4. 15. 35.
34. *SD.*, 5. 34–35. cf. *Bhagawatī Śataka*, 12. 1.
35. *Bhagawati Śataka*, 8.5.
36. *Jain Sūtras*, *SBE.*, Vol. 45., intro. P. xviii.
37. S. *D.*, 7.7.

    In a Commentary on the *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra*, Ācārya Prabhācandra also referred to this rule :—see, *Bhāgwāna Mahāvīra aura Mahātmā* Buddha p. 207.
38. *A.*, iii. 277.
39. Nigaṇṭhā ekasāṭakā ti vadati, *Lohitābhijāta* nāma, *ibid.*, iii. 383 f. cf. *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*. i. 162.
40. *Lāṭi Saṁhitā*, 55. 41. *D.* i. 166. cf. *M.* i. 77.
42. *Pravacanasāra*, 3. 15. According to A. N. Upadhye, this is the interpolated verse.
43. *Ṭhāṇāga*, p. 164. Cf. *Mahāvagga* (N. H. Bhagavata's ed). pp. 108–109.
44. *Mūlācāra*, 4. 155.

45. *ibid.*, 10.92. 46. *Bṛhatkalpakathābhāṣya*, 2780.
47. *ibid.* 492-93. 48. *Mūlācāra*, comm. Val.i p. 133;
49. *Pāiyasadda Mahaṇṇava*, p. 358 :
50. *TSū.*, 9.22. 51. *Mūlācāra*, 5. 107--109.
52. *ibid.* 10. 17-18. 53. *Samavāyāṅga*, 27-1.
54. See, *Mūlācāra* and *Anāgāradharmāmṛta*.
55. *ibid.*, *Piṇḍaśuddhyadhikāra*.
56. Pañcaya mahavvayāeṁ samidīo pañca jiṇavaruddiṭṭhā.
Pañcevindiyarohā chappi ya āvāsayā loco.
Accelakamaṇhāṇaṁ khidısayaṇamadantaghaṁsaṇaṁ ceva.
Ṭhidibhoyaṇeyabhattaṁ mūlaguṇā aṭṭhavīsā du.
Mūlācāra, 1. 2-3.
57. *D.* i. 49.
58. *Dasvaikālika*, cū., 2.9 : Deo, S. V; *History of Jaina Monachism.*, p. 145. f.
59 *Tsū.* 6. 24. 60. *D.* i. 49.
61. *Bṛhatakalpakathābhāṣya*, vṛtti on 2780, Vol. iii.
62. *ibid. Vṛtti*, on 1443, Vol. ii.
63. Piyadhammo daḍhadhammo saṃviggo'vajjabhīru parisuddho.
Saṅgahaṇuggakusalo sadadaṃ sārakkhaṇājutto.
Gambhīro duddhariso midavādī appakoduhallo ya.
Cirapavvaido gihidaṭṭho ajjānaṃ gaṇadharo hodi.
—*Mūlācāra*, 4.183.-4.
64. Tena kho pana samayena chabbaggīya bhikkhu vassaṁ upgantvā antarāvassaṁ cārikaṁ caranti. manussā tatheva ujjhāyanti khipyanti vipacenti-"kathaṁ hi nāma samaṇā sākyaputttyā hemantaṁ pi gimhaṁ pi vassaṁ cārikaṁ carissanti, haritāni tiṇāni sammaddantā, ekindriyaṁ jīvaṁ viheṭhentā, bahu khuddake pāṇe saṅghetaṁ āpādentā. Ime hi nāma aññstitthiyā durakkhātadhammā vassāvāsaṁ allīyissanti saṅkasayiseanti...V, i. 137 F.
65. *Mūlācāra*, 3. 35-36.
66. *ibid.*, 10. 18.

67. *V.*, i. 138. 68. p. 308 b.

69. Accellakam loco vosaṭṭasarīradā ya paḍilihānaṁ
Eso hu liṅgakappo caduvvidho hodi ṇāyabbo.
—*Mūlācāra*, 10-17

70. *MA.*, 1. 423; *DPPN.*, sv. Nigaṇṭha; *Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*, p. 428

71. *Pravacanasāra*, 3. 3-5, 21; Jain, C. R., *Sanyāsadharma*, pp. 45-46; Deo, s v; *History of Jaina monachism* p. 341.

72. Vikāre viduṣāṁ dueṣo navikārānuvartane.
Tannagrative pi sagotthe no Nāma-dueṣa-kalmaṣah.
—*upāsakādhyayana.*, 131. p. 35.

73. *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, p. 175. Also see Barua, B. M.; A History of *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 297. Basham. A. C.; *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, pp. 96, 107.

74. *V.* v. 19-21, 39-40.

75. *DhpA.*, Vol. l. pt. 11., 309. 76. *ibid.* iii. 489.

77. *DhPA.*, Vol. 1. pt. ii. pp. 400; *Buddhist Legend*, Vol. 29. p. 70 ff.

78. *Buddhist Legend*, Vol. 29. pp. 74.

79. *D.* i. 166. 80. *M.* i. 77.

81. *ibid.* i. .38.

82. Uggama uppādaṇa esaṇaṁ ca saṁjojanaṃ pamāṇaṁ ca.
Ingāladhūma kāraṇa aṭṭhavihā piṇḍasuddhī du.
Mūlācāra, 6.2.

83. Jacobi, *uttarādhyyana*, intro. p. xxxi.

84. *Vṛahatkalpabhāśya.* Vol. 1. 532 ff.; *Jitkalpa*, 35., *Bhāṣya*, 1087-1719.

85. Desatti ya savvatti ya duvinaṁ puṇa abhihaḍaṁ viyāṇāhi.
Ācinnamaṇāciṇṇaṁ desāvihaḍaṁ have duvihaṁ.
—*Mūlācara.* 6. 19.

86. *Piṇḍaniryukti*, 219-242.

87. Jāvadiyaṁ uddeso pasaṇḍotti ya have samuddeso.
Samaṇotti ya ādeso niggaṇṭhotti ya have samādeso.

Mūlācāra, 6. 7.; *Ācārāṅga*, 11.1.6.8. (p. 104), *Dasavai.* 5.1.55.

88. Cf. *Piṇḍaniryukti*, 271-77; 279-84.
89. *Mūlācāra*, 6. 10. 11, also see, *Dsv.*, 5. i. 31.
90. Cf. *Piṇḍaniryukti*, 285-91; 303-15.
91. *Mūlācāra*, 6. 15, 17. 92. *ibid.* 6. 20.
93. *Dasvai.* 5. 40-41. 94. *ibid.* 5. 42-3.
95. *Mulācāra*, 6.50, 52; also see, *Dasavaikālika*, 5. i. 43. 5-46.
96. Āsaṇaṃ jadi vā paṇaṃ khajjaṃ bhojaṃ ca lijja pejjaṃ vā. Padilehiūṇa suddhaṃ bhuñjati pāṇipattesu. *Mūlacāra*, 9. 54; 1. 34.
97. *Upāsakādhyyana*, 133-4. p. 35.
98. Addhamasaṇassa savviṁ jaṇassa udarassa tadiyamudayeṇa. Vāū saṃcaraṇaṭṭhaṁ cauṭṭhamavasesaye bhikkhū. —*Mūlācāra*, 6. 72; also see, *ibid*, 5. 153.
99. See, for detail, *History of Jaina Monachism*, p. 196. f.
100. *Āvaśyaka Nirukti*, 766 ff. *Piṇḍa Niryukti*, 427.
101. See, Deo, s. v. *History of Jaina Moncism*, p. 298, *Piṇḍa.* Ni, 494-99.
102. *Nisiha Cūrṇi*, 4. p. 375. *Bṛhat Kalpakathā Bhāṣya*,, Vol. III. 2681.
103. *JA.*, Vol. 13. No. 2. p. 2.
104. *ibid.*, Vol. 12-13, No. 2, p. 2, 68. Such magical practices can also be seen in the Āgamas. See, *History of Jaina Monachism*, p. 420.
105. *Book of Discipline*, Vol. 5. p. 151.
106. *D.* i. p. 57; M., i. 377.
107. *Yogaśāstra*, 2.30
108. *Jaina Sūtras*, introduction.
109. Rockhill, *the life of the Buddha*, p. 99 f. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, *Basham, A. C.*; p. 21. f.
110. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 23.
111. Bahirdhā-maithunaṃ parigrahaviśeṣaḥ ādānaṁ ca parigrahaḥ tayordvandvaikatvamathavā ādīyat ityādinaṁ parigrāhyaṁ vastutacca dharmopakaraṇamapi

bhavatītyat āha, bahistāt dharmopakaraṇād bahirya-diti, iha ca maithunaṁ parigrahe 'ntarbhavati, *Thāṇāṅga*, 4. 1. Tīkā.

112. *Abhayarājakumārasutta.*

113. Dharmārthaṁ putrakāmasya svadāresvadhikātinaḥ. Ṛtukāle vidhānena doṣastatra na vidyate. *Sūkṛ*. 3. 4. 9-13, V. p. 98. At the same place, it is said- Sadanuṣṭhānāt pārśve tiṣṭhantīti pārśvasthāḥ (Pāsatthā), svayūthya vā pārśvasthāvasannākuśīlādayaḥ stripariṣahaparājitāḥ. te vadanti—

Priyādarśanamevāstu, kimanyairdarśanāntaraiḥ.
Prāpyate yena nirvāṇam, sarāgeṇāpi cetasā.
—*ibid.*, 3. 4. 9. V. p. 98;

114. *Sūkṛ*, V. 102, p. 177; 102. Nir. vṛtti.

115. Pañcamahavvayā paṇṇattā-tam jahā-savvāo pāṇātipāta sayvāo veramaṇaṁ, savvāo musāvāyao veramaṇaṁ, savvāo adinnādānāo veramaṇaṁ, savvāo mehuṇāo veramaṇaṁ, savvāo pariggahāo veramaṇaṁ, *Samavāyāṅga*, 5. 2.

116. Abhayarajakumārasutta.

117. Cf. Pesuṇṇahāsakakkasaparanindāppappasaṃsavikahādī.
Vajjita saparahiyaṃ bhāsāsamidi have kahaṇaṁ.
—*Mūlācāra*, 1. 12.

108. Ekamidāhaṁ, Mahanāmā, samayaṁ Rājāgahe vihiraṁi Gajjhakūte pabbate. Tena kho pana samayena sambahulā Niganthā Isigili·· ·· āsanapaṭikkhittā, opakkamikā, dukkhā tibbā kharā kaṭukā vedanā vedayanti......*M.*, i. 93; cf. *M.*, ii, 31, 214 f.

119. *Mūlācāra*, comm. pt. 1. p. 491.

120. Viyatiyacaukkamāse loco ukkassamajjhimajahaṇṇo.
Sapadikkamaṇe divase uvavāseṇa [illegible] kāyavvo.
Mūlācāra, i. 20.

121. M., i. 77. 122. *Mūlācāra*, i. 36. 123. M., i. 77.

124. Maṇavacakāyapautti bhikkhū sāvajjakajjasaṃjuttā.
Khippaṃ ṇivārayanto tīhaiṁ du gutto havadi eso.
—*Mūlācāra*, 5. 134

125. M., i. 372 f.
126. See for the place and nature of Meditation in Jainism, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* by Tatiya. p. 261 f.
127. *TSū.*, 9. 28. Pare mokṣahetuḥ, *ibid.*, 9. 29.
128. Dhyāna Śataka, 30–34.

CHAPTER IV

Jaina Epistemology

1. Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa (Direct Knowledge)

1. Ete vivādā samaṇesu jātā, *Su.* 4. 8. 63.
2. Ye kecime Brāhmaṇā vādasīlā, *ibid*, 2. 14. 162.
3. Ye kecime Titthīya vādasīlā, Ājīvikā vā yadi vā Nigaṇṭhā, *ibid.*, 2. 14. 161.
4. *ibid.* 2. 14. 162.
5. *D.* i. 16.
6. na takkikā sujjhanti, Udāna, 6. 10. 23.
7. *A.* i. 189.
8. *AA.* ii. 305.
9. Tatparokṣaṁ, TSū. 1. 10.
10. Bhagavatīsūtra, 336;
11. Thāṇāṅgasūtrā, 309-310; *History of Indian Logic*, p. 162. *Caraka Samhitā*, 3. 8. 6. 25.
12. *Su.* 4. 8. 59, 60. 62; 411. 94.
13. *ibid.* 4. 8. 60-1.
14. *ibid.* ii. 76.
15. *Nyāya Sūtra*, 4. 2. 50-9.
16. *Vādanyāya*, p. 1.
17. *NV.* 2. 384.
18. *Aṣṭaśatī Aṣṭasahasrī*, p 87.
19. Bhāsappavādako, paṇḍitavādo, sādhu samma to bahijanassa, *M.* i. 227.
20. *ibid.* 23. 4. f.
21. *ibid.* 312.
22. *S.* iv. 323 ff
23. *ibid* i. 176; ii. 122.
24. M. i. 393; *S.* iv. 323.
25. *NV.* 2. 384.
26. *D.* i. 162
27. *D.* i. 163 ff.
28. *M.* i. 403 ff.
29. *SV.* 5, 2; *TSV.* 380.
30. *M.*, ii. 211; Jayatilleke, *R. N. Early Buddhist theory of Knowledge*, p. 171.

31. Niganṭho, āvuso, Nātaputto sabbaññū sabbadassāvī aparisesaṁ ñānadassanaṁ paṭijānāti, carato...samitaṁ ñānadassanaṁ paccupaṭṭhitaṁ. *M.*, i. 92-3' *A.*, i. 220-221.

32. Samyagdarśana jñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ, *TSū*, 1. 1

33. *TSū.* 1. 4.

34. *A.* iV. 429.

35. Cillakṣaṇa evātmā, TSP. P. 118, Jīvo upayogamao... *DS.* 2; *T V.* 2. 8.

36. *TV.* 1. 6. Cf. *Dhavalā Tīkā*, P. 149.

37. *Niyamasāra*, 60, 161-9.

38. *Dhavalā*, 1. 1. 4; *ST.* P. 2. 1.

39. 1. 1. 4.

40. STP. 2. 1.

41. *S V T.* intro. (Hindi), p. 40.

42. *SS.* 1. 15.

43. *S T P T.* p. 458.

44. *PMu.* 6. 1.

45. *Pramāṇanaya Tattvāloka*, 6. 25.

46. *S*amaṁ jāṇadi passadi viharaditti, Prakṛti Anuyoga; Janamane evaṁ ca naṁ viharai, *Ācārāṅga Sūtra.*

47. *STP.* 11; *VBH.* 3089-3135, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p* 75 ff.

48. *NS.* 159;

49. *TSū.* 2. 9;

50. *SS.* 2. 9.

32. *Aṣṭaś*, 101.

52. *Aṣṭasahasrī.*

53. *LT.* 1. 3, *SVT.* 1. 3, see intro. p. 97.

54. Pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānamanadhi...*Aṣṭaśatī-Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 175.

55. Jaṁ pardo Viññāṇaṁ taṁ tu parokkhati bhaṇidamatthesu. Jaṁ kevaleṇaṇādaṁ havadi hu jīveṇa paccakkhaṁ. *PS.*, 58

56. akṣṇoti vyāpnoti jānātītyakṣa ātmā, SS., P. 59; *PMu.*, 6. 1

57. Ādyeparokṣaṁ, *TSū*, 1. 11 : Pratyakṣamanyat. *ibid.*, 1. 11

58. *LT.* 4; *ViBh.* 95.

59. 1. 13.

60. Pratyakasamanyat, 1. 12.

61. *NA.* 1.

62. Aṣṭaśatī *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 175; *Pramāṇa Mīmāṁsā.*

63. *TSū* 1. 15.

64. *Pravacanasārā*, 23-4;

65. *VSu*. 3. 18. *NSu*. 1. 1. 4; *SK*. 5. *SSu*. 1. 89: *Yogabhāṣya*, 1. 7, *JSū*. 1. 1. 4; *Carakasaṁhitā*, 11. 20; See, *An Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*.

66. *YSu*. 3. 54; *SK*. 64.

67. *Vsu*. 9. 1; 13-15.

68. *N. B*. 1. 11,

69. *Tantravārtika*, p. 240.

70. *TS*. 1983.

71. *PSg* 1.3; *NP*. p. 7; *NB*.1.4.

72. SV. 1. 39.

73. *PKM*. 1. 3.

74. *TS*. 1983.

75. *ibid*.

76. *TSū*. 2. 9.

77. *Aṣṭaśatī Aṣṭasahśrī*, p. 275.

78. Ādye parokṣaṁ, Pratyakṣamanyat, TSū. 1. 11. 12.

79. Pratyakṣaṁ viṣadaṁ jñānaṁ mukyasaṁvyavahārataḥ. Parokṣaṁ śeṣavijñānaṁ pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ.

80. *TS*. 1214; *PSg*. p. 8.

81. *TSP*. p. 394; *NKC*. p. 46. *NVV*. p. 13.

82. *TSP*. p. 379, kā. 1265.

83. *ST*. p. 457.

84. *TSū*. 1. 15; LT. 6

85. *TSP*. p. 379.

86. Viṣayaviṣayīsannipātasamanantaramādyaṁ grahaṇamavagrahaḥ, TV. 1. 15. 1.

87. *TSP*. p. 379.

88-89. *ibid*. p. 389.

90. 1. 1. 4.

91. *NA*. p. 43; Tātparyavṛattiṭīkā, p. 145; *NM*. p. 100.

92. *PSg*. 1. 37.

93. *TS*. 1224.

94. *ibid*. 1270.

95. *TS*. 1274-6.

96. Bhedo vaiśiṣṭamuktaṁ hi na viśeṣaṇasaṅgatiḥ. Bhinnamityapi tadvācā nānuviddhaṁ pratīyate, *ibid*., 1272.

97. *ibid*. 1269.

98. Aṣṭaśatī *Aṣṭasahaśrī*, p. 175.

99. *NV*. 1. 158; Also see, *SV*. 1. 4; *TSV*. p. 185; *LT*. 1. 3.

100. *PKM*. p. 8; *NKC* p. 47.

101. *SVT*. p. 13.

102. *Aṣṭasahaśrī*, p. 75.

103. *TS*. 1273.

104. Viśeātmātirekeṇa nāparaṃ bhedalakṣaṇaṁ.
Tadrūpasparsaṇe teṣu grahaṇaṁ kathamucyate.
Tadrūpasparsaṇe cāpi bhedāntaravibheditaḥ.
Grahīta iti vijñānaṁ prāptameṣu vikalpakaḥ.
Ts. 1280-1.

105 *Vibhaṅga*. 323

106. *TS*. 1981–83.

107. *SM*. P. 111–2.; notes. p. 196.

108. *idid*. notes. p. 195.

109. Dve hi rūpaṁ kathaṁ nāma yukte ekasya vastunaḥ. Adve tadā vastuni prāpte aparasparārūpataḥ. Parasparātmatāyāṁ tu ta dyairūpyaṁ viruddhyate. Viśeṣaścopalabhyeta cakṣurādibhirindriyaiḥ. *TS*. 1984–5.

110. Na cāmūnyārthadūṣaṇāni syādvādādināṁ vidyate, *SM*., p. 111.

111. *TSū*. 1. 29; *SThSū* 71.

112. *TSū*. 22.

113. *TSū*. 1. 27.

114. *NSū*. 16.

115. *TSū* 1. 25.

116. *SS*. 1. 24.

117. *TV*. 1. 23.

118. *ViBH*. 814.

119. Niścayadvātriṁśikā, 17, quoted from Jñanavinduprakraṇa by Tatiya in *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 69, fn. 3. bhāvā jīvadayā jīvaguṇā cedanā ya uvaogo. *PKS*. 16.

120. Upaoge khalu duviho ṇāṇena ya dansṇena saṃjutto. *PKS*. 40; *DS*. 4

121. Appāṇaṃ viṇu ṇāṇaṃ ṇāṇāṃ viṇu appago e saṇdoho. Tamhū saparapayāsaṁ ṇāṇaṁ tahā daṁasṇaṁ hodi. *NS*. 170.

122. Bāhyābhyantarehetudvayasannidhāneyathāsambhavamupala bdhuscaitanyānuvidhāyī pariṇamaḥ. *TV*. 2.B.

123. Je egaṃ jāṇai te sabhaṃ Jāṇai, je sebhaṃ jāṇai te egaṃ, jāṇai, *pravacanasāra*. Also sse, *ASū*. 1. 3. 4 : *ViBh*. 320.

124. Jaṁ takkāliyamidaraṁ Jāṇadi Jugavaṁ samantado. sabbaṁ...PS. 1. 47-9.

125. idha, sandhaka, okacco sattha sabbaññū cabbadaesāvī aparisosaṁ ñanadassanaṁ paṭijānāti—carato ca me tiṭṭhato ca suttassa ca jāgrassa ca setataṃ samitaṃ. ñānadassanaṃ paccup aṭṭhitaṃ' ti, so ahuāññaṃpi agāraṃpi pavisati, piṇḍaṃ pi na labhati, kukkuro pi

-dasati, caṇḍena pi hatthinā samāgacchati, caṇḍena pi assena samāgacchati, caṇḍena pi goṇena samāgacchati, itthiyā pi purisassa pi nāmaṃ pi gottaṃ pi pucchati, gāmassa pi nigamassa pi nāmam pi maggaṃ pi pucchati. 'm. i. 529

126. (ekamihāhaṃ mahānāma samayam rājagahe viharāmi gijhakūṭe pabbate. tena kho pana samayena Nigaṇṭhā . katukā vedanā vedayanti...Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto sabbaññū sabbadassāvī·· kiṃ pana tumhe. no hidam. evaṃ sante āvuso Nigaṇṭhā, ye loke ludddā lohitapāṇino kuṟūrakammantā manussesu paccājātā te Nigaṇṭhesu pabbajantī 'ti).

127. *M*. ii 31; M. *Sayings*. ii. p. 228, i. 250.

128. *Buddhist Legend* (*Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*), Vol. 29. p. 74 ff.

129. M. ii. 31, 214 ff; M. i. 92f; *A*. i. 220; *A*. iii. 74; S. iv. 398.

130. tasmīdanuṣṭheyagataṃ jñānamasyavicīryatāṃ. kītasaṅkhyāparijñāne tasya nah kvopayujyate. heyopadeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ yaḥ pramāṇamasāviṣṭe na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ. dūraṁ pasyatu vā mī vā tattvamiṇṭnṃtu pasya tu. pramāṇṁ duradurśī Cedehi grdhrānupasmahe. 2. 31-33.

131. (tato'sya vītarāgātve sarvarthajñānasambhavaḥ. samahitasya sakalaṃ cakāstīti viniścitaṁ. sarveṣām vitarāgāṇāmetat kasmānna vidyate.rāgādikaṇayamātre hi tairyatnasya pravartanāt. punaḥ kālāntare teṣām sarvajñaguṇarāgiṇām. alpayatnena sarvajñatvasiddhiravāritā.—

132. *Bhāgavatī sūtra*, 9.32.
133. Ps. l. 47-49

134. sūkṣmantaritadūrārthaḥ pratyakṣaḥ kasyacidyathā. Anumeyatvato' gnyādiriti sarvajñasaṁsthitiḥ. *AM*. 5.

135. *Jayadhavalā ṭīkā.*

136. *Dharmottara Pradīpa*, p. 245, 248.

137. yadi sukṣme vyavahito va Vastuni Buddhiratyantaparokṣe na syātkathaṁ tarhi jyotirjñanavisaṃvādaḥ ?

jyotirjñanamapi hi sarvajñapravartitameva, etasmādavisaṃvāda......

Aklankenāpi :—

Dino jyotirjñānātsarvajatvasiddhiḥ. Taduktaṃ.
Dhiratyantaparokṣerthe na cetpuṁsaṃ kutaḥ punaḥ.
Jyotirjñānavisaṁvādaḥ srutatvāccetsādhanāntaram.

—*SVT*. p. 526;

quoted by Dharmottar in the *Dharmottara Pradīpa*, p. 245, 248 : compare-NV. 414; Śāstravārtāsamuccaya, 2. 3.

138. Jñāna syātiśayāt sidhyedvibhutvaṃ parimāṇvāt.
139. *ibid*. 8. 3.
140. *ibid*. 8. 10-14.
141. *ibid* 8. 12-18.
142. *SV*. 8 6
143. *PVA* 4. 91.
144. *ibid*. 8. 6-7.
145. *NV*. 37-40.
146. *NVV*. 50-52.
147. See my article *"The Conception of Omniscience in Buddhism"* appeared in *VSMP* 1968. Also see the *Appendix*. III.
148. *Tattvavaiśaradi*, 1. 11.
149. *Anu*. 160.
150. *PVM*. 2. 5.
151. *SV*. 3. 2.
152. *TS*. 1298.
153. PVM. 2. 5.
154. *Tātparyavṛttiṭīkā*, p. 21. ; *Kandali*, p. 61; *NM*. 22, etc.
155. *Prakaraṇa Pañjikā*, p. 42-3; *Vṛhati* Pa. p. 103; Śāstradīpikā, p. 124.
156. *Hetubinduṭīkā*.
157. *TSV*. 1. 10. 78; *PKM*. p. 16.
158. PM. p. 4-5.
159. *PMu*. 3. 5.; *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, p. 60.
160. SV. 227.
161. *Nyāya Vārtika Tātparya Ṭīkā*, d. 139.
162. PV. 3. 502-7.
163. *LT*. 10. 19. 21.
164. PM. 3. 11; SVT. intro.
165. *Śābarabhāṣya*, 9. 1. 1.
176. *TSaBh*. 1. 15.
167. PV. p. 7.
168. *LT*. 11.
169. SV. 3. 8. 9; *Lt*. 12.
170. Aṣṭaśati Aṣṭasahaśrī, p. 236.
171. *NKC*. pp. 724.

172. See in detail for this subject "*The Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*" and SVT. introduction, etc.

173. *NVV*. pt. II. p. 1. 174. *NV*. 170.

175. Sahakramabhāvaniyamo 'vinābhāvaḥ, PM. 3. 16.

176. SV. 6. 16. 177. *NV*. 21.

178. P*M*. 3. 22. 179. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1. 1. 32.

180. S*K*. (Māthuravṛtti), p. 5.

181. *Prakaraṇa Pañjikā*, p. 83-5.

182. Nyāya Praveśa, pp. 1. 183. Vādanyāya, p. 61.

184. PV. 128. 185. Sv. 6. 17;

186. PMū. 33-40.

187. Cetanāstaravaḥ iti sādhye sarvatvagapaharaṇe maraṇaṁ prativādyasiddhaṁ vijñānenadvatīyayurnirodhalakṣaṇasya maraṇasyanenābhyupagamāt, tasya ca tarusvasaṁbhavāt; NB., 59.

188. Digambarāstu sādhyena vyāptamavyāptaṁ vā maraṇaṁ...... p. 190-1.

189. Candratvenāpadiṣṭannācandraḥ śaśalāñchanaḥ.
Iti dvilakṣaṇo heturayaṁ cāpara ucyate. etc. TS., 1372-1379.

190. *TSP*. 1375. 191 *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metapaysics*, *p*. *86*.

192. *PMu*. 3. 37-40. 193. *Pramāṇa* Mīmāmsā.

194. *RVS*. p. 548. 195 *TS*. 1395.

196. *ibid*. 1397. 197. *ibid*. 1398-1429.

198. Nyāyāvatāra Vārtika Vṛtti, Prastāvanā, p. 76-8.

199. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 200, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, p. 203.

200. S*K* (Māṭharavṛtti), 5. 201. *NP*. 1; *NB*. 2-5; *HB*. P. 4; *PS*. 1362.

202. *Tātparyaṭīkā*, 1. 1. 5; *NM*. p. 110. 203. *SV*. 6. 2.

204. *Dharmottar-pradīpa*, p. 35

205. Pātrasvāmimatamāśaṅkate : —
Anyathā' nupapannatve nānudraṣṭā śca hetutā.
Nāsati tryaṁśakasyāpi tasmātklībāstrilakṣaṇaḥ.
Anya thānupapannatvaṁ yasyāsau heturisyate.
Ekalakṣaṇakaḥ so rthasheturlakṣaṇako na vā.

206. Tena tadviṣayatrilakṣaṇakaderthanaṃ uttarabhāṣyaṃ yataḥ kṛtam, *SVT*. p. 371.

207. Mahimā sā Pātrakeśarīguroḥ param bhavati yasya bhaktyāsīt. Padmāvatisahāyā trilakṣanakadarthanam kartum.

— *Jaina Silālekha Saṅgrah*, Pra. Le. 54.

208. *TS*. 1364-5.
209. *ibid*. 1370.
210. *TSP*. p. 406, Kā. 1371.
211. *TS*. 1380-1.
212. *ibid*. 1386-8.
213. *ibid*. 1389.
214 *ibid*. 1395-1429.
215. *ibid*. 1416.
216. *NKC*. p. 440; *SVT*. 6. 16.
217. *HBTA*. p. 290.
218. *HBT*. p. 37.
219. *Aṣṭasahasrī*, p. 3.

CHAPTER V

Anekāntavāda

1. The Theory Of Anekāntavāda

1. This classification excludes the less important conceptions such as *hetuvāda, ahetuvāda, bhāvavāda, abhāvavāda, daivavāda puruṣārthavāda*, and so on. See in detail, *Darśana aura cintana* and *Jaina theory of reality and knowledge*.

2. Utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṁ sat, *Tsū* 5. 30, Guṇaparayayavaddravyaṁ, *TSū*, 5. 38.

Kumārilabhaṭṭa also maintains the nature of reality to be of three-fold character. His view is almost identical with that of Jaina philosophy (see *Ślokavārtika Kārikā*, 21-22. But the difference between the views of Kumārila and Jainas is that the former adheres to a "middle position" (*mādhyasthatā*), between the two extremes of the bheda (anya) and the abheda (ananya), each of which (ekāntikaṁ) is characterised as fallacious (mṛṣā), while the latter recognizes them to a certain extent as right and not

fallacious. Whitehead (PrR. p. 318), Frauwallner and Kant (*The Philosophy of Kant Explained*, by John Watson, Glasgow, 1908, p. 199) are also of about the same view. Hegel, (Hegel's *science of Logic*, tr. by W. H. Johnson and L. G. Struthers, 1929, London, Vol. I. p. 195), Bradley (*Principles of Logic*, by F. H. Bradley, Oxford, 1940, Vol. II. p. 487), Bosanquet (*The essentials of Logic*, by B. Bosanquent, London, 1903, p 134) too are of the close views to the Jaina view of reality. See in detail, Jaina theories of reality and knowledge, pp. 131.

3. See, *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, pp. 258.
4. Atho khalu davvamao davvāṇi guṇappagāni bhaṇidāṇi. *PS.*, 119.
5. *Pravacanasāra*, Jayasena's commentary, p. 121.
6. *STP*. 2. 9--14; *TV*. pt. I, p. 428. 7. *TV*. 5. 37, 2--4.
8. *NKC*. p. 363.
9. Āvuso tvaṁ mama accayena Sassataṁ ti, gaṇhapesi. Evam dve pi jane eka laddhike akatvā bahu-nānā-nihārena uggaṇhapetvā kālaṁ akāsi. Te tassa sarira-kiccaṁ katvā sannipatitā aññahi aññaṁ pucchiṁsu--"kas' āvuso ācāriyo sāraṁ ācikkhī ?" ti "Sassataṁ" ti. Aparo taṁ paṭibāhetvā "Mahyaṁ sāraṁ ācikkhī ti" āha. Evaṁ sabbe : Mahyaṁ sāraṁ ācikkhi,...... *DA* , ii. 906-7. *MA*., ii. 831.
10. *A*., ii. 46; *Millinda Pañha*, iv. 2. 5. Also see, *A*., i. 197.
11. M., ii. 46.
12. Vibhajjavāvaṁ ca vyāgarejee, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1. 14. 22.
13. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 292.
14. *D* i. 191. 15. *HBT*. p. 284.
16. *PVS*. p. 333; *HBT*. p. 369.
17. na sāmānyatmanodeti na vyetivyaktamanvayāt...... -*AM*., 59-61. quoted in *PVST*., by Karṇakagomin, p. 333; Durvekamiśra quotes one more kārikā in the *Hetubindutīkāloka* p. 371.

Na nāśena vinā śoko notpādena vinā dhṛtiḥ.
Sthityā vinā na mādhyasthyaṁ tasmāt vastu trayātmakaṁ.

18. *pravacanasāra*, 17-18.
19. *Lt.*, 30; PM., p. 24.
20. Dravyaśabdena dravati paryāyena gacchatī ti p. 337.
21. *Tattvasāṅgrah, Ātmaparīkṣī.*
22. *HBT.* p: 28.
23. *Prameyaratnmālā*, p. 4, also see, the VIIIth chapter of the *Tattvasaṅgrahə*).
24. See, *TS.*, 350-546. Also see, *HBT*, p. 213. The *Syādvāda-Mañjarī* (p. 19) refers to a stanza in this respect : Yo yatraiva sa tatraiva yo yadaiva tadaiva saḥ. Na deśakālayorvyāptirbhāvānāmiha vidyate.
25. Pūrvaṁ naśvarācchaktātkāryaṁ kinnāvinaśvarāt.
Kāryotpattiviruddhyeta na vai kāraṇasattatayā.
Yad yadā kāryamutpitsu tattadottpādanātmakaṁ.
Kāraṇaṁ kāryabhedena na bhinnaṁ kṣaṇikaṁ yathā..
—*SV.*, 3 11-12. Also see, *NKC.*, p. 379. etc. *Jaina Theories and reality of knowledge.*
26. *HBTA.* p. 373 4
27. Tanna tāvadakṣaṇiko bhāvaḥ kāryaṃ kartum śaknoti, tasya kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāt nāpi kṣaṇiko bhāvaḥ kāryaṃ prabhavati. tathāhi kiṃ kṣaṇiko bhāvaḥ svasattakāle kāryakāraṇasvabhāve' thānyadā. yadi prathamavikalpastadā tadaiva kuryāt. svasattākṣaṇe ca kāryakṛtau saivaṁ jagadekalakṣaṇavarti prāpnoti. tathāhi kāraṇam svasattākṣaṇa eva yat kāryamakṛta tadapyanyasya kāraṇamiti tadapi tadaiva svakāryaṁ kuryāt .. . *ibid* p. 374.
28. Tarhi kāryamapi tadaivotpādyeta'nyadā tatkālaṁ. parihṛtya kāryotpattirvirudhyeta..... *ibid.*
29. *ibid.* p. 374.
30. *TS.*, intro. p. 1.
31. *Uttarādhyayana*, 20-15; 23. 28; 26. 9; 28. 16; 28. 19. *Bhagavatīsūtra*, 73. 2(9; *Daśvaikālikasūtra*, 4. etc.
32. *TS.* 352.
33. *ibid.* 336-349.

34. *Jaina Theory of Reality of Knowledge*. p. 173.

35. Nanvanekātmakaṁ vastu yathā mecakratnavat.
Prakṛtyaiva sadādīnāṁ ko virodhastathā sati.
—*TS.*, 1709.

36. Tāsu tāsu hyavasthāsu sa evāyaṁ nara iti anuvṛttipratyayahetor naratvajāterūrdhvatāsāmānyaśabdābhilApyastāsu cāvasthāsu......*HBTA*. p. 343. CF. Parāparavivartavyāpi dravyaṁ ūrdhvatā mṛdiva sthāsādisu, PM. 4.5 ekasmin dravye kramabhāvinaḥ pariṇāmaiḥ paryayaḥ ātmani harṣaviṣādivat, PM. 4. 8. *HBTA*, p. 343; *PM.*, 4.5.

37. Tiryaksāmānyavyāvṛttipratyayaheto ....
HBTA., p. 343. Cf.
Sadraśāpariṇāmastiryak khaṇḍamuṇḍādiṣu gotvavat.
PM., 4. 4.

38. PM., 4. 9.

39. *PVST*. p. 333; *HBTA*. p. 369. etc.

40. *HBT*. p. 98.

41. Deśakālasvabhāvānāmabhedādekatocyate............
Sāṅkhyālakṣaṇasanjñārthabhedāt bhedāstu varṇyate.
Rūpādayo ghaṭaścetai saṅkhyāsaṁjña vibheditā.
Kāryānuvṛttivyāvṛtti lakṣanārthavibheditā.
Dravyaparyāyayorevaṁ naikāntenā 'viśeṣavat.
dravyaṁ paryāyarūpeṇa viśeṣaṁ yāti cet svayaṁ.
—TS., 313–315; also see, *HBT.*, pp. 98.

42. kiñcidvivakṣitaṁ vastughaṭādi,.........
yadi ghaṭādirbhāvaḥ paṭādinā bhāvāntareṇatulyaḥ syāt-tato yadi vyāvṛttaḥ syāt, tadā khapuṣpānna tasya viśeṣaḥ syāt, sarvathā vastvantarādvyāvṛttavāt, na ca vastvantarādvyāvṛttasyānyagatiḥ sambhavati, khapuṣpatām muktvā. tasmāttasya vastunaḥ khapuṣpatulyatvamabhyupagacchatā bhāvāntaratulyatvaṁ vastutvaṁ nāma sāmānyamabhyupagantavyamiti siddham sāmānyātmakaṁ —TSP., p. 487.

43. *TSP*. P. 487.

44. *TS*. 1712–13.

45. *ibid*. 1714–16.

46. *ibid* 1718-19.

47. *ibid*. 1720–21.

48. *Tārkabhāsā*, pt. *T*. p. 5

49. *PV.*, 3. 237.
50. Pārtantrayaṁ hi sambandhaḥ siddhe kā paratantratā. Tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasy sambandho nāsti tattvataḥ. —quoted in *TV.*, p. 146, *NKC.* 305.
51. Rūpaśleṣo hi sambandhaḥ dvitve sa ca kathaṁ bhavet. Tasmāt prakṛtibhinnānāṁ sambandho nāsti tattvataḥ. —quoted in the *TSV.*, p. 148. cf. *NKC.*, p. 306; *PKM.*, p. 149.
52. *Jaina Thories of Reality and Knowledge.* p. 232. f.
53. Dravyakṣetrakālabhāvakṛta hi pratyāsattiḥ ekatvapariṇatisvabhāva pāratantryapariṇāma sambandho' rthānāmabhipreto Jainaiḥ ..rūpaśleso hi. *NKC.*, p. 307.
54. *NKC.*, p. 369. *Jaina Theories of reality and knowledge*, p. 283.

2. The Theory of Nayavāda

55. Nayo jñātirabhiprāyaḥ, *LT.*, 55. Anirākṛtapratipakṣo vastvaṁśagrāhī jñāturabhiprāyo nayaḥ. *PKM.* p. 676.
56. Sadeva sat syāt saditi tridhārtho, mīyet durnītinayapramāṇaiḥ, *SM.*, 28.
57. See. TV. 1. 33; *Epitom of Jainism.*
58. *A.* ii. 191–3.
59. Nayena neti, *S.* ii. 58; anayena nayati dummedho, *J.* iv. 241.
59. Nayaṁ nayati medhāvī, *J.* iv. 241.
61. Dve satye samupāsritya buddhānaṁ dharmadeśanā. Lokasaṁvṛtisatyaṁ ca satyaṁ paramārthataḥ. —*MK* Ārya. 8.
62. *A.* iii. 178; *Netti.* 21. *J.* iv. 241.
63. Ns., 897, 904, 911. cf. *Milinda Pañha*, 160.
64. *Sn.* 68, 219.
65. Dve'me Tathāgataṁ Abbhācikkhanti Katamaṁ dve ? Yo ca Neyyatthaṁ suttantaṁ nītattho suttanto ti dipeti; yo ca nītattham suttantaṁ nevyattho suttanto ti dipeti, *A.*, i. 60.
66. *AA.*, i. 95; Cf. *Kathāvatthu, Aṭṭhakathā*, 34.

67. *Sn.* 884. 68. *A.* ii. 41; v. 29.

3. The Theory of Syādvāda

69. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 141.
70. *SV.* p. 1027.
71. *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, Fascicule : A-Aca-P, p. 142.
72. *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 22.
73. PKM. 526.
74. Sarvamasti svarūpeṇa pararūpeṇa nāsti ca.
Anyathā sarvasattvaṁ syāt svarūpasyāpyasambhavaḥ.
—*SM.*, 14.
75. Vastvasaṅkarasiddhiśca tatprāmāṇyaṁ samāśritā.
Kṣiradadhyādi yannāsti prāgabhāvaḥ sa ucyate
NKC., p. 467.
76. PKS., 9.
77. Nāstitā payaso dadhai pradhvamsābhāvalaksaṇaṁ,
—*NKC.*, p. 467.
78. Gavi yo'śvādyabhāvastu so' nyonyābhāva ucyate.
NKC., Vol. II. p. 467.
79. *ibid.*, Vol. II. p. 467; *Jaina theories of Reality and knowledge*, p. 350.
80. *Jaina Theories of Reality* and Knowledge, p. 363.
81. *Ṛgveda*, x. 129, Tr. Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader for Students*. p. 207-8.
82. *Vī.*, 2. 1-8.
83. *Tup.* 2. 7; Also see the *CHU p.* 3. 19. 1.
84. *MUp.* 2. 2. 1. 85. *ChUp.* 3. 19. 1.
86. *Sāṅkhyapar avacanabhāṣya*, p. 3
87. *Nyāyabhāṣya*, 2. 1. 18.
88. *Vedāntasāra*, p. 25.
89. Santi...eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā amarāvikkhepikā, tattha tattha pañhaṁ puṭṭhā samaṇa vācāvikkhepaṁ āpajjanti amarāvikkhepaṁ catūhi vatthūni, *D.*, I. 24.
90. *DA.* 1. 115.
91. Idha...ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā idaṁ kusalaṁ ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti, idaṃ akusalaṃ ti yathā-

bhūtaṁ nappajānāti. Tassa evaṃ hoti. Ahaṁ kho idaṁ kusalaṁ ti yathābhūtaṁ nappajānāmi, idaṁ akusalaṁ ti yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāmi. Ahañ c' eva kho pana idaṁ ti yathābhūtaṁ appajānāto, idaṃ kusalaṃ ti yathābhūtaṁ appajānato idaṁ. knsalaṁ ti. vā vyākareyyaṁ, idaṃ, akusalaṁ ti vā vyākareyyaṃ, tattha me assa chando vā rāgo vā doso vā paṭigho vā taṃ mam' assa musā. Yam mam' assa musā so mam'assa vighāto. Yo mam'assa vighāto so mam'assa antarāyo ti. Iti so musāvādabhayā musāvādaparijegucchā n'ev idaṁ kusalaṁ ti vyākaroti na pana idaṁ akusalaṁ ti vyākaroti, tattha tattha pañhaṁ puṭṭho samaṇo vācā vikkhepaṁ āpajjati amarāvikkhepaṁ : Evaṁ ti pi me no. Tathā ti pi me no. Aññathā ti pi me no. No ti pi me no. No no ti pi me no ti. *D.*, i. 24-5.

92. *DA.*, i. 155.

93. idha, bhikhave, ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā mando hoti momūho. So mandattā momūhattā tattha tattha pañhaṁ puṭṭho samāṇo vācāvikkhepaṁ āpajjati amarāvikkhepaṁ–Atthi paro loko ti...evaṁ ti pi me no, ti. tathā ti pi me no, aññathā ti pi me no, no no ti pi me no ti. Natthi paro loko ti pe...atthi ca natthi ca paro loko pi...nevatthi na natthi paro loko pi...; atthi sattā opapātikā pi, natthi sattā opapātikā, nevatthi na natthi sattā opapātikā; atthi sukaṭadukkhaṭānaṁ kammānaṁ phalaṁ vipāko, natthi... vipāko, atthi ca natthi...vipāko, nevatthi na natthi... vipāko. Hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā, na hoti... maraṇaṁ, *neva hoti na na hoti...maraṇā*. *D.* 1. 27.

94. *D.*, i 58-59.

95. *DA.*, i. 115; see, Jaytilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, *p.* 136.

96. Keith writes–he (sañjaya) seems as an agnostic to have been the first to formulate the four possibilities.

of existence, non-existence, both and neither..." *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 303 : Raju, P. T. also supports this view stating "the principle seems to have been first used by Sañjaya"—an article "*The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy.*"

97. *Buddhism and Culture*, ed. Susuma Yamaguchi, Kyoto, 1960 p. 71.

98. Asiyasayaṁ Kriyānaṁ Akriyavāeṇa hoi culasie. Annaniya sattatthi veniyana ca vattisa. *Sūkṛ*. Vo. I. fol. 212.

99. *Ibid.* 1. 3 11-34; *Vṛtti*, p. 45–6; Vavisam suttaim tikanaiyaim terasia sutta parivadie, *Samavāyāṅga* 22. 4.

100. Tathā te eva Gośāla-pravarttitā Ājīvakāḥ pāsaṇḍinas Trairāśikā ucyante, yatas te sarvaṁ vastu tryātmakaṁ icchanti tad yathā jīvo jīvājīvās ca loko' loko lokālokāśca, sadasat sadasat. Naya-cintāyāṁ drvyāstikaṁ paryāyāstikaṁ ubhayāstikaṁ ca, Tatas tribhi rāsibhis caranti iti Trairāsikaḥ. *Nandi comm.*, fol. 113, quoted by Weber Verzeichniss, ii, p. 685. Cf. *Samavāya comm.*, fal. 129. *History and doctrines of the Ājīvikas*. p. 275.

101. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 156.

102. Na yā vi panne parihāsakujjā, ṇa yā' siyāvāya viyāgarejja, *Sūkṛ*. 1. 14. 19.

103. Saṅkejja yā' saṁkitabhāva bhikkhū, vibhajjavāyaṁ ca viyāgarejja, bhāsādukaṁ dhammaṁ-samutthitehiṁ vyāgarejjā samayā supanne. *ibid.* 1. 14. 22.

104. *PK*. 14.

105. Vibhajjavāyaṁ ca viyāgraejja, *sūkṛ*. 1. 14. 22.

106. Ekaṁsikā pi ..mayā dhammā desitā paññattā, anekaṁsikā pi desitā, paññattā, *D. i.* 191, ; Cf. vibhajjavādo ..ahaṁ...nāhaṁ ..ekaṁsavādo, *M. ii.* 197.

107. "The Logic of Relatively as the Common Ground for the Development of the Middle Way", *Buddhism and Culture*, ed. Susuma Yamāguchi, Kyoto, 1960, p. 80.

108. *MA*. ii. 831; *DA*. iii. 906. 109. *M*. i. 232.

110. *S*. iv. 298–9. 111. *M*. i. 498 ff.

112. *MA*. iii. 204. 113. *DPPN*., sv. *Dīghanakha*.

114. Katamo ca Rāhulo tejodhātu ? tejodhātu siyā ajjhattikā siyāvahirā, *M*., *Cūlarāhulovādasutta*; Also see the *Bodhirājakumārasutta* of the same Nikāya, p. 330 (Nāgarī edition).

115. Utpādādyastrayo vyastā nālaṁ lakṣaṇakarmaṇi. Saṁskṛtasya samastasyu rekatra kathamekadā. Utpādasthitibhaṅgnamanyat saṁskṛtalakṣaṇam. Asticedanvasthaivannāsti cette na saṁskṛtaḥ. Mk.45-6.

116. Etenaiva yadahrīkāḥ kimapyaślamākulaṁ. Pralapanti pratikṣiptaṁ tadapyekānta sambhavāt. Digambarāṇāṁ idaṁ ca kimapyayuktaṁ aslilamaheyopādeya. maparinisṭhānāt ākule "syāduṣtro dadhi na syāditi" yairuktaṁ te' pi etenaiva prakṣiptaḥ. bhābenaiva ekāntabhedāt. *PV*. 1. 183.

117. Sarvasyobhayarūpatve tadviśeṣanirākṛteḥ.
Codito dadhi khādeti Kimuṣṭraṁ nābhidhāvati.
Athāstya-tiśayaḥ kaścit yena bhedena vartate.
Sa eva dadhyonyatra nāstityanubhayaṁ paraṁ. *ibid* 1. 184–5.

118. Sarvātmatve ca sarveṣāṁ bhinnau syātāṃ na dhīdhvaniḥ. Bhedasaṁhāravādasya tadabhāvādasambhavaḥ. *ibid*., 1. 185-6

119. Athotpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṁ yattatsadiṣyate. Eṣāmeva na satvaṁ syāt etadbhāvādhiyogataḥ. etc., *PVA*., p. 142.
Yadā vyavastadāsatvaṃ kathaṃ tasya pratīyate. Pūrvaṃ pratītes atvaṃ syāt tadā tasya vyayaḥ katham.

Dhrauvye'pi yadi nāsmin dhīḥ katham satvam pratīyate.
Pratīterevasarvasya tasmātsattvaṃ kuto' nyathā.
Tasmānnityānityasya vastunaḥ sambhavaḥ qvacit.
Anityaṃ nityamathāvastu ekāntena yuktimat.
PVA, p. 142.

120. *HBT.*, p. 233.

121. "Utpādavyayadhrauvya yuktaṁ sat" ityetadapyayuktaṁ, dhra uvenotpādavyayayorvirodhāt, ekasmin dharmiṇyayogāt, kathañcit utpādavyayau kathañcit, dhrauvymiti cet. yathotpadau na tathā dhrauvyayaṁ, yathā ca dhrauvyaṁ na tathotpadavyayayayāviti naikaṁ vastu yathoktalakṣaṇaṁ syāt. *ibid.* p. 146.

122. Drvyaparyāyarūpatvāt dvairūpyaṁ vastunaḥ kila. Tayorekātmakatvépi bhedaḥ. saṁjñādibhedatḥ *ibid.*, p. 104.

123. *ibid.* v. 4-5.

124. *ibid.* v. 7-12, p. 105.

125. *ibid.*, v. 20 & 25. p. 106.

126. *TSP*. p. 421.

127. *TS*. 1722

128. *ibid.* 1723.

129. *ibid.* 1720-30

130. cf. *ibid.* 1733-35.

131. yo'pi Digambaro manyate—Sarvātmakameyedaṃ syādanyāpohāvyatikrme tasmād bheda evānyathā na syādanyābhāvo bhāvānāṃ yadi na bhībediti, sopyanena nirastaḥ. abhāvena bhāvsbhedasya kartumaśakyatvāt. nāpyabhinnānāṃ hetuto niṣpannānāmanyonyābhāvaḥ sambhavati. bhinnāscennispannāḥ. kathamanyonyābhāvaḥ sambhavati ? *PVST*. p 109.

132. tena yo'pi Digambaro manyate...sopyatra nirākṛta eva drastavyaḥ. tadvātī sāmānyaviśeṣavati vastunyabhyupagamyamāne atyantenabhedābhedau syātāṃ... atha sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ kathañcidabbeda iṣyate...... mithyāvāda eva syādvādaḥ. —*PVST.*, p. 332-42.

133. *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 22-23.

134. Sadbhūtā dharmāḥ sattādidharmaiḥ samānā bhinnāścāpi yathā Nirgranthādīnāṃ. Tanmataṃ na

samanjasam. kasmāt ? no bhinnābhinnāmete'pi pūrvavat bhinnābhinnayordoṣābhāvāt......ubhayorekasmin asiddhatvāt......bhidnnābhnnakalpenā na sadbhūtaṃ nyayāsiddhaṃ satyābhāsaṃ grahitaṃ. 2. 2.

135. Guṇaved dravyamutpadavyadhrauvādayo guṇaḥ. Dudrāva dravati drosyatyekānekaṁ svaparyāyaṁ. Bhedajñānāt pratiyet prādurbhāvatyayau yadi. Abhedajñānataḥ siddhā sthitiraṁśena kenacit. *NV.*, 117-8.

136. Arcāṭacaṭaka tadasmāduparaṁa, dustarkapakṣabalacalanāt. Syādvādācalavidalanacuñcurna tavāsti nayacañcuḥ. —*NVV.*, 1087.

137. *AJP.* Vol. I. p. 72.

138. Na naraḥsiṁharūpatvā na siṁho nararūpataḥ.
Sabdavijñākayāṇāṁ bhedāt jātyantaraṁ hi tat.
Nanaro nararyeveti na siṁhaḥ siṁha eva hi.
Samānādhikaraṇyena narasiṁhaḥ prakīrtitaḥ.
Dravyāt svasmādabhinnaśca vyāvṛttaśca parasparaṁ.
Unmajjanti nimajjanti jalakallolavat jale.
—*NKC*, p. 369 ; also see *APT.*, p. 15.

139. Bhūtadoṣasyodbhāvayitumaśakyatvena asaddūṣaṇenodbhāvanaṁ sa jātih, *NVV.*, Vol. 11. p. 233.

140. Tatra mithyottarāṁ jātiḥ yathā' nekāntavidviṣāṁ. Dadhyuṣṭrāderabhedātvāprasaṅgādekacodanaṁ. *NV.*, 2. 203.

141. *NVV.*, Vol. II. p. 233.

142. Pūrvapakṣamavijñāya dūṣako' pi vidūṣakaḥ iti prasiddhaḥ. *NVV.*, Voil. ii, p. 233
At another place Dharmakīrti is called '*Kathamunmātto*' NVV., p. 17 Kutsitmāsaṁsamānaḥ ayaṁ prasiddho Dhārmakīrti kenāpi Dignāgādinā vañcitaḥ (*SVT.*, p. 365 etc.)

143. *NV.*, 2. 204-5. Like-wise at another place Akalaṅka,

commenting on the Buddhist Ācāryas, especially Dharmakīrti, says:

Dadhyādau na pravarteta Bauddha tadbhuktaye,
Janah, Adrasyaṁ saugatiṁ tatra tanuṁ saṁśaṅkamānakāḥ.
Dadhyādike tathā bhukte na bhūktaṁ kañcikādikaṁ.
Ityāsau vettu no vetti na bhuktā saugatī tanuḥ.

—*Siddhiviniścayāsvavṛtti*, 6, 37.

144. Sthūletarākārayorāpyevamanyonyabhede satyapi dravyeṇaikena tādātmyopapatteravaya vino Jainābhimatasya suvyavasthatvāt, *NVV* Pt. ii. p. 172 ; Sadraśātmānaḥ santo niyatarttayaḥ. *ibid* pt. ii. p. 52.

145. *PSg*. p. 115-6.

APPENDICES

1. The Date of Buddha.
2. Buddhist Councils.
3. The Conceptions of Omniscience in Buddhism.

APPENDIX 1

The Date of Buddha

The chief landmark of Buddhist chronology is the year and date of the Buddha's parinibbāna which is said to lie according to two main traditions, somewhere between 487-477 B. C. and 543-544 B. C

Charpentier[1], Max Muller[2], and General A Cunningham[3] asserted 477-478 B. C as the date of the Buddha's demise. According to them, the year of Chandragupta's accession was 315 B. C. and it is now proved to be an erroneous premise.

Oldenberge[4] favours 481 B. C. while V. A. Smith prefers 486 B. C. Smith depends on the so called *"Cantonese Dotted Record"*. It is said that Bhikṣu Saṅghabhadra sent news of the Buddha's parinibbāna to China. Since then an arrangement of reckoning the Buddha's death by marking a dot each year had been made in Canton, and this dotted record continued upto the year 489 A. D. All the dots were counted in 489 A. D., and their total number reached 975, which suggests 486 B. C. as the year of Buddha's death. It is not easy to recognize the *dotted record* as being trust worthy unless other strong evidence supports it.

Raychaudhuri[5] accepts 486 B. C, while Kern[6] places it in 488 B. C. On the other hand, Muni Nugaraj[7] mentions 502 B. C. as the year of the Buddha's parinibbāna. But all these conceptions do not carry weight as they do not take into account all the evidences.

Another date **483 B. C.**, which seems more reliable, is supported by several non-traditionalists or reformed traditionalist scholars. Sylvain Levi[8] pointed out from the Chinese accounts that 483 B. C. was reckoned as the Buddha's demise up to the 4th century in Ceylon, while E. R. Ayroton[9], the late Archaeological Commissioner of Ceylon, and Wickrema-

singhe[10] try to prove the acceptability of this date from the beginning of the 4th century up to the 11th century. Geiger also warmly accepts this view.

John M. Seneviratne established his theory that "The era reckoned from 483 B. C. remained not only up to the 11th century but up to the end of the 15th century, when the new tradition that the Buddha died in 544 B. C.-came in and soon ousted the old, are creating no little confusion, not so much during the transitionary stage as in our own time.[11]

The scholars, who accept 483 B. C. as the date of the Buddha, urge that 218 years after Buddha's death, Asoka's consecration took place. They quote the *Dīpavaṃsa*[13], and *Mahāvaṃsa*[14] in support of their theory. As regards Aśoka's consecration, they say that his predecessors Bindusāra and Candragupta ruled for 28 and 24 years, according to the Ceylonese chronology.[15] And Asoka was consecrated four years after he had already reigned over the country.[16] This means Candragupta would have ascended the throne 162 years (218 - 4=214 - 28+24=162) after the Buddha's nibbāna.

Fortunately they could say with almost certainty that Chandragupta's accession took place in 321 B. C., since Alexander the Great died at Babylon in the same year and this fact has been amply recorded[17]. From this they conclude that the Buddha's death would have taken place in 483 B. C. (321+162=433).

Hoernle, on the otherhand, accepts 482 B. C. as the "Practically certain" date of the Buddha's parinibbāna. He supports his view by the evidence that Bimbisāra was murdered by his son eight years before the Buddha's nibbānā.[18] Though there is no great difference between the dates, 483 B. C. appears the more dependable one.

As regards the **traditional date** of Buddha, it is yet to be asertained, since the tradition itself is not accepted with unanimity. According to the Buddhist Chronicles of Ceylon and Burma, the Nibbāna took place in 544-543 B. C., while

the Northern Indian traditions place it at a very early date. Cunningham[19] refers to some of them. In the time of Hwen Thasang, A. D. 630--645, the Buddhist schools held widely different opinions, varying from 900 and 1000 years up to 1200, 1300 and even 1500 years prior to that date[20], which would place the Nibbāna of the Buddha either in 250, or 350, or 550, or 650 and 850 B. C. The same extravagant antitquity was also asserted in the time of Fa-Hian, who places the Nibbāna during the reign of Ping-Wang, Emperar of China, in B. C. 770-719[21]. A similar antiquity was still claimed as late as the Twelth Century A. D., during the reign of Asoka Balla Deva. Two of his inscriptions are dated in the years 51 and 74 of the Lakṣmaṇa Sena era, or in A. D. 1159 and 1180. A third inscription, which is dated in the year 1813 after the Nibbāna of Buddha shows that at that time, Nibbāna was believed to have occured between about 656 to 633 B. C.

But all the traditional views, except the traditions of Ceylon and Burma, do not have sufficiently strong evidances in their support. According to the Mahāvaṃsa, Parākramabāhu I was crowned when 1696 years had elapsed since the Buddha's death, that is, in the year 1697 A. B. The Ceylonese era falls this year 1153 A. D.[22] This is supported by an independant source, viz. a South Indian Inscription at the Temple of Tiruvalisvara in Arpakkama. According to the Cūlavaṃsa, 56.16 foll., the predecessors of Parākramabāhu, from Parākrama Pāṇḍu onwards, reigned 107 years. Thus the accession of the last-named prince falls at 1590 A. D. Moreover, this date is confirmed by the South Indian Manimangalam inscription, which is dated the same year[23]. All this shows that for the second half of the twelfth century the existence of the Ceylon era, reckoned from 544; is established with certainty.[24]

In support of this view, we can now put forward another evidence. An inscription has been recently discovered near Anurādhāpura in Ceylon which delineates the various kinds of donations made by king Upatissa 1, the elder brother and

predecessor of the king, for the benefit of the Bodi-shrine. S. Paranavitana, on the basis of this earliest inscription so far found in which a date is given in the Buddhist era reckoning from the Parinirvāṇa of Buddha along with the regnal year of the king reigning at the time, has been able to say that the Budhist era reckoned from 544 B C. was prevalent in the reign of king Upatissa I (368-410). A. D[25].

It is to be noted here that some scholars think of 483 B. C. as the Ceylonese traditional era of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa. M. De. Z. Wickremasinghe, however, tried to establish the view that till the 11th Centuary A. D. the tradition of counting the Buddhist era from 483 B. C. was prevalent both in India as well as in Ceylon. He suggested that the mistake might have occured in regard to the length of reigns assigned to the several kings who preceded the great Vijaya Bāhu I. His reason for suggesting it is that it was a century of foreign domination for about 86 or 96 years, the Cholians over-ran the Island, carrying destruction every-where. If a mistake did really occur in this chronology, it is most probable that it was due to such difficult circumstances.[26]

Senaviratne[27] too has attempted to prove that the death of Buddha took place in the year 483 B. C., on the strength of the conclusion arrived at by Fleet and accepted by Geiger and Wikramasinghe. He says that the correctness of Fleet's date is beyond question. According to him, the above date continued till the time of Parākramabāhu VI when it was corrupted by the addition of 93 years; and a few centuries still later a Buddhist monk at kandy dropped out of this 93, when the era assumed its present date.

But these views are refuted by other eminent scholars. E. Hultzsch[28] pointed out that the above view, that of reckoning the era from 483 B. C. is based on an erroneous translation by Wijesinghe of passage in the *Cūlavaṃsa* (Chapter, 53.v. 44), H, W. Codringron[29] remarked on the paper of Seneviratne that the Kalyāṇī inscription indicated that the "Sakarāja" era as that used in Burma and dating from

A, D. 638, according to a Burmese inscription, is dated śakarāja 657 at Bodhigayā." "This date", he says "however, shows that the Buddhist era, as used in Burma in the fifteenth centuary was 544 B. C". E. M. Abhesinghe,[30] on the basis of Jaina literature, criticising the view of Seneviratne, says that "We know that Buddha was countemporaneous with Bimbisāra, and if with the Jainas, we identify Swāmi Gautama or Gautama Indrabhūti with Lord Buddha, the first disciple of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra, we can approximately fix, from both these sources, the date of the great demise at 544 B. C."[31]

In connection with Abhesinghe's conclusion I would like to make a few comments. His suggestion, in support of 544 B. C. being date of the Buddha's demise, that Gautama Indrubhūti and Gautama the Buddha are identical, is incorrect. They were different personalities. One was the Gaṇadhara or Explainer of Mahāvīra's preachings, while the other was the founder of Buddhism. One died at Guṇāvā in. Rājagraha at the age of ninety two, 12 years after the attainment of salvation by Mahāvīra, while the other died at Kusınārā at the age of eighty and attained nibbāna.

In the light of the aforesaid evidences we can now conclude that the most probable date of the birth of Buddha therefore, is 624–623 B. C. We make this deduction as he is supposed to have lived for 80 years, as he himself says in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* before his death that he was of 80 years of age (aṭhītitaro me vayo vattati). Thus the date of the Buddha's parinırvāṇa may be decided at 544 B. C. (624-623 B. C.—80 = 544—543 B. C.).

APPENDIX 11

Buddhist Councils

The Buddha's parinibbāna was a critical moment for the Dhamma and its followers. How the Buddha's teaching could be preserved for the future, was a problem for his prominent disciples. Some disciples, like Subhadda[1], felt that, with the death of the Buddha, they could interpret the Dhamma according to their own wishes. This attitude was viewed with alarm by the more loyal and erudite disciples who immediately thought of summoning a council where the word of the Buddha could be established and where steps could be taken for its preservation and propagation. The task assigned to this Council was to decide the Dhamma and Vinaya of the Buddha[2].

Arrangements were made for this to be held at Rājagaha, near the Saptaparṇi cave under the presidency of Mahākassapa commencing from the second month of the Vassāva season, i. e. in the fourth month after the Buddha's death[3]. Five hundred Arhat bhikkhus participated in it. Ānanda[4], who was yet a śaikṣa, attained arhathood (*asaikṣa*) just on the eve of the Council, and he played a prominent part in the establishment of the texts of the Sutta Piṭaka.

The decisions at this Council were not altogether unanimous. For instance, Gavāṁpati, a senior arhat of the time, abstained from approving or disapproving the decisions of the Council, while Pūraṇa denounced the Council's decisions and urged the incorporation of the seven Vinaya rules[5]. Whatever that may be, the accounts of Gavāmpati and Pūraṇa indicate the germs of schism in the order even at that early date. R. C. Majumdar says "This was a danger signal for the Church."[6]

The **sources** of the First Council are (i) The *Cullavagga*, XI, of the *Pāli Vinaya*, (ii) The *Dīpavaṃsa*, (iii) The *Mahāvaṃsa*, (iv) Buddhaghosa's introduction to the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, (v) *Mahābodhivaṃsa*, (vi) *Mahāvastu*, (v) *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, (vi) The Tibetan sources :—Bu-ston's Chos. Bbyung (History of Buddhism), translated into English by Obermiller, and Taranatha's History of Buddhism, (vii) Chinese sources but derived from the Sanskrit sources : The Vinaya of Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptas, Mahāsaṅghikas, Sarvāstivādins, Kāśyapa saṃgītisūtra (Kai-ye-kie-king), Aśokāvadāna (A-yu-wang-king), Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, Parinirvāṇa-sūtra, and Hiuen Tsang's Record of western countries.

As regards the **authenticity** of the First Council, the Russian savant I. P. Minayeff[7] appears to be the first to investigate and establish the historicity of the event in 1887. Oldenberg refuted his opinion in 1898 and said that the First Council was nothing but pure fiction. His argument is that Subhadda's account is referred to in the *Cullavagga* and *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, (*Dīgha*. 2. 3) but the latter is silent about the Council. This silence, according to him, "is as valuable as the most direct testimony : it shows that the author of the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* did not know anything of the First Council. "He then concludes that it is not a fact, "but pure invention, and moreover an invention of no very ancient date."[8]

Rockhill reviewed Oldenberge's view in 1884 on the basis of Tibetan sources and remarked that "the authenticity of the council of Rājagaha has been doubted on insufficient grounds[9]. But T. W. Rhys Davids seems to have uphelp Oldenberg's view. He says "The conclusion drawn by oldenberg is atleast the easiest and readiest way of explaining the very real discrepancy that he has pointed out[10]. R. O. Franke declares emphatically against the First Council that "the two accounts in the *Cullavagga* xi, xii, are but air-

bubbles."[11] Among later scholars, Sukumar Dutta expresses his view thus—"The account of the First Council is only a legend of this invented character, seizing, as a peg to hang on, the Subhadda story in the *Mahāparinibbāna* narrative[12].

But all these views are one-sided and based on merely the absence of any reference to it in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*. As a matter of fact, the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* is concerned with the account of the Buddha's parinibbāna and not the history of the Order. The *Vinaya*, of course, is related to the history of the Buddhistic order and therefore an account of the First Council has a legitimate place in it. Likewise the *Dīpavaṃsa* mentions the First Council, but not Subhadda's account. Tibetan Dulva also does the same.

Fīnot[13] pointed out that chapters XI and XII of the *Cullavagga*, which contain an account of the two councils, have such an abrupt beginning unlike the other chapters of the *Cullavagga* that they could not have been originally a part of this work. He further points out that the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* also differs from the other Suttas of the *Dīghanikāya* in the nature of its contents, being more historical in character, and that the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* and the two chapters (XI, XII) of *Cullavagga* are so similar in nature that they must have been originally parts of one and the same work. In support of this contention of his, he refers to a work entitled *Saṃyuktavastu* (Nanjio 1121), the Vinaya of the *Mūla-Sarvāstivādins*, which contains the account of both *parinibbāna* and the *Councils*, and concludes therefrom that the Theravādins too had a work corresponding to the *Saṃyukta-vastu*, and that it was disembered at a later date by the ancient editors of Nikāyas and Vinaya[14].

Obermiller[15], Poussin[16], Prazyluski[17] also support the authenticity of the First Council Jacobi urged that it was not essential for the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* to go out of its way to describe the Council. He then remarked that mere *argumentum ex silentio* cannot be accepted against the historicity of the First council.[18]

Assessing the different views of scholars regarding the authenticity of the First Buddhist Council of Rājagaha, we find that no reliable evidence is available to reject its validity. The Gavāṁpati and Pūraṇa accounts contain the parts of the Buddha's teaching which they accepted. We cannot therefore think of it as a pure invention. Thus all accounts favour the acceptance of the First Council as a historical event.

As regards its cotribution to the evolution of the Pāli Canon, it is, however, difficult to accept the traditional conception, which asserts that the whole Dhamma and Vinaya were recited in the First Council. The *Sumagaṅlavilāsini*[19] further adds that not only *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*, but also the *Abhidhamma* was finalised in this very Council. How was it possible to compile the whole of the *Sutta* and *Vinaya* along with the *Abhidhamma* within about two months ?

Poussin is inclined to thihk that the Council could not but be regarded as an enlarged *Pātimokkha* assembly.[20]

Minayeff asserts that the accounts of the Council contain two clearly distinguishable parts, of which the one that speaks of the compilation of the Canon must belong to a period posterior to the rise of the sects.[21] Nalinaksa Dutt is of opinion that the Council was summoned to decide the less important rules of discipline (khuddakānukhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni), which were sanctioned by the Buddha himself.[22]

The *Dīpavaṁsa* presents a more probable aocount : "The Bhikkhus composed the collection of Dhamma and Vinaya, by asking the Thera called Ānanda regarding the Dhamma. There Mahākassapa and the great teacher Anurudha, Thera Upāli of powerful memory, and learned Ānauda, as well as many other distinguished disciples who had been praised by the Buddha....made this council." Here the Dhamma and Vinaya mean selected groups of the original Suttas and doctrines, not the whole present *Pāli Tipiṭaka.*

(b) The Second Council

Hundred years after the death of the Buddha (vassasata-parinibbute Bhagavati), the Second Council was held in

Vesālī to recite again the Dhama and the Vinaya. Seven hundred monks participated in this council. It is also therefore called Saptasatikā.

The accounts of the Second Council

The accounts of this council state that Yasa Thera was shocked when he came to know about the relaxing of monāstic rules and the acceptance by some monks of the ten heretical practices *(dasa vatthūni)*[23]. But as Yasa Thera opposed them, he was excommunicated *(paṭisāraṇīyakamma)*. Yasa then went in search of monks who would agree with his views. He further tried to bring the dispute to a peaceful end. For this purpose a Council was summoned at Vesāli in *Vālikārāma* under the presidency of Thera Revata. All these ten points were considered unlawful according to tradition. This council lasted eight months during which the Dhamma and Vinaya were discussed. The heretical monks then arranged a separate council called Mahāsaṁgīti making a different redaction of the Canonical literature.[24]

Main Sources

The main sources of the second council are : (1) the cullavagga of the Vinayapiṭaka, (ii) *Dīpavaṁsa*, (iii) Mahāvaṁsa, (iv) *Samantāpāsādikā*, (v) Hiuen Tsang's Record of Western countries (vi) Tibetan Dulva, Tārānātha's Geschichted's Buddhismus in Indien, ubersetz von Schifener, and other Chinese sources such as Fa-hian and Hiuen-Thsang's records. These sources differ in some respects, but the *Cullavagga's* record is the oldest one and the others appear to be based on it.

Historicity of the Council.

The historicity of this council is now accepted unanimously by the scholars. Kern raised an objection saying "We could not discover in these accounts anything but dogmatic fictions for which didactic mythical stories of older times have furnished the materials[25]. But in another work he altered his conception stating "The council on Vinaya in Vaiśālī has

historical base."[26] Oldenberg, who denied the First Council, accepted the Second Council. He says : "It is an account, which with all its pedantic snatching after trifles, bears the stamp of being in the highest degree trustworthy.[27]

It should be noted here that the debatable points were settled after discussions, most probably on the basis of some authoritative works. But Majumdar is of the view that the present Vinaya could not have been compiled before the Second Council was held, or otherwise the dispute over the monastic rules could not have arisen among the monks at that stage.

We are inclined to accept the traditional view that both the Dhamma and the Vinaya were recited at the Vesālī Council. The Dhamma comprises the Nikāyas which are the earliest and most reliable sources of the Buddhist doctrines. Whether any finality was reached regarding the structure and contents of the Piṭakas ar not, we may not be able to decide due to the lack of necessary evidence available to us. But it is most unlikely that a Council summoned to settle a dispute in monastic Order, which was threatening the unity of the Buddhist Order, was concluded without a review of the body of doctrines preserved by the monks.

The Third Council

Up to the time of Aśoka Buddhism became very popular and easier to follow than the original teachings of Buddha. It is said that the heretics in monk's robes used to live in Buddhist monasteries and preach their own dhamma in the name of Buddhism. Under such circumstances the monastic rules were slackened and the Uposatha and the Pavāraṇā could not be held for about seven years. The Great king Aśoka somehow came to know of this corruption among the Buddhist monks and then sent a religious officer to conduct *Uposatha* and *Pavāraṇā* ceremony. He found that some bhikkhus failed to carry out the king's order. He then cut throats of several monks. Aśoka was much disturbed by this Moggaliputta, Tissa, however, came into contact with Asoka and a solution was found.

This was the background for the third council held in Pāṭaliputra under the presidency of Moggaliputta Tissa. It is referred to in the *Dīpavaṃsa*, *Mahāvaṃsa* and Samantapāsādikā. It is recorded in the Tibetan Dulva and some Chinese sources too. But the *Cullavagga* does not give an account of the third Council. Asoka's inscriptions also make no reference to it.

Historicity of the Council

Some scholars like Minayeff, Keith, Franke, etc. deny its historicity. Their main argument is that it is not mentioned in the *Cullavagga*, one of the earliest scriputures and in the Asoka's inscriptions. Keith, for example, says : "It is incredible that it ever took place without receiving some mention in the numerous records of Asoka "[28] In the Buddhist Philosophy he says : "the only verdict of scientific history must be that the council was a figment of the pious or fraudulent imaginings of a sect, which desired to secure for its texts, and espcially for the new *Abhidhamma*, a connection with the greatest Buddhist sovereigns, and that the northern tradition does well to ignore the Council entirely."[29] He even thinks of Tissa in a "Suspicious aspect."[30]

As regards the absence of any record in Asoka's inscriptions, it can be said that Asoka would have preferred to attach the name of Moggaliputta Tissa to this council since it was the result of his invaluable efforts. Asoka was only the supporter and provider of the purpose.

Actually some of his edicts indicate that this Council did take place. In one of his edicts, for example, King Asoka decrees that heretical monks and nuns shall be excommunicated.[31] G. C. Pande rightly suggests that Asoka might not have been "as intimately connected with the Council as the Pāli tradition would have us believe."[32]

It was only the *Vibhajjavādins* or the *Theravādins* who attended this Council. A rift in the Buddhist order took place after the Second Council and by the time of Asoka it was divided into eighteen sects[33], which were refuted by Vibhajjavādins in this great Council.

Thus on the basis of above literary as well as inscriptional evidences, we cannot deny the historicity of the Third Council held in Pāṭaliputra under the presidency of Moggaliputta Tiss.

Other Councils

Other Councils also were summoned for various purposes at different times. The Fourth Council was held under the auspices of Kaniṣka in about 100 A. D. According to the *Mahāvaṁsa* and *Other Ceylonese* traditions, three Councils were held in Ceylon. The *First* was held during the reign of king *Devānampiya Tissa* (247-207 B. C.) under the presidency of the Venerable Ariṭṭha Thera. The *Second* Council was held during the time of King Vattagamini Abhaya (about 101-77 B. C.) under the presidency of Mahāthera Rakkhita and the Canon was reduced to writing. It was held at the Alu-Vihara in the village of Matale in Ceylon. The *Third* Council was conducted in 1865 at Ratnapura in Ceylon under the presidency of the Venerable Hikkaduve siri Sumangala. Two Councils have been held in Thailand (Siam). Some Councils were summoned in Burma too. The so-called *Fifth* Council held in Mandelay is very important, as the text of the Canon fixed at this Council was engraved on marble slabs which for the last so many years had proved to be the most reliable record of the Buddhist Canon. The *Sixth* Buddhist Council was inaugurated in May 1954 in Rangoon with the collaboration of the various countries of the Buddhist world.

APPENDIX III

The Concept of Omniscience In Buddhism

The Buddha is said to have declaimed omniscience in the sense of knowing everything at once and all the time as claimed by Nātaputta[1], though he never denied the possessing of supernatural power. The Buddha himself said that he had a three-fold knowledge (*tisso vijjā*). He has remarked that "those who say that the Recluse Gotama is omniscient and all-seeing and professes to have an infinite knowledge and insight, which is constantly and at all times present to him, when he walks or stands, sleeps or keeps away—are not reporting him properly and misrepresent him as claiming what is false and untrue." On being asked how he could be reported correctly in this matter, he replied "in proclaiming that the Recluse Gotama has a three-fold knowledge" (*tisso vijjā*)[2]. It is said therefore that whatever is well-spoken is the word of the Buddha (*yam kiñci subhāsitām, taṁ tassa bhagawato vacanaṁ*).[3]

The very familiar *Abhiññā* in Buddhist literature has an "older and wider meaning of special supernatureal power of a perception and knowledge to be acquired by training in life and thought.[4] "It has been interpreted as the following six powers called Chalābhiññā attained by the Buddha[5] :

(i) *Iddhividha* (psychokinesis).

(ii) *Dibbasotadhātu* (clairaudience).

(iii) *Cetopariyañña* (telepathic knowledge).

(iv) *Pubbenivāsānussatiñāna* (retrocognitive knowledge).

(v) *Dibbackkhu* (clairvoyance) also known as cutupapātañāna (*D.* i, 82) or knowledge of decease and survival of beings, and

(vi) *Āsavakkhayañāna* (knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses).

All these six powers have a close relation with the five knowledge of Jainism. The first two are similar to *Matijñāna* and *Śrutajñāna*. The fourth and the fifth correspond to *Avadhijñāna*, the third to *Manaḥparyaya jñānā*, and the last to *Kevalajñāna* of the Jainas.

On the basis of possessing the *Pubbenivāsānussatiñāna* and *Dibbacakkhu*, the Buddha claimed to see and know the decease and survival of beings and their karmas.[6] Anuruddha, who is said to have attained the *dibbasotādhātu*, is believed to have the power of "seeing a thousand worlds."[7] All the characters of these two *abhiññas* resemble the *avadhijñāna* of Jainism.

Manaḥparyayajñāna corresponds to *Cetopariyañana* in Buddhism. The general and particular characters of another's mind can be known through this jñāna. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* gives four ways by which another's thoughts can be known viz. (i) by observing external signs (*nimittena*), (ii) by getting information from others or from an intermediate source, (iii) by listening to the vibration (*vipphārasaddam*) of the thoughts (*vitakka*) of another as he thinks and reflects (*vitakkāyato vicārayato*), and (iv) by comprehending with his mind the mind of another and observing how the mental dispositions are placed in the mind of a particular individual (*manosaṅkhāra panihita imassa antara*) on the part of one who has attained the state of concentration free from cognitive and reflective thought (*avitakkaṁ avicāraṁ samādhiṁ*). Here the third and the fourth seem to be identical with *ṛjumati* and *vipulamati* of *manaḥparyayājñana*.[8]

The sixth *abhiññā* *Āsavakkhayañāna* is a knowledge acquired for the destruction of defiling impulses. *Ātmajñāna*[9] (*attanāvā jāneyyātha*) is essential for destroying the impulses and then for the attainment of salvation[10]. The Buddha is also called the *ñānavādin* in the *Nikāyas*[11]. The power of knowing and Perceiving everything (*jānāti passata*) is a distinguishing

characteristic of the Buddha[12]. This knowing and perceiving is connected with the Four Noble Truths (*ariyasaccāni avecca passati*[13]). After being eliminated the five impediments (*pañcanīvaraṇepahāya*[14]) the Buddha is said to have known and perceived the Four Noble Truths with the last three *abhiññas*. He knows "this is the truth of suffering, this is the cause of suffering, this is the cessation of suffering, and this is the path leading to the cessation of defiling of impulses [15]

The Buddha is one who has knowledge and insight into all realities (*sabbesu dhammesu ca ñānadassī*),[16] which can be comprehended by mental concentration (*samādhi*). Through this insight the Buddha could know that Sunakhatta would die after seven days, and that of epilepsy and on dying he would be reborn as one of the Kalakanjas, the very lowest of the Asura groups[17]. Once when the bhikkhus were conversing in his absence, he was able to say that they hed been discussing[18]. In the *Kevaddha Sutta* he is said to have claimed to answer a quesion which even Brahma was ignorant of[19].

All these references indicate that because of some short of insight the Budddha could know and perceive things. He is said to have a three-fold knowledge (*tisso-vijjā*),[20] six intellectual powers (*cha imāni.........Tathāgatabalāni*),[21] ten intellectual powers (*dasa balāni*)[22] and so forth. He is therefore considered sometimes an omniscient. Keith refers to a passage from the *Aṅguttaranikāya*[23] where the Buddha is compared to a granary, whence men every good word, and points out the same view.[24]

These are the negative references to the Buddha's omniscience. They have been the stepping stones to establish omniscience positively in the Buddha in later Pāli as well as Buddhist philosophical literature. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* says in this respect that the Tathāgata's omniscience consists in knowing everything conditioned and unconditioned, and also knowing everything in the past, present and future.

Further it tries to prove omniscience in the Buddha, and says that 'he knows everything that has seen heard, sensed, thought, attained, sought and searched by the minds of those who inhabit the entire world of gods and men.[25] "Likewise, the Kathāvatthu describes the two epithets *"sabbaññu"* (omniscient) and *"sabbadassāvi"* (all-seeing) as occurring in a list of eight epithets of the Buddha.[26]" As a matter of fact, the Buddha never claimed himself to be omniscient. His discipline explained his supernatural power or threefold knowledge as omniscience and supplemented some references to establish it in the Buddha at the compilation of the *Tripiṭaka*, especially the Abhidhamma. This happened so because of *saddhā* or faith and *bhatti* or devotion in the Buddha.

The Pāli Canon refers to saddhā as synonymous with *bhatti* (devotion), *pema* (affection) and *pasāda* (propitiousness) or *appreciation*[27]. The *Milindapañha*[28] and the *Aṭṭhasālinī*[29] show that the *saddhā* has two characters, appreciation (*samupasādanālakkhaṇa*) and endeavour (*samupakkhandanālakkhaṇa*). Datta observes that *"saddhā* carries two distinct meanings (1) one is faith (*pasāda*) producing *pīti* (pleasure), and (2) the other is self confidence proving vīrya (energy)[30]. Likewise, Jainism *śraddā*[31], *bhakti*[32], *anurāgā*[33], *sevā*[34], and *vinaya*[35] are said to be indentical words.

The conception of *Dammañāna* (knowledge of *ariyasaccāni*) in the Buddha was gradually developed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Dharmakrīrti supports this view that the Buddha was a *Dharmajña* as well as *Mārgajña* in the sense that he was knower of *Caturāryasatya*, but he did not deny the omniscience of the Buddha. He said that spiritual knowledge should be recognised as an essential element of a Teacher.[36]

Prajñākaragupta, a disciple of Dharmakīrti further observes that omniscience is possible, if one has destroyed all worldly attachments. This requires great effort.[37]

Śāntarakṣita emphasises sarvajñatva more than *Dharmajñatva*. He says that an omniscient being can know everything that he intends to know, since he has already destroyed all the obstructions of knowledge[38]. He then refutes the view of Kumārila, and establishes complete omniscience in the Buddha. The later Buddhist Philosophers followed Śāntarakṣita's view.

In the sixth century B. C. omniscience was considered one of the essential characteristics of a Teacher or Prophets. The Buddha criticised this view and said that no one can know and perceive everything at once. But his disciples were anxious to give their teacher a position of greater recognition, and gradually went on to establish the theory of the perfect omniscience of the Buddha on the basis of the superhuman powers. There is no doubt that this was done with a view to stand the Buddha in the line of other Prophets.

NOTES

APPENDIX 1

The Date of Buddha

1. *IA.,* 1914, pp. 126.
2. *Introduction to the Dhammapada, SBE.,* pp. xliii-xlvii.
3. *Book of Indian Eras,* p. 34.
4. *Vinaya Piṭaka, SBE.,* Vol. xlll. p. 28.
5. *Political History of India,* p. 227.
6. *Kern, Buddhism,* 11. p. 63.
7. *Āgama aura Tripiṭake : EKa Anuśīlana,* P. 114.
8. *Journal Asialique,* 1900, pp. 316; Eng. trans. by J. M. Seneviratne, *JRAS* (Ceylon Branch), Vol. xxiv., No. 68, pp. 82-102.
9. "*Date of the Buddha's of Ceylon from a Chinese Source*", *JRAS,* 1911, pp. 1142-1144.
10. *Epigraphia Zeylanica,* Vol. 1. pp. 79-80, 122-124, 155-157.
11. *Mahāvaṃsa,* intro. pp. xxii.
12. *JRAS.* (Ceylon Branch), 1914, Vol. xxxiii, No. 67, p. 143.
13. Dve satāni ca vassāni aṭṭhārasa vassāni ca. Saṁbuddhe parinibhūte abhisiṭṭo piyadassano. *Dīp.,* vi. 1.
14. Jinanibbānato paccā purā tassābhisekato. Satthārasaṁ vassasatadvayaṁ evaṁ vijāniyaṁ. Mahā Vaṁsa. v. 21.
15. *Dīp.,* v. 10(; *Mahā* , v. 16-18.
16. *Dīp.,* vi. 21-22; *Mahā.,* v. 22.
17. Smith, V. A; *The Early History of India,* pp. 38-9. Roychaudhuri accepts 323 B. C.
18. *ERE.,* 1. pp. 260-261.
19. *Book of Indian Eras,* pp. 34-5.
20. Ulien's *Hwen Thsang,* 11,335.
21. *Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms,* translated by Giles. C. vii.

22. *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, Vol. 1. p. 155 & p. 123; *See* also *Galvihara Inscription of Polonnaruwa*, 11. 1-4 (Ed. Muller, *Ancient Inscription of Ceylon*, pp. 87. 120).
23. Hultzsch, *South Indian Inscription iii.* no. 27, p. 53; Epigr. Zeyl. pp. 80, 155.
24. Geiger, *Mahāvaṁsa*, intro. p. xxix.
25. *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. xviii. Nos. 3 & 4, pp. 131.
26. *Epigraphia Zelanica*. Vol. 1. pp. 79-80, 122-124, 155-57.
27. *The date of Buddha's death and Ceylon chronology*, *JRAS*. Vol. xxiii. No. 67, 1914, pp. 143.
28. *Ibid.*, P. 253.
29. *Contribution to Sinhalese chronology*, JRAS. 1913, p, 517-531.
30. *JRAS.*, (Ceylon Branch), Val. xxiii. No. 67, 1914.
31. *IA.*, Vol. xi. 1882, p. 246 (for the particulars about Indrabhūti Gaṇadhara).

APPENDIX 11

Buddhist Councils

1. Alaṁ āvuso, ma socittha, ma paridevittha, Samuttā mayaṁ tena mahāsamaṇena, upaddutā ca homa, idaṁ vo kappati idaṁ vo na kappati. idāni pana mayaṁ yaṁ icchissāma taṁ taṁ karissāṁ. yaṁ na icchissāṁ taṁ na karissāṁ. *Dīghanikāya*, Mahāparinibbāna-Sutta ; *Vinaya Piṭaka*, Culla, Pañcasatika Khandhaka.
2. Pure adhamo dippati, dhammo paṭibāhīyati. avinayo dippati. 3. *Mahāvaṃsa.*, ii 2.2
4. There is no unanimity regarding to inclusion of Ānanda in the First Council. See, *Le Councile de Ragaha*, p. 225.
5. Prof. La Valiee Poussin has traced some of these rules in the *Mahāvagga* (vl. 17-19 20). Pūraṇa says "The dhamma and the Vinaya have been well sung by the Theras. Nevertheless, even in such manner

as it has been heard by me from the mouth of the Blessed One, in that manner will I bear it in memory." *Vinaya Piṭaka*, iii.341-Culla, XL. i. i., quoted by S. Dutta in The Buddha and Five After Centuries, p. 103.

6. *Buddhistic Studies*, p. 44.
7. *Recherches sur le Bouddhisme*, 1887, translated from Russian into French by R. H. Assier de Pompognan, 1824.
8. *Buddhistische Stuaien*, ZDMG, 1898, pp. 613 ; Introduction to the *Vinayapiṭaka*, Vol. 1.xxv-xxix.
9. *The life of the Buddha*, p. vii.
10. General introduction to the *Buddhist Suttas, SBE*. Voi. XL. p. xiii.
11. *J. P. T. S.*, 1908, pp. 1-80.
12. *The Buddha and Five After Centuries*, p. 102,
13. *IHQ.*, Viii. pp. 241-6.
14. *Early Monastic Buddhism*. N. Dutta, Vol. 1. p. 337.
12. *IHQ.*, VIII. pp. 781-4.
16. *Le Mouseon*, VI. pp. 213-323, tr. into English in the *Indian Antiquary*, 1908 ; See also *ERE.*, sv. Councils.
17. *Le council de Rajagṛha*, by Jean Przyluski.
18. *Z.DMG.*, Vol. xxxiv ; 1880, pp. 184 ff.
19. Tata anantaraṃ-dhammasaṅgaṇi-vibhaṅgañca, kathāvatthuñca Puggalaṃ, Dhātu-yamaka-paṭṭhānaṃ, abhidhammāti vaccati. Evaṃ samvaṇṇitaṃ sukhamayānagocaraṃ, taṃ saṃgāyitva idaṃ abhidhammapiṭakaṃ nāmāti vatvā pañca-arhantasatāni sajjhāyamakansu. Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, Nidānakathā.
20. 2 Cf. *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. 1. p. 339.
21. *Recherches Sur le Bouddhisme*, pp. 35-36.
22. *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Vol. 1. p. 339.
23. *Mahāvaṃsa*, 5.

The Tibbetan and Chincse accounts give a quite difierent reason. They relate this dissension with Mahādeva's dogmas, which are as follows :

(i) An Arhat may commit a sin by uncounscious.

temptation. (ii) One may be an Arhat and not know it. (iii) An Arhat may have doubts on matters of doctrine. (iv) One cannot attain Arhatship without a teacher., and (v) The noble ways may begin by a shout, that is one meditating seriously on religion may make such an exclamation as how sad ! How sad ! and by so doing attain progress towards perfection—the path is attained by an exclamation of astonishment.—2500 years of Buddhism, p. 98.

24. *Dīpavaṃsa*, 5.30 foll. names it Mahāsaṁgīti, while the *Mahāvaṃsa*, 5. 3-4, calls it Mahāsāṅghika.
25. *Historic du Bouddhisme Dans*, 1. Indc : *Buddhistic Studies*, p. 26.
26. *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 109.
27. Introduction to the *Vinayapiṭaka*, p. xxix.
28. *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, Vol. 11. pp. 265-6.
29. *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 19. 30. *Ibid.*
31. Hultzsch, E., *Inscriptions of Ashoka*, ; *Corpus Inscription Indicarum*, Vol 1. Oxford, 1925, pp. xliii. ff; p. 160. No. 5.
32. *Studies in the Origin of Buddhism*, p. 8.
33. The Vajjiputtakas established the Mahā-Sāṅghika sect in the Second Council. It was divided later on into five sects and become six, Viz. Mahāsāṅghika, Ekabbohārika, Gokulika, Paññattivādi, Bāhulika, and Cetiyavādi.

APPENDIX III

The Concept of Omniscience In Buddhism

1. *M.* i. 529; ii. 31; *Buddhist Legend* (*Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*), Vol. 29. p. 7[illegible].
2. *M.* i 482.
3. *A.* iv. 164.
4. *PTS.* Dictionary.
5. *D.* i. 83.

6. So dibbene cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena satte passati cavamāne upapajjamāne hine panīte suvanne dubbanne sugate duggate yathā-kammupage. *D.* i 82.
7. *M*. i. 213.
8. A. i. 170-171; *Early Buddhist theory of Knowledge* p. 440.
9. *A*. ii. 191.
10. *M*. i. 167.
11. *D*. iii. 12; *A*. i. 340.
12. *M*. i. 111.
13. *Sn*. 229.
14. *M*. i. 347.
15. So imaṁ dukkhaṃ dukkhaṃ ti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkhasamudayo ti.....ayaṃ āsavanirodhagāminipaṭipadā ti, *D*. i. 84.
16. *Sn*. 478.
17. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, iii. p. 12.
18. *ibid*. ii. p. 4.
19. *D*. i. 223.
20. Unlimited retrocognition, unlimited clatrovoyance, and knowledge of the destruction of the inflowing impulses, *M*. i, 482.
21. In addition to the three—fold knowledge: (i) the Buddha knows, as it really is, what is possibe as possible and what is impossible as impossible, (ii) the Buddha knows as it really is the effects according to their conditions and causes, of the performance of karma in the past, present and future, and (iii) the Buddha knows, as it really is, the corruption, perfection and arising from contemplative states of release, concentration and attainment, *A*. iii. 417.
22. In addition to the six rbhiññas the following four added: (i) The Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the mode of a life leading to all states, (ii) the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the world with its various and diverse elements, (iii) the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the various predilections of beings, and (iv) the Tathāgata knows, as it really is what goes on in the senses and faculties of other beings and individuals, M. i. 71. Vibhaṅga, 335-44. *Early Budelhist Theory of Knowleage.*

23. *A*. iv. 173 ff.; Smith, Aśoka, p. 154.
24. *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 33.
25. Sabbaṃ saṅkhataṃ asaṅkhataṃ anavassaṃ jānāti ti......atītaṃ......pacuppannaṃ sabbaṁ jānāti ti, Paṭisambhidāmagga, 131.
26. Kathāvatthu, 228.
27. *A*. iii. 165.
28. *Milindapañha*, 34.
29. *Aṭṭhasālinī*, 304.
30. Dutta, N., *Place of Faith in Buddhism*, IHO. Vol. 16, p. 639.
31. *Pāe-sadda-mahaṇṇava* Vol. in. p. 796 ; *Prakrita Vyākaraṇa* of Hemachandra. d. Pishel, Bombay, 1900, p. 159. Belief in the seven categories (saptatattvas) as ascertained in Jainlsm is called *Right* Belief (*Samyag-darśana*) which paves a way to attain salvation.
32. *Sarvārthasiddhi* ; 6.24.
33. *Yaśastilaka and Indian Cultnre*, p. 262, N. 3.
34. *Pāeaisaddamahaṇṇava*, Vol. iii. p. 796.
35. *Abhidhānarājendrakoṣī* Vol. X.
36. Heyopādeyatattvasya sabhyupāyasya vedakaḥ.
Yaḥ pramāṇamasīviṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ.
Brahm pasyatu vā na vā tattvamiṣṭaṁ tu paśyatu.
Pramāṇaṁ dūrdarṣi{cedeha gradhrānupasmahe.
Pv. 2.32-33.
37. Tato vītarāgatve sarvārtha jñānasambhaḥ punaḥ kālantare tesām sarvajña-gunarāgiṇām, alpayatnena sarvajñatvasiddhiravartta...PVA. p. 329.
38. Ydyadicchti boddhum va tattvavetti niyogataḥ. Śaktireyaṁ vidhā-hyasya prahıṇavarāṇo hyaso.
TS. 3628.

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1	4	Niganth	Nigaṇṭha
11	5	is birth	his birth
11	15	on the of river	on the bank of river.
26	6	Nignth	Nīgaṇṭha
38	1	anonical	Canonical
38	26	cannon	Canon
41	24	Othef Pramāriās	Other pramāṇays
46	14	Candelas	Chandelas
48	36	Tejapur	Terapur
59	27	Viññavada	Vijñānavāda
73	18	Know	Known
78	15	as	at
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179	26	Kṣaṇābhangavāda	Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda
179	30	sāntarakiṣata	Śāntarakṣita
185	26	Dunnaya	Durnaya
186	27	fn	in
187	20	Nayovada	Nayavāda
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